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 Preface 
 We are extremely happy to see  Austrian Economics Re-Examined in print. 
This is an expanded edition of  The Economics of Time and Ignorance , 
published by Routledge in 1996. The new edition contains many important 
additional features. There is a substantially updated Introduction that 
explains why, in our view, the book is more relevant than ever before. Perhaps 
most importantly, we are including the previously unpublished essay “What 
Is Austrian Economics?” Although this article is more of a survey than is the 
book, it was the basis from which we wrote the book. There is also the full text 
of the  New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics article “Austrian Economics: 
Recent Work,” fi rst published in 2009. Finally, we are including our largely 
self-contained responses to criticism we received at a session of the Southern 
Economics Association on November 19, 2011, that was held in recognition 
of the twenty-fi fth anniversary of the original Blackwell edition of the book. 
If  readers want to see the full symposium, it is contained in  The Review of 
Austrian Economics , 2013, vol. 26, issue 1. We are indebted to Professor David 
Harper of New York University for organizing this session. 
 We have also decided to create a website with recommendations for fur-
ther reading, photos and other material helpful for a further appreciation 
of the book. We are indebted to Professors Simon Bilo (Allegheny College) 
and Shruti Rajagopalan (Purchase College) for urging the construction of the 
website and for their invaluable help in gathering the relevant content. The 
site can be accessed at  http://timeandignorance.com . 
 We are also indebted to Anne Stubing of the C. V. Starr Center at New York 
University and various research funds generously made available by NYU for 
help in producing the manuscript for this book. We are also indebted to the 
H. B. Earhart Foundation for further fi nancial support. 
 Gerald P. O’Driscoll, Jr. 
 Mario J. Rizzo 
 March 2014 
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 A changing world 
 The world has changed tremendously since the fi rst Blackwell edition of 
the book in 1985, and since the Routledge edition in 1996. There have been 
very important changes in the economy and in the discipline of economics. 
Paradoxically, these have made our book much more relevant than it was. The 
changes in the external world and in the economics profession have destroyed, 
or at least seriously weakened, many of the taboos that used to dominate 
economic thought. The passage of time and the growth of knowledge 
combined to bring about a new era. 
 It used to be the case that questioning the static nature of competitive the-
ory was not fashionable, but clearly economists are more concerned now 
about dynamic issues. How could they not when innovations are springing 
up everywhere around us? The universal applicability of rigid and narrow 
axiomatic rationality assumptions (preference completeness, transitivity, and 
independence of framing, etc.) is under severe pressure from behavioral eco-
nomics. The questioning of these opens the door to a greater appreciation of 
the pragmatic nature of economic rationality and to the subjective interpret-
ation of economic “data.” We are also now permitted to question the intra-
personal stability of tastes. Economists are thus more willing to embrace the 
importance of change even at the level of the individual. 
 The fi nancial crisis of 2007–08 and the associated Great Recession were 
extremely important economic events that have had a still diffi cult-to-evaluate 
impact on economic thinking. The general revival of Keynesian thought dur-
ing the fi nancial panic and the Great Recession and its aftermath brought 
with it a renewed appreciation of the old Keynes-Hayek debate as it became 
obvious that Keynes and Hayek were the true antipodes on the fundamental 
macroeconomic issues. We were extremely interested in this in our book – as 
well as in those areas in which we believe Keynes had valuable things to say. 
 The importance of Knightian and radical uncertainty has not gone 
unnoticed by economists in view of the fi nancial crisis. We remember many 
neoclassical economists saying that the distinction between risk and uncer-
tainty is not very important. Situations could be modeled, they said, as if  
they were merely risky, especially in light of subjective probability. However, 
insofar as the riskiness of new asset forms were judged by the “stable” data 
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of recent history the possibility of structural change was ignored to the det-
riment of all. 
 The rule of law (a topic long of concern to Hayek) became an issue of 
renewed importance in understanding the policy response to the fi nancial 
crisis, the Great Recession and other problems. Increasingly critics worried 
about the violations of the rule of law in Federal Reserve policy, in TARP 
and in the auto bailout. 1 
 These developments naturally led to an accelerated appreciation of the 
importance of institutions. This was a development that had been gaining 
importance, perhaps ever since the work of Ronald Coase. But institutions 
become even more important – a matter of economic life or death – during 
rough patches. 
 Institutions cannot be fully understood except in the context of local know-
ledge, another Hayekian theme, as was seen in the still-limited recovery from 
Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans. 2 In a development-economics context, 
the neglected importance of local knowledge became a critical point in ana-
lyzing what critics believe is the overall failure of World Bank policies. 
 Thus, the shifting and dissolution of scientifi c taboos and the recognition 
of certain “Austrian issues” promoted by recent events, even when they are 
not recognized as Austrian, have given the ideas in the book new and height-
ened relevance. We believe that our ideas provide, in many cases, an alterna-
tive to the increasingly obvious poverty of standard approaches. 
 The plan 
 In this new introduction there will be two main parts. In the fi rst we sketch 
the impact of recent economic history on (mainly) the macroeconomic and 
monetary ideas that we sought to promote in this book. In the second we 
describe recent developments in behavioral economics that strengthen the 
case for our general approach. 
 I.  The impact of economic crises 
 The fi nancial crisis began with the Panic of  2007, and continued into 2008 
with multiple crisis events involving, among others, mortgage giants Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac; failed investment banks like Bear Stearns (bailed 
out) and Lehman Brothers (not bailed out); and many fi nancial fi rms whose 
solvency was in doubt at some point (e.g., Citigroup and Morgan Stanley). 3 
The Panic involved a great housing boom fi nanced by innovative fi nancial 
instruments. After the housing boom ended there was a crisis in housing 
fi nance involving actual or perceived insolvency of  fi rms at the center of 
housing fi nance. 
 The crisis occurred in the midst of a period known as the Great Moderation 
(Taylor,  2009 , pp. 34–46). It was a period in which the growth rates of mon-
etary aggregates moderated. Macroeconomic fl ow variables, like real GDP, 
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became less volatile. But it was also a period of a great expansion in the vel-
ocity of the M1 monetary aggregate. 
 The increase in velocity, or decrease in money demand, accompanied the 
rise of “shadow banking,” in which housing loans (and other bank lending) 
were securitized. Long-term debt, like home mortgages, was increasingly 
fi nanced by short-term credit, even overnight funding as was so famously the 
case with Lehman Brothers. A credit pyramid was erected upon a narrow base 
of bank money. The possession of Treasury securities or other eligible collat-
eral fi nanced transactions in repo (overnight repurchase agreements) markets. 
Gorton succinctly described the process. 
 Another important feature of repo is that the collateral can be rehypothe-
cated. In other words, the collateral received by the depositor can be 
used – “spent” – in another transaction, i.e., it can be used to collateralize 
a transaction with another party. Intuitively, rehypothecation is tanta-
mount to conducting transactions with the collateral received against the 
deposit. There is no data on the extent of rehypothecation. 
 (Gorton,  2010 , p. 44) 
 Traditional banking was increasingly being replaced by securities markets. 
Banks and thrift institutions continued to play a role in originating home 
mortgages (though origination was also done by mortgage companies). But 
they no longer held the mortgages, which were bundled with others and sold 
off  as securities. Information about the underlying risk of each mortgage was 
 Figure I.1  Velocity of M1 money stock 
 Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 2014 research. stlouisfed.org. 
1960 Q4 1970 Q4 1980 Q4 1990 Q4 2000 Q4










6 Introduction 2014: a changing world
lost in the process. Yet securitization only grew. Investment banks supplanted 
commercial banks, and repo markets grew in importance relative to the 
federal funds market. 
 During the crisis, the repo market dried up. But so, too, has the federal funds 
market. The Federal Reserve’s extraordinary monetary policy actions (quan-
titative easing or QE) have made it, and not interbank lending, the source of 
liquidity in banking. Today the Federal Reserve is increasingly operating in 
repo markets. 4 
 The conventional modern analysis of risk was challenged by these develop-
ments in fi nancial markets. The challenge has been analyzed in two, ultimately 
complementary, ways. One line of analytical criticism of standard risk models 
we will describe as immanent. It questions the properties of the distribution 
of risk. Standard risk analysis models risk with a Gaussian distribution. That 
is typically described as a normal or bell curve. The events in the recent fi nan-
cial crisis suggest “that fi nancial returns are not Gaussian – or even remotely 
so” (Dowd  et al .,  2011 , p. 14). 
 The Cauchy distribution is one “fat-tail” distribution, and it is reproduced 
here along with a normal distribution. The Cauchy distribution implies that 
“extreme losses are much more likely than under the Gaussian” (Dowd  et al ., 
 2011 , p. 14). How much more likely? In August 2007, Goldman Sachs’ CFO 
David Viniar stated that “we were seeing things that were 25-standard deviation 
moves, several days in a row.” 5 Dowd  et al . estimate that a single 25-standard 
 Figure I.2  Gaussian vs. Cauchy distribution chart 
 http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/M1V/ 
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deviation event should occur only once every 10 (to the 137th power) years. 
They conclude that “to be plausible, risk models need to be based on alterna-
tive distributions to the Gaussian” (Dowd  et al .,  2011 , p. 14). 
 Alternatively, one can view recent events as manifestations of Knightian 
uncertainty. Frank Knight argued there was (1) an absence of objective prob-
abilities and (2) an inability to list, or determine beforehand, the complete set 
of possible outcomes. Risk managers extrapolated recent history to model the 
riskiness of new types of complex and bundled securities, especially mortgage-
backed securities (MBS). In 2009, Edmund Phelps asked rhetorically, “why did 
big shareholders not move to stop over-leveraging before it reached dangerous 
levels? Why did legislators not demand regulatory intervention?” He went on:
 The answer, I believe, is that they had no sense of the existing Knightian 
uncertainty. So they had no sense of the possibility of a huge break in 
housing prices and no sense of the fundamental inapplicability of the risk 
management models used in the banks. “Risk” came to mean volatility 
over some recent past. The volatility of the price as it vibrates around 
some path was considered but not the uncertainty of the path itself: the 
risk that it would shift down. The banks’ chief  executives, too, had little 
grasp of uncertainty. Some had the instinct to buy insurance but did not 
see the uncertainty of the insurer’s solvency. 
 (Phelps,  2009 ) 
 The Knightian critique is more fundamental, since it questions whether 
there are discoverable distributions of risk in all instances. Knight certainly 
recognized that many risks are calculable. Modern risk analysis collapses 
Knightian uncertainty into quantifi able risk, and then assumes a normal 
distribution of risk. In the wake of the fi nancial crisis, each of those steps 
must be questioned. 
 When the housing boom went bust, economists of the Austrian school saw 
it as a textbook example of malinvestment ending in a crisis. The Austrian 
analysis built on that of classical political economy – as Mises, Hayek and 
others long emphasized (Mises  1966 , p. 204). Some fi nancial analysts, econo-
mists and members of the public acknowledged the applicability of Austrian 
analysis. Many members of the economics profession busily defended theor-
ies that neither predicted nor accounted for what had happened. 
 The most surprising thing, however, was that the public policy response 
was to fall back on crude versions of Keynesian income-expenditure mod-
els. Hoary myths of fi scal-expenditure multipliers greater than one were res-
urrected, in some cases by advisers to President Obama whose own work 
undermined such beliefs. Of such beliefs, Milton Friedman observed more 
than 50 years ago that “they are part of economic mythology, not the demon-
strated conclusions of economic analysis or quantitative studies” (Friedman, 
 2002 , p. 84). In the ensuing 50 years, a large body of economic research – eco-
nomic analysis and quantitative studies – debunked that mythology. Much 
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of the work was done by Friedman, his colleagues and students. As this is 
written, we have just passed the fi fth anniversary of the Obama “stimulus” 
program. No one, to our knowledge, has mounted a serious argument that it 
had concrete, measurable benefi ts. 
 An important conference put on in March 2009 by the Mont Pelerin Society 
focused on whether the Great Recession was best explained by Austrian eco-
nomic analysis or that of another school, Keynesian or otherwise. In a sem-
inal paper, Axel Leijohnufvud ( 2009 ) examined whether the downturn was 
one best analyzed by an income-expenditure model, i.e., in terms of economic 
fl ows. He concluded that it was not. Instead, he declared it to be a classic 
balance-sheet recession, and one best analyzed by Austrian analysis. 
 All of the macroeconomic policies implemented in the Great Recession 
ignored its character as a balance-sheet recession. When households and busi-
nesses are trying to restore their balance sheets and rebuild savings, creating 
massive new federal debt is counterproductive. But creating future tax obliga-
tions for households and businesses is precisely what the stimulus did. There 
were also other, deleterious microeconomic effects that put more of the bur-
den of adjustment on the private sector. Much of the federal spending went 
to prop up state government spending on public-sector workers. That forced 
the private sector to bear more of the adjustment costs. 
 Many chide Austrian economists for not having a positive policy to cushion 
against the effects of the Great Recession. They did have a policy. It was to 
facilitate and not to impede the adjustments in asset markets. 
 First, do no harm. The macroeconomic response was largely harmful. In 
the second half  of 2008, the Federal Reserve responded appropriately to pro-
vide more liquidity. After that, its various QEs were misbegotten. The econ-
omy was not suffering from a lack of liquidity, but the aftermath of a severe 
collapse in the prices of many assets. Financial institutions and other fi rms 
were insolvent, not illiquid. Additionally, the Federal Reserve policy of very 
low interest rates (negative in real terms) distorts capital allocation and cre-
ates new malinvestments. 
 Institutional reform? 6 
 Since the fi nancial crisis, the entire monetary and fi nancial system has 
come under increased scrutiny and criticism. 7 Relative to the recent past, 
the prospects for serious discussion of monetary reform are comparatively 
bright. 
 When discussing alternative reform proposals, the most basic distinction 
is between a regime of discretionary monetary policy and one governed by 
rules. It is diffi cult to conceive of a regime of pure discretion in which the 
monetary authority followed no rules or regularities in their actions. It would 
be a regime of pure randomness. 
 Axel Leijonhufvud ( 1984 , p. 23) proposed viewing the modern fi at money 
regime as “a random-walk monetary standard.” David Fand, ( 1989 , p. 325), 
elaborating on Leijonhufvud’s standard, said of the Federal Open Market 
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Committee’s decision-making process: “[T]he only rule governing this process 
is that, at each point in time, those who are responsible for monetary policy 
choose the convenient and expedient thing to do.” Fand’s is a minimalist con-
cept of rule-following behavior, and it is not unreasonable to designate such a 
regime as one of discretion. 
 The 100-year history of Federal Reserve policy is not an attractive one. 8 
Most studies of it start by writing off  the Great Depression. The two wartime 
experiences are treated as exceptional periods (with justifi cation). Periods of 
monetary stability get down to a relatively few years in the 1920s, the post-
Accord period in the 1950s, and the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s to 
the mid-2000s. In each period, the Fed was rule-bound, though the rules dif-
fered – in the 1920s, the Fed was governed by the modifi ed gold standard; in 
the 1950s there was a fi scal rule of balanced budgets (after the Korean War), 
imposed by President Dwight Eisenhower, a defi cit hawk; and in the Great 
Moderation the Fed appeared to be following what is now called the Taylor 
Rule – a self-chosen and self-enforced rule. 
 It is conventional for the Federal Reserve’s good performance to be attrib-
uted to the Treasury Accord of 1951 and the central bank’s newly achieved 
independence from the Treasury. Cargill and O’Driscoll ( 2013 , pp. 419–20) 
argue that the decade of the 1950s does not provide evidence that the Federal 
Reserve was independent, or that independent central banks provided super-
ior infl ation performance. Any central banker would have had a relatively easy 
job with the “Eisenhower Rule.” Once Eisenhower left offi ce, the long-time 
Federal Reserve chairman of that era, William McChesney Martin, was will-
ing to accommodate Kennedy-Johnson fi scal activism, and infl ation ensued. 
 The brief  periods of superior Federal Reserve performance support the 
fi ndings of rule-based models. Moreover, the three episodes suggest that there 
may be a variety of rules consistent with monetary stability: a gold or com-
modity standard, a fi scal rule, and a modifi ed monetarist rule. What is import-
ant is that a viable rule was in place. In each case, the rule constrained central 
bank policy-makers and helped insulate them from political pressures. 9 
 Rules enable central banks to operate in a way that may be described as 
independent. As Adam Smith and the classical economists observed, it is the 
natural tendency of governments to spend in excess of revenues. Good rules 
help a central bank resist political pressures to infl ate to pay for spending. 
Absence of a rule does not enhance, but rather erodes central bank independ-
ence (Cargill and O’Driscoll,  2013 ). 
 Public choice arguments are complemented by informational arguments. 
These were at the heart of the monetary work of both Milton Friedman and F. 
A. Hayek. They both argued that there are fundamental informational problems 
that render discretionary monetary policy impossible. Neither suggested that 
monetary policy actions had no effects. Quite the opposite. Both men believed 
that money had powerful impacts on the economy. But both argued we do not 
have suffi cient information about the structure of the economy and agents’ 
expectations to improve economic outcomes in a  systematic way. Friedman 
( 1961 ,  1968 ) summarized these arguments most cogently. A brief quotation from 
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an early monetary work of Hayek anticipates Friedman’s later, more thorough 
statement of the information problem. According to Hayek ( 1966 , p. 23), 
 The one thing of which we must be painfully aware at the present time … 
is how little we really know of the forces which we are trying to infl uence 
by deliberate management; so little indeed that it must remain an open 
question whether we would try if  we knew more. 
 We suggest, then, that the economic and fi nancial crisis should lead to a 
reconsideration of risk analysis. The concept of Knightian uncertainty would 
help explain the extraordinary events in fi nancial markets. Austrian monetary 
theory correctly characterized the credit-fueled housing boom, the accumu-
lation of malinvestments, and the character of the panic and fi nancial bust. 
The private sector, especially fi nancial fi rms and households, experienced a 
collapse in asset prices and the necessity of deleveraging. 
 Finally, the time is ripe for consideration of monetary reform. The monet-
ary regime is one of discretion, unconstrained by any rule except that of pol-
itical expediency. Federal Reserve offi cials and monetary economists trumpet 
central bank independence. Instead, the central bank has become an enabler 
of fi scal excess. It is de facto once again bound by Treasury policy. It is back 
to the pre-1951 Accord era. 
 II.  Challenge and opportunity of behavioral economics 
 Developments in behavioral economics over the past 30 years have provided both 
opportunities and challenges for Austrian economics. Behavioral economics is 
a curious mix of standard neoclassical economics and a fundamental critique 
of that economics. On the one hand, behavioral economics would be nowhere 
without standard economics. The research agenda seems to be to show why 
individuals do not behave in the way that standard models allegedly predict. 
In particular, behavioralists say people do not satisfy the standard rationality 
axioms for choice. These include a complete preference ordering that is 
consistent or stable over time, as well as transitive throughout the ordering. 
Experiments fi nd that the violation of these axioms is ubiquitous. On the other 
hand, they say that people  ought to satisfy these axioms (Berg and Gigerenzer, 
 2010 ). The axioms defi ne rational behavior. Behavioral economists accept the 
normativity of the standard conception of rationality. Indeed, their policy 
prescriptions involve various degrees of incentivizing people toward rational 
behavior as it has been formally defi ned. 
 It is important to note, however, that in the historical development of the 
rationality axioms, the primary motivation of economists was not to show 
that following these axioms was a welfare-imperative for the individual. They 
were developed mainly to place utility function analysis, both under condi-
tions of certainty and uncertainty, on a very general and abstract foundation. 
This was an effort to produce mathematical rigor rather than faithfulness to 
reality. They were not trying to isolate essential features of real individuals 
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who, by some consequentialist standard, behaved correctly. Yet behavioral 
economists and many standard economists treat these analytical, constitutive 
norms as if  they were prescriptions for well-being enhancing behavior. 
 In sharp contrast, the Austrian view of rationality has traditionally been 
of a minimalist sort. For example, Ludwig von Mises considers rationality 
to be synonymous with “human action” which is simply “purposeful behav-
ior” (Mises  1966 , p. 11). For our purposes, the details of Mises’ view are not 
important. What is important is that the Austrian conception opens the door 
to a pragmatic view of rationality. The individual’s purpose is to achieve his or 
her goals. The individual is interested in what works in the relevant context. 
 The challenge for Austrians is to contrast the standard and behavioral 
conception of rationality with the pragmatic (“praxeological”) view and to 
show the superiority of the pragmatic. The opportunity for Austrians is to 
encourage and participate in work that emphasizes the ecological rationality 
of behavior (Gigerenzer,  2008 ; Smith,  2008 ). Gerd Gigerenzer has developed 
an approach that conceptualizes heuristics as cost-saving methods of solv-
ing problems that are often superior to the application of formal systems of 
rational thought in the specifi c context in which individuals fi nd themselves. 
Vernon Smith has emphasized the institutional structures that have grown 
up in society which produce results that are superior to those that isolated 
individuals could produce. For example, certain types of auction markets can 
produce results consistent with competitive equilibrium even where the agents 
are not individually well-informed. 
 Closely related to the concept of pragmatic rationality is attention to the 
meaning of problem situations to the agents themselves rather than to econo-
mists or other analysts. Before we can talk about the rationality of particular 
cases or types of behavior we must understand what problem the agent is 
attempting to solve. The importance of interpretation has been a key element 
in the subjectivist form of analysis. It is quite evident in all the writings of 
the earlier Austrian economists, especially Carl Menger, Friedrich Wieser and 
Eugen von B ö hm-Bawerk. The characteristics of subjectivism were, however, 
most clearly elaborated in Hayek ( 1955 ). In Hayek’s analysis it is clear that 
before one can assess the conformity of individual decisions with rules it is 
important to understand the decisions subjectively:
 So far as human actions are concerned the things  are what the acting 
people think they are. … [T]he objects of economic activity cannot be 
defi ned in objective terms but only with reference to a human purpose … 
Unless we can understand what the acting people mean by their actions 
any attempt to explain them, i.e., to subsume them under rules which 
connect similar situations with similar actions, are [sic] bound to fail. 
 (Hayek,  1955 , pp. 27, 31) 
 A convenient and much-discussed example in the behavioral literature will 
illustrate both the challenge and the opportunity. It is known as the “Linda 
problem” (Tversky and Kahneman,  1983 ). Experimental subjects were given 
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the following description of  a hypothetical Linda: “Linda is 31 years old, 
single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, 
she was deeply concerned with issues of  discrimination and social justice, 
and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.” They were then asked 
to rank several propositions with respect to “probability” including the 
following three: Linda is active in the feminist movement (A); Linda is a bank 
teller (B); Linda is a bank teller and active in the feminist movement (A&B). 
Some 85 percent of  subjects,  including statistically sophisticated ones , rank 
A&B over B. This is considered an incorrect answer because the conjunction 
(A&B) is a narrower class than B. The class of   bank tellers contains the class 
of   bank tellers who are active in the feminist movement . So even if  Linda is 
a bank teller active in the feminist movement she is also a bank teller. Thus 
the “correct” answer does not depend  at all on the description provided of 
Linda. 
 An obvious question we should ask is: why are the experimental subjects 
being asked this question? The standard answer is to discover whether they 
know how to apply elementary principles of the probability calculus and, if  
they do not, to suggest an alternative explanation for their “defi cient” behav-
ior. The explanation most often given is that subjects are prone to a “repre-
sentativeness bias.” The description of Linda is representative of a feminist 
in many people’s eyes and thus they choose “bank teller active in the feminist 
movement” over “bank teller.” Subjects decide on the basis of a representa-
tiveness heuristic rather than on the basis of the rational principles of the 
probability calculus. Rationality, in this behavioral experiment, is equated 
with adherence to a particular formal system of thought. 
 We should note, however, that the experimenters here are not acting 
cooperatively. By not acting cooperatively we mean that they are not satisfy-
ing ordinary conversational norms and expectations (Grice,  1989 ). It is rea-
sonable for the subjects to expect that the information they are being provided 
is relevant to the correct answer. And yet it is not supposed to be. 
 One way in which the description provided will be relevant is if  the term 
“probability” – which has an extremely broad meaning in everyday life 10 – 
is interpreted as the degree to which a hypothesis is supported by the evi-
dence (Linda’s description). This is the approach taken by Isaac Levi ( 2004 , 
pp. 25–35). Such an interpretation is quite reasonable as it makes sense of the 
fact that the subjects have been presented with a description of Linda. Which 
of the two hypotheses (A&B or simply B), Levi asks, is given  additional sup-
port by the evidence – that is, relative to what a person would have thought 
without the description? Clearly: “Linda is a bank teller active in the femin-
ist movement” is the correct answer on this interpretation. The experimental 
subjects’ “rationality” has been rescued! 
 If  the subject looks at the problem in this way, then he or she has not inter-
preted the problem in the same way that the experimenters do. In a sense this 
is an obvious point for us. No Austrian would simply assume that there is 
no difference between the analyst’s perspective and the actor’s. Each agent 
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(experimenter and subject) has a particular perspective growing out of the 
context of his action. The experimenter is bringing a certain theoretical per-
spective to the situation. The subject is bringing a pragmatic perspective 
based on the ordinary norms of conversational expectation and the types of 
problems solved in everyday life. The theoretical and pragmatic perspectives 
are not the same (Gigerenzer and Hug,  1992 ). 
 Thus the behavioral economist’s analysis of the rationality of agents is hob-
bled by two factors: fi rst, the narrow limitation of rationality to adherence to 
a single kind of formal system – the probability calculus; second, the assump-
tion that individuals see the world the way the economist-analyst sees it. 
Interestingly, they are each failings that the behavioral economist shares with 
the standard neoclassical economist. The only difference is that the behav-
ioral economist believes that these biases against rationality are pervasive and 
signifi cant while the standard view is that they are not. 
 Regardless of whether the Linda problem has valuably pointed to a foi-
ble in human reasoning, certain points are clear. The interpretation of the 
agent is important and the correct solution depends on that interpretation. 
Rationality for economics should not be thought of as consistency with a for-
mal calculus of some sort. It is preeminently instrumental or pragmatic. This 
depends on the context as the agent sees it. 
 Another related area in which behavioral economists have created a stir is 
on the issue of whether logically equivalent framings of problems result in the 
same decisions. People may react differently, for example, to different descrip-
tions that are logically equivalent (Kahneman,  2011 , pp. 363–74). They may 
be more likely to take a medicine if  it is described as having a 40 percent ( p ) 
success rate than if  it is described as having a 60 percent (1 -p ) failure rate. If  
so, then the subjective interpretation of the frame determines the outcome. 
The inference drawn by behavioralists is that if  the mere description affects a 
person’s choice then he or she could not have had determinate mental prefer-
ences. Therefore, actual choice does not refl ect the improvement of welfare in 
terms of an underlying stable mental preference. This is interpreted as if  the 
decision is, to a large degree, arbitrary. 11 
 The problem for standard and behavioral economists is the same. They 
each ignore the broader context of human communication. Abstract logical 
criteria are not suffi cient to understand behavior either descriptively or nor-
matively. In general, logically equivalent statements used outside of logic 
classes or logic textbooks do not have the same semantic content. There will 
be “information leakage” from the selection of the particular frame, which, in 
turn, can be received by those who interpret the frame (Sher and McKenzie, 
 2006 ). 
 The act of selecting or interpreting a frame is part of the process by which 
the individual determines what is relevant to the decision at hand. Do the 
logically equivalent statements about success and failure of the medical treat-
ment mentioned above each convey the same information – are they informa-
tionally equivalent? In normal everyday contexts it appears that they are not. 
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McKenzie and Nelson ( 2003 ) show that people select and interpret the differ-
ent logically equivalent formulations when they are implicitly comparing the 
result relative to a norm or expected result. The  p -description is more likely 
when the framer is conveying that the survival data are better than might be 
expected; it may be better still since certain structural features in the world 
may have changed, or if  there is reason to believe that, in the case at hand, the 
degree of belief  in a successful result is greater than the statistical frequency. 12 
The selection of frame by one party is an informational message to the other 
party. 
 The study of human action and choice is not an exercise in applying abstract 
logical relations or identifying logical equivalences. Before the rationality 
of choice can enter the picture, both actors and analysts must attend to the 
 meaning attached to decision, to the objects of choice, to the ways in which 
choice is conceived or presented. This is part of a broader process of rational 
decision-making derived from the social context in which individuals act. 
 Framing is preeminently part of the  process of  rationality, that is, part 
of the process by which agents set up a decision problem in the fi rst place 
(Kirzner,  1973 ). At that point, and only relative to that point, can we assess 
the rationality of their behavior. 
 All of these themes are familiar to Austrians and to readers of  The 
Economics of Time and Ignorance . They have been made more relevant than 
ever before by the debates, challenges and opportunities generated by behav-
ioral economics. 
 Conclusions 
 Ideas among economists often change under the infl uence of external events 
and shifts in intellectual paradigms. Our purpose in this Introduction is to 
show how developments in these areas have made the message of our book 
more, not less, relevant to contemporary economic thought. We obviously 
have not examined in depth the ways in which Austrian ideas can now 
insinuate themselves in the broader intellectual discussion. That would require 
a different book. But as we emphasized in the last chapter, our purpose, then 
and now, is to encourage readers to add their own research projects to the 
time-and-ignorance agenda. 
 Notes 
 1  TARP is the “Troubled Asset Relief  Program” created in response to the 2008 fi nan-
cial crisis. For a discussion of the rule of law aspects of the program see Samples 
( 2010 ) and for a discussion of the auto bailout see Zywicki ( 2011 ). 
 2  Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast, including New Orleans, of the United States 
on August 29, 2005. It created property damage in excess of $125 billion and cost 
1,600 lives. Many areas have not fully recovered. However, those areas did best 
where local voluntary institutions and cultural ties were best able to mobilize local 
knowledge and incentives. See Chamlee-Wright ( 2010 ). 
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 3  See Gorton ( 2010 ). 
 4  See the Operating Policy of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York:  http://www.
newyorkfed.org/markets/opolicy/operating_policy_140304.html 
 5  As quoted in Dowd  et al . ( 2011 , p. 33, fn 18). 
 6  This section draws from Gerald P. O’Driscoll, Jr. ( 2014 ). 
 7  In November 2013, the Mercatus Center at George Mason University hosted 
a conference entitled “Instead of the Fed: Past and Present Alternatives to the 
Federal Reserve System.” That conference critically examined the historical per-
formance of the Fed, prospects for improving that performance, and possibilities 
for fundamental reform. Also in November,  Cato Unbound featured four essays 
on “The Federal Reserve at 100” (O’Driscoll  et al .,  2013 ). Additionally, the Cato 
Institute’s annual monetary conference in November 2013 examined alternatives 
to the current monetary regime. 
 8  My historical sketch is heavily infl uenced by Allan Meltzer’s verbal summaries 
of the results of his three-volume  History of the Federal Reserve. Friedman and 
Schwartz ( 1963 ) is also relevant. 
 9  We are not suggesting that  any rule suffi ces, merely that there may be multiple 
monetary rules that can produce macroeconomic stability. 
 10  See, for example, Gigerenzer  et al . ( 2005 ). 
 11  The interpretation could have normative signifi cance to the extent that it implies 
that we need not give such “arbitrary” choices any respect. 
 12  On the last point, Gigerenzer has emphasized the inappropriateness of simply 
applying relative frequencies to a single case. See Gigerenzer ( 1994 ). 
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 Part II 
 What is Austrian economics? 
 Prefatory note to “What is Austrian economics?” 
 This chapter, never before published, was presented at the 1980 Allied Social 
Sciences Association (ASSA) meetings in Denver, Colorado, September 
5–7. The session was entitled “Recent Developments in Economic Theory: 
Austrian Economics.” Both the location and time of year were experimental, 
which made for smaller than average attendance. The session was well 
attended, however, and was in the fi rst time slot at 8 a.m. on September 5. 
O’Driscoll attended and presented the paper. The paper was well received. 
Among those in attendance was Lord Lionel Robbins. He described the 
paper as “interesting,” which we were later told was, for him, a polite way of 
expressing disagreement. One got the impression that we were raising issues 
that he did not wish to revisit. 
 M. Bruce Johnson chaired the session. Other papers presented were 
“Intertemporal Coordination and Macroeconomic Stability” by Roger 
Garrison; and “The Moderate Quantity Theory” by J. Huston McCulloch. 
Mark Perlman, T. K. Rymes and Mack Ott were discussants. 
 About two months later Rizzo received a letter from Ren é Olivieri, with 
Basil Blackwell encouraging us to consider turning the paper into a book. We 
learned that Rymes had brought the paper to Olivieri’s attention. And that is 
how the book was born. 
 The chapter that follows was revised in October 1980, shortly after the 
September ASSA meetings. 
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 What is Austrian economics? 
 Although much has been written about modern Austrian economics in the 
past fi ve to seven years, relatively few economists understand the concerns, 
insights and importance of this once-forgotten school of economic thought. 
The Austrian tradition arises, of course, out of the work of Carl Menger, 
Friedrich von Wieser and Eugen von B ö hm-Bawerk. In more recent times, it 
has been self-consciously continued and developed by Friedrich A. Hayek, 
Israel M. Kirzner, Ludwig M. Lachmann, Ludwig von Mises and Murray 
N. Rothbard. Despite the rather small number of economists, at least until 
recently, who have explicitly worked within the Austrian tradition, some 
of the themes or elements of this school have worked themselves into 
the writings of prominent neoclassical thinkers (Hicks,  1976 ). Consequently, 
the ideas discussed in this paper may not seem entirely new. Nevertheless, the 
unique Austrian contribution lies in (1) the integration or unity of its themes 
and (2) the logical consistency with which they are pursued throughout all 
areas of economics. 
 The Austrian tradition is not a ready-made set of dogmatic answers to 
major theoretical questions or, still less, a set of policy prescriptions. Instead, 
it is a value-free way of looking at “the economic problem,” an orientation or 
a research program (Lakatos,  1970 ). Unfortunately, it is not a fully developed 
program, perhaps in part because of the great Keynesian diversion in the 
history of economic thought (Yeager,  1973 ). In any event, there has been a 
renewal of interest in this tradition due to Hayek’s 1974 Nobel Prize, the ster-
ility of much mathematical economics and the surge of interest in the micro-
foundations of macrotheory. The purpose of this paper then is to present an 
overall view of the Austrian research program as it can be developed through 
considering a number of important analytical themes. 
 The fundamental research policy, or “positive heuristic” (Lakatos,  1970 ), 
of Austrian economics is to render social phenomena intelligible in terms of 
individual purposes and plans (human action) (Lachmann,  1971 , p. 31). In this 
spirit, the founder of the tradition, Carl Menger, saw the basic questions of 
the social sciences as “… how can it be that institutions which serve the com-
mon welfare and are extremely signifi cant for its development can come into 
being without a common will directed toward establishing them?” (Menger, 
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 1963 , p. 146). As a statement of the purpose of economics, this is obviously 
quite broad. In terms of method as well, Austrians have generally considered 
economics to be a part of a wider social science, “praxeology” (Mises,  1966 , 
pp. 1–3). This is the purely formal discipline that investigates the implications 
of the self-evident fact that individuals engage in purposeful behavior. It is a 
pure logic of choice and therefore applicable to all areas of decision-making, 
not just those traditionally considered economics. International diplomacy, 
war, legal institutions and the family are some of the noneconomic social 
phenomena that can be understood praxeologically. As a consequence, the 
Austrian view is clearly in step with the spirit if  not the letter of the growing 
“imperialistic” movement of economics into many areas of social investiga-
tion (Becker,  1976 , p. 5). 
 An institution in Menger’s framework is any coordinated pattern of indi-
vidual interaction. A legal system is obviously an institution, but so are 
money and prices. How did it happen that many separate individuals came to 
agree on the use of a certain commodity as a medium of exchange? How is it 
possible that so many exchanges take place on mutually advantageous terms 
without central direction? These are just some of the questions to which 
Austrian economics must provide answers. Hayek has described the method 
by which such answers are to be constructed as “compositive” (Hayek,  1955 , 
pp. 36–43). The object of scientifi c investigation is to recompose or repro-
duce the social institution under study by tracing its logical origins to the 
interaction of individual plans. This “methodological individualism” (Hayek, 
 1955 , p. 38) is incompatible with any explanation that proceeds in terms of a 
solution to a social maximization problem. The relevant data are not “given” 
to the society as a whole; instead, small pieces of information are spread 
throughout the minds of a myriad of separate individuals (Hayek,  1948a ). 
Our main question is not answered but evaded if  we ignore the decentraliza-
tion of knowledge and construct an explanation in terms of, for example, a 
constrained maximum in a social indifference system. 
 The Austrian concerns that we develop in the course of this essay are not a 
mere collection of unconnected topics. Each of them can be rigorously derived 
from the concept of purposeful behavior itself. Ends and means do not auto-
matically produce behavior; it is clearly the individual perception of them that 
really matters. The idea of purpose thus implies the concept of  subjectivity . 
Further, all actions must take place in  time . For unless the end precedes the 
means all goals would have already been attained (or left forever unattained). 
The passage of time, as ordinarily perceived, is inextricably linked to the con-
cept of  uncertainty . This, in turn, must involve the disappointment of plans 
and expectations and hence the concept of  disequilibrium . Disequilibrium is 
characterized by unexploited opportunities for mutually advantageous trade 
and the consequent emergence of pure  profi ts . This, fi nally, provides incentives 
for economic  processes that approach but never actually attain equilibrium. 
Although it is possible logically to derive the Austrian themes from a cen-
tral concern, these individual categories tend inevitably to overlap. Therefore, 
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in discussing any one of them we must necessarily refer to concepts previ-
ously developed, as well as anticipate the development of others. Dividing our 
investigation in the way we have just outlined reveals the internal unity and 
consistency of the Austrian system. 
 Subjectivism 
 Subjectivism is a major feature of the Austrian tradition in two interrelated 
ways. First, as we have already seen, social phenomena are to be explained 
in terms of individual purposes or plans. The subjective perception of the 
relevant framework of ends and means is clearly indispensible to this task. 
Second, it must be stressed that the social phenomena themselves – the 
subject matter of our study – cannot be defi ned except in terms of individual 
intentions (Hayek,  1955 , p. 31). A court, for example, is not just a physical 
building but, more importantly, an institutionalization of a pattern of 
individual intentions. People go to court with certain very specifi c purposes in 
mind. Similarly, money cannot be defi ned independently of the intentions of 
those who use it. A medium of exchange differs from ordinary metal or paper 
precisely in terms of its intended use. Therefore, not only the method but also 
the very questions of economics are completely intertwined with subjectivism 
(Morgenstern,  1972 , p. 702). 
 Although no one is denying the existence or relevance of  objective entities 
in economics (subjectivism is not solipsism), Marshallian “scissor” analogies 
are not an adequate way of  portraying the subjective-objective interaction. 
The data of  economics are not neatly divided into the subjective (tastes) and 
the objective (resources and technology).  All of  the data are subjective in 
the sense that only the perception of  resources and technology matters. In 
Hayek’s ( 1955 , p. 27) words, “So far as human actions are concerned the 
things  are what the acting people think they are.” It is not appropriate sim-
ply to assume that subjective perceptions are always in harmony with the 
objective facts. Perfection of  knowledge is a phenomenon to which a theor-
etical explanation must ultimately be given. It cannot be taken for granted. 
In fact, the perfect or superior knowledge of  the “observer” and analyst is 
not directly relevant to economic explanation. It can only be relevant in the 
presence of  a  theory that says this knowledge will eventually be acquired by 
market participants. 
 In the next two subsections we elaborate further on the importance of sub-
jectivism by developing its role in some major areas of economic theory. First, 
although the subjectivity of tastes has long been recognized, its corollary, the 
subjectivity of costs, has all too frequently been neglected – with unfortunate 
results. Second, both perfect and imperfect information models have gener-
ally assumed that all economic agents possess the same information, thus 
neglecting an important aspect of the market process. The full importance 
of the subjectivity of economic data, however, cannot be understood until we 
later undertake our investigation of uncertainty and processes. 
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 Subjectivity of costs 
 Let us imagine a simple two-commodity world in equilibrium. Nonpecuniary 
elements are excluded, as are indivisibilities and allied problems. Assume that 
an individual must be willing to give up one beaver to acquire two deer. If  
the individual willingly engages in exchange at this rate, what is the cost to 
him of two deer? The well-trained economist would answer: the opportunity 
foregone, or one beaver. The answer is not entirely precise. The cost of deer is 
not beaver, but the want satisfaction given up when beaver is foregone. Cost 
accordingly belongs in utility space and not in objective space. The cost of 
deer is the want not fulfi lled by beaver (Knight,  1928 , p. 359). Cost is not a 
disembodied magnitude, or technological “given,” but must be related to a 
concrete decision. To say, therefore, that the cost of deer is beaver must be a 
shorthand or metaphorical way of saying that the cost is the utility of beaver 
foregone (Buchanan,  1979 , pp. 1–15). 
 If  this were all that there is to the subjectivity of costs, then the whole mat-
ter would be little more than a verbal exercise. Metaphors and shorthands 
can be useful in many contexts. In the two-commodity equilibrium world of 
deer and beaver, the damage done by metaphorical thinking is minimal. In 
more complex cases, however, the objectivist frame of mind, to which the cost 
metaphor gives rise, is extremely misleading. 
 We now take up the problems with an objectivist cost notion  seriatim . 
Consider, for example, a multi-commodity world with money (or a  num é raire ), 
which is in general equilibrium. An individual supplier of labor fi nds nonpe-
cuniary advantages or disadvantages associated with alternative occupations. 
His current job pays $7.00 per hour; his highest ranked alternative, however, 
pays $7.50 but has signifi cant nonpecuniary disadvantages. Making the usual 
assumption about adjustments at infi nitely small margins, the opportunity 
cost (in money terms) of this person’s time is $7.00 rather than the object-
ively measurable wage in the best alternative. This is because that occupation 
has a nonpecuniary disadvantage, which the individual would be willing to 
pay $0.50 at the margin to avoid. Compare now the slightly different case of 
an individual whose current job pays $7.00 per hour but also has signifi cant 
nonpecuniary advantages associated with it. His best alternative pays $7.50 
and is without any nonpecuniary features. Here the individual’s opportunity 
cost is $7.50 instead of his objectively measured wage rate. At the margin, the 
nonpecuniary advantages are worth $0.50. In the fi rst example, then, where 
the alternative endeavor was characterized by nonpecuniary disadvantages, 
the opportunity cost of time was the current wage. In the second example, 
on the other hand, where the current job had nonpecuniary advantages, the 
opportunity cost of time was equal to the wage in the best alternative. 
 Thus even in equilibrium, whenever (as in the illustration above) there are 
nonpecuniary elements present, money prices do not necessarily refl ect the 
goods foregone by the decision-maker. In order to determine what he has 
given up in any context, we must know his scale of values, i.e., his utility 
function. Out of equilibrium, however, monetary magnitudes bear no defi nite 
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relation at all to subjective costs. Once we remove ourselves from the imagin-
ary constructions of general equilibrium models, subjectivist elements become 
still more important. Since opportunity costs involve expectations and these 
expectations will differ among individuals, some agents will believe that the 
true opportunity costs are higher or lower than money costs observed in mar-
kets. Hence, costs will involve expectations and these expectations will differ 
among individuals. 
 In the general equilibrium world of unchanging data, the past and future 
merge into the ever-present. Actions are replicated period after period, so that 
one can no longer even distinguish between periods except by subscripts. In 
such a world, we could argue that the analyst could identify the relevant good 
foregone by an individual – the objective opportunity foregone. Outside of 
stationary equilibrium, in a world of change and uncertainty, the ideal obser-
ver cannot even identify the objective opportunities foregone by decision-
makers, much less the subjective cost. 
 Some of the practical implications of these strictures are considered in the 
subsection (below) “Misplaced concreteness: static welfare economics.” Two 
points, one specifi c and one general, can be made here. The specifi c point 
relates to our original beaver-deer example. Only insofar as the individual is 
a pure medium for the fl ow of market forces are his costs “objective” in the 
metaphorical sense described above. For this to be the case, the only fore-
gone opportunity attached to labor must be the market value of the product 
produced. More generally, the subjectivist cost theory points out problems 
with crude economic-man constructs and assumptions about perfection and 
uniformity of knowledge in a world of incomplete information and special-
ized knowledge. If  our object is to explain behavior, the subjectivist frame-
work tells us that there is more to look at than objectively measurable prices. 
Actions that appear to the objectivist as irrational, or misallocations, may 
rather refl ect the fact that the decision-maker had different values or different 
information than the welfare theorist. 
 One very practical contribution of subjectivists has been in public choice 
and public policy discussions. Analysis has been shifted from the putative data 
of welfare-maximization models to the actual costs and constraints faced by 
the relevant individual choosers. We understand political and bureaucratic 
decision-making better today precisely to the degree that we have subjectifi ed 
this area of economics. Our understanding of nonmarket decision-making is 
still in its infancy. A consistent pursuit of subjectivist economics here would 
add immeasurably to our economic understanding in this area. Likewise, the 
economic theory of the fi rm would be enhanced by a consistent subjectivist 
approach to the issues raised in this area. 
 Dispersion of knowledge 
 In the previous section we saw the importance of subjectivity even where 
individuals were more or less the same. To be sure, where individuals have 
different utility functions the subjectivity of costs poses even more complex 
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problems of measurement. However, the heterogeneity of individuals 
extends far beyond their possibly different utility functions – to the diversity 
of knowledge. In the standard constrained maximization problem, the 
equilibrium of the individual is defi ned relative to “given” data. Although 
it is not unusual to allow taste to differ among individuals, 1 resources and 
technology are frequently assumed not to differ even in imperfect information 
models. In order to emphasize some fundamental conceptual issues we shall 
ignore taste differences in the following discussion, and instead concentrate 
on differential knowledge of both means and technology. There are two 
kinds of knowledge dispersion or diversity between which it is important 
to distinguish. First, individuals may have different and incompatible ideas 
with respect to the same objective facts. Second, they may have knowledge 
of different sorts of things, e.g., some people may know a great deal about 
conditions in the auto industry and others very little. These two types of 
knowledge diversity raise different theoretical issues and therefore we shall 
handle them separately. 
 Insofar as those with mistaken technological ideas improve their know-
ledge, their behavior will undergo change. As expectations are revealed to be 
incorrect, agents will revise their forecasts. 2 For the Austrian, the important 
question is not so much what the new fi nal equilibrium will be; instead his 
attention focuses on the process of adjustment toward an equilibrium. There 
are thus two conceptually distinct problems: (1) How do people adjust to 
each other and (2) how do they adjust to the underlying objective data? The 
divergence of expectations among individuals is one of the most important 
reasons for the existence of asset markets (Lachmann,  1978 , p. 4). Attempts 
to learn the true underlying demand curve for a product manifest themselves 
in advertising, market research and price-cutting – all of which are incom-
patible with perfectly competitive equilibrium (Kirzner,  1973 , pp. 151–80). In 
addition, price-cutting tends to create incentives for fi rms to improve their 
technological knowledge and thereby approach the best technology. Market 
phenomena such as these are essentially adjustment processes in a world of 
heterogeneous “data.” 
 The second type of  dispersion of  knowledge consists of  what Hayek 
called “the knowledge of  the particular circumstances of  time and place” 
(Hayek,  1948a , p. 80). Different individuals will have knowledge of  different 
things. Some people will be aware of  alternate methods of  producing steel 
while others will be experts on demand conditions in the market for rubber. 
Clearly, this division of  knowledge is related to the division of  labor in soci-
ety: people will learn only what is important to their activities. Market prices 
tend to communicate or disseminate the relevant aspects of  this differential 
information (Hayek,  1978 , pp. 179–90). If  in some uses rubber and steel are 
substitutes, then a technological revolution in the production of  steel will 
be communicated to the rubber industry through a downward shift in their 
demand curve. No one in the rubber industry need become an expert on 
steel production to react properly. The divergence of  knowledge of  this kind 
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may be compatible with equilibrium. Unlike the diversity of  knowledge that 
stems from confl icting or incompatible conjectures, the  division of  know-
ledge in society may still exist in competitive equilibrium. In such circum-
stances, market prices convey a knowledge surrogate to all economic agents. 
To the extent that market processes push the system toward equilibrium, 
they are then the means by which the division of  knowledge is continually 
refi ned and its relevant components more accurately communicated. 
 In recent years, Hayek’s “knowledge of the particular circumstances of time 
and place” has played an important role in a varied literature on incentive-
compatible systems, effi cient markets and rational expectations (Hurwicz, 
 1973 ; Grossman and Stiglitz,  1976 ). In this literature, the division of know-
ledge appears as “localized” or “private” knowledge. It has also arrived inde-
pendently at a number of the conclusions reached in Austrian economics: 
the comparatively large information requirements of centralized planning 
(Frydman,  1980 ), and the inapplicability of rational expectations models 
to situations of divergent expectations and rapid change (Frydman,  1980 ; 
O’Driscoll,  1979 ). The independence of these fi ndings confi rms the concep-
tual power of Hayek’s original insight. 
 Time and causality 
 The  perception of  means and ends entails both the passage of time and 
relationship of cause and effect. Ends are usually attained after some period 
of acting in time (Mises,  1966 , pp. 99–101). In addition, individuals must be 
able to perceive causal relationships in order to act: certain means must be 
viewed as effi cacious in achieving specifi c goals. In a world without causality 
acting man would be paralyzed. 
 Time 
 For some, Austrian economics is nothing but a particular capital theory. 
In this view, B ö hm-Bawerk ( 1959 ) made the authoritative statement at the 
core of Austrian economics, while Hayek ( 1941 ) restated it in modern terms. 
We are now in a position to explain not only why Austrian economists have 
always been concerned with capital theory, but also why their capital theory 
does not defi ne Austrian economics. 
 A consistent subjectivist approach necessarily entails an emphasis on time. 
All action is future oriented. There is no possibility of infl uencing the present 
(Mises,  1966 , pp. 252–3). Economic agents can, however, make the decision 
for which time periods in the future that they will plan. Austrian economists 
have accordingly focused on this choice and on its implications for interest 
and capital theories. They have tended to separate capital from interest theory 
more than do most economists today. Following B ö hm-Bawerk, they viewed 
interest as a phenomenon resulting from the  exchange of  goods through time. 
Indeed, in following this insight through to its logical conclusions, writers 
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such as Mises, Kirzner and Rothbard removed all productivity elements from 
their interest theories (Mises,  1966 , pp. 524–37; Kirzner,  1966 ; Rothbard, 
 1962 , pp. 313–86). While their pure time preference theory of interest is still 
controversial among Austrians, the relatively sharp separation of capital the-
ory from interest (or capitalization) theory is not. Interest theory, among 
other things, gives us the basis for a theory of capitalization or capital value. 
Capital theory proper deals with a highly important, though more narrowly 
focused, set of issues:
 The central aim of this study is to make a systematic survey of the inter-
relations between the different parts of the material structure of the pro-
cess of production, and the way in which it will adapt itself  to changing 
conditions … Our main concern will be to discuss in general terms what 
type of equipment it will be most profi table to create under various con-
ditions, and how the equipment at any moment will be used, rather than 
to explain the factors which determined the value of a given stock of pro-
ductive equipment and of the income that will be derived from it. 
 (Hayek,  1941 , p. 3) 
 While it is certainly sensible and even illuminating to talk of  capital allo-
cation for an isolated individual, the central issues of  modern Austrian cap-
ital theory revolve around the problems of  intertemporal plan coordination. 
The major question concerns the economy’s ability to produce a concrete 
set of  capital goods (i.e., a capital structure) consistent with intertempo-
ral plan coordination. In their applied work, Austrians have emphasized 
the causes and effects of  intertemporal discoordination. (We take up one 
example of  this applied work below in our discussion of  money’s effects on 
relative prices.) Viewed from this perspective, the Austrian focus on capital 
theory fl ows from, but does not itself  defi ne, the Austrian research program. 
Attention to capital and time derives from attention to the process of  indi-
vidual decision-making. In this century, Austrians have to one degree or 
another moved beyond B ö hm-Bawerk’s position. They have all endorsed 
his  goal of  subjectivizing capital theory by removing exclusively technical 
factors from capital and interest theories. B ö hm-Bawerk demonstrated that 
one cannot establish that production produces value merely by showing that 
it is  physically productive. Yet he relied on this same  non sequitur in his own 
theory. The central question must be: why don’t the values of  the factors of 
production fully absorb the value of  the output? Among modern Austrians, 
Mises was the fi rst to criticize B ö hm-Bawerk for this error. Hayek’s  Pure 
Theory of Capital ( 1941 ) is a link between the older and newer Austrian 
capital theorists. Though a B ö hm-Bawerkian work, it is also an immanent 
criticism of  parts of  that system. Among other things, Hayek criticized the 
average period of  production concept ( 1941 , pp. 76, 144–6, 199–200). He 
demonstrated that one could not establish a unique functional relation-
ship between quantitative measures of  capital and the rate of  interest. No 
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measure of  capital could be independent of  relative prices, and thus could 
not be independent of  interest rates. To this extent, the Cambridge capital 
theorists have only recently arrived at the position that the Austrians had 
adopted by 1941. 
 Having explained the traditional Austrian focus on capital theory, we can 
also explain the transformation in the type of contributions made by the 
Austrian school to capital theory. Their contribution now typically occurs 
in a different area (Kirzner,  1966 ; Lachmann,  1977 ). The central issue of 
intertemporal coordination now appears under a new guise: the coordina-
tive function of the entrepreneur over time. While we take up this topic else-
where, we note here that the traditional Austrian concern with intertemporal 
coordination has not been abandoned but extended and refi ned by Kirzner, 
Lachmann and others. 
 Causation 
 In contrast to much contemporary thought, Austrians view the framework 
of  cause and effect as absolutely indispensable to satisfactory economic 
analysis. Recall that the Austrian research program rests on the potential 
intelligibility of  social phenomena in terms of  human action. From this 
starting point it is clear that there are two related reasons for the importance 
of  causality. First, to understand why people undertake certain actions one 
cannot omit their perception of  causal relations. In the absence of  such 
perception they could not act at all. Second, to render social phenomena 
intelligible means to show how they are the result of, or caused by, individual 
action. 
 The atemporal framework of  competitive equilibrium theory, by contrast, 
is incompatible with cause and effect analysis. This model is merely a set 
of  simultaneous equations and their solutions: there is no sense of  how the 
economy actually attains the specifi ed equilibrium (Hayek,  1948b , p. 94). 
Indeed Brian Loasby tells us that “[e]quilibrium models cannot  explain , 
because they specify no causal process.” Even comparative statics does 
not deal with causal explanations despite the fact we tell motivating stor-
ies “between the equations” (Loasby,  1976 , p. 26, emphasis added). These 
stories are not a part of  the formal model and may in fact be inconsistent 
with it (Loasby,  1976 , p. 45). The comparative static methodology requires 
that the assumed change in a parameter or exogenous variable be completely 
unexpected (because expectations are assumed to be static). However, it is 
unlikely that after several comparative static shocks the new equilibrium will 
be one in which change is totally unexpected. Hence the static nature of 
expectations characteristic of  this apparatus is inconsistent with the use to 
which we put it. 
 Recently, Sir John Hicks ( 1979 , pp. 18–26) has explicated a notion of “con-
temporaneous causation” to allow for causal explanations in static equilib-
rium models. This idea, however, rests on an artifi cial view of time. Hicks’ 
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suggestion is that if  we stretch out the relevant period by an amount long 
enough we can accommodate both cause and effect within the  same period. 
This notion of the relevant period is not, however, the economically pertin-
ent one. The temporal separation of cause and effect is fundamental to any 
focus on individual planning and acting. Contemporaneous causation thus 
has nothing to do with economic causation. 
 Uncertainty 
 The importance of uncertainty in decision-making is obvious from causal 
observation. However, to the extent that we are concerned with processes, there 
is also an analytical need to introduce uncertainty into economic models. The 
assumption of perfect foresight is logically incompatible with any tendency 
toward equilibrium. 3 Attempts to construct models  with equilibrating processes 
will dissolve into logical circularities unless the assumption is abandoned. We 
can easily demonstrate this proposition by use of two related examples. 
 More than 50 years ago, Oskar Morgenstern ( 1976 , p. 174) showed that 
when one individual’s plan is dependent on that of another, perfect foresight 
will produce “an endless chain of reciprocally conjectural reactions and coun-
ter-reactions.” An equilibrium set of plans cannot be attained except by the 
sheerest of accidents. Morgenstern’s example is worth quoting in full:
 Sherlock Holmes, pursued by his opponent, Moriarty, leaves London 
for Dover. The train stops at a station on the way, and he alights there 
rather than travelling on to Dover. He has seen Moriarty at the railway 
station, recognizes that he is very clever and expects that Moriarty will 
take a faster special train in order to catch him in Dover. Holmes’ antici-
pation turns out to be correct. But what if  Moriarty had been still more 
clever, had estimated Holmes’ mental abilities better and had foreseen his 
actions accordingly? Then, obviously, he would have traveled to the inter-
mediate station. Holmes, again, would have had to calculate that, and he 
himself  would have decided to go on to Dover. Whereupon, Moriarty 
would again have “reacted” differently. Because of so much thinking they 
might not have been able to act at all or the intellectually weaker of the 
two would have surrendered to the other in the Victoria Station, since the 
whole fl ight would have become unnecessary. 
 (Morgenstern,  1976 , pp. 173–4) 
 The equilibrium in this illustration is a stable set of plans that might result 
 either in Holmes escaping or being captured. That aspect of the solution is 
unimportant for us; what is important is the absence of any tendency for 
the plans of the individuals to change. In equilibrium their plans would be 
coordinated (even though they are enemies) in the sense that each is optimal 
given what the other individual is in fact planning. 4 The moral of the Holmes-
Moriarty story, however, is that perfect knowledge of each other’s plans makes 
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attaining such an equilibrium impossible. Neither individual will ever be 
satisfi ed with any tentatively adopted deterministic plan and so coordination 
cannot be achieved. 
 The second example was developed 20 years ago in a more familiar mar-
ket context by G. B. Richardson ( 1960 , pp. 30–8). Assume, initially, that in 
one industry there is an “objectively” expected rate of  return higher than the 
normal rate. (There is some underlying objective structure “producing” the 
future.) Assume further that all market participants have perfect foresight 
of  this and that all the other conventional assumptions of  the competitive 
model have been satisfi ed. If  each potential entrant must take into account 
the behavior of  others because they can produce competitive supply, there 
will be either an indefi nite expansion of  output or no expansion at all. If  
everyone foresees a supernormal return then an indefi nitely large number of 
fi rms will enter at the same time and the actual rate of  return will be indef-
initely lower than that “objectively” expected return. But if  people are very 
clever they will foresee this and not enter. If, however, no one enters then 
the rate will again fail to be bid down to the equilibrium level. In neither 
case, then, is the assumption of  perfect foresight compatible with a tendency 
toward equilibrium. This is not a mere cobweb-like situation but rather a 
problem of logical circularity. Each potential entrant must make his deci-
sions on the basis of  what others decide. Perfect knowledge of  what they 
intend to do, however, paralyzes decision-makers. One cannot assume lagged 
entry to eliminate Richardson’s conundrum. Differential speeds of  entry are 
inconsistent with perfect knowledge. If  all fi rms have perfect knowledge, 
none should be slower or quicker to enter (Gordon and Hynes,  1970 ). As 
we suggest below,  divergent expectations may be a  necessary condition for a 
movement toward equilibrium. 
 The characterization of uncertainty 
 Although it is evident that the perfect foresight assumption cannot be 
reconciled with a theory of economic process, it is not immediately clear how 
we ought to model uncertainty. The purpose of this subsection is to examine 
three different views of uncertainty and to determine the strengths and 
limitations of each. 
 1.   RISK 
 This can be defi ned as an objectively measurable uncertainty that can be 
converted into a certain prospect by the judicious grouping of cases (Knight, 
 1971 , pp. 231–2). The relative frequency of accidental fi res, mortality rates in 
socioeconomic age categories, and the number of certain types of illnesses per 
100,000 population are all collections of risky events. The apparently random 
character of these events is responsible for their stability in the aggregate. To 
the extent that individuals are concerned with these aggregations of events, 
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the uncertainty is “transformable” or “eradicable” (Weston,  1950 , pp. 43–4; 
 1954 , p. 155). 
 The objectivity of risk is capable of at least three interpretations that are rele-
vant for our purposes. In cases of structured games (e.g., tosses of a fair coin, 
throws of a fair die) the probabilities can be viewed as part of the experimental 
setup. The game is, in effect, programmed to yield certain relative frequencies in 
a long series of trials. In other circumstances (e.g., mortality tables) empirical 
regularities have been noted over signifi cant periods of time. These regularities 
then become hypotheses about future sequences of events that are often well 
corroborated. Insurance companies and others used them in, for example, the 
computations of premiums, because they produce satisfactory results. Finally, 
it is possible to take a thoroughgoing Bayesian view and say that objective 
probabilities are merely uncontroversial probabilities. The problem with this 
approach, however, is that it leaves unexplained why some probabilities are 
uncontroversial and others are not. Furthermore, if  probabilities were purely 
arbitrary degrees of belief it would be hard to generate any tendency toward 
agreement as in models of stationary stochastic equilibria. For our purposes, 
then, we shall adopt as a useful maintained hypothesis that some probability 
assignments do refl ect an underlying objective structure while others, in cases 
of more complex phenomena, do not. This objectivity can be of a prepro-
grammed,  a priori variety or of a statistically based, empirical kind. 
 2.   KNIGHTIAN UNCERTAINTY 
 “True” or Knightian uncertainty is objectively unmeasurable or, if  it is so 
measurable, it cannot be converted into a certain prospect because the grouping 
of cases is economically unfeasible or irrelevant. This kind of uncertainty is 
clearly “nontransformable.” Although in theoretical terms the distinction 
between risk and Knightian uncertainty is quite sharp, in reality there is a 
continuum from the easily measurable to the “completely” unmeasurable. 
The degree of measurability or, more precisely, the usefulness of the measure 
adopted, clearly depends on the cleverness with which the analyst chooses the 
reference class for a given event. Consider, for example, the case of a “unique” 
investment decision. It may not be possible to fi nd other decisions suffi ciently 
homogeneous 5 to construct a very useful class. However, “instead of taking the 
decisions of other men in situations more or less similar objectively, we may 
take decisions of the same man in all sorts of situations” (Knight,  1971 , p. 228). 
From the point of view of a bank contemplating a loan to this entrepreneur, 
such a reference class may indeed be the relevant one. Consequently, the 
determination of the correct class depends upon the purpose of the individual 
economic agent. Probability measurements, then, clearly have a large subjective 
(but not arbitrary) component whether they are made in the context of risk 
or Knightian uncertainty. In the former case, once the reference class is 
established, the probability is objective, but in the latter, even with an accepted 
class, an objective probability estimate cannot be established. 
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 Individual cases in the category of risky events are not themselves risky 
but instead they are uncertain (Knight,  1971 , p. 234). Objective probabilities 
are relative frequencies and hence apply directly only to the reference class. 
The individual toss of a coin, for example, cannot have a relative frequency 
of one-half  for heads: it is either heads or tails. In those cases where the eco-
nomic agent is only concerned about the single toss or case, the overall object-
ive frequencies are of no direct relevance to his decision-making (Buchanan 
and Di Pierro,  1980 , pp. 696–8). 
 Even when the economic agent is dealing with large classes of events, 
there is a question of the relevance of the observed frequencies to the class 
at hand. Since no two classes are exactly the same, there is a subjective judg-
ment involved in the decision that the two are  suffi ciently similar, so that the 
data on one are useful for predicting certain characteristics of the other. For 
example, to what extent are data on the frequency of tropical diseases among 
group X applicable to Y? In what respects must X and Y be the same in order 
for the inference to be reliable? Unless there is a whole sequence of such deci-
sions to which we can refer, this judgment must take place under conditions 
of Knightian uncertainty. 
 Those who favor the personal probability approach may fi nd the distinc-
tion between risk and uncertainty unhelpful. If  probabilities are merely deci-
sion weights, then it may seem that we can apply them without regard to the 
nature of the uncertainty. This argument, however, confuses the behavioral 
and cognitive levels of analysis (Buchanan and Di Pierro,  1980 , p. 695). From 
a behavioral perspective, decision weights may be useful under both risk and 
uncertainty without any distinction. From a cognitive perspective, however, 
the existence of uncertainty may be an important element in explaining why 
decision weights differ among people (Buchanan and Di Pierro,  1980 , p. 696). 
 The heterogeneity of expectations is more likely under Knightian uncer-
tainty than under risk. Where individuals react in the same way toward uncer-
tainty, the divergence of expectations is necessary to ensure a tendency toward 
equilibrium. Without such divergence, the Morgenstern-Richardson para-
doxes would reassert themselves and make process analysis an impossibility. 
 3.   RADICAL UNCERTAINTY 
 In the two previous forms of uncertainty, each individual was assumed to 
be capable of listing all of the various possible outcomes. The sample space 
was thus viewed as complete. However, to the extent an individual does not 
know what outcomes are possible he will not be confi dent of any probability 
distribution (Loasby,  1976 , p. 9). In fact, he may feel quite strongly that 
something not part of the sample space or not on the probability distribution 
will happen. Cases of technological innovation, for example, are not just 
characterized by the inability to assign objective probabilities to each of 
the possible inventions. Instead, the individual may have no idea what the 
complete set of possible inventions is. 
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 G. L. S. Shackle has developed an approach to uncertainty that does not 
require complete listability and hence is more appropriate to circumstances 
like those described above. He has constructed a nondistributional measure 
of uncertainty known as “potential surprise” (Shackle,  1969 , pp. 67–113). His 
spectrum extends from a zero degree of potential surprise (“perfectly pos-
sible”) to an arbitrary maximum of potential surprise (“impossible”). The 
possibilities over which potential surprise is measured are rival, mutually 
exclusive outcomes. In no sense must these possibilities be exhaustive. It is 
not necessary to “distribute” one’s certainty over a complete set of outcomes 
as in the probability approach. Certainty (i.e., a probability of unity) cannot 
be ascribed to more than one rival outcome or hypothesis. A zero degree of 
potential surprise, however, can be given to any number of rival possibilities. 
An individual can believe that he would not be the least bit surprised if  any 
one of an indefi nite number of rival possibilities occurred. In addition, as 
more possibilities become known, none of the original alternatives need have 
a greater degree of potential surprise as a consequence. If, for example, all 
fi ve initial hypotheses occurred to an individual, these additional possibilities 
could also have zero potential surprise. Each of the seven can be just as per-
fectly possible as each of the fi ve were. The probability approach, on the other 
hand, requires that the new alternatives “borrow” some of the certainty from 
the initial possibilities and hence the degree of belief  in these must fall. 
 Disequilibrium 
 The limitations of equilibrium analysis and the need for a comprehensive theory 
of disequilibrium adjustment are made more evident when we understand 
the proper function of equilibrium constructs. By abstracting from change 
altogether and specifying the conditions under which it will not occur, it is 
possible to begin to understand the forces that induce change (Mises,  1966 , 
p. 248). Equilibrium serves as an analytic focal point toward which some 
forces tend and from which other forces pull away. In addition, the construct 
enables us to trace out the full effects of a given change under static conditions 
(Machlup,  1967 , p. 48). While this may not be a “realistic” description of the 
effects, it specifi es the tendencies that a certain change alone sets in motion. 
The essence of equilibrium theorizing is thus predictability of effects  within a 
model (Rizzo,  1979 , p. 3). Consequently, all equilibrium models are conceptual 
tools and not descriptions of reality (Machlup,  1967 , pp. 56–8). 
 The foregoing interpretation of the function of the equilibrium notion 
sets up a critical tension within the concept itself. For example, to empha-
size tracing out the full effects of an assumed change is to use causal lan-
guage: A results in B. Thus time has crept into the analysis. Furthermore, it 
is impossible to know why the condition of plan consistency is a state of rest 
unless we tell ourselves some informal story about processes. If   ex ante sup-
ply and demand are equal on a certain market it is not immediately obvious 
why people shouldn’t change their behavior slightly in an effort to do better. 
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We have a story about how a small displacement from the equilibrium sets in 
motion forces to bring us back. 
 The unique advantages of adopting the Hayekian (Hayek,  1948c , pp. 33–44) 
concept of equilibrium as plan consistency 6 rest on the ease with which the 
concept is adaptable to a theory of process. Since plans unfold in time the 
development of a theory of plan adjustment to unexpected changes is a nat-
ural offshoot of the Hayekian equilibrium. Furthermore, plan consistency 
focuses on purposes and anticipations and so gives rise to less rigid or mech-
anistic dynamics. 
 1.  “Equilibrium discoordination” 
 In recent years there have been attempts to reduce the need for disequilibrium 
models by greatly extending the meaning of the term “equilibrium” (Rizzo, 
 1979 , pp. 2–7). Frank Hahn ( 1973 , p. 28), for example, says that “[t]he 
traditional notion of an equilibrium … requires the equilibrium actions of 
agents to be consistent, whereas I have the weaker requirement that they not 
be systematically and persistently inconsistent.” Consider a world in which 
the prices faced by fi rms have a random component. In period after period 
the fi rms will try to guess what these prices will be so that they can correctly 
determine their level of output. If  the process that generates the random price 
components is stable, fi rms will eventually settle on a constant expectations 
function (Stigum,  1969 ; Hahn,  1952 , pp. 803–4; Littlechild,  1977 , pp. 6–8). 
They will fi nd the best way of predicting prices and never change that method. 
Even the best method, however, will not always be correct, but it will not be 
“systematically and persistently” incorrect. Hence fi rms will at times produce 
too much output and at other times too little output; equilibrium in this sense 
exhibits not complete consistency but only “optimal” consistency. 
 This approach has far more in common with traditional equilibrium mod-
els than it does with any kind of process analysis. No learning at all occurs 
in this world because, by assumption, people have already discovered the best 
way to cope with their risky environment. In fact, all that has happened is that 
the perfect foresight assumption of the old models has been replaced with 
perfect  stochastic knowledge. How anyone would acquire such knowledge is 
not a question that can be entertained. 
 As equilibrium models, however, it is not clear that stochastic equilibria are 
preferable to old-fashioned deterministic equilibria. Perhaps the main motiv-
ation for developing such stochastic models is that they are more “realistic.” 
After all, it is not often that we see complete plan coordination. 7 A stochas-
tic equilibrium is more nearly compatible with the frustrations and disap-
pointments of the real world. To the extent, however, that this idea underlies 
the foregoing approach, it is seriously misleading. As we have already seen, 
equilibrium is not meant to be a description of reality but a conceptual 
tool. Making such a tool more “realistic” may in fact be harmful if  it now 
fails to isolate the proper variables. To consider imperfect coordination as 
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the equilibrium state leaves us at a loss to describe the direction of change 
when, for example, the stochastic component of prices decreases. We must, at 
least implicitly, retain a vision of the perfectly coordinated state of affairs to 
understand what happens when parameters of the stochastic model change. 
The major problem of stochastic equilibria is that in being more “realistic” 
they may convince us that we needn’t bother about developing disequilibrium 
models that can explain the processes of change and learning. As the next 
section will make quite clear, this would be a terrible mistake. 
 2.  Disequilibrium discoordination 
 The models discussed above make the artifi cial assumption that all agents 
possess the same perfect stochastic knowledge. This is at odds with not only 
the subjectivity and diversity of individuals but also with the costliness of 
gathering information. Suppose, instead, we postulate a world in which 
individuals’ perceptions of an underlying stochastic structure are gradually 
undergoing change. This could be either because the costs of information-
gathering are falling or merely because more “draws from the urn” convey 
a better picture of the underlying distribution. In any event, such changing 
perceptions imply that agents are learning and, hence, the method by which 
they attempt to forecast relevant events will itself  change. This kind of model 
is thus inconsistent with the constancy of expectation functions. 
 If we further complicate the situation and question the modeling of uncer-
tainty purely as risk, the divergence of expectations takes on new signifi cance. 
Insofar as uncertainty is objectively unmeasurable, people will develop different 
plans even if they have the same attitude toward uncertainty. Recall that in a 
Knightian world, personal probability distributions are likely to diverge and so 
different people will expect different things. Hence the degree of discoordina-
tion is likely to be greater than in a risky world. In addition, it is unclear that 
there is any meaning to the concept of a stochastic equilibrium if we jettison the 
objective measurability of probabilities. Under these conditions, we probably 
must defi ne equilibrium in terms of the complete fulfi llment of expectations. 
 Models of stochastic equilibrium are completely incapable of handling 
radical uncertainty. If  an individual were to face a price that did not lie on 
his probability distribution, the model could not explain how he would react 
(Stigum,  1969 , p. 549). True learning has not taken place and therefore it is 
unlikely that the individual would react in some constant way, i.e., his expec-
tations function itself  would change. This is because the disappointment “of 
the fi rst situation must always enter as a new parameter into the second” 
decision (Hahn,  1952 , p. 805). The agent will take account of his previous 
mistakes. Consequently, the stability of expectation functions and hence the 
maintenance of stochastic equilibrium is dependent on the complete elimin-
ation of surprises. 
 Is it possible to say something about how expectation functions will change 
as people engage in genuine learning? Obviously, some kind of metatheory 
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is necessary to explain a change in the “theories” by which people form their 
expectations or make their predictions. Such a theory is not yet available 
(Hahn,  1973 , p. 21). Nevertheless, we can say something about how it might 
look. In the fi rst place, recognition of the possibility that something undreamt 
might happen will itself  have an impact on the confi dence with which people 
hold their expectations. Second, what people will learn from their disappoint-
ments and how they will respond to them is something that we can hope to 
explain only in very general terms. We might be able to exclude some possible 
modes of adjustment or, alternatively, specify a probably large set of possible 
expectations functions. Fundamentally, our inability to determine more pre-
cisely the method by which changes in these functions occur lies in the impos-
sibility of predicting the future course of knowledge. That course is radically 
uncertain. 
 Misplaced concreteness: static welfare economics 
 Although many theorists will admit that general equilibrium constructs are 
analytical tools rather than descriptions of reality, most, if  not all, welfare 
economics proceeds on the assumption that all markets, except for the one 
under study, are in competitive equilibrium. In an analysis of taxes and 
subsidies, for example, the market prices of resources are assumed to refl ect 
correctly their value in alternative uses. This implies, of course, equilibrium 
not only in those factor markets but also in the markets for the alternative 
output. In the static theory of monopoly, furthermore, the conclusion that 
monopolists underproduce is predicated on the absence of distortions 
in substitute and complement markets. The general theory of second best 
and its complex optimality conditions have been developed to deal with 
simple situations where distortions are known (Lipsey and Lancaster,  1957 ). 
Nevertheless, most of what welfare economists do rests on the assumption 
that the conceptual tool of equilibrium mirrors a good deal of the real world 
quite accurately. To the extent that this is not true, however, the foundations 
of applied welfare theory are shaky. 
 The focus of Austrian economics, as we have seen, is on the plans or actions 
of individuals rather than directly on social wholes or institutions. One of the 
key diffi culties of some applications of static welfare theory is that focus of the 
individual is suppressed by use of the aggregative concept of social welfare. 
This is particularly true in contexts that make use of the Kaldor-Hicks poten-
tial compensation principle: the actual loss of one individual is “offset” by the 
gain to another. Whether the social welfare measure is based on a willingness-
to-pay approach or on a social-indifference system does indeed matter. The 
latter, of course, is even more offensive to those who take seriously the dif-
ferences among individuals. Nevertheless, both approaches tend to aggregate 
gains and losses in a way appropriate if  society were a single individual. On 
the other hand, Austrians prefer to view social institutions in terms of their 
ability to coordinate individual plans (Kirzner,  1973 , pp. 212–34). Certainty 
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creation, knowledge dissemination, and incentive enhancement are all fac-
tors that tend to increase the opportunities for voluntary exchange and thus 
the possibilities for coordination. In the fi nal analysis, however, no approach 
to economics can eliminate the need for ethics and social philosophy in the 
determination of policy. Hence the coordination approach, like all others, will 
never be a complete basis for policy unto itself. 
 1.  Partial equilibrium welfare economics 
 Ineffi ciencies of all types can be traced to the inadequacy of knowledge. 
Since Coase’s classic article ( 1960 ), economists have tended to categorize 
ineffi ciencies by the type of transaction cost identifi ed as their source. These 
costs are commonly divided into search, contracting and enforcement 
costs. All of these stem, however, from the absence of perfect knowledge 
(Dahlman,  1979 ). Search would, of course, be unnecessary were knowledge 
complete. Contracting costs consist of discovering mutually acceptable terms 
of exchange. And there would be no enforcement costs if  everyone knew 
in advance who would and who would not keep agreements. 8 Thus each 
ineffi ciency can be attributed to a particular transaction cost, which, in turn, 
is the result of certain information being absent or too costly to obtain. 
 In an important sense, however, there can  never be ineffi ciencies in a static 
model even when information is imperfect. Ineffi ciency must be relative to 
certain constraints. A perfectly competitive world in which oil was a scarce 
commodity would seem ineffi cient when compared to one in which it was 
a free good. Analogously, the greater the degree of technological informa-
tion possessed by the members of a society, the more “effi cient” that society 
would seem to be. A world of complete knowledge of objectively available 
technological options, however, is not a relevant standard against which the 
effi ciency of the current system can be measured (Demsetz,  1969 ). 
 Why should effi ciency be defi ned in terms of some unattainable goal? 
People make the best use of the knowledge on hand in a world of limited 
information, just as they do in a perfectly competitive one. If  some people in 
the former world have better information than others, then the others would 
have already purchased the fuller knowledge to the optimal extent. Similarly, 
if  an institutional change could increase effi ciency then that change would 
have already been affected to the optimal degree. In a purely static frame-
work, all opportunities for potential gains are effi ciently exploited. In that 
world, whatever  is must also be effi cient. Therefore, a static welfare frame-
work is ultimately self-destructive since it degenerates into a crude tautology 
and is thus unable to provide guidance for desirable change. 
 Dynamic or disequilibrium elements must be introduced into a welfare 
framework in order to avoid the problematic reasoning discussed above. If  
this is done, ineffi ciencies can be seen as unexploited opportunities from the 
perspective of superior knowledge that has not yet been fully absorbed. This 
lack of full absorption by the economic system might, of course, be attributed 
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to costs and then the imperfect absorption can be effi cient  at each point in 
time . This, however, would return us to a static equilibrium framework. To 
view such ineffi ciencies as a disequilibrium phenomenon, however, is essen-
tially to predict that if  agents were aware of certain facts they would exploit 
specifi ed opportunities. If  we have reason to believe that this superior know-
ledge will become more widely known, then we can begin to say something 
about the direction in which the economy will move. 
 Superior information about unexploited exchange opportunities can be 
possessed by the economic agent-entrepreneur or, less likely, by the economic 
analyst. In the fi rst case, entrepreneurs incur profi ts or losses to the extent 
their information is correct or incorrect. Hence here is some feedback mech-
anism exercising at least a limited self-corrective tendency. In the latter case, 
however, there is no such feedback. Economists are not normally in a position 
to observe the realization of the potential profi ts or losses that are implicit in 
their statements about ineffi ciencies. Welfare economics is thus a kind of vic-
arious entrepreneurship, 9 the full signifi cance of which can only be recognized 
in a completely dynamic framework. 
 2.  General equilibrium welfare economics 
 Static welfare theory is inextricably linked to the general equilibrium framework 
even when it is seemingly applied in a partial equilibrium context. Analyses 
of output market distortions, as we have seen, presuppose that factor prices 
measure “social” opportunity costs with tolerable accuracy. This, however, 
cannot be simply taken for granted, even abstracting from all the problems we 
have previously raised. Even when there is a complete absence of nonpecuniary 
advantages associated with factor employment decisions and when there are 
no externalities, market prices need not represent true social opportunity 
costs. Consider, for example, the type of illustration that has gained some 
prominence in the economic analysis of law (Posner,  1977 , p. 125). Suppose 
that people are risk-neutral and that, unless precautions are undertaken, an 
accident may occur between A and B which has an expected loss of $60. If  
A can avoid the accident by spending $45 on avoidance resources and B by 
spending $50 on different resources, it may seem that liability ought to be 
placed on A. This would appear to create incentives for the minimization of 
the sum of expected accident and accident prevention costs. From a global 
perspective, however, it is not at all clear that this solution is the most effi cient. 
The general equilibrium value of A’s resources might actually be $50 and B’s 
only $45. If  this is the case then the truly effi cient solution is the reverse of the 
one initially indicated: liability ought to be placed on B. 
 To recognize “socially” effi cient solutions to nonmarket problems like the 
above liability-rule illustration requires entrepreneurial alertness. It is the 
function of entrepreneurs in market contexts to notice when existing prices 
are “wrong” and hence when unexploited profi t opportunities have emerged. 
Similarly, in a nonmarket context we cannot automatically assume “that the 
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available fi gures often approximate reasonably the information we really want” 
(Baumol,  1970 ). Here too the relevant prices are not always in equilibrium, 
and to assume that they are is to commit the fallacy of the misplaced concrete. 
Heuristic tools are not descriptions of reality (Hayek,  1955 , pp. 53–63). 
 Profi ts and process 
 1.  The role of profi ts 
 This is crucial to understanding why and how unexploited opportunities 
(ineffi ciencies) are eventually seized. Profi t, as we defi ne the term, is a pure 
entrepreneurial gain attributable to the possession of  superior knowledge, but 
not imputable to market resources that produce knowledge. It is a residual in 
excess of  the payments to all factors of  production. Ultimately, profi t must 
be attributed to some creative spark of  insight or perhaps to what Kirzner 
has called “alertness” (Kirzner,  1973 , p. 35). A necessary, although not 
suffi cient, condition for the emergence of  pure profi t is market inconsistency, 
i.e., the existence of  more than one price for the same good (Kirzner,  1979a , 
pp. 157–8). This can be in input markets where, for example, in two locations 
the prices of  the same quality apples for apple juice differ by more than 
transportation costs. There can also be inconsistency between output and 
factor markets when the price of  the output is not exactly exhausted by the 
prices of  the inputs. From this perspective, the coordinating function of  the 
entrepreneur is built on his role as an arbitrageur (Kirzner,  1973 , p. 46). In 
an effort to reap arbitrage profi ts he reduces the inconsistencies that exist in 
various markets. 
 As our discussion in the previous section made clear, the elimination of 
ineffi ciencies depends on the existence of  superior information. However, 
why doesn’t the cost of  this superior information equal its value? More pre-
cisely, why don’t the prices of  information-producing resources absorb the 
pure profi ts and leave only normal returns? The answer must be that the sell-
ers of  these resources underestimate (or overestimate in the case of  losses) 
their value. 10 Knowledge that has not yet been produced is diffi cult to evalu-
ate. In fact, the only way to anticipate correctly the value of  such resources 
is to know perfectly what they will produce (Arrow,  1971 , p. 148). In the case 
of  information, however, this is equivalent to saying that it must have  already 
been produced. Under those circumstances, of  course, there would be no 
demand for the resources at all. The essence of  the emergence of  profi ts (and 
losses), then, is the imperfect knowledge about knowledge (Kirzner,  1979b , 
pp. 137–53). 
 2.  Expectations 
 Until now we have somewhat awkwardly abstracted from entrepreneurial 
expectations, but, clearly, they are important in uncovering profi t or coordinative 
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opportunities. This is especially the case when expectations turn out to be 
incorrect. Under those conditions, entrepreneurship may be disequilibrating 
and thus increase market inconsistencies rather than reduce them. In recent 
years, the most important development in this respect has been the rational 
expectations framework. Expectations are rational if they are the predictions of 
the correct economic theory (Muth,  1961 , p. 316). This has been usually taken 
to mean that the subjectively perceived stochastic structure of the economy (or 
the relevant portion of it) is identical to the objective stochastic structure (Barro 
and Fischer,  1976 , p. 156). Furthermore, the psychologically expected values 
of the various distributions must be equal to the mathematically expected 
values (Poole,  1976 , p. 464–5). The rational expectations approach is thus an 
equilibrium theory postulating the existence of perfect stochastic knowledge. 
As such, it says nothing about the process of acquiring such knowledge or 
the dissemination of it as soon as some people have acquired it (O’Driscoll, 
 1979 , pp. 153–76). In fact, in a world of rational expecters who have the same 
attitude toward risk, there can be no tendency or process toward equilibrium 
whatsoever. Fundamentally, rational expectations theory is objectionable 
because it postulates what is in fact being investigated. Furthermore, any test of 
the rational expectations hypothesis must be a  joint test of the correctness of the 
economic theory and of the method by which people make their predictions. 
Divergence between individuals’ expectations and “stochastic truth” is not even 
conceivable. The analysis construct itself makes error an impossibility. Far from 
enhancing our understanding of the formation of expectations, this theory has 
proven to be an unfortunate diversion from the task. 
 3.  Process 
 Attempts rigidly to tie the formation of expectations to some objective 
structure have their roots in a desire to produce (at least ultimately) fairly 
precise or detailed stories about processes. In contrast to this “mechanical 
dynamics,” a truly “expectational dynamics” (Hart,  1951 , p. viii) would not 
produce the same kind of explanation. Instead, it would yield very general 
insight into the equilibrating and disequilibrating processes. Consider, for 
example, the perspective on explanation by von Neumann and Morgenstern 
( 1967 , p. 44, emphasis added) in another context: “[T]he complete answer to 
any specifi c problem consists not in fi nding  a solution, but in determining the 
 set of  all solutions.” When expectations are not “objectifi ed” (i.e., reduced to 
a one-to-one function of objectively specifi able variables) we shall not be able 
to determine them uniquely. Nevertheless, we may be able to understand in 
a general way how expectations are formed and hence to determine a set of 
possible expectations. Even if  an economic model of process contained all 
of the proper variables in the correct relationship to each other, it would still 
amount to a “mere” explanation of the principle (Hayek,  1967 , pp. 15–16). To 
the extent that the variables in the model are expectations and other subjective 
magnitudes (“the state of knowledge”) we will not be able to ascertain anything 
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more than ranges of possible values for these variables. As a consequence, 
the most precise form of process explanation feasible would be that given 
certain values of the exogenous variables, a certain range of values for the 
endogenous variables is possible. Often, however, we may not even be able 
to go this far. The above formulation presupposes the existence of a correct 
model and the only diffi culty lies in plugging in the precise values for the 
exogenous variables. In most cases, even the parameters or structure of the 
model will not be known with exactness. In those cases we may be confi ned to 
constructing a model of such generality that its only observational power is to 
exclude certain qualitatively specifi ed events from happening together (Hayek, 
 1967 , pp. 15–16). For example, we may be able to “predict” 11 that given the 
state of expectations likely to persist over the relevant period, an increase in 
the money supply is incompatible with any increase in the purchasing power 
of money. We might also be able to predict that, under current conditions, 
interest rates cannot fall if  the rate of increase in the money supply is raised. 
Other examples can no doubt be found, but the essence of the point is that, 
due to the subjective elements involved in the processing of objective data, 
dynamic theories can never be as precise as equilibrium theories in the 
determination of a unique or small set of outcomes. This refl ects not a failing 
of the theories so much as the complexity of the subject matter. 
 Money and prices 
 Austrian insights have long been applied to monetary economics. Among the 
original marginalists, Menger alone made monetary analysis an integral part 
of his price theory. His analysis of the origins of money remains the most 
theoretically complete statement of the problem. Modern theorists have yet to 
equal much less surpass his achievement (Menger,  1892 ;  1950 , pp. 257–85). 
 In this section, our concern is chiefl y with a more applied problem, the ana-
lysis of the infl ation process. Austrian monetary work has centered on the impact 
of monetary shocks on  relative process and resource allocation. This is an area 
in which the profession has executed almost a 360-degree turn. In the late 1920s 
and early 1930s, the distributional and allocational effects of monetary distur-
bances were of great theoretical interest to economists. To employ modern ter-
minology, monetary theorists were establishing microfoundations for monetary 
theory. Hayek’s four lectures (“Prices and Production”) on the subject at the 
University of London earned him a University chair – testimony to both their 
brilliance and the subject’s importance to economists (Hayek,  1935 ). 
 With the coming of the Keynesian Revolution, however, professional inter-
est turned elsewhere. The hard work done on the microfoundations of monet-
ary theory, distributional effects of monetary shocks, the behavior of capital 
stocks in monetary disequilibrium, etc., was forgotten. In their stead, the pro-
fession inherited a highly aggregated “Keynesian” macro model, which by its 
very construction and assumptions could not deal with any of the problems 
that seemed so important but a few years before. 
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 The grand synthesis of Walrasian general equilibrium theory and Keynesian 
macrotheory produced even more abstract macromodels, which retained 
nonetheless their highly aggregative structure. Among the abstractions intro-
duced was that of “neutral money.” This assumption by itself  ensured that 
no analytic treatment of the issues mentioned above would be possible (Lutz, 
 1969 ; O’Driscoll,  1977 , pp. 49–56). Hayek had invented the term “neutral 
money” and delimited the concept as part of a discussion of the goals of 
monetary policy. The context was a world of very nonneutral money. A neu-
tral monetary policy was among the policy  goals . Yet subsequent neoclassical 
literature turned the problem upside down by  assuming neutrality of money, 
thereby abstracting from all the problems resulting from money’s nonneutral-
ity. The Austrian (and many would say the Keynesian) message was lost in the 
process. Monetarist models followed in the same mold, so no real competition 
on this issue existed. 
 Rampant infl ation in the 1970s brought the allocational and distributional 
effects of infl ation back to the profession’s attention. An infl ation-ridden 
world does not look faintly neoclassical. Thus far the work has been empiric-
ally oriented (Bordo,  1979 ; Parks,  1978 ; Vining and Elwertowski,  1976 ). We 
would argue that not only are theoretical underpinnings needed, but that the 
work of the Austrians can supply a good deal of the needed analysis. 
 Writing on money, Austrians have naturally seen the effects of monet-
ary disturbances being mediated through entrepreneurial expectations. For 
instance, changes in the growth rate of the money stock alter the profi tabil-
ity of investments. Mises, Hayek and others focused on the distributional 
(“Cantillon”) effects of monetary shocks, together with an integration of 
capital-theoretic considerations. Entrepreneurs receiving additional credit-
money as loans gain purchasing power at the expense of population segments 
which do not initially benefi t from the net additions to credit and money. 12 
The monetary expansion not only transfers purchasing power but also alters 
relative prices by depressing  real interest rates (even if   nominal rates increase 
for expectational reasons) (O’Driscoll,  1979 , pp. 163–8). Investments hitherto 
unprofi table become profi table, along with complementary investments. But 
investments in processes geared to higher interest rates will generally be ren-
dered less profi table or even unprofi table (Hayek,  1935 , pp. 32–104). 
 Two crucial points must be emphasized. First, the assumed monetary disturb-
ance has altered cost-price ratios. Entrepreneurs’ expectations change because 
of relative price and interest rate signals. They need not suffer from any illu-
sions. If, as rational expectations theorists claim, Keynesian macrotheory relied 
on unexploited profi t opportunities, the Austrian analysis of economic fl uctua-
tions depends on entrepreneurs exploiting perceived profi t opportunities. 
 The second point concerns the unsustainability of  infl ation. The changes 
in the pattern of  investment (Hayek’s “material structure of  the process 
of  production”) can only be sustained so long as infl ation is at least sus-
tained, if  not accelerated. (This would, of  course, mean accelerating mon-
etary growth.) In order that entrepreneurs can complete new investments, 
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they must continue receiving net additions to purchasing power through 
net credit creation fi nanced by monetary expansion. A production process 
involves many complementary investments, each of  which is economically 
viable only if  all are completed and maintained. Real capital considerations 
thus require larger and larger net additions to entrepreneurs’ purchasing 
power, i.e., accelerating infl ation. Accelerating infl ation is not, however, sus-
tainable  ad infi nitum . Hence, investments dependent on continuing infl ation 
are not sustainable. These nonsustainable investments represent  mal invest-
ment and capital market discoordination. Intertemporal tastes (e.g., time 
preference) and intertemporal production plans have not been coordinated 
(Hayek,  1970 , pp. 135–56). 
 The movement in price averages or indices is epiphenomenal. Observed 
changes in real activity are a concomitant of the changes in real prices. When 
Hayek fi rst presented this analysis at the University of London, he held strong 
empirical hypotheses about the precise nature of the relative-price changes 
and their impact on the structure or processes of production. He also still 
employed the average period of production concept. Changes in real interest 
rates accordingly had defi nite effects on the length of the production process. 
As we discussed above, Austrians (including Hayek) abandoned such reason-
ing shortly after these lectures. But the essence of Hayek’s analysis remains 
untouched. 
 Infl ationary (and defl ationary) shocks are exogenous forces in capital mar-
kets, being independent of notional or planned saving and investment. In pla-
cing a wedge between intertemporal consumption and investment decisions, 
monetary disturbances lead to intertemporal discoordination and cyclical 
fl uctuations. The variegated nature of capital, a constantly changing fi nan-
cial structure, and other variations within each cycle make it diffi cult to make 
any but the most general statements about cycles in general. However dis-
parate cycles may be, they can still be described as the product of infl ation-
induced discoordination. Indeed, the theme of discoordination has strong 
support in recent Austrian and non-Austrian literature (Leijonhufvud,  1975 ; 
O’Driscoll,  1979 ). Some of the recent empirical work has partly vindicated 
earlier Austrian work on the intensity of the 1929–33 depression (Gallaway 
and Vedder,  1979 ). More interaction between the existing theoretical litera-
ture (Austrian work being included here) and recent empirical and historical 
work is needed. 
 Concluding remarks 
 In the course of this survey we have developed the central Austrian themes 
as logical implications of a coherent research program: to make social 
phenomena intelligible in terms of human action. This has led us to consider 
a wide range of economic issues from subjectivity to uncertainty to dynamic 
processes. The Austrian research program, however, is not fully developed in 
all of these areas; in fact, in some it is only a suggestion of a way to proceed. 
What is Austrian economics? 43
Nevertheless, the Austrian tradition offers an alternative path of not fully 
explored insights to those who have become disillusioned with neoclassical 
orthodoxy. That alternative rejects both the excessive mechanization of 
individual choice characteristics of contemporary price theory and the 
inappropriate aggregation of many quasi-Keynesian models. The Austrian 
framework is consistent with genuine, nonmechanistic choice and the 
decomposition of social wholes into the human planning from which they 
arise. Surely these are still the “noteworthy, perhaps the most noteworthy, 
problem(s) of the social sciences” (Menger,  1963 , p. 146). 
 Notes 
 1  However, in their effort to reduce signifi cantly the importance of subjective elem-
ents, Becker and Stigler assume the homogeneity of tastes (Becker and Stigler, 
 1977 , pp. 76–90). 
 2  Here we are assuming single-valued expectations. 
 3  It is important to understand that we are not claiming that the equilibrium  state 
is incompatible with perfect foresight. In this situation there is no logical prob-
lem because everything, by defi nition, is unchanging – including the actions of 
individuals. 
 4  The “perfect” foresight assumed in this illustration is perfect in the sense that A 
knows what B will in fact do  if A does such and such, etc. It does not include 
knowledge of the equilibrium plans. This is because that kind of knowledge would 
make process impossible since everyone would  immediately proceed to the equilib-
rium, i.e., they would never be in disequilibrium in the fi rst place. 
 5  By “homogeneous” is meant that the relative frequency of an outcome is invariant 
with respect to random subsequences. 
 6  The plans must be consistent with each other and with the objective 
environment. 
 7  Actually, we might not recognize it if  we saw it. See Machlup ( 1967 , pp. 56–9). 
 8  This produces some paradoxes similar to those in the Holmes-Moriarty example 
above. 
 9  We are indebted to Israel Kirzner for this term. 
 10  Where the entrepreneur uses only his own resources their opportunity cost must be 
below their value in the current use. This would seem to imply that profi ts are really 
a rent. However, rents exist in equilibrium but profi ts do not. The entrepreneurial 
“rent” must arise out of uncertainty. For the view that the entrepreneur,  qua entre-
preneur, uses no resources, see Kirzner ( 1973 , p. 40). 
 11  The work “predict” is being used in its technical broad meaning. A model “pre-
dicts” when it yields a certain fi nite number of events as logical implications of 
that model. Hence models about past events do not forecast but they “predict” or 
“retrodict.” The discussion in the text presupposes that one goal of process ana-
lysis is to clarify actual, historical processes. 
 12  The existence of contracts is a suffi cient but not necessary condition for the distri-
butional effects to emerge. 
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 Introduction 
 Time and ignorance after ten years 
 Mario J.  Rizzo 1 
 [W]e all try hard to avoid error … Yet to avoid error is a poor ideal: if  we 
do not dare to tackle problems which are so diffi cult that error is almost 
unavoidable, then there will be no growth of knowledge. In fact, it is from our 
boldest theories,  including those which are erroneous , that we learn most. 
 Karl Popper (1979, p. 186) 
 In her recent history of the contemporary Austrian school, Karen Vaughn 
says that after 1985, the original publication date of the present book, “it [was] 
impossible to think of Austrian economics as anything but the economics 
of time and ignorance” ( 1994 , p. 134). While it would be too generous to 
attribute this development primarily to our book, her statement does express 
an important truth. Austrian economics has changed in the past ten years 
and that change has been positive. Austrians have now become among the 
most creative, innovative and least doctrinaire of economists. 2 While the 
neoclassical mainstream continues to spin its wheels, “Austrians” (meaning 
the broad subjectivist and market-process school of thought) are asking and 
answering deep questions at the frontier of social-scientifi c knowledge. 3 They 
understand that application of the mechanistic model of nineteenth-century 
physics may well have reached the limits of its useful contributions. They are 
not afraid to challenge many widely, but passively, accepted beliefs among 
economists. They know that the twentieth century is almost at an end and that 
not all of its intellectual developments have been benefi cial. They understand 
that a new century will demand not only “new” techniques (perhaps many of 
them being old techniques) but also new divisions among academic disciplines 
(Rizzo,  1992 , pp. 246–8). The questions and answers proffered by many 
of today’s economists might comfortably fi nd a home as a kind of “social 
physics” (Comte,  1988 , p. 13). 4 On the other hand, some of the efforts of 
Austrians and others whose conception of economics is rooted in the realistic 
intentions and purposes of agents might be appropriately considered, without 
derogation, a “philosophical” economics. 5 
 For our present purposes, however, it is important to understand the 
sense in which Austrian economics has become the economics of  time and 
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ignorance. The reader will recall that the term “economics of  time and 
ignorance” is derived from Keynes’ “dark forces of  time and ignorance.” 
Of  course, this does not mean that Austrian economics has become the eco-
nomics of  John Maynard Keynes. (How ironic that would be!) Although 
we fi nd elements in Keynes’ analysis that are subjectivist, deeply insightful 
and congenial to our way of  thinking, we are not Keynesians. We choose 
Keynes’ expression because he understood, at least much of  the time, the 
importance of  the basic problems with which real time confronts individ-
ual actors. To say that Austrian economics is the economics of  time and 
ignorance is to say that it is the economics of   coping with the problems 
posed by real time and radical ignorance. Although individuals are not 
paralyzed by these problems, they do not automatically or completely over-
come them. The behavior generated by this predicament in which human 
beings fi nd themselves is a source of  market phenomena and institutions. 
It is also the source of  prudential limits to our institutions, both markets 
and governmental. Human beings are “prisoners of  time” (Shackle,  1970 , 
p. 21). This prison acts not only as a constraint (the allocational aspect of 
time) but also as a formulator of  experience, thus generating and limiting 
our knowledge. 
 If  we take time seriously, it is hard to imagine Austrian economics as 
merely “a supplement to neoclassical economics.” This represents the least 
the Austrians have to offer (Vaughn,  1994 , pp. 165–8). Some neoclassical 
economists may be able to make improvements in their analyses by formal-
izing (and thus transforming) the insights of Menger, Hayek or others. But 
this is not the essence of the Austrian contribution to knowledge about the 
social world. Austrians ask different kinds of questions and provide different 
kinds of answers. This is not to say that they may not sometimes ask the same 
or similar questions or that their vocabulary might not be at least superfi -
cially similar to that of the neoclassical mainstream. It is to say, however, 
that Austrian economics is essentially a different enterprise from neoclassical 
social physics. 
 The ways in which Austrian economics has changed over the past ten years 
focus, as we shall see, on the ideas of time and ignorance.  Why have time and 
ignorance become so important within Austrian economics? 
 Most, if  not all, Austrians have argued that subjectivism, as a substantive 
doctrine and as a method, lies at the heart of the unique Austrian contribu-
tion. The theory of subjective value as pioneered by Menger, B ö hm-Bawerk 
and Wieser was the fi rst lesson the Austrians taught the economics profes-
sion. The subjectivism of value soon expanded into a more general  verstehe-
nde approach in which the actor’s problem situation is defi ned as he 6 perceives 
it to be. (This is not to say, of course, that his perceptions bear no relation to 
an underlying reality.) As Austrian economics increasingly became concerned 
with the coordinative properties of entrepreneurship and discovery, questions 
of real time had to surface. Coordination is not simply a matter of meshing 
activities at a point in time or across a time span frozen by the absence of 
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unexpected change. So the central issue emerged: the meaning of subjectivism 
in a world of real time. 
 Subjectivism in time (“dynamic subjectivism”) encompasses what Edmund 
Husserl ( 1964 ) called “internal time consciousness” and Henri Bergson called 
“la dur é e r é elle” or real duration ( 1910 , pp. 99–128). 7 This is consciousness 
of the passage of time or of the fl ow of events. As such it requires that con-
sciousness of the present moment manifest within itself  a dynamic tendency. 
Both the past and the future must inhere in that moment through memory 
and expectation. In the static conception of time the present is a virtual stop – 
the very negation of passage or fl ow. In the dynamic conception it is virtual 
movement from past to future or, more precisely, from memory to expect-
ation. The mnemic link to the past is responsible for the continuity of the fl ow. 
But the fl ow itself  arises out of the contrast between the remembered past and 
the expected future. Without the novelty of the future (seen as “novel” only 
in contrast to the remembered past) there could be no sense of temporal pas-
sage. 8 Thus, subjectivism in time or time consciousness entails novelty 9 and 
its correlative, ignorance. On the other hand, characterizing time as strictly 
homogeneous, that is, without novelty, leads to a denial of time consciousness 
or subjectivism in time. 
 The denial of time consciousness is inherently self-contradictory from the 
perspective of the agent. This is because the instantaneous (or mathematical) 
present is “specious.” “Where is it, this present? It has melted in our grasp, 
fl ed ere we could touch it, gone in the instant of becoming” (James,  1890 , 
p. 608). We simply cannot perceive a present apart from memory and antici-
pation. The perceptible present, on the other hand, “is the vivid fringe of 
memory tinged with anticipation” (Whitehead,  1961 , p. 116). Thus, “[t]here 
is no sharp distinction either between memory and the present immediacy or 
between the present immediacy and anticipation” (p. 112). Time conscious-
ness or real duration must be a fl ow because, without the  continuity associated 
with the span of memory to anticipation, there is no temporal perception, no 
action and hence no subject matter for economics. 
 Outside of real time, all that is perceived would appear as if  it were at a 
single instant, including all causes and effects. 10 Since action must presup-
pose causal effi cacy, the simultaneity of cause (i.e., human agency) and effect 
amounts to a denial of the possibility of action. If  every effect we as agents 
(or causes) desire to bring about has already been brought about, then there 
is no need or possibility of action. Static models thus contain two concepts 
implicitly at war with each other: the specious present and action. While self-
contradictory models can sometimes be useful (Mises,  1966 , p. 236), they are 
obviously not ideal because any attempt to think through all of their implica-
tions can lead us into an intellectual quagmire. 
 A relatively simple example will show, from another perspective, the incom-
patibility of the specious present and action. Consider a buyer responding 
to a fall in the price of an intertemporally substitutable product. Should he 
purchase more now or should he wait because the fall in price is just a sign 
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of further declines to come? The behavioral implications of a change in the 
current variable depend on the agent’s expectation of the future value of that 
variable. This expectation is, in turn, partly dependent on the agent’s previ-
ous experience or, more precisely, on his memory of it (Lindahl,  1939 , p. 36; 
Starbuck and Milliken,  1988 , p. 40). So the present which has meaning for 
action is not a specious present, but a present extended to encompass both 
memory and anticipation. 
 Austrian economics has become the economics of time and ignorance, not 
only for “essentialist” reasons such as those discussed above, but also because 
of its practical attempt, discussed below, to deal with problems of coord-
ination and entrepreneurship. This requires analysis in time, thus implying 
novelty and ignorance. Given the entrepreneurial turn in Austrian economics 
(real) time and ignorance  had to be the next step. 
 What changes have the ideas of time and ignorance wrought in Austrian 
economics and in related areas? Before we can answer this question the reader 
must consider three general points. 
 First, Austrian economics is still in the process of self-creation so no nar-
row defi nition of the subject will capture the signifi cant changes under way. If  
we were to defi ne Austrian economics so narrowly as to include only the work 
of those few whose honest vision is fairly restricted, then much of what we say 
would be untrue about such an Austrian economics. 
 Second, more importantly, a diffi culty in defi ning Austrian economics nar-
rowly is that it would constitute a stagnant and uninteresting school. It is a 
consideration such as this, as well as the related capacity for growth in know-
ledge, that should be paramount in identifying a school. Austrian economics 
 is broad because it  needs to be broad in order to be interesting and in order 
to grow in the knowledge it conveys. Narrow Austrian economics cannot ask 
interesting questions and cannot give interesting answers. 
 Third, in many respects developments in the broader area of subjectivist 
economics are more important for the future of Austrian economics than 
those within a narrower range of such thought. This is because gains from 
intellectual interaction are greatest when, among approaches within the same 
or similar research programs, there are important differences in perspective. 
Lawson ( 1994b , pp. 534–5) suggests, for example, that, substantive differences 
notwithstanding, Institutionalism, Post-Keynesianism and Austrian econom-
ics share a common philosophical perspective and “perhaps … it is time for 
some fuller reconciliation between [these] traditions.” 11 
 In the past ten years there have been many important developments in 
Austrian and related thought. It is impossible to list them all here (and exclu-
sion of some should not necessarily be taken as disapproval), but there are 
four developments that appear to be fecund and that are closely related to the 
themes of this book. 
 (1)  A more profound recognition of the importance of disequilibrating 12  forces . 
While most of the older work in Austrian economics certainly did recognize 
that not all market adjustments are equilibrating, very little emphasis was 
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placed on this recognition and its implications were certainly not explored. 
It was as if  disequilibration were not an “essential” feature of the market 
economy: equilibration is essential, while disequilibration is random or “acci-
dental.” Whatever incentive-driven asymmetries between equilibration and 
disequilibration exist ( viz , agents seek profi ts and not losses), error is not an 
accidental feature of a world in real time. The subjective perception of the 
passage of time inherently or essentially involves genuine surprise. Unless 
we quite artifi cially restrict the system to favorable surprises only, error and 
disequilibration will be inevitable and therefore an essential part of market 
“adjustment.” 13 
 Today many, if  not all, Austrians accept the importance of disequilibrating 
tendencies in markets (Vaughn,  1994 , pp. 139–61; Prychitko,  1993a , pp. 372–
4). These tendencies are not simply the result of changes in the exogenous data 
but emanate from the source of equilibrating behavior, that is, the indetermin-
ate or creative response to perceived profi t opportunities. “The same active 
mental processes which are taken to adjust to change once it has occurred, 
will also originate change” (High,  1986 , p. 115). 14 The very process of adjust-
ment – or rather attempted adjustment – will produce errors that undermine 
equilibration. If  this were not the case and if  only systematic equilibrating ten-
dencies existed, then money and, more generally, market institutions would 
tend to disappear (Boettke  et al .  1994 , p. 64). Since data changes would then 
be the only reason for the continuance of institutions, we should expect them 
to be relatively unimportant in stationary or traditional societies. In fact, just 
the opposite is the case. 
 Israel Kirzner, who for many years resisted acknowledging the importance 
of disequilibrating tendencies, has now undergone somewhat of a change in 
thinking, as we shall see further below. The original exposition of his theory 
of entrepreneurship is completely spatialized. Profi ts emerge from the price 
differentials for a single product in a single market at a single moment in time. 
“For me the changes the entrepreneur initiates are  always toward the hypo-
thetical state of equilibrium” (Kirzner  1973 , p. 73, emphasis added). Without 
changes in the underlying data, the long-run movement of the market is 
toward equilibrium or a state of zero arbitrage differentials. In Kirzner ( 1982 , 
pp. 153–4) this position is reaffi rmed even in an analysis of uncertainty: “It 
should be clear that nothing essential is lost [in the original model] when our 
picture of the market is expanded to include many commodities and, in par-
ticular, the passage of time.” An atemporal market “process” is alleged to be 
essentially the same as a market process in real time. Such a view is plaus-
ible because the adjusting changes are seen to have no impact on the data 
to which they are adjusting. Thus Kirzner can make the even more amazing 
claim that it is on the tendency for (presumably constant) opportunities to be 
noticed that “our belief  in a  determinate market process is founded” ( 1976b , 
p. 121, emphasis added). The market process is determinate in the sense that 
all systematic movements are in the direction of the implicit equilibrium cor-
responding to the initial data. 
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 In the fi nal analysis, however, this equilibration-always view is untenable. 
A plausible (albeit moderated) case for it can be made only in circumstances 
where disequilibrating forces are exogenous in origin. Then we might say that 
entrepreneurial changes, while not  always in the direction of equilibrium, tend 
in that direction – in the sense that, with frozen data, the system may ultim-
ately become consistent with that data. This, however, is not a stable intellec-
tual position. If  economics is truly part of a more general humane science of 
rational choice (“praxeology”) then more and more of the data will continue 
to be transformed into endogenous “variables.” We have already witnessed 
the endogenzation of technological choice, knowledge of resource availabil-
ity – as well as the production of resources themselves, tastes defi ned over 
market goods, and, of course, the institutional setting itself. If  change does 
not emanate from outside the system (because there is nothing outside), then 
either (1) there is no change at all, or (2) change is generated entirely from 
within, and hence equilibrium must be ruptured by endogenous processes. To 
the extent, therefore, that the equilibration-always view eschews endogenous 
disruption of coordination, it must degenerate into the complete-stasis pos-
ition of extreme neoclassical economics. There will be no exogenous shocks to 
which entrepreneurial adjustments must be made. As a consequence, the task 
of economics will be quite rightly seen as moving from a framework in which 
entrepreneurship is important to one in which it is of no (or little) import-
ance. Economics would, in this view, progress only to the extent that it reduces 
its dependence on the entrepreneurial function. 15 
 Kirzner has not, to my knowledge, fully understood the diffi culty into which 
he has gotten himself. Nevertheless, he has recently emphasized the impact of 
erroneous entrepreneurial acts on the process of adjustment (Kirzner,  1992 , 
pp. 31–7). He carefully distinguishes “true” (objective) underlying future real-
ities from “mistake-induced” realities. The former refl ect consumer prefer-
ences that are uncontaminated by the latter entrepreneurial mistakes along the 
adjustment path. Consider an example discussed by Kirzner ( 1992 , pp. 29–31). 
Suppose that the objective situation (the initial data) is that there exists sig-
nifi cant unsatisfi ed demand for shoes. Some entrepreneurs, however, misjudge 
the data and construct factories instead to satisfy the less urgent demand for 
bicycles.  After these factories are  built, other entrepreneurs sell the additional 
steel that is needed to make bicycles. Kirzner asks the question: is the activ-
ity of the sellers of steel “coordinating” even though resources should have 
been used, in the fi rst instance, to build shoe machinery? His answer is “yes” 
because the steel entrepreneurs are responding to the data that is currently 
relevant – the new data involving the mistaken entrepreneurial judgment to 
build bicycle factories. “The most useful place  now for the steel is in fact in 
the bicycle industry. The original realities … have no relevance  now, and have, 
indeed, correctly now failed to infl uence the allocation of resources” (Kirzner, 
 1992 , p. 30). The original error – the construction of bicycle factories – is the 
basis for the emergence of profi t opportunities that direct resources into the 
production of bicycles. 
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 As we see it, sometimes errors that occur in the market process are self-
reinforcing in a special sense. Entrepreneurial errors along the adjustment 
path can lead to a cumulative departure away from the equilibrium implicit in 
the initial data, that is, the data which exists in putative independence of mar-
ket adjustments. While it may be true that once the fi rst entrepreneurial error 
is committed, further “errors” relative to the initial data are warranted from 
a short-run welfare point of view, this is not the central issue here. 16 What is 
at stake is whether the market, to a greater or lesser extent, generates its own 
equilibria or, in other words, whether equilibrium is “defi ned in the process 
of its emergence” (Buchanan,  1986 , p. 73). In Kirzner’s story above, the shoe 
market will not be moving in the direction of the equilibrium implicit in the 
initial data. It will, instead, be moving in the direction of an equilibrium that 
has  endogenously undergone change. 17 The equilibrium has changed because 
of entrepreneurial errors in the process of adjusting to the initial data. Thus 
this example supports, albeit unintentionally, Buchanan’s insight concerning 
the emergent nature of equilibria. 
 Despite this recent development in his views, Kirzner does not appear to 
believe that entrepreneurial errors are a necessary part of processes in real 
time. One gets the impression that, unlike the coordinating activities of entre-
preneurs, errors are just so much happenstance. Moreover, the market pro-
cess is still portrayed as moving in the direction of  an equilibrium even if  it 
is not the initial equilibrium. Regardless of where we situate Kirzner in the 
growing recognition of the importance of disequilibrating forces, many other 
Austrians have, as we have seen, participated in this intellectual change. 
 It is sometimes argued that this development has not been salutary because 
too much emphasis has been placed on disequilibration and the possibility of 
disorder. G. L. S Shackle and Ludwig Lachmann, for example, were accused 
by some of intellectual nihilism. There is a profound misunderstanding here 
(for which these authors were partly to blame). In Lachmann’s earlier work 
( 1977 , pp. 181–93) there was a clear understanding of both equilibrating and 
disequilibrating forces with an invitation to examine the properties of vari-
ous markets in terms of the relative strength of these forces. 18 If  in later years 
Lachmann’s emphasis ( 1986 ) shifted to an examination of disequilibrating 
forces, the most plausible explanation is that his (largely) Austrian audience 
needed to hear this far more than another lesson on the equilibrating char-
acter of markets. A similar point might be made about Shackle since his 
intended audience was the (neoclassical) profession at large which needed the 
disequilibration lesson even more than the Austrians needed it. 19 
 The ultimate signifi cance of this more profound recognition of the import-
ance of disequilibrating forces is an increasing focus on the conditions neces-
sary for equilibrating behavior, and, ultimately, on the different senses of 
equilibrium. 
 (2)  Greater attention to the prerequisites for equilibrating behavior . If  equili-
bration cannot simply be taken for granted, in the sense that profi t oppor-
tunities – in and of themselves – are suffi cient to ensure movements toward 
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equilibrium, then it is necessary to discover the cooperating conditions that 
are needed to make equilibration more (or less) likely. But before this can 
be done we must understand that different concepts of equilibrium have dif-
ferent knowledge requirements. These requirements differ not only in the 
content but also in their severity, and therefore in the likelihood that an eco-
nomic system will move in the direction of the equilibrium described by the 
concept. The more complex the knowledge requirements in equilibrium the 
more complex the knowledge requirements of successful moves  toward that 
equilibrium. 
 At one end of the “continuum,” the concept of individual equilibrium, 
without common knowledge across individuals, is almost a tautology. (The 
qualifi er “almost” is used because under conditions of uncertainty there is 
an entrepreneurial element in discovering the most effi cient means to ends.) 
Maintenance of such an individual equilibrium over time, requires that the 
data generated by the economy does not disrupt the agent’s expectations. In 
the absence of common factual knowledge, agents can have their individual 
expectations confi rmed while holding incompatible theories. 
 Interpersonal equilibria, on the other hand, have more stringent knowledge 
requirements. Market-day coordination on the stock market, for example, 
requires knowledge of offers to buy and offers to sell. Yet there are, and indeed 
must be, divergent expectations about the future value of the stock. Mutual 
compatibility of individual plans  over time requires convergent expectations 
among those who are engaged in exchange (otherwise their plans would be 
based on inconsistent premises). Finally, a  full plan coordination not only 
requires mutual compatibility of plans of exchanging agents but also the 
complete exhaustion of gains from trade. The prerequisites for equilibration 
will thus vary in content and likelihood depending on the concept of equi-
librium in use. A detailed examination of these is beyond the scope of this 
Introduction. Our attention shall be largely focused, therefore, on the more 
general considerations common to a wide variety of equilibrium concepts. 
 Some of the conditions prerequisite to equilibration can be analyzed at the 
aggregate level while others are more obviously and fruitfully analyzed at the 
individual level. At the aggregate level, we can think of institutions as “points 
of orientation” (Lachmann,  1971 , p. 38) that are likely to lead to relatively 
compatible actions and expectations. At the individual level, we can assess the 
information requirements for increased coordination (e.g., Hayek’s “know-
ledge of the particular circumstances of time and place” ( 1948b , p. 80)). The 
former consists of general or enduring pieces of knowledge, while the latter 
consists of knowledge relevant for so short a time period that it cannot have 
been congealed into institutions. 
 In a number of articles Peter Boettke ( 1990a ,  b ;  1994 ) explores the epi-
stemic properties of alternative institutional arrangements. Institutions are, 
in an important sense, congealed social knowledge. By following institution-
ally sanctioned patterns of behavior, separate individuals are able to coord-
inate more completely their actions and plans. This is because institutions 
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often limit the options available to an individual thereby reducing the uncer-
tainty about what others are going to do. Furthermore, to the extent that 
institutions represent approximate, if  not optimal, adaptations to the object-
ive environment, the individual plans will also be roughly coordinated with 
that environment. 
 On the other hand, institutions which encourage what we call (in  Chapter 5 ) 
“time-dependent uncertainty” can be discoordinating. Suppose speculator  A 
expects speculator  B to place a high valuation on an asset (e.g., the stock of 
a fi rm) but neither of them has any idea about how much consumers will 
indirectly value the fi rm. It is quite possible that the underlying institutional 
arrangement, that is, the stock market, will generate a great deal of uncer-
tainty as people try to guess what others are thinking about their thoughts 
(and so forth). If, however, the speculators are really trying to guess what 
others are concluding about the current and future decisions of  consumers 
and there are some shared beliefs about these, then institutions may decrease, 
rather than increase, uncertainty. This is because knowledge or knowledge 
surrogates are disseminated more quickly when price offers and actual trans-
actions are made manifest in an organized setting. 
 Institutions are also less likely to enhance coordination in the context of 
“big players.” In a series of papers Koppl and coauthors (Koppl and Yeager, 
 1994 ; Butos and Koppl,  1993 ; Koppl and Langlois,  1994 ) have argued that 
the presence of agents who are large and relatively less sensitive to the discip-
line of profi t and loss reduce the reliability of expectations. There are at least 
two reasons for this. First, the mass of agents must try to predict the idiosyn-
crasies of a single individual (e.g., the timing of short-term interest rate rec-
ommendations by the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board). Second, the 
behavior of big players is more likely to be suboptimal or maladapted than 
that of players who are more strictly subject to the discipline of profi t and 
loss. Consider, for example, the dubious behavior of a central banker seek-
ing to keep the international value of his currency from falling in the face of 
accelerating domestic infl ation. Furthermore, to the extent that governments 
try to insulate agents against the possibility of failure, then they can create a 
big-player effect through relatively small players. Such is the consequence of 
federal deposit insurance on the stability of the banking structure. Under this 
system of “insurance” risk is shifted by the big player (the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation) from the banks who create it to depositors. This 
means that the banks will incur more risk than is appropriate and the bank-
ing system will become more unstable than otherwise (Clair and O’Driscoll, 
 1993 , pp. 47–8). This instability is ultimately a result of the institution-creat-
ing behavior of the big players. 
 Within a given institutional context, equilibration requires the dissem-
ination and utilization of transient knowledge. The knowledge-enhancing 
movements that can occur in disequilibrium contexts vary in their complexity 
and diffi culty. The nearer the system is to overall equilibrium – that is, the 
smaller the deviations of prices, quantities and expectations are from their 
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“appropriate” magnitudes – the more likely individual agents are to make 
correct or equilibrating decisions. The farther the system is from overall equi-
librium, on the other hand, the more complex is the system of deviations from 
appropriate magnitudes and hence the more likely agents are to err in their 
adjustments (Rizzo,  1990 , p. 25). 20 
 It might appear that in far-from-equilibrium situations there will be larger 
profi t incentives to overcome – perhaps completely – the greater information 
diffi culties. If  this were true it would not  follow (except  ceteris paribus ) that 
equilibration is less likely far from equilibrium. Information diffi culties, how-
ever, are not perfectly offset by the greater potential profi ts. The distance from 
equilibrium to which we are referring is not primarily that of a single price 
deviating from its equilibrium value. Instead, we are referring to a situation 
of many markets in states of disequilibrium. In such a circumstance there will 
be complex distortions among these many markets. To obtain the large prof-
its associated with signifi cant moves toward equilibrium a number of prices 
must be changed simultaneously. Even if  these were to happen, however, a 
single decision-maker would not be able to appropriate these large profi ts. He 
would earn the smaller profi ts associated with the movement of a single price 
because related prices would be beyond his reach. 21 
 (3)  Growing attention to the idea of endogenously produced change . 22 The 
essence of the contemporary Austrian research program (or, more precisely, 
of its positive heuristic) is the development of the idea of endogenously pro-
duced change. This lies at the heart of the “genetic-causal tradition” (Cowan 
and Rizzo,  1995 ) in economic thought which, although certainly not confi ned 
to Austrian work, received its most self-conscious elaboration by Austrians, 
especially by the neglected Hans Mayer ( 1994 ). Schumpeter ( 1934 , p. 63) was 
also one of the fi rst to lay explicit stress on the concept of endogenous change, 
but failed to convince the economics profession as a whole of its importance. 
A careful examination of the nature and role of “entrepreneurial alertness” in 
contemporary Austrian theory will show that only by elaborating the idea of 
endogenously produced change can Austrians be successful in drawing out the 
full implications of their contribution and in differentiating their product from 
that of the neoclassical mainstream. Alertness, that is, the discovery propensity, 
although exogenous in certain respects, is switched on by profi t opportunities 
within the economic system. Nevertheless, the way in which alert entrepreneurs 
move from knowledge of the current state of the world to knowledge of future 
opportunities is largely unexplored. Austrians must show, obviously in gen-
eral terms, fi rst, how knowledge is disseminated within a disequilibrium econ-
omy and, second, how the economic process itself generates completely new 
knowledge. Both the dissemination of knowledge (“subjective novelty”) and 
the generation of completely new knowledge (“objective novelty”) are sources 
of change within an economy (Witt,  1992 , pp. 223–4). 23 While the fi rst issue is 
extremely important, our main concern was and is with the second. 
 Brian Loasby’s emphasis on research programs, discussed below, and elab-
orated recently ( 1991 ), is an important step in the direction of understanding 
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the generation of new knowledge. Still more recently, David Harper ( 1994 , 
 1996 ) has comprehensively applied the broad Popperian framework to the 
phenomenon of entrepreneurship. Among many interesting results, Harper 
shows that since the solution to any given problem necessarily gives rise to 
new problems, entrepreneurial learning can never cease or settle into a state 
of rest. Thus, not only will knowledge continually grow but it will grow in a 
coherent way arising out of the previous problem situation (or, at least, so it 
would seem most of the time). Attempts to solve current problems,  whether 
successful or not, will give rise to new problems and thence to new knowledge. 
The history of technological change is replete with examples of this phenom-
enon (Rosenberg,  1969 ). 
 There is also an older tradition, to which Loasby ( 1991 , pp. 11–12) refers 
us, that holds promise for understanding endogenous change. This is the idea 
of dynamic increasing returns in its original Smithian version. Unlike the 
more recent version of Brian Arthur (e.g.,  1990 ) changes in technology are 
not the result of random shocks at some early stage of technological devel-
opment. In Adam Smith’s version the specialization and concomitant div-
ision of labor directs the individual’s attention to certain problems and hence 
to certain kinds of solutions. These problems are actually opportunities for 
increased productive effi ciency to which intimate knowledge of the product-
ive process (through division of labor and specialization) gives rise. There is 
nothing automatic about this growth of knowledge. What the (static) division 
of labor does is make the perception of some technological opportunity for 
gain (“the problem”) more likely and by increasing the agent’s understanding 
of possible technologies renders the solution more likely. 
 More importantly, it is not only the division of labor,  having already 
occurred , that endogenously generates the production of new knowledge. In 
a world of real time and novelty, the division of labor is not simply a func-
tion of the (exogenous) size of the market. Greater division of labor – and 
hence improvements in technology via Smithian increasing returns – does not 
need to be generated by an exogenous shock. In real time the homogeneous 
differentiates into heterogeneity spontaneously. 24 So relatively unspecialized 
and undivided labor (the homogeneous) becomes more and more specialized 
and divided (the differentiated heterogeneity) as productive knowledge grows 
in the passage of time. As a result there will also be continual growth in the 
technologies inspired by the ever-new divisions and specializations of labor. 
This is an application of the Principle of the Instability of the Homogeneous. 
As earlier discussed by Herbert Spencer ( 1888 , pp. 401–2), it did require initi-
ation by an exogenous shock, but in more modern discussions by complexity 
theorists it became a principle of spontaneous differentiation (Prigogine and 
Stengers,  1984 , p. 38). Thus any  given division of labor with its consequent 
opportunities for the growth of knowledge will not simply play itself  out and 
settle in an equilibrium. It will continually generate new divisions of labor 
which will, in turn, produce ever-fresh discoveries. This is a reason that overall 
equilibrium is inherently unstable in the long run. Equilibrium makes possible 
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the very circumstances (i.e., divided labor and specialization) 25 that generate a 
change in knowledge and hence an undoing of the equilibrium. Spencer’s law, 
cited above, is actually the Principle of the Instability of Equilibrium. 26 
 (4)  Attention to the reconciliation of equilibrium and unpredictable change . 
An economics  in time must have an equilibrium construct that is in time as 
well. Hayek tried to marry equilibrium and time. As we show in  Chapter 5 , 
however, the conception of  time was, in his earlier work, largely static. As 
such, Hayek’s fi rst “marriage” was not a happy one; it does not carry us 
very far along the contemporary Austrian research program. In Hayek’s later 
work ( 1973 , pp. 98–110;  1976 , pp. 114–25) the reconciliation among equilib-
rium, time and unpredictable change is more successful. Hayek distinguishes 
between the legal framework, upon which the relative certainty of  expecta-
tions is founded, and the system of market exchanges within that framework, 
in which there is no certainty of  expectations. Because of  the law’s abstract 
quality, agents can rely on expectations regarding the typical form or pattern 
of  economic interactions (Rizzo,  1985 ; Horwitz,  1992 , pp. 45–79). In con-
tract law, for example, there are criteria for a valid contract regardless of  the 
price or nature of  the goods exchanged; excuses or justifi cations for breach 
of  contract do not depend on the prices or quantities of  economic theory – 
and neither does the type of  remedy for breach. There is a relative order or 
“pattern equilibrium” at the level of  legal institutions. Within this higher-
level equilibrium, however, there is a disequilibrium or continual change 
in the economic variables. The framework clearly permits agents to change 
their plans (and hence the prices of  whatever they buy or sell) in accordance 
with new facts about both the external world and other agents. In fact, the 
stable legal framework makes such change  possible for without the certainty 
generated by the institutions of  property and contract, market exchanges 
would cease. In facilitating these changes the higher-level pattern equilib-
rium ensures maximum market coordination. Maximum coordination, how-
ever, does not necessarily mean a state that is fairly close to a full or exact 
coordination (Rizzo,  1990 , pp. 25–7). This is because to attain the highest 
possible degree of  coordination we must have (adaptive) change which itself  
involves a certain amount of  discoordination. The very process of  coordin-
ating must involve discoordinating. Thus encompassed within an overall pat-
tern equilibrium there is a system of market interactions that endogenously 
produces a certain degree of  disequilibrium – a disequilibrium that is vital 
to generating whatever degree of  market coordination we do in fact enjoy. 
If  we move beyond simple adaptation to the case of  technological change, 
it is clear that an initial change will stimulate still-further technological dis-
coveries and consequently disappointments in expectations. This is because 
technological changes generate imbalances and bottlenecks in production 
processes (Rosenberg,  1969 , pp. 1–11). These, in turn, create profi t oppor-
tunities where there were none previously, in associated technologies, as well 
as disappointments in the expectations of  those whose activities were coordi-
nated with the old technology. These effects are discoordinating in terms of 
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the current  behavior of  agents, whatever the long-run consequences for the 
satisfaction of  their underlying preferences. 
 Another promising, if  yet untested, route has been forged by Brian Loasby 
( 1991 ). He wishes to adapt the concept of  equilibrium to the continual pro-
cess of  learning that occurs under conditions of  real time and radical uncer-
tainty. For Loasby an equilibrium is something similar to a shared research 
program, that is, an intellectual structure for learning. 27 A research program 
contains, among other things, instructions as to how individuals ought or 
ought not to go about learning. Although the structure is temporarily fi xed 
and relatively predictable, what individuals will learn when applying it is not 
fi xed or predictable. Genuine novelty is not thereby excluded from equilib-
rium in real time. The most obvious locus for a “fi xed” research program is 
the individual fi rm, regulated, as it is, by a single or small group of  decision-
makers. Nevertheless, it is not inconceivable that, at least with respect to 
general or broad features of  the environment, a common and relatively fi xed 
research program may apply across many individuals and fi rms within an 
economy. 28 
 An equilibrium construct in time has signifi cant implications for the equili-
brating process. To the extent that equilibrium can “realistically” be defi ned 
only in terms of relatively constant structures of a higher order (e.g., law, 
research programs) the transmission of knowledge during periods of equili-
bration must be conceptualized in a radically different way. It no longer 
makes sense to think of this knowledge as decentralized  facts about consumer 
demand, resource availability, etc. This would be more appropriate to a static 
framework in which knowledge of current facts moves through a system. 
What kind of knowledge can be transmitted through a system undergoing 
change? To transmit the data of today is already too late because decisions 
are future-oriented. In a world of real time, and hence of change, the facts 
of yesterday or today will not be the same as those of tomorrow. An effi cient 
economic system must therefore transmit not (outdated) facts but effective 
techniques of coping with change, of solving problems of a certain type. 29 
“Evolution selects, therefore, for populations with the ability to learn, rather 
than populations with optimal, but fi xed, behavior” (Allen,  1994 , p. 11). This 
is why “institutions” at the individual or fi rm levels (routines), as well as at the 
more general societal level, are very important. At their best, institutions are 
successful methods of dealing with an unknown future. 
 The evolution of money made possible the rapid adaptation of the indi-
vidual’s and community’s resources to new conditions. The fi rm routine of 
maintaining inventories performs a similar function in a more specifi c way. 
Other institutions provide adaptational fl exibility, not so much by improv-
ing responses once a change is recognized, but by improving recognition or 
anticipation of change in the fi rst place. While the future is not predictable it 
is also not entirely novel or undetermined. There are repeated patterns (typi-
calities) in the world which make certain routines of problem-solving suc-
cessful even where the content of the problem could not have been predicted 
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beforehand. It is also true, however, that the future is  partially determined 
by antecedent conditions. Thus, attention to the “laws” of our world puts us 
in a better position than we would otherwise be to anticipate at least certain 
aspects of future developments. The institutionalized methods or techniques 
of accomplishing all this are vital to the successful functioning of an eco-
nomic system. 
 Markets transmit propensities to adapt and to learn through the incentives 
provided by profi t and loss. It is obvious that the kind of “knowledge” to 
which we are now referring cannot be summarized in a price. Nevertheless, a 
price system, through the discipline it exerts on actors, can stimulate them to 
do much to adapt to and partially anticipate the future. 
 Even after ten years,  The Economics of Time and Ignorance must be seen as 
a transitional work. Between the late twentieth-century Austrian revival and 
the new mature Austrian economics of the twenty-fi rst century must stand an 
intellectual transition: a series of insights, problems, incomplete and perhaps 
even messy solutions. We make no pretence that our work is anything more 
than a small beginning but, we deeply believe, it is a step that must be taken in 
order to enter the world of discovery that could be ours. 
 Notes 
 1  I am indebted to many people, for very helpful comments on earlier drafts, particu-
larly to Gerald P. O’Driscoll, Jr. and Peter J. Boettke. I am also indebted to William 
Butos, Young Back Choi, Robin Cowan, Andres Garcia, Sanford Ikeda, Israel 
Kirzner, Roger Koppl, David Harper, Yaw Nyarko, Joseph Salerno, Karen Vaughn, 
and the Austrian Economics Colloquium at New York University. Responsibility 
for errors is mine alone. 
 2  The idea of asking innovative questions is in the Hayekian tradition. See O’Driscoll 
( 1989 , p. 345). 
 3  There has been a worldwide explosion of work in the broad subjectivist tradition, some 
of which has appeared in the  Review of Political Economy (Edward Arnold),  Advances 
in Austrian Economics (JAI Press),  Review of Austrian Economics (Kluwer Academic 
Press), the series of books entitled, “Foundations of the Market Economy,” published 
by Routledge, and the series of books entitled, “The Political Economy of the Austrian 
School,” published by New York University Press. Attention should also be directed 
toward the “praxeology” school refl ected in the sociological journal,  Cultural Dynamics 
(E. J. Brill). Moreover, Austrian perspectives in macroeconomics are now receiving 
recognition side-by-side with mainstream developments. See, for example, Snowden 
 et al . ( 1994 ). Other related intellectual currents are emanating from work on realism 
in economic thought severally produced by Lawson ( 1994a ,  c ) and M ä ki ( 1990 ). There 
is also a lively Austrian-inspired literature on competitive banking in the works of 
White ( 1989 ), Selgin ( 1988 ), Selgin and White ( 1994 ), and Cowen and Kroszner ( 1994 ). 
Similarly, an Austrian (i.e., B ö hm-Bawerkian) literature on capital theory has been pro-
duced by Faber ( 1986 ). In the fi eld of comparative economic systems there is Lavoie 
( 1985 ), Boettke ( 1990c ,  1993 ), Prychitko ( 1991 ) and Kornai ( 1992 ). Evolutionary eco-
nomics has witnessed attempts to combine Austrian with other strains of thought in 
the work of Langlois ( 1992 ) and Witt ( 1992 ). One cannot fail to mention, as well, the 
international industry devoted to the analysis and criticism of the work of Friedrich A. 
Hayek. The contributions to this literature are vast. Mention should be made, however, 
of Birner and van Zijp ( 1994 ) and Colonna and Hagemann ( 1994a ,  b ). 
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 4  In recent years, the theme of economics patterned after physics has been examined 
critically by Philip Mirowski ( 1989 ). 
 5  Although fashionable, a very sharp division between philosophy and science is 
insupportable. Philosophy is more “scientifi c” than is commonly supposed, and 
science is more “philosophical.” See Gjertsen ( 1989 ). For a discussion of realism 
in economics, see M ä ki ( 1990 ). 
 6  “He” is used in its traditional generic sense. Readers who are uncomfortable with 
this may mentally replace “he” or “his” with “it” or “its” because the actors, agents 
or individuals discussed are constructs rather than fl esh-and-blood people. 
 7  We are quite aware that there are important differences on the conception of time 
among Husserl, Bergson, James and Whitehead (the latter two are cited below). 
For our purposes these differences are not important. We are making use of the 
characteristics these ideas have in common to illuminate issues in economics; this 
is not a detailed work in philosophy. On differences among Bergson, James and 
Whitehead, see Capek ( 1971 ,  passim ). 
 8  In ordinary parlance we reserve the word “novel” for differences that are relatively 
large or interesting. The change that is a necessary part of our perception of time’s 
fl ow may be boring. This is, in part, responsible for the mistaken view that it is pos-
sible for real time to fl ow without anything new happening. 
 9  Cycles may or may not qualify as novel. If  agents think and make decisions at the 
level of the putatively identical cycles, then there is no novelty and hence no time 
consciousness. If, on the other hand, the cycle is a phenomenon visible only to the 
analyst, then the agents may experience change within the cycle. For these agents 
there is novelty and hence time consciousness. 
 10  The reader ought to keep in mind that we are talking about time  consciousness, and 
not physical time. 
 11  Lawson locates the common perspective at a fairly high level of abstraction in the 
philosophical tradition of “transcendental realism.” This set of ideas holds,  inter 
alia, that (1) the world is “structured,” that is, not reducible to the events of sense 
experience, and (2) these structures are “intransitive,” that is, they exist independ-
ently of their identifi cation (Lawson,  1994a , p. 513). Burczak ( 1994 , pp. 31–58), on 
the other hand, discovers a common thread between Hayekian Austrianism and 
Post-Keynesianism in their “postmodern moments.” The emphasis here is on “con-
stituted subjectivity” or, more specifi cally, on the way in which socially constituted 
knowledge and meaning affect human action (pp. 34–6). These two conceptions of 
a common perspective do not appear, at least prima facie, to be entirely consistent. 
 12  “Disequilibrating” refers to a movement away from equilibrium. There are dif-
ferent meanings of the term “equilibrium” in modern Austrian economics. The 
meaning in this subsection is that of full coordination of plans, i.e., (1) the mutual 
consistency or compatibility of plans ( ex ante and  ex post ) among agents who are 
trading with each other; and (2) the exhaustion of profi t – arbitrage – opportun-
ities. Thus, even if  Jones (seller) and Smith (buyer) are both happy to trade apples 
at 25 cents each, this is not an equilibrium if  Wilson would be willing to buy from 
Jones at 35 cents each. An equilibrium in this sense is not equivalent simply to 
maximizing behavior. Furthermore, equilibrium requires more than that the inter-
acting parties have consistent beliefs. There must also be a dissemination of know-
ledge to all parties to whom it would be relevant. 
 13  If  favorable surprises have implications for action (rather than simply being wind-
falls) then, as surprises, they will cause disruption of the plans of others, and hence 
a certain amount of disequilibration. For a view that excludes favorable surprises 
from the process of equilibration, see Fisher ( 1983 , pp. 86–94) and the analysis 
of Fisher by Ikeda ( 1990 , pp. 81–4). Consider also, at this point, the statement by 
Joan Robinson ( 1971 , p. 53): “[I]t is impossible for a system to  get into a position 
of equilibrium, for the very nature of equilibrium is that the system is already in it, 
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and has been in it for a certain length of past time.” The very factors responsible 
for the existing state of disequilibrium may make movement into a position of full 
equilibrium impossible. 
 14  Compare Franklin Fisher ( 1983 , p. 91): “In an ongoing economy, what constitutes 
an ‘exogenous’ shock? How is such an original shock to be distinguished from the 
‘endogenous’ shock brought about by adjustment to the original shock?” 
 15  For an interesting discussion of the disappearance of the entrepreneur from neo-
classical economics, see Barreto ( 1989 ). 
 16  To the extent that the relevant short-run equilibrium is defi ned largely by mistake-
induced “data,” then Kirzner’s implicit welfare standard is not independent of 
the analytical standard around which he organizes his description of the market 
process. This “merger” raises profound questions beyond the scope of our inquiry 
here. Furthermore, from a long-run perspective the accumulation of many errors 
along the adjustment path should cause us to revise our conception of the welfare 
properties of the market to one which is primarily based on the comparison of 
institutions. For the original statement of the comparative-institutions approach, 
see Hayek ( 1948a , p. 100, 105–6). 
 17  Vaughn’s failure to recognize the importance of this endogenous shift in equilib-
rium leads her to say that Kirzner has not changed his position (Vaughn,  1994 , 
p. 149). 
 18  It is instructive to compare Kirzner’s more recent approach ( 1992 ) with that of 
Lachmann ( 1977 ). Consider, fi rst, Kirzner ( 1992 , p. 35): “Although theory insists 
on the formal validity of the market coordinating process under all relevant 
circumstances, it does not claim that the tendencies which make up the process 
operate with uniform power at all times and in all contexts. It is easy to imagine 
circumstances where the power of the coordinative market process is completely 
swamped by the volatility of change and by the high incidence of entrepreneurial 
error. No doubt there have been moments in capitalist history where this has been 
the case.” The reader should now decide to what extent Lachmann ( 1977 , pp. 189–
90) is saying much the same thing “[T]o deny the signifi cance of general equilib-
rium is not to deny the existence of equilibrating forces. It is merely to demand that 
we must not lose sight of the forces of disequilibrium and make a comprehensive 
assessment of all the forces operating in the light of our general knowledge about 
the formation and dissemination of human knowledge.” 
 19  I am more confi dent of my understanding of Lachmann’s position than of 
Shackle’s. I discussed these issues with Lachmann over a period of many years. 
Nevertheless, those who believe that Shackle sees no order in economic affairs 
should read Shackle ( 1969 , pp. 4–5). 
 20  Any attempt to make the concepts of “nearer” to or “farther” from equilibrium 
precise is fraught with diffi culty. Nevertheless, it seems (intuitively) that there is an 
important analogy here with the behavior of physical systems whose equilibration 
properties vary with their distance from equilibrium. 
 21  The ideas in the preceding two paragraphs bear an obvious relationship to 
Leijonhufud’s concept of the “corridor” ( 1981b , pp. 109–10). Within the corridor, 
that is, when the economy is near overall equilibrium, deviations bring the system 
back to equilibrium; outside of the corridor (i.e., far from equilibrium) they move 
the system farther away. 
 22  In this section we pay exclusive attention to endogenous change on unhampered 
markets. On the other hand, Sanford Ikeda ( 1997 ) has developed this idea in the 
context of state intervention in the economy. He shows how endogenous change 
can propel a system from the minimal state to a highly interventionist state. 
 23  The distinction between subjective and objective novelty is important because 
the fi rst involves pure dissemination and thus can be modeled by the economist 
in a way that permits a neat separation between the endogenous and exogenous. 
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The to-be-disseminated knowledge can be viewed as given to the analyst (if  not to 
the agents). Its dissemination amounts to discovery of the system’s data and thus 
is modeled as equilibrating. On the other hand, completely new knowledge can-
not be taken as given even to the analyst and should be modeled as disruptive of 
equilibrium. 
 24  “Spontaneously” does not mean in a completely undetermined manner. Instead 
it means underdetermined, that is, the determinants of a particular event do not 
necessitate its production. 
 25  A system in overall equilibrium encourages greater division of labor and special-
ization than a system outside of equilibrium. This is because the division of labor, 
which makes greater production possible, is limited by the extent of the market. 
The market has a greater “extent” the more often traders can rely on selling their 
greater output and the more frequently consumers can buy from the market. Thus 
the extent of the market varies directly with the degree of coordination among 
market participants or inversely with the distance from overall equilibrium. See 
Loasby ( 1991 , pp. 9–13). 
 26  “Order is desirable not for keeping everything in place but for generating new pow-
ers that would otherwise not exist” (Hayek,  1988 , p. 79). 
 27  Young Choi Back ( 1993 ) has similarly modeled equilibrium as a “regime of con-
vention” (p. 99) which in turn is based on a paradigmatic learning structure. 
 28  This, however, is just speculation at this stage of our endeavor. Much more work 
will be necessary to test this idea. Nevertheless, see the stimulating observations 
and analysis of Denzau and North ( 1994 ). 
 29  Nathan Rosenberg ( 1969 , p. 1) observed this phenomenon in his study of the 
inducements to technological progress: “One of the things which is perfectly obvi-
ous about societies which have achieved high degrees of industrialization is that 
they have acquired unusual skills in problem-solving activities.” 
 
 1  An overview of subjectivist economics 
 The social object of skilled investment should be to defeat the  dark forces of 
time and ignorance which envelop our future. 
 John Maynard Keynes ( 1964 , p. 155; emphasis added) 
 That subjectivists of different schools, that is to say, all those who view the 
market as a pattern of meaningful utterances of the human mind, will in the 
future be able to fi nd common ground seems to us to lie distinctly within the 
realm of possibility. 
 Ludwig M. Lachmann ( 1984 , pp. 13–14) 
 This book began as an attempt to survey and restate the basic features of 
“Austrian” economic theory. As we examined the fundamental presuppositions 
of the theory, however, we realized that in order to accomplish our task we 
had, in a sense, to go beyond it. At the very heart of Austrian economics lies a 
common ground with some other schools of economic thought. This common 
ground has long been recognized as the essence of the Austrian contribution 
to economics: subjectivism. For most economists, unfortunately, subjectivism 
denotes either exclusively the supposedly complete subjective theory of value 
or the idea that scientifi c theories should be personal and hence never subject 
to testing. Both meanings are, however, thoroughly inaccurate. 
 On the most general level, subjectivism refers to the presupposition that 
the contents of the human mind, and hence decision-making, are not rigidly 
determined by external events. Subjectivism makes room for the creativity 
and autonomy of individual choice. Dealing as it does with the individual 
mind and individual decision-making, it is also intimately related to meth-
odological individualism. This is the view that overall market outcomes ought 
to be explained in terms of individual acts of choice. Thus, for the Austrians, 
and for subjectivists generally, economics is fi rst and foremost about the 
thoughts leading up to choice, and not about things or the interaction of 
objective magnitudes (Morgenstern,  1972 , p. 702, Shackle,  1972 , p. 66). 
 In this chapter we fi rst examine the basic implications of subjectivism for 
economic theory. We then discuss the importance of these implications. In a 
third section we outline the common ground between Austrians and (post-) 
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Keynesians while, at the same time, recognizing the unique Austrian contribu-
tions to subjectivist economics. Finally, we briefl y discuss the contents of the 
remaining chapters. 
 Time and ignorance 
 The relative autonomy of individual choice clearly implies the imperfect 
predictability of the future consequences of choices. When an individual 
decides to embark upon a particular course of action, the consequences will 
depend, in part, on what courses of action other individuals are, or will be, 
choosing. A world in which there is autonomous or creative decision-making 
is one in which the future is not merely unknown, but  unknowable. There is 
nothing in the present state of the world that enables us to predict the future 
state because the latter is underdetermined by the former. (This, of course, 
does not preclude the analyst from,  ex post , making the once-future intelligible 
on the basis of what happened in the past.) Subjectivism and action under 
uncertainty are thus inseparable ideas. 
 There are two complementary ways of conceptualizing the unknowability 
of the future. The fi rst is to develop the dynamic conception of time (variously 
known as “real,” “historical,” or “subjective” time). The other is to explicate 
the notion of ignorance and its corollary, radical or “genuine” uncertainty. 
We begin with a discussion of real time. 
 Real time 
 In a certain respect, neoclassical economics has not changed much in the 
past 50 years. Many of the recent “innovations” in theory simply extend 
the static maximizing apparatus to allegedly dynamic issues. In particular, 
time is still most frequently conceived in purely static terms. As such, it is 
analogized to space: just as an individual may allocate portions of space 
(land) to certain purposes, he can also allocate portions of time to certain 
activities. In principle, time and perfect predictability are compatible. The 
dynamic conception of time, on the other hand, is time perceived as a fl ow of 
events. Implicit in this idea of a fl ow is that of novelty or true surprise. The 
individual’s experience of today’s events itself  makes tomorrow’s perceptions 
of events different than it otherwise would be. As an individual adds to the 
stock of his experiences, his perspective changes and so both the present 
and the future are affected by the past fl ow of events. Flows, however, are 
continuous, and hence the individual’s perspective changes right up to the 
moment of any experience. This renders perfect prediction of the experience 
impossible. Since all individuals are similarly affected, and since, as we have 
seen, the consequences of an individual’s course of action depend on what 
others will do, this idea of time has implications for decision-making. Choices 
made in real time are thus never made with complete knowledge (either 
deterministic or stochastic) of their consequences. The recognition of this 
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fact by individuals is the source of rule-following behavior and, on a social 
level, of the development of institutions. We have more to say on this later in 
the chapter and in future chapters. 
 Ignorance 
 In all variants of neoclassical economics there is a presumption of knowledge 
on the part of economic agents. In its older form the presumption was of 
perfect knowledge and foresight, and in its more recent form it has been that 
of perfect stochastic knowledge and foresight. Thus, 30 years ago agents knew 
with certainty the price charged for a given product in both the current period 
and in all future periods; today, on the other hand, they are likely to know 
the probability distribution of current prices and the underlying stochastic 
structure that generates future prices. Even when agents are assumed 
not to know the complete probability distribution, such a distribution is 
hypothesized to “exist” in some objective way. This is then used as the basis of 
a story about how individuals gradually learn the distribution. None of these 
approaches, however, captures the idea of ignorance in the sense intended 
by subjectivists. Ignorance is not something that, at least at some level, can 
be avoided or overcome. It is not a state of imperfect knowledge that some 
process asymptotically eliminates. As long as we remain in a world of real time, 
unexpected change is inevitable and ignorance is ineradicable. Subjectivists 
therefore are not in sympathy with analytical devices that eliminate this object 
of study. Ignorance should not be transformed into a variant of knowledge. 
 The neoclassical method of modeling uncertainty essentially denies the 
fundamental tenet of subjectivism: the autonomy of individual choice. To 
portray the uncertain future as an objective probability distribution defi ned 
over an exhaustive set of events is to make the claim that the future is merely 
unknown. Thus, it is in principle knowable because the future exists out there 
independently of the autonomous choices of individuals. Or, to put it another 
way, the neoclassical modeling techniques abolish the autonomy of the human 
mind. This is the central problem inherent in most formulations of rational 
expectations equilibria. 
 The movement toward a “subjectivist” theory of probability in some areas 
of economics has no doubt been an improvement from our perspective. 
Yet most of this literature neglects a fundamental aspect of ignorance: the 
(perceived) unlistability of all possible outcomes. It is not merely that we do 
not know which possibility out of a given set will occur, but the set itself  is 
unbounded. Subjective probability thus refl ects subjectivism in its static form; 
while unbounded possibility sets refl ect the essentially dynamic aspect of sub-
jectivism. Real time and ignorance belong together. 
 The importance of time and ignorance 
 Does any of this matter? A critic might admit that real time and ignorance 
do describe aspects of the world in which we live, but he might claim that 
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they are unimportant (or even counterproductive) from the perspective of 
deriving useful economic implications. Most of the rest of this book is, in 
effect, an answer to this hypothetical critic. We hope to show in very detailed 
fashion that subjectivism has important implications for economic theory 
and, ultimately, for applied economics. It is, however, important to make clear 
that contemporary economics overemphasizes the importance of “useful 
implications.” This is the consequence of an essentially instrumentalist 
view of social science. The presupposition is that we really know  nothing 
about individual decision-making, aside from what can be corroborated 
in econometric tests of aggregative (market) data. We reject this naive 
instrumentalism (Caldwell,  1982 , pp. 173–88). While the implications for 
overall market behavior are important, it is also important to be faithful to 
the structure of human action as we know it to exist (Mises,  1966 , pp. 11–29, 
92–142; Rothbard,  1970 , pp. 1–66). In this sense, we try to steer a middle 
course between pure apriorism and pure instrumentalism. 
 The most fundamental or general implication of  time and ignorance, to 
which we have already alluded, is that economics must abandon its trad-
itional static mold. “[A] theory which takes serious account of  time and 
ignorance must be a theory of  processes, not of  states – not even dynamic 
states” (Loasby,  1976 , p. 220). Since all action takes place in real time and 
under genuine uncertainty, the actions of  individuals are unlikely to be per-
fectly coordinated. This means, of  course, that people will be frustrated in 
efforts to achieve their goals. Hence all market activity, as the outgrowth of 
individual goal-directed action, can be rendered intelligible as a  process of 
attempting to correct errors and coordinate behavior. This process will obvi-
ously fail at times, and economics must also concern itself  with the forces 
that promote error and discoordination. Sometimes these forces will be the 
result of  purely exogenous changes in the “data,” but at other times they will 
be the result of  endogenous changes. Thus, the market process is literally 
unending. 
 Time and ignorance not only make economic processes necessary, they also 
affect the very character of these processes. A process economics differs from 
one incorporating dynamic states insofar as the former is not deterministic. 
There is no stable endpoint toward which the process must lead, nor a single 
path that it must follow. At least on a general level, our view shares much 
in common with that of Nelson and Winter ( 1982 ), who have developed a 
nondeterministic evolutionary economics. In their approach, as in ours, error 
and the correction of error are important facets in the dynamic process. In 
counterdistinction to the neoclassical approach, however, these errors do not 
wind down to a determinate equilibrium state. Thus, we have process or evo-
lution without traditional equilibria. 
 A second extremely important effect of the explicit recognition of time and 
ignorance is a shift away from modeling all behavior as the result of mathem-
atical maximization. The unboundedness of expectations – or, more specif-
ically, of the possibilities and choice set envisaged by the actor – means that 
traditional maximization techniques are inapplicable (Loasby,  1976 , p. 217). 
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Consequently, actors are more appropriately modeled as following rules of 
thumb or “routines” (Nelson and Winter,  1982 , pp. 14–21 and  passim ) at one 
end of the behavioral continuum, or as engaging in entrepreneurial discovery 
at the other end (Kirzner,  1973 ,  1979a ). 
 In the fi rst case, many different perceptions of the environment, as well as 
different expectations, are each consistent with the same pattern of behavior. 
Rules provide, as it were, safe bounds for behavior in a relatively unbounded 
world. Institutions are the social crystallization of rule-following behavior or, 
in other words, the overall pattern of many individuals following a similar 
rule (Hayek,  1973 , pp. 35–54). Thus, the circle is closed. Time and genuine 
uncertainty promote the following of rules and the development of institu-
tions. The latter, in turn, serve to reduce, but not eliminate, the unbounded-
ness of the economic system by providing the stable patterns of interaction. 
 In the second case, entrepreneurial discovery can be seen as an attempt to 
fi ll coordinative gaps in the system that arise from the existence of time and 
ignorance. At the individual level, entrepreneurship consists of going beyond 
a given means-ends framework; it is the act of altering or creating the frame-
work by discovering new ends and means. At the market level, entrepreneurs 
strive to discover (or create) possibilities that have been generally overlooked 
by other market participants. Entrepreneurs are, however, themselves subject 
to the effects of time and ignorance, and hence may often commit errors. 
These errors can be the source of further unpredictability and instability in 
the system. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to believe that a world without 
profi t-seeking entrepreneurial behavior is likely to be more unpredictable and 
unstable than a world with it. 
 A third implication of taking time and ignorance seriously is a greater 
emphasis on spontaneous or unintended consequences of individual action. 
Neoclassical economics in its purest form is uncomfortable with the idea of 
spontaneous consequences. Wedded as it is to one or more species of know-
ledge, it strives to explain as many market phenomena as possible as the 
intended outgrowth of individual optimizing. In the economic analysis of 
law, for example, certain judge-made legal doctrines have been rationalized as 
promoting effi ciency. While the process by which this supposedly comes about 
is somewhat mysterious, there is a clear implication that judges, at least impli-
citly, want it that way (Posner,  1977 , pp. 15–191). Similarly, in at least one 
variant of the economics of the political process, tariffs, agricultural subsid-
ies, minimum wages, and the like exist because they are effi cient adaptations 
to individuals’ redistributional demands (Peltzman,  1976 ; Becker,  1976b ). 
Many, though not all, neoclassical rationalizations of aggregative phenom-
ena are thus rooted in the view that “people get what they want.” 
 The subjectivist research program, on the other hand, is to explain over-
all outcomes as the spontaneous, unintended product of social interactions. 
Under conditions of ignorance, no individual can predict fully the conse-
quences of a chosen course of action. Hence he is bound to be at least some-
what surprised by the ultimate (aggregate) outcome. The world looks as if  it 
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is no part of his doing. The interaction of individuals’ courses of action, the 
market process, is thus a kind of discovery procedure (Hayek,  1978 ). Through 
the knowledge that is revealed to him by this process each agent is able to sur-
pass the limits of his own ignorance. No one individual or fi rm needs to know, 
or can know beforehand, how best to organize production, what products to 
produce, or even what raw materials to use. In the course of acting, an indi-
vidual will learn more about the “environment” in which he operates. 
 The idea of spontaneous consequences and market discovery has sig-
nifi cance for economic policy. It leads us away from the presumption that 
we can always improve matters by merely applying our (i.e., the planner’s) 
 given knowledge in the most effi cient way. This is the view Hayek ( 1965 ) has 
called “constructivism.” In contrast, Austrian subjectivists would argue that 
state economic planning deprives society of the knowledge gained through 
the market process and of the ability to surpass the limitations of individual 
knowledge (Lavoie,  1985 ). Thus, the ignorance of the individual constrains 
action at the central planning level to a far greater extent than at the market 
level. 
 Keynesianism and the Austrian contributions 
 Keynes 
 It is clear from the fi rst epigraph of this chapter that Keynes was no stranger 
to the economics of time and ignorance. Recognition of the power of the 
“dark forces” was central to his conception of the economic system. In the 
fi rst instance, the “state of longterm expectations,” which is important in 
determining the rate of investment, might “be subject to [autonomous] waves 
of optimistic and pessimistic sentiment … where no solid basis exists for a 
reasonable calculation” (Keynes,  1964 , p. 154). As we have seen, a “reasonable” 
or, more exactly, an optimizing calculation is not possible in an unbounded 
context. In addition, Keynes saw the importance of subjectivism for short-
run output decisions which are infl uenced by user cost. “User cost” is “the 
reduction in the value of … equipment due to using it as compared with 
not using it” now “and preserving it to be used later on” ( 1964 , p. 70). The 
calculation of user cost obviously depends upon subjective guesses as to the 
future state of the market. Keynes sometimes also recognized that individual 
choice is the pivotal distinction between the natural and social sciences. In 
an important letter to Sir Roy Harrod, he said that, if  the natural sciences 
were to be treated as the social sciences, then “it [would be] as though the fall 
of the apple to the ground depended on the apple’s motives” (Keynes,  1973 , 
p. 300). 
 Despite the evidence presented above, it is only quite recently that the sub-
jectivist aspects of Keynes’ thought have been more widely recognized. In 
part, this is because the reformulation of his work in general equilibrium 
terms, arising out of the neoclassical synthesis, obliterated the subjectivist 
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component (Davidson,  1981 , p. 159). More importantly, perhaps, there exists 
a deep contradiction in the  General Theory itself  between the mechanical, 
aggregative method and the nonformalized subjectivist message (Lachmann, 
 1984 , p. 7). Unfortunately, Keynes never resolved this contradiction, and thus 
it prevented him from seeing the full implications of subjectivism. His state-
ment about the dark forces of time and ignorance was made in the context 
of advocating government management of major investment decisions. He 
apparently never saw the limitations that real time and ignorance place on 
policy-makers. 
 Post-Keynesianism 
 In recent years a largely American branch of the Cambridge (UK) school, 
known as post-Keynesian economics, has arisen to carry forth the subjectivist 
aspects of Keynes’ system. For a long time these had been buried and almost 
forgotten within the Hicksian neoclassical synthesis. Now, fortunately, they 
are being revived and developed. Paul Davidson has conveniently summarized 
the post-Keynesian perspective in three propositions ( 1981 , pp. 158–61):
 (1)  the economy is a process in historical (real) time; 
 (2)  in a world where uncertainty and surprises are unavoidable, expectations 
have an unavoidable and signifi cant effect on economic outcomes; 
 (3)  economic and political institutions are not negligible and, in fact, play an 
extremely important role in determining real-world economic outcomes. 
 The reader will be hard pressed to fi nd any signifi cant differences between 
these propositions and the argument of this chapter. What is even more 
surprising is that Davidson’s explication of the meaning of these propositions 
increases, rather than reduces, the area of overlap. It is evident that there is 
much common ground between post-Keynesian subjectivism and Austrian 
subjectivism. Cross-fertilization between these two schools is, however, 
exceedingly rare, although the possibilities for mutually advantageous 
interchange seem signifi cant. 
 Austrian contributions 
 We have already discussed what may be the most important distinctive 
contribution of the Austrian variant of subjectivism. Austrians have stressed 
the view of the market process as an engine of discovery. Just as real time 
implies genuine uncertainty about the future, it equally implies that truly 
novel things can be learned by economic agents. One interpretation of the 
statement that we live in a world of real time and ignorance is simply that 
we cannot predict the knowledge we shall gain in the future (Popper,  1964 , 
pp. vi-vii). Learning, for Austrians, is not merely plugging in new values of 
variables in an otherwise unchanged learning function. It involves a structural 
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shift in knowledge, i.e., a change in the learning functions themselves. The 
market process is both the source and the manifestation of these structural 
changes. In the absence of such a process, economic planners must address 
the question of how they can acquire the requisite information necessary to 
implement their plans successfully. 
 There are other distinctive Austrian contributions to subjectivist econom-
ics. These, however, are less easy to state in summary fashion, but some will 
be examined in greater detail later in this book. Austrians have made fun-
damental contributions to, among other areas, interest theory (Fetter,  1977 ; 
Rothbard,  1970 , pp. 313–86), capital theory (Lachmann,  1956 ; Kirzner, 
 1966 ), the theory of  money (Mises,  1953 ; White,  1984 ), competition and 
entrepreneurship (Kirzner,  1973 ;  1979 ), and business cycle theory (Hayek, 
 1969 ; O’Driscoll,  1977 ; Wainhouse,  1982 ). The common thread underlying 
all of  these analyses is the extension of  subjectivism beyond the point to 
which it had previously been developed. This is not to say that in all of  these 
areas the subjectivist approach has been completed or is fully adequate. It is 
rather to claim that the subjectivist ideas of  time and ignorance have been 
infused into the analyses in a way that changes the basic questions and 
issues. 
 Overview of the rest of the book 
 This book (appearing here as Part III) is divided into two sections. In 
Section I we present, in more detailed fashion, the analytical framework that 
we sketched in this chapter. We discuss subjectivism, knowledge, decisions, 
time, uncertainty, and equilibrium. In Section II we apply this theoretical 
framework to specifi c economic subject areas such as competition and 
monopoly, political economy, capital theory, and monetary theory. In neither 
section will the reader fi nd much in the way of explicit formal modeling. 
This refl ects a conscious decision by the authors. In the fi rst place, we believe 
that presenting the conceptual foundations of our approach is both logically 
and heuristically prior to any modeling effort. Second, and perhaps more 
important, many of the formal analytical tools used by economists today 
necessarily preclude the phenomena in which we are interested. In fact, one 
of the reasons contemporary economics is still fundamentally static is that the 
mechanics of optimization and the standard assumptions of equilibrium are 
not consistent with genuine process analysis. 
 Framework 
 In the next chapter we distinguish our concept of subjectivism from the 
older, static idea that derives from the subjective theory of value. In so doing, 
we discuss the meaning of creative choice and the role of nondeterministic 
explanation. Our general conclusion is that we must avoid both the position 
that creative choice is impossible, and the position that all choice is creative 
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and unbounded. Creativity can exist only within a framework that provides at 
least some degree of predictability. 
 In  Chapter 3 we analyze the problem of knowledge from a subjectivist per-
spective. Foremost among the issues we discuss are the nature and process of 
learning, the difference between knowledge of economic actors and know-
ledge of the scientist, the division of knowledge in society, and the role of 
knowledge in institutions. The chapter concludes with a re-examination of 
utility theory. Here the subjectivity of both blades of the Marshallian scissors 
(utility and cost) is explained and applied to a disequilibrium context. 
 Chapter 4 is a detailed examination of the differences between “Newtonian” 
(analytic or static) time and the dynamic conception that we have already 
briefl y mentioned. We discuss the role of each concept of time in specifi c eco-
nomic models. In particular, we examine the implications of real time for the 
study of economic processes. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the 
conceptual relation between Newtonian and real time. 
 The fi fth chapter explores the most important implication of ignorance: 
genuine uncertainty. Here the interrelation between uncertainty and equilib-
rium is explored. We fi nd that genuine uncertainty is incompatible with trad-
itional ideas of equilibrium, including that of stochastic equilibrium. In this 
context we spend a good deal of time analyzing the “endogenous” uncertainty 
in Keynes’ famous beauty contest and Morgenstern’s Holmes-Moriarty story. 
An alternative equilibrium construct is proposed (“pattern coordination”) 
that is consistent with endogenous or genuine uncertainty. 
 Applications 
 Chapter 6 is a detailed study of our claim that the market process is a discovery 
procedure. We trace the logical evolution of the concept of competition from 
that of a state of affairs to a process of attaining or approaching equilibrium 
to, fi nally, a ceaseless “mechanism” of discovery. We then go on to show that 
market processes, in the widest sense, consist not only (or even primarily) 
of optimizing behavior but also of rule-following behavior. The latter is, of 
course, ultimately related to the social role of institutions. Both rules and 
institutions are, in turn, as we have seen, consequences of the conditions of 
ignorance under which individuals face the future. 
 In  Chapter 7 we apply the theoretical structure developed in the previous 
chapter to a number of important issues in political economy. Real time, 
ignorance and genuine uncertainty, as we have seen, have signifi cant implica-
tions for economic policy. In this chapter we apply those general insights to 
pollution control through tax policy and to antitrust regulation. Our general 
conclusion is that much regulation, in order to be effective, presupposes the 
kind of knowledge available only through market processes. Paradoxically, 
then, the regulators need the very process that their regulation is, at least in 
part, designed to supplant. 
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 Chapter 8 applies subjectivist ideas to the theory of capital goods and asso-
ciated “macro” and monetary issues. The Austrian concept of a production 
structure is introduced and the nature of capital complementarities within 
that structure is explored. The heterogeneity of capital goods is shown to be 
crucial to any theory of economic processes. Specifi cally, the whole process 
of capital recombinations or changes in the production structure is obliter-
ated by neoclassical theories of capital homogeneity. In those theories there 
is nothing to recombine and no production structure to change. Therefore, 
subjectively perceived differences in capital goods are intimately related to the 
dynamic market process. 
 Chapter 9 begins with an analysis and application of the Mengerian theory 
of the origin of money. As we shall see, Menger’s theory embodies almost every 
important aspect of subjectivist economics: methodological individualism, 
emphasis on expectations, and a market process of discovery. One important 
conclusion we draw from his theory is that even a basic economic institution 
like money is a part of the ongoing market process. Hence, attempts by gov-
ernment to modify or regulate monetary institutions must take account of 
this process. The fi nal part of  Chapter 9 discusses the Wicksell-Mises-Hayek 
theory of economic fl uctuations. Here the subjectivist theory of capital goods 
and the production structure, developed in  Chapter 8 , is integrated with a 
theory of the cycle. The chapter concludes with a review of new evidence cor-
roborating the Austrian cycle theory, as well as an analysis of the relevance of 
rational expectations to this theory. 
 Chapter 10 is a concluding chapter in which we identify some areas of 
future research and suggest applications of the approach developed in the 
previous nine chapters. 
 
 SECTION I:   FRAMEWORK 
 2  Static versus dynamic subjectivism 
 Economic theory is unending, because we are confronted with an  open system . 
The idea we could have a (closed) “system of economic theory,” say, of the 
Walrasian type, is a futile one. 
 Oskar Morgenstern ( 1972 , p. 702) 
 The questions 
 Proponents of  different schools of  economic thought have traditionally 
emphasized the confl icting answers that their respective schools have given 
the great economic questions. Recently, however, it has become evident 
that what really separates schools of  thought is, in large part, the asking 
of  different questions (Robinson,  1977 ). Therefore, it seems appropriate to 
begin our discussion of  subjectivist economics in general, and the Austrian 
approach in particular, with a precise statement of  the class of  questions 
that we propose to ask. Specifi cally, it is necessary to address two issues: 
(1) What is the “level of  reality” in which we are interested? (2) What is our 
research policy – what precisely are the questions within the chosen level of 
analysis? 
 Subjective meaning as the phenomenon 
 Each science specifi es, implicitly or explicitly, the level of reality in which it 
is interested. “Levels” demarcate the different aspects of what, from a more 
general point of view, might be considered the same phenomenon. Man, for 
example, may be studied from the perspectives of physics, physiology, medicine, 
chemistry, biology, and many other disciplines. The level of reality in which 
we are interested is the realm of purposes, plans, valuations and expectations. 
In other words, we are interested in the realm of  subjective meaning . 1 The 
objects of economic activity are thus not even defi nable except in terms of 
what actors perceive them to be. A price is not merely a number placed on 
a label but, more fundamentally, the conditions of exchange on which A 
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and B purposefully interact. This world of subjective meaning is inextricably 
bound up with the world of everyday life. It rests on our “experience of the 
existence of other human beings and of the meaning of their actions,” which 
“is certainly the fi rst and most original  empirical observation man makes” 
(Schutz,  1954 , p. 265, emphasis added). 
 Having identifi ed the domain of relevance, the economist is now in a 
position to observe, at least in a preliminary way, patterns of social inter-
action. These patterns are not the physical coordinates of commodity stocks 
or quantities of capital goods. Rather, they are the coherent ways in which 
individuals who are attempting to achieve various goals typically interact. 
Speculative markets, for example, can be understood as attempts by individ-
uals with different expectations each to “buy low and sell high.” No amount 
of study of the physical attributes of the commodities in question will make 
such markets intelligible. It is impossible even to conceive of the term “specu-
lative” in purely physical terms. Recognition of the realm of subjective mean-
ing is therefore a prerequisite for identifi cation of the organized phenomena 
in which we are interested. 
 General research policy 
 The task of economics goes beyond the preliminary recognition of certain 
patterns of interaction based on subjective meaning. There are, in addition, 
the three further, yet closely related, tasks: (1) more precisely identifying 
interaction patterns; (2) specifying their logical or static “origins”; and (3) 
explaining the historical or causal processes that give rise to them. 
 A science of subjective meaning permits a more precise recognition of inter-
action patterns than is possible on the basis of preliminary or commonsense 
observational theories (Hayek,  1955 , pp. 55–6). A more exact understanding 
of the concepts of rent and supply elasticity, for example, places us in a pos-
ition to see a common element in exchanges that are far removed from the 
original context of land transactions. Rent can thereby be seen as a ubiqui-
tous economic phenomenon. None of this involves a denial of the original 
subjective-meaning contexts with which we began our pattern recognition. 
On the contrary, we are simply engaging in the refi nement of our ability to 
recognize such patterns. 2 The abstract concept of rent is thoroughly suffused 
with subjective meaning because, apart from that, no sense can be attached to 
constitutive terms like transfer price and the perception of alternative oppor-
tunities on which the latter is based. 
 To understand the subjective meaning of a price is not automatically to 
understand the relation of that price to the valuations of all individuals in a 
market. How does it come about that consumers and producers with myriad 
different valuations can create or tend to create a single price? The theory of 
price determination under static conditions enables the economist to “build 
up” the market price from given individual valuations. This does not specify 
causal processes in which learning and the transmission of information are 
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involved. However, it does demonstrate how the aggregate phenomenon and 
its subjective meaning is, in turn, built up from the meanings of many individ-
uals (Hayek,  1955 , pp. 36–42). 
 Finally, to understand the subjective meaning of a price and how it can, in 
a static sense, be recomposed from the valuations of individuals is only the 
fi rst step toward a genuine causal explanation. Causal explanations involve 
the description of processes through time and hence must allow for learn-
ing. A dynamic theory of price formation consists not only of showing how 
individual valuations interact to form prices but also how the acquisition 
of knowledge and the projection of expectations are involved. Again, none 
of this requires any deviation from the subjectivist character of our discip-
line because learning and expectations are preeminent subjective-meaning 
concepts. 
 In the foregoing paragraphs we have outlined, in effect, three major steps 
in our research program. 
 (1)  On the basis of commonsense observational constructs, the empirical 
reality of intended meanings is perceived. In a preliminary way, patterns 
of social interaction (e.g., money, prices, etc.) are identifi ed. 
 (2)  Further refi nement of these patterns and identifi cation of still others is 
achieved by a more precise conceptualization of the commonsense obser-
vational categories. The scientist eliminates their concrete associations 
and builds up an abstract or general framework of subjective meaning. 
Substitution, complementarity, elasticity, money, prices are all examples 
of such abstract subjective-meaning concepts. They are essentially con-
structs of commonsense constructs (Schutz,  1953 ) i.e., the distillation or 
typifi cation of everyday concepts. 
 (3)  The fi nal stage of analysis is achieved when the economist recomposes 
or builds up, either statically or dynamically, the overall pattern (viewed 
as a “social fact”) from its individual elements, i.e., the meanings of indi-
vidual actors. The main feature that takes us beyond mere description of 
the phenomena is the attempt of the research program to show how these 
are the unintended outgrowth of purposeful behavior. More precisely, 
our self-imposed question is,  How can individuals acting in the world of 
everyday life unintentionally produce existing institutions or, more gener-
ally, the overall patterns of social interactions? 3 (See Menger,  1963 , p. 146.) 
The subjective meanings of actors do not directly, as by mere command, 
bring economic events into existence. Instead, there is a complex chain of 
mutually reinforcing actions that produces results beyond those that can 
be individually apprehended or intended. 4 
 In the remaining sections of this chapter we shall examine the central features 
of subjectivism as a method. In particular, we shall contrast the method’s two 
important forms: the traditional static subjectivism that emanates from the 
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standard theory of consumer choice, and the more recent thoroughgoing variety 
that affi rms the “creativity” of human decision-making. In a fi nal section, the 
relationship and interdependency of these approaches will be examined. We shall 
conclude that both are necessary for a comprehensive analytical framework. 
 The method of subjectivism 
 The mere posing of our question determines, in large part, the method that 
will be used in answering it. The methodological subjectivist constructs a 
model of an individual mind or a fi ctitious consciousness that is endowed 
with certain goals, constraints, knowledge and expectations. This  mind 
construct (see the similar terms in Machlup,  1978a , p. 221) is then portrayed 
as engaging in activity that must bear an “understandable” relation to the 
phenomenon we wish to explain (Schutz,  1953 ). The familiar economic 
concepts of the consumer, producer, fi rm and entrepreneur are all examples 
of a mind construct. Our preliminary investigation of the subjectivist method 
will then be centered on the following two issues: (1) the permissible contents 
that can be attributed to the mind construct, and (2) the meaning of an 
“understandable” relation. 
 Since we are concerned not with an actual real-world individual but only 
with a model of such an individual, the contents of its mind need be only those 
things necessary to generate the appropriate behavior. Whether it believes in 
the Virgin Birth is presumably irrelevant to an explanation of why the price of 
lima beans has risen. Thus, the imputed contents of our fi ctitious conscious-
ness must satisfy a  minimum suffi ciency requirement. 
 The creator of the mind construct cannot attribute any type of knowledge 
to it that will ultimately rationalize the phenomenon in question. The con-
struct ought to possess only that knowledge which, in terms of its position 
or what it deems relevant, would have been reasonable to acquire. 5 It is not 
appropriate to attribute to a farmer construct, for example, knowledge of 
demand and supply conditions in the steel industry or of the general equi-
librium prices of the commodities he grows. Nevertheless, at some point we 
needn’t explicitly account for the knowledge possessed by our construct if  
that is so general as to be warranted by merely its existence in a given society 
or its “human” character. 
 An “understandable” relation must be understandable in the structural 
terms of commonsense interpretation of everyday life. Hence the scientifi c 
constructs must be  consistent with, although not identical to, the mental con-
structs of everyday life (Schutz,  1953 ). This follows from our statement of the 
research program’s central question: how can we relate action in everyday life 
to the overall patterns of social interaction? 
 The above consistency requirement is met by preserving the basic structure 
of decision-making but not the individualized contents of particular deci-
sions or plans. This structure moves beyond the mere logical implications of 
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human action to include some of the typical contexts of such action. An 
incomplete, but illustrative, list of the common structural components of 
decision-making can be stated in fi ve propositions. 
 (1)  The decision to take a specifi c course of action is the outcome of a pro-
cess of projecting and weighing the consequences of the various courses 
of action. 
 (2)  This projecting is based on a stock of knowledge, part of which is indi-
vidually acquired and part of which is socially transmitted through 
institutions. 
 (3)  An individual’s chosen courses of action fi t into an overall plan. 
 (4)  The social world consists of many such acting individuals. 
 (5)  There is a social distribution of knowledge and plans and, consequently, 
of chosen courses of action. Not all individuals know or do the same 
things. 
 In the subsequent sections of this book these important components of 
decision-making will be extended and integrated into a coherent theory of 
individual action. This theory, in turn, will be the basis for our overall analysis 
of the market process. 
 Dimensions of subjectivism 
 In the previous section we discussed the subjectivist method of mind constructs 
without acknowledging the two different forms that method can take. The 
fi rst form is most closely related to the traditional subjective theory of value 
and we shall call it “static subjectivism.” In this case, the mind is viewed as a 
passive fi lter through which the data of decision-making are perceived. To the 
extent that this fi lter can be understood, the whole process of decision-making 
is perfectly determinate. The second form, on the other hand, views the mind 
as an active, creative entity in which decision-making bears no determinate 
relationship to what went before. Here, decision-making is literally a “cut,” 
a new beginning (Buchanan,  1982a ). This form of subjectivism we shall call 
“dynamic subjectivism.” 
 Static subjectivism is perfectly consistent with the well-known covering-law 
model of scientifi c explanation (Hempel and Oppenheim,  1965 , pp. 246–51). 
In this model, explanation proceeds by way of an explanatory apparatus, 
consisting of logically antecedent conditions and a general (“covering”) law. 
From the conjunction of the conditions and law, a statement of the event 
we are attempting to explain is logically derived. Thus, from the antecedent 
conditions of tastes and knowledge of the relevant constraints in conjunction 
with the law of constrained utility maximization, we are able to derive a state-
ment of the consumer’s bundle of choices. The explanatory schema appears 
to determine exactly the particular outcome. In principle, the outcome could 
have been predicted given complete knowledge of the antecedent conditions 
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and appropriate laws before occurrence of the event (Hempel and Oppenheim, 
 1965 , p. 243). This determinism-in-principle is closely related to the “apodic-
tic” praxeological theorems of Mises ( 1966 , pp. 30–71) and the “exact laws” 
of Menger ( 1963 , p. 218). For both of these economists, there was a variant of 
subjectivism that had much in common with the rigidly deterministic systems 
of classical mechanics. 
 The deterministic ideal is not, however, a fully realizable research program. 
The most obvious problem is that it is rarely possible to specify the antecedent 
conditions and relevant law completely. All sorts of diffi culties, both concep-
tual and pragmatic, stand in the way of such an achievement. Thus, static 
subjectivists must offer explanations that are incomplete even in terms of the 
theoretical framework in which they appear. A perfect fi t between the explana-
tory schema and the relevant phenomenon is consequently out of reach. 
 Still more important are several considerations that make deterministic 
explanation unachievable  even in principle. Recall that, from a statement of 
initial conditions and a general law, we derive a statement of the particular 
event. It is clearly impossible to relate this  statement in a deterministic fashion 
to the actual real-world event. D. J. O’Connor explains this point concisely:
 No prediction can distinguish the predicted event in such a way as to dis-
criminate it from any of the other possible events that could fall under the 
same set of measurements … The statement which expresses our predic-
tion is never capable of identifying without ambiguity one and only one 
event whose occurrence would satisfy the prediction, for a description 
can do no more than specify a  class of  closely similar events, whose dif-
ferences lie beneath the threshold of discrimination …. 
 (O’Connor,  1957 , p. 313) 6 
 A second reason why attempts at purely deterministic explanations must, 
in principle, fail arises from the fact that the “economy” is an open system 
(Morgenstern,  1972 , p. 709). Conditions at the boundary of our analysis are 
always changing, thus upsetting our best efforts at prediction. For example, 
economists cannot explain the formation of tastes, and hence when these 
change the predicted effects of supply shifts may prove entirely wrong. To 
“close” the system would require building a model of an order of complexity 
far in excess of what the human mind seems capable. Everything that could 
possibly interact with the “economy” would have to be accounted for in a 
precise quantitative way. This, of course, cannot be done. As a consequence, 
explanations of a fairly complex phenomena usually must be limited to 
general “explanations of the principle” or of the class of such phenomena 
(Hayek,  1967b ,  1967c ) and hence cannot be deterministic. 
 The formidable obstacles in the path of rigid determinism have not, however, 
led to the abandonment of static subjectivism or the covering-law model of 
explanation. Machlup, for example, views determinateness as an ideal charac-
teristic of a well-constructed model (Machlup,  1978b , p. 280). All theoretical 
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models should be deterministic in the sense that the statement of the phe-
nomenon we wish to explain can be logically derived from the explanatory 
apparatus. Determinism is thus a feature of the model and not of the world. 
The applicability of a model in any given instance, on the other hand, is not 
determinate but may, in fact, be highly uncertain. From Machlup’s perspec-
tive, then, indeterminism has no role in the context of model-building itself  
but presumably does have a role in the empirical application or testing of a 
model. As we argue next, this view would be tenable only if  indeterminism 
were unimportant to those whose behavior we are trying to explain. In such 
circumstances indeterminism could be treated as a residual unexplained vari-
ation in the relevant phenomena that is of interest only on the level of the 
analyst-observer. In principle, this cannot be the case, and thus we must reject 
Machlup’s position. 
 The essential premise of  dynamic subjectivism is that decisions are not 
the determinate result of  clearly specifi able causes (Shackle,  1969 , pp. 3–7). 
This fundamental premise manifests itself  both in the learning process and 
in the formation of  expectations. Genuine learning is not merely the result 
of  a determinate processing of  what is already known. It must go beyond 
those narrow confi nes and include unpredictable shifts in the method of 
processing itself. Similarly, expectations must not be confi ned to the dis-
covery of  an already-determined future. Much of  the future is the result 
of  the free, indeterminate decisions of  actors and hence is actually created 
by them. Dynamic subjectivism is incompatible with rigid determinism and 
perfect predictability. 
 Dynamic subjectivism requires that the models themselves embody nonde-
terministic processes in an essential way. This is in sharp contrast to Machlup’s 
suggestion that indeterminism be viewed as a feature of the model’s applic-
ability rather than of its structure. The reason for this difference is not merely 
a matter of taste. We contend that the actor must see his own decision-making 
as indeterminate and, hence, cannot be in a position to predict his actions. 
As a consequence, it is logically impermissible to develop mind constructs 
in which decisions are purely deterministic. This can be demonstrated in two 
useful ways. 
 Our fi rst argument is derived from Karl Popper’s demonstration that it is 
impossible for an individual to predict his own future knowledge (Popper, 
 1950 , pp. 117–33, 173–95; O’Hear,  1980 , p. 141). Because actions are based 
on the individual’s stock of knowledge, if  he cannot predict his future know-
ledge, he also cannot predict his future decisions. 
 Suppose P (predictor) has complete knowledge of his initial circumstances 
at  t 1 as well as of the appropriate theories of learning, and wishes to predict 
his knowledge at  t 3 . Can this be done? P will take some fi nite amount of time, 
say until  t 2 , in order to deduce his state of knowledge at  t 3 . However, the know-
ledge gained at  t 2 will affect P’s state at  t 3 . Again, it will take a fi nite amount 
of time, until  t 3 , to determine precisely how this will affect his state at  t 3 . 
But then complete self-prediction of future states of knowledge is obviously 
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impossible. 7 If  P cannot have his knowledge at  t 3 until  t 3 , he also cannot know 
exactly what he will decide at  t 3 until  t 3 . 8 Thus, no individual can have total 
foreknowledge of his decisions. 
 A second, similar, argument is based on the proof that the ability to 
foresee one’s own decision at  t 2 logically  precludes the ability to decide at 
 t 2 (Schick,  1979 , pp. 240–2). Suppose an individual, P, is both “deductively 
thorough” – that is, he believes all of  the logical consequences of  his initial 
beliefs – and “belief-retentive” – that is, between the point of  attempted pre-
diction and the point of  choice he will not change his beliefs. Let us further 
suppose that at  t 1 P knows his preferences, prices and income at  t 2 . Because 
he is deductively thorough at each instant in time, he also knows that he 
will decide X at  t 2 . Therefore, P believes at  t 1 that it is true that X is the case. 
Because P is belief-retentive, he will also believe that X is the case at the 
moment of  his decision. If  X is  already the case, then where are the options 
at  t 2 ? Clearly, there can be none, and hence the decision was already made at 
 t 1 , the moment of  the “prediction.” Hence self-prediction of  a decision can 
only be made simultaneously with the decision. This, of  course, means that 
self-prediction is impossible. 
 From the foregoing two arguments, we draw an important general con-
clusion. Mind constructs that yield the required behavior as a determinate 
implication of  initial conditions and a theory cannot be genuinely dynamic. 
If  we allow time to pass, then we must in effect be claiming that the indi-
vidual can predict his own decisions. Consider, for example, a determinate 
choice-theoretic model of  a process. This would require the postulation of 
a mind whose decisions at  t 2 are perfectly determined by its own self-con-
scious 9 state at  t 1 . If  this is logically impossible, as we have argued, then 
such a model would be inconsistent, or, more exactly, would be based on 
inconsistent foundations. “Surprise” is thus integral to the lives of  individ-
ual actors. 
 The covering-law model, therefore, does not provide an adequate form of 
explanation for dynamically subjectivist theories. An essential feature of these 
theories is that logical deducibility of the statement of the relevant decision 
or phenomenon is no longer possible. This, of course, does not mean that 
explanation is no longer possible, but merely that one variety of explanation 
has been excluded. “Not deducibility, but intelligibility constitutes the basic 
feature of the logic of explanation” (Yolton,  1959 , p. 207; see also Lachmann, 
 1971 , pp. 36–8; Lachmann,  1943 , p. 14). One clear and useful meaning we can 
attach to the intelligibility relationship is that the choice-theoretic explana-
tory schema must render the given phenomenon more likely than if  the par-
ticular model had not been presented. This does not imply predictability, or 
even a high likelihood, but merely  increased likelihood of occurrence. 10 “The 
need [is] for favourable relevance rather than high mathematical probability” 
(Cohen,  1977 , p. 300). Thus, within a mind-construct model a number of 
alternative decisions can be seen as possible, but, given the model, that which 
actually did occur is rendered more likely than it would have been given some 
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alternative model. In this view of the role of a theoretical explanation, the 
observed decision need not be the most likely of the various alternatives. Even 
the least likely of these can, if  it were to occur, be explained by the model so 
long as there is “favourable relevance.” 11 
 Favorable relevance may be viewed from either an  ex ante or  ex post per-
spective. In an  ex ante sense, the hypothesis will have a certain  marginal 
predictive value. What might have appeared highly unlikely before the 
hypothesis was proffered may now appear somewhat less unlikely. From an 
 ex post perspective, on the other hand, the relationship between an event, 
after it has already occurred, and an explanation will be such that the “retro-
spective likelihood” of  an event is increased in the light of  the explanation 
(Rizzo and Arnold,  1980 , p. 1408 and  passim ; Rizzo,  1981 , p. 1030). One 
of  the main differences between a retrospective calculation of  likelihood 
and an  ex ante calculation is that,  ex post , we may know more about what 
has happened to conditions at the boundary of  the system. Thus, after the 
price of  soybeans rises we may know, at least indirectly, what happened to 
tastes or expectations. Consequently, it might be possible to construct an 
explanation with favorable relevance only after the event has occurred and 
not before. In either situation, the explanation can render the event more 
intelligible. 
 There is another method of relating an explanatory schema to a given event 
that is consistent with dynamic subjectivism. This is captured in the idea of 
“pattern explanation” or “pattern prediction” (Hayek  1967b ). If  a model 
yields a determinate implication for a  class of  phenomena, each element of 
that class will be perfectly consistent with the explanatory schema. Thus, 
with respect to the specifi c event itself, the schema is not deterministic. Other 
events in the class could have occurred without producing any change in the 
proffered explanation. This concept of nondeterministic explanation is con-
sistent with the favorable relevance view discussed above in the case where the 
competing hypothesis entirely excludes the event in question. Then, of course, 
the likelihood of that event will be greater on the accepted hypothesis than 
on its competitor. In most cases, however, the two methods are not identical. 
Nevertheless, for the broad purpose of specifying principles of explanation 
consistent with dynamic subjectivism, both the favorable relevance and pat-
tern explanation ideas are acceptable. 
 Relationship between static and dynamic subjectivism 
 While there are extremely important differences between static and dynamic 
subjectivism, there are also important logical dependencies and interrelations 
between them. This section will be devoted to an analysis of that relationship. 
We shall divide the discussion into two arguments. 
 (1)  Within a broader perspective, both the static and dynamic approaches are 
consistent. 
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 (2)  The static form of decision-making (or, more precisely, its real-world ana-
log) is a necessary empirical foundation for “creative” decision-making. 
 The static subjectivist view is that four factors determine choice: (1) the ordinal 
ranking of goals or wants, (2) knowledge of the relationship between courses 
of action (or commodities) and want satisfaction, (3) knowledge of prices 
and (4) knowledge of the income constraint. This is determination in a purely 
logical sense. The four factors are mental constructs: we have recomposed the 
choice in terms of its constituent parts. So the choice is determined in a causal 
sense by itself; or, more precisely, the theory does not tell us what the causal 
determinants are. This has been recognized in terms of the ranking of wants 
by Schutz – “goals do not exist at all before the choice” ( 1967 , p. 67) – and by 
Mises – “The scale of value is nothing but a constructed tool of thought” ( 1966 , 
p. 102)  – but the principle clearly applies to the other three factors as well. 
 If  the determinants of choice do not exist except as constituent parts of the 
choice, how do individuals choose? Goals in a disembodied sense can exist 
prior to choice; it is only the fi nalized ranking that does not. The individual, 
in his imagination, projects the likely consequences of different courses of 
action, including what must be sacrifi ced to achieve them. This “phantasying” 
takes place sequentially, with each fantasy informing and affecting the other 
(Schutz,  1967 , p. 38). In this process, the individual clarifi es his ranking of 
the imagined consequences, his knowledge of the relationship between par-
ticular courses of action and those ranked consequences, and his perception 
of prices and income. The point at which the ranking and perceptions are 
fi nalized is, or constitutes, the point of decision. They exist simultaneously, 
and thus this four-pronged apparatus does not determine the decision in any 
causal sense, for that would require temporal priority of the cause. 
 What an individual decides to do depends, in large part, on what he expects 
other individuals to decide. Therefore, it is impossible to examine adequately 
the nature of decision-making without paying attention to the content of 
expectations. Unless an individual can expect a great deal of predictable deci-
sion-making on the part of others, he will fi nd it impossible to make a mean-
ingful choice. 
 Single-valued expectations 
 For simplicity, let us begin our analysis with the case in which expectations 
are of one, and only one, possible outcome. Where an individual does not 
envisage a probability distribution over a set of possible outcomes, the only 
criterion of forecasting accuracy is how far the single-valued estimate deviates 
from the actual outcome. In such a world there must be a base of “tolerably” 
predictable or habitual actions. These actions need not be automatic refl ex 
motions but can be purposeful activity whose contents have been routinized 
(Berger and Luckmann,  1966 , p. 53). “Habituations” are the empirical 
counterparts to static decision-making. In such cases the logical constituents 
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of a decision remain unchanged from period to period. 12 Therefore, the 
tastes and knowledge of the previous period can be viewed  as if they causally 
determined the choices of the current period. In the fi nal analysis, however, 
this is merely an illusion of determinism, because the individual is actually 
freely choosing to repeat his activity. Since this type of activity provides the 
necessary predictable foundation for all forms of decision-making, including 
the most creative and spontaneous, static analysis is itself  the necessary 
foundation for dynamic theory. 
 In a world of uni-valued expectations in which the individual must be able 
to predict fairly accurately in order to make meaningful decisions, all activ-
ity still need not be habitual. Truly creative, indeterminate decisions are pos-
sible so long as they do not too heavily disappoint the expectations of most 
decision-makers. In fact, creative activity can disappoint some expectations 
while at the same time ensuring the fulfi llment of others. The lure of profi ts 
as the reward for facilitating the activities of other individuals means that 
sometimes creative activity will make the decision-making environment more 
stable, on balance, than otherwise (Kirzner,  1982 ). 
 Multi-valued expectations and decision weights 
 The single-value expectations approach is ultimately an inadequate portrayal 
of the position of the decision-maker. Normally, there are many  possible 
actions that could be undertaken by other relevant parties. Not only is 
that number probably quite large, but, more importantly, the particular 
combination of such actions will affect the consequences of the decision-
maker’s choice. A still further element of complexity emerges when we realize 
that the “order” of such actions also matters. The particular identity of the 
individuals who engage in certain actions will itself  have an effect since some 
individuals are closer than others, in an economically relevant sense, 13 to the 
original decision-maker. Hence we must be concerned with the total number 
of permutations of the possible actions. Even in a very small society this 
number will be extremely large. Thus, it is imperative that people be able to 
weight these various possibilities in terms of their likelihood in order to make 
the process of decision-making humanly manageable. 
 Weighting possible actions of others does not necessitate being able to spe-
cify all the possible outcomes. If  an individual feels that one or more decisions 
might be made of which he knows absolutely nothing, his own decision-mak-
ing can proceed unimpeded if  he places a low weight on these. Such a require-
ment may seem a bit awkward at fi rst because the individual is expected to 
know something about the likelihood of unknown eventualities. This, how-
ever, is not at all implausible because the contrary assumption would paralyze 
all action. We cannot be blocked by the mere possibility that something just 
might happen to upset our plans. 
 The weights that we have been discussing are, like the determinants of 
choice under certainty, logical constructs used to identify the constituents of 
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a decision. They are fully subjective attributes of the methodological mind 
construct. To say that they are “subjective” does not mean, however, that 
there is nothing in the objective world to which they refer. In order to see this, 
let us analyze three possible views of decision weights. 
 (1)  The weights refer to nothing objective: they are merely arbitrary and per-
sonal, like tastes. If  this is so, then decision-making is almost entirely a 
leap of faith. Not only are suffi cient grounds for choice thereby elimi-
nated, but any grounds, in the sense of interpersonal justifi cation, are 
impossible. The consequences of any course of action would be limited 
only by wishful thinking. Furthermore, in this kind of world any degree 
of  ex ante coordination of plans could occur only by sheer accident. 
Presumably, then, exchange and social institutions as we know them 
would be virtually impossible. 14 
 (2)  The weights are only social conventions. Again, even the most casual 
observation refutes this view. If  this were the case, then no amount of 
disappointment would ever lead people to change their weights. The real 
world would provide no useful feedback of any kind, and hence learning 
would be impossible. 
 (3)  The weights are  attempts to perceive objective propensities (Popper, 
 1959 ). If  we say that a great deal of what individuals will do is affected 
by objective propensities, then the requirements of meaningful decision-
making are met. The huge number of possible consequences of different 
courses of action can be pared down by a weighting scheme. This scheme, 
in turn, is something that bears a relationship to the external world and is 
not merely self  or social delusion. Thus, there must be a base of “loosely 
determined” behavior. With respect to this base, although something 
completely unexpected could happen, it is not likely. And what is not 
completely unexpected is more or less likely to happen as specifi ed by 
underlying objective propensities. 
 On this base of loose determinism, there can be erected a domain of creative 
decision-making. This is determinate in neither the strict nor the loose sense. 
Yet it is possible only because it is limited. In a stimulating passage of an 
introductory mathematics book, Alfred North Whitehead comes to a very 
similar conclusion:
 It is a profoundly erroneous truism, repeated by all copybooks and by emi-
nent people when they are making speeches, that we should cultivate the 
habit of thinking of what we are doing. The precise opposite is the case. 
Civilization advances by extending the number of important operations 
which we can perform without thinking about them. Operations of thought 
are like cavalry charges in a battle – they are strictly limited in number, they 
require fresh horses, and must only be made at decisive moments. 
 (Whitehead,  1939 , p. 61) 
90 The economics of time and ignorance
 Creativity in decision-making that is both unbounded in degree and 
quantitatively unlimited is a contradiction. No decisions at all can be made 
when the future is completely unpredictable. Yet this does not imply that 
creativity must be unimportant. Like Whitehead’s cavalry charges, it can 
occur at decisive moments and hence be of profound importance. The key 
behavioral aspect of its limitation must be that it does not render decision-
making pointless. Whether decisions are to be viewed as effi cacious or not 
is obviously a determination that only acting individuals can make. The 
maximum amount of indeterminism consistent with genuine choice is not a 
subject that can be addressed on purely  a priori grounds. 
 Institutions 
 One of the main focal points of habituations are institutions. Outside of 
the special theoretical case of uni-valued expectations, institutions do not 
perfectly determine the behavior of their participants. Instead, they “[posit] 
that actions of type X will be performed by actors of type X” (Berger and 
Luckmann,  1966 , p. 54). For example, the institution of the post offi ce enables 
us to predict the actions of the ideal-typical postman (e.g., he will pick up the 
mail, deliver it, etc.) Similarly, typical fi remen, butchers, doctors, and so on 
can be counted on to engage in certain predictable patterns of behavior. For 
any given real-world individual, institutions enable us to narrow the range of 
possible actions to some specifi able class, 15 perhaps even to rank the elements 
of that class in terms of their likelihood. Thus, institutions reduce but do 
not eliminate uncertainty; they provide, as it were, “points of orientation” 
(Lachmann,  1971 , pp. 38, 49–91). 
 Concluding remarks 
 The discussion of dynamic subjectivism in this chapter has established a 
theme that will be pursued throughout most of this book. The creative 
aspects of human decision-making appear in many forms in subjectivist 
economic theory. The process of learning, the characterization of time and 
uncertainty, the construction of a useful equilibrium concept – all must entail 
appreciation of the nonmechanistic and indeterminate aspects of individual 
action. The development of this theme even in the more applied areas later 
in the book will reveal its importance. Practical issues such as antitrust law 
and government regulation of industry can be seen in a new light from a 
dynamically subjectivist perspective. 
 Notes 
 1  “Praxeological reality is not the physical universe, but man’s conscious reaction to 
the given state of this universe. Economics is not about things and tangible material 
objects; it is about men, their meanings and actions” (Mises,  1966 , p. 92). 
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 2  “Theoretical economics has the task of presenting not merely the ‘ laws ’ of  eco-
nomic phenomena to us but also their ‘ general nature .’ A presentation of the above 
science, for example, which would, to be sure, enlighten us on the laws, but not on 
the  nature , of  goods, of value and the various forms in which value appears, of 
economy, of price, of ground rent, or income on capital, of speculative gains, of 
money, etc., would at any rate have to be designated as incomplete” (Menger,  1963 , 
p. 198). 
 3  This defi nition of the economic question is intentionally broad since the boundar-
ies between economics and the other social sciences are, to a great extent, merely 
conventional. 
 4  It is conceivable that institutions could be the  intended consequences of human 
action. This may, in fact, be true in certain selected cases. However, in general, 
considerations such as the divergence of individual plans and the social div-
ision of knowledge make it unlikely that complex outcomes could be completely 
intended. 
 5  “My knowledge of everyday life is structured in terms of relevances. Some of these 
are determined by immediate pragmatic interests of mine, others by my general 
situation in society” (Berger and Luckmann,  1966 , p. 45). 
 6  The quotation continues: “We can indeed make this class smaller and smaller with-
out limit by making our description more and more detailed. But however far we 
go, it is a necessary consequence of the nature of language that we can never make 
the description perfectly determinate” (O’Connor,  1957 , p. 313). 
 7  This doesn’t depend on how the periods are divided (Ackerman,  1976 , p. 45). 
 8  It makes no sense to argue that P will decide at  t 3 on a course of action on the basis 
of what he knows only up to  t 2 . Why should P ignore information that, by assump-
tion, he has on hand? 
 9  How could a mind not be conscious of what,  ex hypothesi , has been attributed to 
its consciousness? 
 10  For a development of this principle in the area of legal causation see Rizzo and 
Arnold ( 1980 , p. 1410 and  passim ) and Rizzo ( 1981 , p. 1022). 
 11  In principle, there may be many theories that increase likelihood or provide favor-
able relevance. Choice among them must proceed,  inter alia , on some notion of 
relative degrees of likelihood and the ability of a theory similarly to explain other 
phenomena. 
 12  Some habituations are merely the result of the same maximization exercise being 
repeated time after time while others are non-maximizing rules of thumb. The 
former can be approximated under roughly static conditions. The latter are con-
sciously followed as an alternative to maximization under nonstatic conditions. 
See  Chapter 5 and  Chapter 6 for further discussion. 
 13  People with whom one expects to engage in one exchange per year may be of 
less importance to the success of one’s plans than people with whom one trades 
every day. 
 14  We would also never observe actors spending resources to learn what is more or 
less likely. They could merely “conjure up” the relevant weights. 
 15  On this idea of prediction in general see Popper ( 1965 , p. 73) and Hayek ( 1967b ,  c ). 
 
 3  Knowledge and decisions 
 We are not simply acquiring knowledge about a static system which stays 
put, but acquiring knowledge about a whole dynamic process in which the 
acquisition of knowledge is itself  a part of the process. 
 Kenneth Boulding (1966, p. 9) 
 The all-encompassing importance of the individual’s state of knowledge 
was implicit in our analysis of the mind construct in the last chapter. In 
this chapter, we probe more deeply into the nature of that knowledge and 
the process of learning. In addition, we focus explicitly on an extremely 
important, though widely misunderstood, feature of decision-making: cost. 
In a subjectivist framework, cost must be seen in a way that takes account of 
both its foundations in utility theory and its forward-looking orientation. 
 Subjectivism as content: knowledge 
 In recent years the economics of knowledge has received considerable 
attention. It is not our purpose to retrace its development. Instead, we shall 
concentrate on a number of critical issues that have not been explored in 
this literature. The neglect of these issues stems from the nonsubjectivist 
perspective adopted by most information theorists. Our analysis will stress 
precisely those subjectivist themes that tend to be absent in the conventional 
approaches. Specifi cally, we shall divide our discussion into four subsections: 
(1) the context of the individual’s knowledge; (2) the nature of learning; (3) 
the division of knowledge in society; and (4) the difference between scientifi c 
and nonscientifi c knowledge. 
 The context of knowledge 
 An individual’s knowledge always arises in the context of a problem situation 
(Popper,  1979b ). The static version of “situational analysis” consists simply 
of a precise statement of a problem, the background to that problem, and the 
framework of its solution. From the economic perspective, the problem situation is 
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interpreted as focusing around a means-ends relationship. Consider, for example, 
the problem of want satisfaction. The background to this is knowledge of the 
relationship between commodities or courses of action and want satisfaction. 
The framework is the assumed motivation of utility maximization and the price-
income constraints. Thus, from the point of view of situational analysis, the task 
of the economist is to reconstruct the situation of the actor in terms of achieving 
the  rational solution to a problem  as the actor saw it . 
 The emphasis on the rational solution to a problem differentiates this form 
of analysis from a  psychological subjectivism that often appeals to notions 
of “irrationality.” In addition, our approach differs from that of individual 
psychology insofar as there is no real-world individual-by-individual investi-
gation of perceptions. Instead, there is only a conjecturing of the perceptions 
of an ideal-typical individual or mind construct. More generally, because no 
direct observation of what the individual “sees” is possible, the problem situ-
ation must be  hypothesized in the context of the overall outcome the analyst 
wishes to explain. 
 Situational analysis need not imply, however, that the behavior of the indi-
vidual be determinate as the solution of a mathematical problem would be. 
We must clearly allow for dynamic or nondeterministic situational analysis 
(Popper,  1979b , p. 178). Fundamentally, the problem-solving logic is a ration-
alization or reconstruction of a situation. “When we speak of a problem, we 
do so almost always from hindsight. A man who works on a problem can 
seldom say clearly what his problem is (unless he has found a solution)…” 
(Popper,  1979a , p. 246). The indeterminism inherent in the actual situation is 
thus evident when we try to reconstruct matters as the actor saw them  ex ante. 
From that perspective, the statement of the problem will not be very precise, 
and, hence, an exact solution cannot be determined in advance. 
 The nature and process of learning 
 Merely to confi ne ourselves to rational reconstruction of problem situations 
does not tell us anything about how the individual sets up the problem context. 
Learning is thus not usefully explained in terms of the logical working out of 
a given, carefully specifi ed problem. Recall that the consumer’s problem under 
static conditions is reduced to mere computation of a constrained maximum. 
Because economic agents are assumed always to be rational, they don’t even 
take time to compute such solutions. “True” learning involves more than 
mathematical computation; rather it consists of the setting up of the problem 
situation itself  or the movement from one problem situation to another. This 
is analogous to Hahn’s distinction between different solutions to the same 
learning function (as the data change) and different functions themselves. 
Learning takes place when the individual’s framework of interpreting external 
“messages” or stimuli has changed over time (Hahn,  1973 , pp. 18–20). At 
present, we do not have a theory that enables us to say something signifi cant 
about the move from one problem context to another. Nevertheless, we can 
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go beyond Hahn’s remarks and say something about how such a theory 
might look. 
 Theories about genuine learning cannot be deterministic. If  we try to force 
learning into such a mold, we shall lose any notion of creative response. We 
have already seen the inconsistency involved in constructing deterministic 
theories of processes. In addition, because individuals undoubtedly perceive 
a nondeterministic element in their learning experiences, this must affect how 
and why they act. Nevertheless, to claim that learning is not deterministic is 
not thereby to assert that it is purely random. Popper has elucidated, at least 
in general terms, the idea of a “plastic control” (Popper,  1979a , p. 240) stand-
ing between mechanical determinism on the one hand and blind chance on 
the other. While the details of this idea are based on a theory of scientifi c pro-
gress that we do not entirely share, it is nonetheless important to model the 
learning process in a way that attempts to formalize Popper’s intuition. 
 Learning in this Popperian sense is evident in the Austrian theory of entre-
preneurship. In that theory we assume only the “ tendency for a man to notice 
those [facts] that constitute possible opportunities for gainful action on his 
part” (Kirzner,  1979a , p. 29; emphasis added). In addition, “human action 
involves [merely] a  posture of alertness toward the discovery of as yet  unper-
ceived opportunities and their exploitation” (Kirzner,  1979a , p. 109; fi rst 
emphasis added). The  process of  entrepreneurial learning is neither determin-
ate nor random. With respect to this “in-between” world of plastic control, 
two important points can be made. First, although what individuals will learn 
is not determinate, that they will learn something may well be. In fact, this is 
the fundamental assumption of the theory of entrepreneurship. We are will-
ing to say  a priori that learning will take place. Second, given the overall con-
text of a change in knowledge, we can show how the move from framework 1 
(F 1 ) to framework 2 (F 2 ) is intelligible, in the sense that a metatheory can be 
constructed in which a loose dependency on F 1 is shown. F 2 is more likely 
(though not necessarily highly likely or probable) given F 1 than it would be 
given some other F′ 1 . On the other hand, we might say that, given F 1 , many 
possible alternative frameworks can be ruled out and that only a class of sub-
sequent frameworks (which includes F 2 ) can be determined. 
 The division of knowledge 
 One of the criteria for the type of knowledge we can attribute to the mind 
construct is whether it is plausible (intelligible) that the knowledge would 
have been acquired in the postulated context. Fundamentally, this context is 
the individual’s system of relevances (Schutz and Luckmann,  1973 , pp. 182–
229) – what he deems important. This, in turn, is dependent on his goals, the 
perception of opportunities, etc., or, in short, on the problem situation he 
faced in the previous period. Primarily because different people face different 
problems, there is a division or distribution of knowledge in society (Schutz 
and Luckmann,  1973 , p. 306). It is not plausible to argue that, regardless 
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of the situation, individuals fi nd that they will ultimately learn the same 
things. Further, even if  all individuals faced the same problems, they would 
probably not all have the same ability to acquire knowledge. There would still 
be a distribution of knowledge, although the “stock” of knowledge would be 
equally useful to everyone. Merely because people faced different problems 
does not mean, however, that all of the knowledge acquired by one individual 
is irrelevant to the others. Hence, knowledge must be communicated. 
 Consider the case of a reduction in the supply of steel. Those in the indus-
try itself  may know that a rise in the price of coal is partly to blame for the 
increased cost of production and therefore the reduced supply. But the causes 
of supply reduction may be irrelevant or, at least, less relevant to the build-
ers of houses. They need know only a part of what the steel producers know: 
merely that steel has become relatively more scarce. Thus, some knowledge 
will remain uncommunicated while other bits of knowledge will be transmit-
ted. For our purposes there are two important ways for knowledge to be com-
municated: through prices and through institutions. 
 Prices In the previous example, the price of steel would rise, thus conveying 
information about the relative reduction in supply (Hayek,  1940 ). But price 
signals need not always be correct. Suppose the same steel producers mis-
takenly believe that there has simultaneously been a decrease in the demand 
for products using steel as an input. They might actually attempt to lower the 
price. 1 The issue is not, however, the accuracy of the price signal relative to 
some external standard of perfection. Prices, we admit, can and will be incor-
rect. The crucial point is that, overall, more information is conveyed through a 
market price system than without one (Hayek,  1937a ,  1935a ,  1935b ). Further, 
even “incorrect” (i.e., nonequilibrium) prices convey information by revealing 
inconsistencies and plan discoordination (Kirzner,  1984 ). 
 Institutions Information is also conveyed outside the price system through 
patterns of routine behavior. Institutions may transmit knowledge in two 
senses. First, if  people can rely on others to fulfi ll certain roles then their 
expectations are more likely to be coordinated. If, for instance, an individual 
knows that the sanitation department will pick up his garbage in the morning, 
then he can make use of the knowledge of garbage disposal that is possessed 
by others. What is transmitted to him is not that knowledge itself  but the 
knowledge of how to make effective use of skills he will never possess (Sowell, 
 1980 , pp. 8–11). 
 Second, some have argued (e.g., Hayek,  1973 ) that institutions also con-
vey knowledge, in the sense that the routine courses of action they embody 
are effi cient adaptations to the environment. A vague Darwinian process is 
postulated which weeds out institutions with inferior survival properties. 
There are several problems with the view. Unless the nature of these sur-
vival properties is made clear, the whole “theory” is little more than a tau-
tology. Survival properties are, by defi nition, those attributes that enable an 
institution to survive. Hence in any “confl ict” among institutions those with 
inferior survival properties must necessarily give way to those with superior 
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properties. Unfortunately, as the theory now stands, a careful specifi cation 
of what makes societies survive has not been achieved. The second problem 
with the “Darwinian” view of institutions arises out of indivisibilities. The 
routine courses of action that comprise an institution are not all independ-
ent; the Darwinian process cannot eliminate all but the very best routines and 
combine them into a consistent or coordinated whole. Some clearly inferior 
routines must be maintained in order to permit those clearly superior (but 
dependent) to exist. Furthermore, nature does not throw up an infi nite num-
ber of institutions out of which only the best will survive. The choice set, so 
to speak, is normally quite limited. The implication of these considerations is 
that, in the absence of a clear conception of the nature of survival properties, 
we cannot know whether any given institution or course of action is the most 
adaptive. In fact, we know that many institutions will not be the most adap-
tive possible because of indivisibilities in the evolutionary process. 
 Are prices and institutions objective knowledge? 
 The transmission of knowledge through prices and institutions does not mean 
that subjectivity is no longer important and knowledge has in effect, become 
objectifi ed. It is a misconception of subjectivism to assume that it deals with 
only elements of the individual psyche that can never be intersubjectively 
communicated. The social world is preeminently an intersubjective world 
(Schutz,  1954 ), and the phenomena in which we are ultimately interested 
rest on this fact. To say that knowledge has been transmitted from A to 
B means that where there was initially only one mind there are now two. 
Subjectivism is now more, not less, important than before. The nature of 
what is transmitted – the thoughts of individuals – is subjective. Similarly, the 
modes of transmission must be interpreted by those who receive the signals. A 
price or an institutional code of behavior must  mean something in order to be 
an effective communication device. A rise in the price of a given commodity, 
for example, will have different meanings depending on the “elasticity of 
expectations” of the receiver. A price rise may signal higher or lower future 
prices when the subjective context of the date is taken into account. 
 Although the process of transmission enables individuals to make use of 
widely dispersed knowledge, it does not eliminate the heterogeneity of indi-
vidual stocks of knowledge. Because people misinterpret signals, communica-
tion is imperfect. What the sender sends is often not what the receiver receives. 
Furthermore, information transmission is costly. At the very least, individuals 
must pay attention to prices, and they must recognize or understand how 
institutions function. Thus, there is an optimal amount of transmission and 
hence a degree of heterogeneity of knowledge that is irreducible. 
 But even when it pays to communicate, the sequence or order of know-
ledge acquisition will probably not be the same for all actors (Schutz and 
Luckmann,  1973 , p. 307). If, for example, the individual who directly acquired 
bits of information a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 did so in that order, another individual might 
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acquire this same information in reverse order, a 4 , …, a 1 . This means, how-
ever, that their stocks of knowledge will ultimately be different. The “meta-” 
knowledge of relationships among these elements can depend upon the order 
in which they are apprehended. It is also the case that the nature of commu-
nication itself  makes it impossible for all heterogeneity to be eliminated. So 
long as knowledge is communicated rather than directly acquired, the context 
of its original acquisition will be unknown to some. As a consequence, not all 
individuals will understand the full context and hence the full meaning of the 
“communicated” knowledge. 
 Because of (1) differences in the problem situations that individuals face and 
(2) the very nature of the communication process, there exists no presumption 
that knowledge will be uniformly distributed: it will always be divided. Even 
in equilibrium, 2 then, not everyone will know the same things. 
 To talk of a “social stock of knowledge” is therefore merely a shorthand 
way of referring to its distribution across society. This social stock, how-
ever, bears no simple relationship to the individual stocks. It is both less and 
more than their summation. It is less because not everything that is relevant 
to each individual taken separately is in their common interest (Schutz and 
Luckmann,  1973 , p. 289). It is more because new knowledge arising out of 
combinations of the old “isolated” elements is now possible. 
 The relationship between the two stocks of knowledge is compositive. An ini-
tial social stock is built up from the individual stocks on the basis of common 
relevances. Then the individual is able to increase his knowledge still further by 
establishing interconnections among the now-collected bits. By so doing, the 
social stock on which individuals can draw is expanded as this new derivative 
knowledge spreads. The process can continue  even if underlying objective con-
ditions remain unchanged. There is no end to the enrichment of the social stock 
of knowledge except the largely unexplored limitations of the human mind. 
Thus we must reject any notion of a fi nal “equilibrium” state of knowledge. 
 Scientifi c knowledge 
 In the previous section we explored some fundamental aspects of the individual 
and social stock of knowledge as “data” of economics. In this section we wish 
to emphasize the important differences between the subjectivity of the subject 
matter and the subjectivism of our method of investigation.  Subjectivism as 
a method is perfectly consistent with objective science. In order to see this, we 
must consider two component issues: fi rst, the difference between scientifi c 
knowledge and knowledge of the mind construct; second, the possibility of 
having an objective science of subjective meaning. 3 
 The key to the difference between the level of knowledge of the scientist 
and that of the economic actor or mind construct lies in the different problem 
situation faced by the two. The typical scientifi c question investigates the over-
all, frequently unintended, consequences of individual action. Individuals, on 
the other hand, are not always interested in those consequences. 
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 Consider, for example, the well-known scientifi c question, does capital, labor, 
or the consumer bear the burden of the imposition of a corporate income tax? 
For the individual actors this issue can be decomposed into several subissues: 
savers must decide whether to continue the same rate of saving; investors must 
decide whether to reshuffl e their portfolios; laborers must decide whether to 
shift jobs in response to any change in wage rates; and, fi nally, consumers must 
decide whether to shift product mixes. Each of these actors makes his own 
marginal adjustments without necessarily understanding the interaction and 
overall result of those adjustments. If, on the other hand, they are faced with 
the political question of whether to support the corporate income tax, the 
overall result or net burden may be a part of their problem situation. 
 This does not mean, however, that the actors understand the relevant sci-
entifi c theory. A further argument must be constructed that will show that 
this knowledge can be communicated from scientists to nonscientists. More 
importantly, actors are normally faced with several models of  an economic 
problem. They must choose among scientifi c theories. The proponent of  the 
“correct” theory has no assurance that actors will believe his theory instead 
of  an “incorrect” one. There is no reason to think that nonscientists will 
settle on just that theory adopted by the scientist. In the fi rst place, even 
scientifi c standards of  theory acceptance or rejection are controversial and 
highly ambiguous (Feyerabend,  1975 ; Kuhn,  1970 ; Lakatos,  1970 ). So there 
is a large range of  indeterminacy that will surround the choice of  theories. In 
the second place, scientifi c standards do not necessarily coincide with those 
of  the actors. Suppose, for example, that a model explains the effects of  a tax 
on X and Y. Because of  the problem in which the actor is interested, he may 
be more concerned about inaccuracies in the explanation with respect to X 
alone. The scientist, on the other hand, may be interested in minimizing the 
sum of the errors with respect to X  and Y. Hence, each may be led to select a 
different theory on the basis of  different standards of  performance. 
 The second issue concerns the status of an objective science of subjective 
meaning. The possibility of such a science rests on the method of idealized 
rational reconstruction (whether deterministic or nondeterministic) of a prob-
lem situation. At the most abstract level, the problem situation need not embody 
reference to any concrete goals or constraints. Instead, we may be content to 
work out merely the formal implications of purposiveness. The law of diminish-
ing marginal utility, for example, says a great deal about the structure of action 
in a static context, while completely abstracting from the content of individual 
ends. Objective science at this level is the development of a  logic of choice that 
transcends the context in which particular individuals fi nd themselves. 
 On an applied level, however, the economist cannot abstract from the typ-
ical contents of actors’ minds. He must incorporate these into explanations 
of real-world phenomena. Although direct observation of subjective contents 
(tastes, expectations, etc.) is not possible, applied economics can still have 
intersubjective validity. The knowledge attributed to the mind construct must 
bear an “understandable” relation to the behavior under study. Therefore, our 
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attribution of subjective states is always “controlled” by the real-world actions 
they are meant to illuminate. In addition, the contents of the actors’ minds 
must be assumed to be consistent with one another in the specifi c sense that no 
one will  knowingly believe contradictory things or have contradictory values. 
Finally, the usefulness of particular subjective states in understanding behavior 
outside of the immediate context of investigation is important. If, for example, 
we wish to explain why the price of soybeans has risen, we may want to invoke 
expectations that the government will impose a general price-increasing regu-
lation on commodities. This specifi c attribution of content to individuals’ 
expectations will carry greater scientifi c weight the more  independent evidence 
that there is for it. Thus, if  the behavior of the prices of other commodities, the 
information-gathering activities of individuals and the announcements of the 
government are all consistent with our expectational hypothesis, then we can 
assign it some measure of scientifi c corroboration. At no time, however, do we 
directly “see” expectations; rather, we merely observe that there are more and 
more phenomena consistent with the same subjective state. 
 The objectivity of the subjectivist method ultimately rests both on the level 
of analysis pursued by the scientists and on the “controlling” effect of the 
individual’s behavior. In the fi rst instance, although the knowledge of the sci-
entist incorporates the subjective contents of the actor’s mind, it goes beyond 
that to a higher level of generalization. This level often concerns the over-
all unintended consequences of individual actions. Furthermore, even at the 
individual level, objectivity in the method can be maintained. The imputed 
knowledge of the mind construct must bear an understandable relation to the 
behavior we seek to explain. Hence our imputations are controlled at least 
partially by that behavior. 
 Subjectivism as weighing of alternatives 
 For many economists subjectivism means little more than the subjective 
theory of value. As we have already seen in this and the previous chapter, 
the nature and implications of subjectivism spread farther and wider than 
this. Nevertheless, even within the domain of value theory subjectivism has 
been only partially understood. While value is admittedly subjective, cost 
has inexplicably been viewed as objective. Thus, the Marshallian blades of 
the scissor were invented to symbolize the neoclassical fusion of subjective 
and objective factors. In our view, however, this dichotomization of the 
value process fails to understand the fundamental principle of subjectivism: 
valuation is nothing but the  mental weighing of alternatives. None of these 
alternatives is a realized event because choices can be made only between 
images or projections of the outcomes of various courses of action. When an 
alternative is realized it is already too late to choose (Buchanan,  1969 , p. 43). 
Subjectivism, then, must suffuse both the theory of value and the theory of 
cost; both blades of the scissor are made of the same material (Schumpeter, 
 1954 , p. 922). 
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 Utility background 
 Figure III.1 illustrates in schematic form a thoroughly subjectivist view 
of value theory. The foundation of all value is a basic human want. In the 
sense originally conceived by Menger ( 1981 , pp. 52, 139) and more recently 
developed by Becker (e.g.,  1965 ) and Lancaster (e.g.,  1966 ), wants are not 
directly for observable goods. Instead, they are for the satisfaction of some 
more basic desire: music (Stigler and Becker,  1977 , p. 78), comfortable indoor 
temperature, health and delicious meals (Becker,  1971 , pp. 47–8) are all 
examples of basic wants. 4 
 With a background of these wants, the individual projects an image of 
future want satisfaction. These projections are the immediate motivating 
source of his activity. Because individuals choose among directly observable 
goods or observable courses of action that produce these goods, there must be 
some link between the projected want satisfaction and these observables. This 
link is the individual’s knowledge of a commodity’s want-satisfying poten-
tial, i.e., the perceived production function. The relationship between market 
commodities and projected want satisfaction is not automatic but depends on 
 Figure III.1  Value theory: a utility scheme 
W A N T
Knowledge of want-satisfying potential 
of a commodity
Choice of a commodity 
(directly-within-reach) CONSUMER THEORY
OR
Choice of course of action 
to obtain commodity PRODUCER THEORY
Course of action to transform  
commodity into want satisfaction HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION
ACTUAL WANT SATISFACTION
Projection of future want satisfaction
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the undertaking of a specifi c course of action to transform the commodity 
into actual satisfaction. This is the essence of the household production idea, 
originated by Menger and developed by Becker. 
 As we have just seen, the relationship between wants and choices of market 
commodities is not a simple one. “There is many a slip betwixt cup and lip.” 
The individual may incorrectly attribute want-satisfying potential to a good 
(Menger,  1981 , p. 53; “imaginary good”), or he may ignore such potential 
when it is actually there. Furthermore, he may fi nd that the costs involved in 
engaging in a particular plan of household production (in addition to the dir-
ect commodity costs) make the achievement of a particular want satisfaction 
prohibitively expensive. 
 Utility in this framework refers to the rank ordering of  projected want sat-
isfactions. An individual may value the prospective satisfaction of his desire 
for an additional unit of comfortable indoor temperature more than that of 
his desire for an additional unit of delicious meals. Strictly speaking, he does 
not rank the wants themselves, because they are mere deprivations and are 
not valued. Similarly, he does not rank the market commodities themselves, 
because they are wanted not for their own sake but only for the satisfaction 
they indirectly produce. 
 It is true that if  we viewed the link between commodities and satisfaction 
as automatic, then little is gained by this separation. The subjectivist view of 
utility theory must allow, however, for the erroneous perception of such a 
link. Hence the distinction between commodities and satisfaction is import-
ant. Finally, realized (as opposed to projected) want satisfactions cannot be 
objects over which utility is defi ned because  ex post magnitudes occur too late 
to motivate behavior. It is only projected satisfaction of wants that can pro-
vide the motivating force in decision-making. 
 In a static equilibrium world, the distinctions, on the one hand, between 
commodities and the projected satisfactions they can create and, on the other 
hand, between realized and projected want satisfaction lose much of their 
force. In the fi rst case, no economically relevant error would enter into the per-
ception of a commodity’s want-satisfying potential. In the second, images or 
projections of satisfaction would never deviate from the realized event. Thus, 
one might quite reasonably invoke Occam’s Razor and defi ne utility over mar-
ket commodities, omitting the intermediate steps. 5 However, in a world of dis-
equilibrium, individuals cannot proceed directly and immediately from goods 
to want satisfaction. In such a world the distinction made in our utility scheme 
can be quite useful in highlighting the complexities of the decision process. 
 Cost in consumer decision-making 
 Cost theory is not really a separate subject from utility theory. The concept 
of cost follows immediately from the way in which utility is defi ned. In a 
subjectivist framework, the cost of choosing any commodity is the highest 
ranked projected want satisfaction that is perceived to be sacrifi ced. Cost, 
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just like utility, is defi ned over projected want satisfaction and not directly 
over the commodities themselves. The relevant sacrifi ce cannot be merely the 
perceived commodity displacement, for the same reason that the relevant 
motivation for choice cannot be the chosen commodity itself. Commodities 
are only way stations to the ultimate satisfaction of basic wants. It is these 
projected satisfactions that constitute both utility and cost. 
 The only sense in which cost can infl uence choice is the perception at 
the very moment of choice of the satisfactions foregone (Wicksteed,  1967 , 
p. 391). Thus, cost is tied to choice and apart from it has no economic mean-
ing (Buchanan,  1969 , p. 43). After a choice is made, retrospective calculations 
of what the relevant costs “really” were (in the sense of what the actor would 
have perceived if  he had had certain superior knowledge) cannot, of course, 
be relevant to that prior choice situation. To the extent that conditions are 
expected to remain the same, however, such calculations can inform future 
choice situations. Nevertheless, even these historical estimates cannot demon-
strate unambiguously what would have happened if  the individual had chosen 
another commodity or course of action. It is quite possible that the projected 
satisfaction associated with a rejected alternative would have never material-
ized. Thus, even  ex post, costs cannot be realized. They must remain forever 
in a world of projecting, fantasizing or imagining. 
 Although cost is inextricably bound to the individual’s choice context, it is 
nevertheless possible for one individual to affect the costs of another. If A pol-
lutes the water (a completed act of choice), then the cost to B of obtaining clean 
water to drink will increase. The nature of B’s cost is still subjective: the highest 
ranked projected want satisfaction that  he perceives must be sacrifi ced in order 
to obtain drinkable water. Nevertheless, this perception is affected by individuals 
making choices outside of the context in which B’s cost itself affects behavior. 
This is not the same thing as saying that other individuals strictly “determine” 
or “impose” costs on any decision-maker. While other people can surely affect 
the environment of choice, it is still the choosing individual who must ultim-
ately perceive the alternatives sacrifi ced and bear the costs of his choices. In 
perfectly competitive equilibrium, the three quantitative magnitudes (foregone 
revenue, outlay cost and consumers’ valuation) are equal at the margin. This 
equality at the margin does not imply that the conceptual differences disappear 
but that they are not manifest in competitive markets in equilibrium. 
 Cost in the theory of the fi rm 
 For heuristic purposes, cost takes on a somewhat different meaning in the 
theory of the fi rm. Here, the relevant meaning depends entirely on the imputed 
objective function of the fi rm’s decision-maker.  If the fi rm seeks to maximize 
profi ts, then cost must be defi ned in terms of foregone revenue and not in terms 
of foregone want satisfaction. This is because it is analytically convenient to 
separate the process by which the fi rm makes its decisions (theory of the fi rm) 
from the process by which the decision-maker buys market commodities and 
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transforms them into want satisfaction (consumer theory). To combine the 
two in every case would make our efforts to understand market phenomena 
enormously more complicated without yielding any increased insight. 
Nevertheless, we must always remember that the  ultimate motivation for all 
choices is want satisfaction. Profi t-maximization, sales maximization and 
other imputed fi rm goals are only means to the attainment of more basic 
ends. Thus any assumed motivation should not be viewed as a constant. 
 For the profi t-maximizing decision-maker, cost is the revenue that the  deci-
sion-maker perceives  he could have obtained with the same resources in the 
best alternative line of  endeavor (Thirlby,  1973 , p. 277). In contrast to this 
notion of  cost, there are at least two conventional nonsubjectivist concepts. 
The fi rst is direct outlay cost: this amounts to the expenditures incurred in 
acquiring the necessary factors of  production. The second is a species of 
“social cost” (Thirlby,  1973 , p. 278), referring to the  consumers ’ valuation 
of  the alternative products that  other decision-makers might have produced 
had a different course of  action been undertaken. In perfectly competitive 
equilibrium, all three notions of  “cost” collapse into each other. Assuming 
that a decision-maker is not restricted to any given industry, his costs will be 
equal at the margin to the market prices of  the resources that he employs. 6 
This follows because, under competitive conditions, these prices will be bid 
up to the value of  the resources in their best alternative use, regardless of 
where in the economy that might be. The decision-maker’s costs will also 
equal the consumer’s valuation of  the alternative product because the total 
value of  a commodity on the output market will be the same as its value on 
the resource market. 
 In disequilibrium, however, these notions of “cost” need not bear any sys-
tematic relation to one another. Therefore, the analyst’s choice of which one 
he will use is of paramount importance. To understand the decision-making 
process of the fi rm, only the fi rst, thoroughly subjectivist, view of cost (the 
fi rm’s anticipated foregone revenue) will be useful. Only costs as perceived by 
the decision-maker in terms of his own options are relevant to understand-
ing his behavior. Direct outlay cost in conjunction with the implicit market 
value of factors owned by the decision-maker will, on the other hand, be use-
ful in calculating entrepreneurial profi t. The difference between total revenue 
and these expenses represents profi t from the market point of view. Finally, a 
comparison of the consumer valuation of alternative products and the costs 
as perceived by the fi rm tells us something about how well the market is sat-
isfying consumer demands. When fi rm decision-makers view alternative A as 
preferable to B, and consumers favor B over A, then we have imperfect market 
coordination. 
 The three concepts that are conventionally lumped together as “cost” are 
really very different in analytical function outside of competitive equilib-
rium. As a consequence, it would seem better to allocate different names to 
these ideas, reserving the term “cost” for the concept that arises directly from 
the theory of choice. Implicit or explicit expenses (outlays) and consumer 
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valuations are unambiguously handled by these other terms, and calling them 
“cost” only creates confusion. 
 Conclusion 
 In this chapter we have discussed issues of knowledge from a perspective 
different from that normally pursued in the economics literature. We view 
knowledge as inherently decentralized and its acquisition as necessarily 
nonmechanistic. In addition, we have found that the transmission and growth 
of knowledge is a never-ending process. In the next chapter, this continual 
increase in knowledge will be linked with a dynamically subjectivist conception 
of time. Real time and changes in knowledge belong together. In  Chapter 5 , an 
equilibrium construct will be developed that is fi rmly embedded in real time. 
Thus, the continual growth of knowledge will occur even in equilibrium. 
 We have also seen that decisions made on the basis of the individual’s 
knowledge contain fully subjective components. Not only is utility subjective, 
but costs are as well. The theoretical developments of this idea in the current 
chapter will lay the foundation for a more thoroughgoing critique of eco-
nomic policy presented in  Chapter 7 . 
 Notes 
 1  Of course, their error need not manifest itself  if  there are suffi cient speculative pur-
chasers of steel who are correctly informed. 
 2  Here the term “equilibrium” is being used in the sense of no tendency to change 
rather than in the dynamic Hayekian sense of plan coordination. See the discussion 
in  Chapter 5 and  Chapter 6 . 
 3  Schutz ( 1953 , pp. 334–5) poses this question but does not appear to answer it very 
clearly. 
 4  How exactly basic wants ought to be defi ned depends on what is useful in the con-
text; there is no unique way to do this. 
 5  Although even here the distinction between basic wants and market goods can be 
useful in some contexts, as Becker ( 1976a , p. 5) has claimed. 
 6  We assume that he owns no factors and hires or purchases everything he uses. If  he 
owns any factors then they must be included at their implicit market price as part of 
the fi rm’s “outlays.” 
 
 4  The dynamic conception of time 
 The element of time … is the centre of the chief  diffi culty of almost every 
economic problem. 
 Alfred Marshall ( 1961 , p. vii) 
 In the two previous chapters we presented an overview of the methodological 
and substantive importance of subjectivism. In this chapter we shall extend and 
deepen dynamic subjectivism by applying it to a critical concept in economic 
theory: time. The nonsubjectivist method of neoclassical economics has not 
been able to handle time in a satisfactory manner. The core of orthodox theory 
is beset with temporal paradoxes and inconsistencies. As long ago as 1934, 
Kaldor saw that in equilibrium theory “the formation of prices must  precede 
the process of exchange and not be the result of it” ( 1934 , p. 127). Recently, 
Bausor more precisely diagnosed the problem when he concluded that in 
general equilibrium theory there is a “logical  simultaneity between current 
decisions and current prices” ( 1981 , p. 6; emphasis added). Thus, cause and 
effect, present and future are all laid out instantaneously. Even models that 
purport to take time seriously fail. Intertemporal general equilibrium theory 
has also effectively annulled time. As Hahn admitted, “The assumption that 
all intertemporal and all contingent markets exist has the effect of collapsing 
the future into the present” ( 1980 , p. 132). Decisions are all made in a single 
primordial instant: the future is merely the unfolding of a tapestry that 
exists  now . 
 In recent years, a number of articles have emphasized both the neglect of 
time by neoclassical economics and the importance of incorporating it into 
our models (e.g., Hicks,  1976 ). Nevertheless, much of this critical literature 
fails to pinpoint the exact source of the problem and, more importantly, to 
indicate the character of a possible solution. In this chapter we attempt to 
remedy that situation by, fi rst, critically analyzing the orthodox treatment of 
time and, second, presenting an alternative, thoroughly subjectivist, concep-
tion of time. 
 The chapter is divided into fi ve sections. The fi rst is an analysis of Newtonian 
time and its implications for economic theory. The second is a contrasting 
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study of the implications of real or subjectivist time. In the third section we 
clarify the relationship among real time, planning and action. There follows a 
development of the consequences of real time for economic processes and the 
characterization of uncertainty. Finally, we examine the interrelation between 
Newtonian and real time and specify their respective analytical roles. 
 Newtonian time 
 The Newtonian conception of time is spatialized; that is, its passage is 
represented or symbolized by “movements” along a line. Different dates 
are then portrayed as a succession of line segments (discrete time) or points 
(continuous time). In either case, time is fully analogized to space, and 
what is true of the latter becomes true of the former. Neoclassical theory 
has uncritically adopted this idea and used it in almost every systematic 
treatment of the temporal aspects of economics. In fact, almost all work on 
the economics of time is plagued by an excessive dependence on this analogy. 
Theorists treat a mere analogy as if  it were the reality to which all models had 
to be faithful. 
 While the Newtonian view of time has doubtless been useful for many pur-
poses, it nevertheless abstracts from some of the most important problems 
with which contemporary economics must deal. In order to support this con-
clusion, we shall begin by analyzing the central features of Newtonian time 
and the particular ways in which they manifest themselves. 
 Central features of Newtonian time 
 Newtonian time can be characterized in many ways, but for our purposes 
there are three aspects that are especially important: (1) homogeneity, (2) 
mathematical continuity and (3) causal inertness (Capek,  1961 , p. 36–48). 
 Homogeneity In the geometry of lines each point is identical to all others, 
except for its position. In fact, position is really all that constitutes a point. 
Analogously, spatialized time is merely  temporal position. It is an empty point 
or “container” that can (but need not) be fi lled with changes. Just as mat-
ter occupies empty space, changes occupy points or instants of time. Since 
a point is, by construction, empty, time must in principle be independent of 
its contents. In other words, Newtonian time can elapse without anything 
happening. The Newtonian conception thus transforms time into a static 
category. 
 One implication of this is that time can pass without agents learning. In 
the Arrow-Debreu model, for example, all decisions are made on some initial 
day. Although time passes and agents eventually fi nd out which of the vari-
ous contingent states of the world occur, they never learn anything that would 
cause them to want to change the decisions made on day one (Radner,  1970 , 
pp. 480–4). Agents are completely constrained to the view of the world held 
at the beginning of time. 
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 Mathematical continuity This is not continuity in the sense of an interrela-
tion between successive instants but merely continuous divisibility. Just as a 
line can be divided and subdivided without end, the intervals of Newtonian 
time can be made arbitrarily small. In addition, no matter how fi nely we div-
ide time and how close the resultant points are to each other, there is always 
some space between them. Each instant of time is isolated or, in principle, 
independent of the others, for points on a line can never touch. 
 Gunnar Myrdal ( 1939 ) saw the signifi cance of mathematical continuity. If  
economic adjustments occur at points or durationless instants, all dynamic 
problems are evaded and hence left unsolved. In temporary equilibrium mod-
els, for example, adjustments occur at “the timeless points dividing the peri-
ods from each other” (p. 44). This, then, must neglect both the learning that 
accompanies processes and, more specifi cally, the order of each element in a 
process (since they are modeled all to occur at once). Furthermore, adjust-
ments must have an infi nite velocity and resources must be infi nitely mobile 
for a process to take place at a mere instant. Here, of course, is the heart of 
the Newtonian paradox: if  adjustment is instantaneous, why is change ever 
necessary? Things should be “right” from the beginning. Indeed, Myrdal put 
it more strongly, “The occurrence of change is contradictory to the idea of a 
timeless point” ( 1939 , p. 44). This diffi culty has been noted in the literature on 
price adjustments. Any stable  disequilibrium adjustment process must occur 
instantaneously. Stability of the adjustment functions implies the predictabil-
ity of the entire process. Consequently, if  the process were to take time, pure 
profi t opportunities would emerge. Entrepreneurial response to these oppor-
tunities would ensure that prices immediately adjusted (Gordon and Hynes, 
 1970 , p. 372; White,  1978 , p. 9). 
 Nevertheless, Newtonians have attempted to represent change “as a ser-
ies of states, each of which is homogeneous … and consequently does not 
[itself] change” (Bergson,  1911 , p. 163). Hence, any movement must emanate 
from outside the system; that is, it must be exogenous. A Newtonian system is 
merely a stringing together of static states and cannot endogenously generate 
change. Each period (or point) is thus isolated. Consequently, either we have 
the mere continuation of a period (no change) or we have change without the 
ability to show how it could be generated by the previous period. This is the 
fundamental problem with the comparative dynamics method that derives 
from Lindahl’s temporary equilibrium theory (Hicks,  1965 , pp. 68–9). Since 
each period is in temporary equilibrium, we can examine change only by ask-
ing what the “new” equilibrium would be if  an alternative set of data were 
exogenously imposed on the system. 
 Causal inertness That the mere elapse of time does not produce or cause 
anything is obviously just another way of looking at homogeneity: the inde-
pendence of time from its contents. More importantly, however, if  there are 
any changes, then they must be determined from the beginning. The initial 
state of the system must contain within it all that is necessary to produce 
“change”;  time adds literally nothing . 
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 The causal inertness of time is especially evident in the deterministic treat-
ment of learning in neoclassical models. The passage of time does not produce 
change in the method of processing exogenous messages. In equilibrium an 
agent’s “theory” is “independent of the date  t ” (Hahn,  1973 , p. 19). Therefore, 
given an exogenous message, we defi nitely know what the agent learns from 
it. More specifi cally, given his present information, we know what his expec-
tations are. Neoclassical learning is merely a series of cross-sections over a 
surface or function depicting the  existing state of knowledge. 
 The illusion of change 
 Change or the succession of events is not “genuine” in Newtonian time. Just as 
the points on a line coexist or are simultaneously given, so too must the future 
that the Newtonian model is intended to portray. In our previous example 
of neoclassical learning, the entire learning function exists “now” or, more 
exactly, is outside of time. Thus, there is no analytical difference between the 
various cross-sections being spread out over what we call successive instants 
and those same cross-sections being spread out over different regions at one 
instant in time (Shackle,  1969 , pp. 16–17). It is perfectly possible for  t 1 , …,  t  n  
to be compressed into a single conscious present. 
 The eradication of time 
 As we stated in the introductory section of this chapter, the explicit 
compression of change into a single instant is an important feature of 
neoclassical economics. No doubt this often results in greater mathematical 
tractability and the elimination of such problems as false trading (since 
equilibrium prices and exchanges are simultaneous), but, as we shall see, it 
also  negates the very problem the economist ostensibly has set out to solve . This 
is the inevitable outcome of the causal inertness of Newtonian time and its 
consequent determinism. If   all of  the causes are present at  t 1 , why must we 
wait until  t 2 for the results? In this section we shall examine three cases of the 
explicit elimination of time and the resultant undermining of the essential 
problem at hand. 
 Capital theory The classic Clark-Knight theory of  capital is an import-
ant illustration of  the neoclassical treatment of  time. Throughout the 1930s 
and 1940s this theory was contrasted with the Austrian approach to capital. 
The latter placed heavy emphasis on variations in the time structure of  pro-
duction. Knight, however, fundamentally disagreed with that emphasis, for 
“under equilibrium conditions production and consumption are simultan-
eous” ( 1946 , p. 387). There is no time structure in Knight’s theory because 
he fully adopted the Newtonian conception of  time. The Clark-Knight view 
collapses the time structure of  production into a cross-section of  the econ-
omy’s “stages.” Once again, the future is spread out over instantaneous 
space. 
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 Intertemporal general equilibrium The purpose of the Arrow-Debreu con-
struction was to refi ne and extend the simple Walras-Pareto model of general 
equilibrium. The latter had been criticized for neglecting intertemporal rela-
tions and uncertainty. A simple and ingenious analytical device incorporating 
contingent futures markets was used to remedy these defects. But even though 
commodities are made available on different dates over an indefi nite future, 
the analysis is still essentially static. There is no real difference between a given 
physical commodity at two dates and at two geographic locations. The further 
complication of adding a contingent state of the world (e.g., “if  it is cold”) to 
the physical description, location and date changes little. All we have done is 
expand the number of commodities over which the individual maximizes. 
 Change, rather than mere uncertainty, is the  true effect of time. Suppose, 
for example, that all of the “future” commodities were spread out in space at a 
single instant. Then we could view contingent markets as merely the uncertain 
prospect of what  now is actually in a given container (perhaps ice cream, per-
haps hot soup, etc.). The incompleteness of knowledge is not the sole element 
of a genuinely temporal model. 
 Tight prior equilibrium The most dramatic case of the abolition of time is 
the research program described by Reder ( 1982 , esp. pp. 11–13) and ostensibly 
practiced by Chicago school economists. The core of this approach is the 
maintained hypothesis that “in the absence of suffi cient evidence to the con-
trary, one may treat observed prices and quantities as good approximations to 
their long-run competitive equilibrium values” (p. 12). Despite a considerable 
amount of confusion as to which long-run model Reder is referring to, the 
main thrust of this approach is clear. Agents are assumed to “treat long-run 
equilibrium values of all endogenous variables as parameters” (p. 18). Thus, 
permanent rather than transitory income explains variations in consumption; 
security prices fully incorporate all relevant information at (almost) every 
instant in time; agents “rationally” expect the distribution of prices generated 
by the long-run stochastic structure of the model; and all decisions can be 
effectively executed, that is, all decisions are immediately pre-reconciled. 
 This position is the most thoroughgoing and consistent application of 
the Newtonian conception of time in contemporary economics. The “tight 
prior equilibrium” framework thus reduces all economic theory to a set of 
comparative static propositions (Reder,  1982 , p. 12) that are assumed to hold 
instantaneously. The question of time as change does not arise, much less is 
it answered, in this world. 
 The measurement of time 
 The eradication of succession is intimately related to the way in which 
Newtonian time is measured. Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as the 
succession of Newtonian moments. Time is measured by the “counting of 
simultaneities” (Bergson,  1911 , p. 338) and not of successive events. Suppose, 
for example, that T is a mobile that moves along its trajectory. Then the dating 
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of a movement (“change”) of T is by reference to the simultaneous position 
of another mobile, T′. Thus, if  T moves by one unit simultaneously with T′ 
moving by one-half  a unit of distance, then T can be said to have moved 
(or “changed”) by one unit in one-half  a unit period of  time (as measured 
by the movement of the second mobile). Now, compress the  psychological 
duration separating the trajectory positions, T 1 and T 2 , etc., into one instant, 
and nothing has really happened. The change of T is dated by comparing 
simultaneous positions of T′. If  mobiles T 1 , T 2 , T 3 … all coexist, they can 
still correspond to the positions of other mobiles T 1 ′, T 2 ′, T 3 ′ … which also 
coexist. Hence, even in the measurement of Newtonian time, succession, as 
opposed to juxtaposition, is inessential. 
 Hood ( 1948 , p. 462) gives a simple example of  the instantaneous measure-
ment of  time. Consider three continuous and differentiable functions:  y = 
 f ( t ),  x =  g ( t ) and  y =  F ( x ), where  t is the trajectory of  the movements in the 
mobiles X and Y. Time can be measured in terms of  either X or Y. Suppose 
we choose to measure it by movements in X. Let’s assume that  dy / dt >  dx / dt . 
This then implies (since the relationship  y =  F ( x ) was established) that  dy / dx 
> 1. Now if   dy / dx = 2, we can conclude the Y changes by 1 unit in a half  
unit measure of  time (which is analogous to our result in the previous para-
graph). This conclusion, however, is really just a convention or stipulation. 
A system based on differential equations is actually concerned with  present 
or  instantaneous rates of  change: neither the past nor the future is involved. 
Newtonian time is thus measured by simultaneous correspondences with a 
static moment. 
 As a fi nal illustration, consider the adjustment model discussed by Hood 
( 1948 , p. 463) in a somewhat different connection. Let the rate of price change, 
d p /d t, be a function of excess demand: 
 d d 0 0p D S/ [Kt (P ) ( )P ]− ( )t 0P P′ ′  
 where K = constant;  D ′,  S ′ are the slopes of the demand and supply curves 
respectively; P 0 is the equilibrium price; and  P  t  is the current price. Time is 
here measured in terms of the absolute value of the changes in excess demand. 
The simultaneities counted then are the changes in the quantities  supplied and 
demanded and the changes in price. Thus, the above equation determines the 
instantaneous (present) rates of change in prices for various present changes 
in excess demand. All of these changes literally refer to a single moment. The 
formal model effectively collapses diachronic and synchronic changes; that is, 
the temporal cross-section distinction is obliterated. 
 Real time 
 Along with other economists, Austrians have stressed the importance of real 
time. Often, however, the main features of this alternative concept have not 
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been made precise. From our discussion of the Newtonian framework, it 
ought to be evident what real time is not. In this section we shall go beyond 
the previous discussion and present the central features and consequences of 
non-Newtonian time. 
 Following the work of the philosopher Henri Bergson ( 1910 ), we distin-
guish between spatialized time and the subjective experience of the passage 
of time. Bergson called the latter concept “la durée” or duration, but we shall 
generally use terms more congenial to economists: “real” or “subjective” time. 
Time, in this sense, is not the static subjectivist concept used in planning or 
refl ection. Instead, it is a dynamically continuous fl ow of novel experiences. 
This fl ow is not  in time, as would be the case from a Newtonian perspective; 
rather, it is or constitutes time. We cannot experience the passage of time 
except as a fl ow: something new must happen, or real time will cease to be. 
 Features of real time 
 There are three interrelated features of our alternative view of time: (1) 
dynamic, rather than mathematical, continuity; (2) heterogeneity; and (3) 
causal effi cacy (Capek,  1971 , pp. 90–1). 
 Dynamic continuity This form of continuity can most easily be grasped by 
an aural analogy. Hearing only one note of a melody, for example, is insuf-
fi cient to capture the experience of music. This is because our perception 
involves memory of the just-elapsed phases (or notes) and anticipation of 
those yet to come. The actual experience is thus more than a mathematical 
instant; it is impossible to subdivide continuously a piece of music without 
fundamentally altering or negating the experience. The dynamic structure of 
real time consists, then, of two aspects:  memory and  expectation (Shackle, 
 1958 , p. 16). On this view, the present is in principle linked with other peri-
ods through the perceptions of the individual. Memory and expectation are 
the structural components of real time accounting for its dynamic continuity. 
Although the physical or mathematical time that a given experience takes can 
be continuously subdivided, these durationless instants are not, from a sub-
jectivist viewpoint, independent of or isolated from one another. Real time 
thus implies the very linkages from which Newtonian time abstracts. 
 All purportedly dynamic models postulate some kind of connection 
between successive periods. The existence of linkages  per se , however, does 
not mean that Newtonian time has been abandoned. The exact character of 
the intertemporal relationship is very important. For example, Hicks ( 1965 , 
p. 32) links periods in a dynamic analysis by the “stock of  physical capital 
that is handed on from one single period to its successor” (emphasis added). 
Similarly, Hey ( 1981 , p. 52) discusses a dynamic optimization model in which 
the present is linked to the past through the “inherited” value of wealth; but, 
given that value, the individual’s optimal strategy is independent of time. Thus 
in both the Hicks and Hey models, “the future always looks the same irre-
spective of from where it is viewed” (Hey,  1981 , p. 52). The central difference 
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between this form of intertemporal connection and the dynamic continuity 
of real time is that the latter necessarily involves a change in perspective. The 
future must look different depending on from where it is viewed. In a some-
what different context, Hahn ( 1952 , p. 805) has made a similar point: “The 
experience of the fi rst situation must always enter as a new parameter into the 
second situation.” 
 Heterogeneity If  memory is the component of our experience that links the 
past to the present, it is also the factor responsible for the continuous differen-
tiation of each successive moment. As time passes, the individual’s memory is 
continually enriched and thus the subjective standpoint from which he experi-
ences the world undergoes change. As a consequence, each phase of real time 
is novel  precisely because it is linked to previous periods by memory (Capek, 
 1971 , p. 127). The dynamic continuity and heterogeneity of real time are thus 
not separable features, but are merely two aspects of the same phenomenon. 
 The heterogeneity of  time sheds considerable light on the limitations of 
agents’ forecasting abilities. Suppose that an individual tries to predict an 
event. Paradoxically, even if  it occurs “exactly” as predicted, it will not be 
 experienced exactly as predicted. The simple reason is that before he made 
the forecast his standpoint was different. Afterwards, his memory incorpo-
rated the forecast and this changed his perspective (Schutz and Luckmann, 
 1973 , pp. 240–1). This is a limiting case of  the general phenomenon of a 
prediction interacting with and changing the object of  prediction. The focus 
of  this interaction, however, is on the subjective standpoint (state of  know-
ledge) of  the agents and not on a physical event. Thus, where the predicted 
event is dependent on a subjective state of  affairs, such as the expectations 
of  individuals, the  event itself may be altered by predictions. If  an oligopol-
ist, for example, decides to change his price, this decision will in part depend 
on his expectation of  the prices to be charged by competitive fi rms. But the 
prices that they will charge depend on their expectations of  the price he will 
charge. Therefore, the competitors must determine his expectations about 
their expectations of  his expectations. If  he were to make a “wrong” pre-
diction, then their predictions and hence actions would in fact be different. 
This phenomenon is well known in the literature of  oligopoly models. In the 
next chapter we discuss in greater detail the particular form of uncertainty 
engendered by a similar example. 
 Causal effi cacy This follows immediately from heterogeneity. The mere 
elapse of time, as distinct from physical change, is a source of novelty. As 
we saw in the previous section, the swelling of memory alone changes the 
perspective from which the world is seen. Hence time is causally potent and 
creative. This implies that all economic processes must involve the transmis-
sion and growth of knowledge. In this framework, for example, competition 
is no longer merely the name given to a certain equilibrium state. Instead, as 
we demonstrate later in this book, the process of competition is literally a 
discovery procedure. The growth of knowledge is the endogenous force that 
endlessly propels the system. 
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 General consequences of real time 
 There are two important consequences of adopting our non-Newtonian 
concept of time. First, real time is irreversible. There can be no return to 
a previous period. Thus, “movements” along supply and demand curves 
do not mirror real temporal changes. Strictly speaking, as soon as we move 
away from a given point on such a curve there is no going back to it. Second, 
the passage of time involves “creative evolution”; that is, processes produce 
unpredictable change. A process is not a mere rearrangement of  given factors, 
as it is portrayed in deterministic models of “change.” If  change is real, it 
cannot be completely deterministic: there must be scope for surprise. 
 Real time, planning and action 
 The concept of time directly incorporated in plans is Newtonian. The 
planner can imagine units of time that are isolated, empty and as small as 
convenient. These homogeneous units can then be fi lled with specifi c activities. 
If  completed plans were the only important aspects of economics, then 
Newtonian time would be quite suffi cient as a tool of analysis. However, the 
 process of  planning must take place in real time. As we contemplate a course 
of action and project its consequences, we continually refi ne and refocus our 
tentative plans. Knowledge must be gained in the process of projecting. If  this 
were not so, we could never go from a state of indecision to one of decision. 
Something must have changed during the process in order to account for the 
individual’s eventual ability to decide (Bergson,  1910 , p. 171). 
 In a plan, the individual projects a completed act (e.g., the ditch as already 
dug) (Schutz,  1967 , p. 58), and so, as we have seen, the plan itself  is static 
and hence compatible with spatialized time. In the process of acting (e.g., 
digging), however, the individual experiences things. These experiences are 
novel if  only because he approaches the world from subjective standpoints 
continually changed by the memory of what has been occurring. Moreover, 
 exogenous factors are also affecting the system and upsetting the individual’s 
prior decision framework. 
 Neoclassical economics confl ates the plan with the process of  planning, 
the completed act with the process of  acting. Furthermore, in its perfect-
foresight version, the plan and completed act are confl ated. This is equiva-
lent to the assumption that all plans can be successfully executed and that 
there are no coordination problems. In such a world, there is no room for 
real time. 
 Novel experiences acquired in planning or acting are signifi cant only to the 
extent that they engender plan revisions or alterations in the course of action. 
Thus these experiences must be connected with changes in the stock of know-
ledge. Knowledge, unlike pure experience, has applicability beyond the indi-
vidual case that gave rise to it and thus can affect the future. In order to show 
that the growth of experience can be signifi cant for our purposes, we must 
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show its interrelation with the growth of knowledge. This can be demonstrated 
in alternative ways. From an inductivist perspective, agents can infer universal 
statements from statements of particular experiences. If  all past increases in 
the money supply were ultimately associated with higher interest rates, then 
agents might infer the universality of this relationship. Therefore, as they “col-
lect” more particular experiences they strengthen (or perhaps change) their 
theoretical understanding. Even from the now-dominant hypothetico-deduc-
tive perspective, it is conceded that experiences “suggest” certain hypotheses 
or interpretative frameworks. In addition, experiences can overturn or refute 
existing hypotheses. As a consequence, any change in (addition to) the stock 
of experience will give rise to new conjectural frameworks. Necessarily, then, 
it will also generate revised anticipations of the future because these are based 
on the current tentative framework. Hence growth in the stock of experience 
leads, via growth in the stock of knowledge, to alterations in both memory 
and expectations (the intertemporal links). 
 These alterations can never be deterministic. The connection between 
experience and new knowledge is not logically airtight. In the fi rst instance, 
induction is a logically insuffi cient basis for any generalization. The fact that 
past expansions in the money supply were associated with higher interest rates 
does not justify a law covering all future occasions (Popper,  1964 , pp. 27–30). 
Second, since many hypotheses are consistent with the same data (Friedman, 
 1953 , p. 9), any given experience will not point uniquely to a particular gen-
eralization. Finally, even the elimination of hypotheses is not absolute. A 
particular observation may be incorrect, or further data may reinstate a pre-
viously refuted hypothesis (Popper,  1964 , p. 50). 
 Real time is important because in the course of planning and acting the 
individual acquires new experiences. These new experiences then give rise, in 
a nondeterministic way, to new knowledge. On the basis of this new know-
ledge, the individual changes his future plans and actions. Thus the economic 
system is propelled by purely endogenous forces. The “natural” state of an 
economy in time is change and not rest, for “as soon as we permit time to 
elapse we must permit knowledge to change” (Lachmann,  1959 , p. 73). 
 Economic processes and uncertainty 
 The most important implications of real time are for the modeling of 
adjustment processes and the characterization of uncertainty. No process 
can fi t comfortably within a purely Newtonian construct. As we have seen, 
a world of instantaneous adjustment is really a world without process. If, 
on the other hand, adjustment takes time, then knowledge can grow and 
novel outcomes can emerge. Real time also affects the characterization of 
uncertainty. Risk analysis, whether objective or subjective, is essentially a 
weighting of possibilities already known. Genuine uncertainty, however, 
allows for the unpredictable growth of these possibilities and thus for “gaps” 
in agents’ probability distributions. 
The dynamic conception of time 115
 Reality of succession and indeterminacy of processes 
 Since the essence of real time includes novelty and causal effi cacy, the future 
cannot be logically derived from the present because the former has not yet 
been created (Capek,  1971 , pp. 106–11). Recognition of the creative aspect of 
time reinforces the position we adopted in  Chapter 2 that decision-making 
is not deterministic. Conventional utility maximization, or what Kirzner 
calls “Robbinsian maximizing” ( 1973 , p. 38), is a mere rearrangement or 
computation of things already known. To model processes in these terms 
is to render the analysis completely mechanical. In real time the situation 
must be different. Although the stages of a choice-theoretic process must be 
dynamically continuous (memory and expectation link the periods), these 
stages cannot  ineluctably give rise to one another. The relationship between 
stages will be understandable even though each stage will not be completely 
predictable given its predecessor. 
 Examples In the Arrow-Debreu construction an agent knows with cer-
tainty his response to every possible contingency. Although the future states 
of the world are uncertain, nevertheless,  given any such state, the agent views 
his response as certain. Pye ( 1978 ) developed a model embodying at least 
one aspect of real time: a decision-maker can predict only stochastically his 
response to hypothetical future situations. This is a reasonable feature for 
models in which the individual can be expected to learn during the course of 
time. Such a feature implies indeterminism in any sequence of decisions. Even 
if  the consequences of the fi rst decision and the exogenous state of nature at 
the moment of the second decision were perfectly predictable, we still could 
not predict exactly that second decision. Hence, the second decision does not 
follow inevitably from the fi rst and the connection between stages in the pro-
cess is stochastic. Winter ( 1971 , pp. 254–6) depicts the stochastic evolution of 
an industry, and Radner ( 1975 , pp. 198–205) discusses a stochastic process of 
cost reduction. And a general theoretical analysis of probabilistic processes is 
examined in substantial detail by Howard ( 1971 ). 
 In Schotter ( 1981 , pp. 13–14), a possible framework is described for proc-
esses that are both nondeterministic and nonstochastic. There, a game is con-
structed for which two stable institutional arrangements can be construed as 
solutions. Because each arrangement is really a class of possible specifi c solu-
tions, the theory delimits classes rather than exact imputations. This type of 
outcome is typical of many game-theoretical analyses. “The complete answer 
to any specifi c problem consists not in fi nding a solution, but in determining 
the set of all solutions” (von Neumann and Morgenstern,  1947 , p. 44). 
 This view has been more recently echoed by Hayek ( 1967b ) in his idea of 
pattern predictions. Theories of complex phenomena can be expected to pre-
dict only the overall pattern of outcomes (e.g., the kind or type of institution) 
rather than the exact outcome (e.g., the particular variant of the institutional 
type). If  we model a social process as a series of such games, that process will 
be indeterminate. Even if  we know the outcome of the fi rst game and the 
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nature of the second, we cannot say what the particular outcome of the second 
will be. We can only delimit a class of outcomes given the fi rst outcome. 
 Genuine uncertainty 
 We shall postpone the main discussion of uncertainty to the next chapter. 
However, it is important to understand that real time implies a characterization 
of uncertainty that is fundamentally different from that prevalent in 
neoclassical economics. 
 Ordinary treatments of uncertainty depict it as a weighted arrangement 
of already-known possibilities. This is simply a given framework under static 
uncertainty (Langlois,  1982b ). As we have seen, genuine uncertainty involves 
an open-ended set of possibilities. At the moment of choice, the individual will 
have conceived of a certain number or range of possibilities. Nevertheless, he 
is fully aware that in a world of change something might happen that he could 
not list beforehand. So he perceives his choice set as, in principle, unbounded 
in at least certain respects. 
 Genuine uncertainty is inherently ineradicable in the sense that additional 
knowledge may not enable the individual to overcome it (Dahrendorf,  1968 , 
p. 238). Recall the forecasting example where the forecast altered the predicted 
event itself. In more general terms, since action takes place in real time, any 
activity designed to deal with uncertainty may merely transform that uncer-
tainty. The source of uncertainty is thus endogenous in a world in real time. 
 Newtonian and real time: the interrelation 
 Until now, we have merely presented two concepts of time and examined the 
different implications of each. The impression thus given is of alternative 
and irreconcilable perspectives. Newtonian and real time, however, are each 
special cases in a more general temporal analysis. While it is true that these 
extreme cases are quite distinct, some types of human activity tend more in 
the one direction and others in the other direction (Bergson,  1911 , p. 200). 
The deciding characteristic is the strength of the mnemic and exceptional 
link between time periods. As we shall see, creative decision-making (e.g., 
the setting up of frameworks of analysis) tends in the real-time direction. 
Ordinary maximizing behavior, on the other hand, tends in the Newtonian 
direction. Therefore, the actual content of the thought or decision-making 
process determines the appropriateness of the particular concept of time. 
 Individual entrepreneurship 
 What is commonly called “creative” activity or “insight” involves solving a 
problem or seeing a solution in a single leap (Bergson,  1920 , p. 20). After this 
undivided insight is gained, an analyst may  reconstruct the solution in a series 
of steps that others, at least in principle, are capable of following. The original 
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leap can then be portrayed as the condensation of the reconstructed steps 
into a single, undivided, one. From the perspective of the less creative activity 
that follows these explicit steps in time, the more creative activity involves the 
compression of the past preliminary stages into the present fi nal stage (the 
problem’s solution), and hence a very wide mnemic link. 
 This is precisely Schumpeter’s concept of entrepreneurship. For Schumpeter 
entrepreneurial success depends on “the capacity of seeing things in a way 
which afterwards proves to be true, even though it cannot be established at the 
moment” ( 1934 , p. 85). A creative leap cannot, by defi nition, be conclusively 
“established” because it literally leaps over the requisite logical steps. Through 
this intuition the entrepreneur may be able to discover better technologies, 
new products and new resources. Similarly, Kirzner ( 1979a , pp. 158–92) has 
analyzed entrepreneurship at the individual level in which the central task is 
to formulate the “given” means-ends framework. This framework is logically 
prior to ordinary maximizing behavior. 1 It is the result of a creative insight or 
relatively condensed activity. 
 This analysis has important implications for the agent’s perception of the 
rapidity of time change. In entrepreneurial or creative activity the prelimin-
ary stages in a problem solution are seen as part of the very recent past or, in 
the limit, as an aspect of the subjective present moment. In contrast, the less 
creative the activity under study, the more distended those stages become, or, 
equivalently, the narrower the mnemic link between them. Each stage becomes 
relatively more isolated. Reduction in the degree of creativity is thus associ-
ated with a relegation of the stages to the more remote past. Increasing the 
degree of creativity and the consequent widening of the mnemic link results 
in a subjective quickening of time. For any given interval of clock time, more 
is happening  relative to the less creative state. Thus, the entrepreneur will per-
ceive clock time as passing relatively more quickly (Capek,  1971 , p. 200). 
 Maximizing behavior 
 Less creative activity takes each step at a time so that each phase more nearly 
resembles a Newtonian time period. The steps are relatively isolated from 
one another and thus the mnemic link is attenuated. This “Newtonization” 
of  time is greater the more the agent’s actual solution to a problem is broken 
down into explicit steps. Solving a problem is made fully explicit when 
the steps that lead up to the solution are logically suffi cient, i.e., when the 
framework yields determinate implications. In this form of activity there 
is no place for “creative leaps.” Pure Robbinsian maximizing is an example 
of  an explicit step-by-step and determinate technique applied to decision-
making. Thus, maximization analysis is compatible with the essential features 
of  Newtonian time. 
 Since the mnemic link for explicit maximization has a relatively narrow 
span, the perceived present will encompass a smaller range of activity. This 
in turn means that,  ceteris paribus, maximizers perceive clock intervals as 
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passing relatively less quickly. In other words, there is a subjective lengthen-
ing of time (Capek,  1971 , p. 200). 
 Rules of thumb 
 Routine activity, such as following rules of thumb, moves us still closer to the 
Newtonian end of our continuum. It is of the essence of a rule of thumb that 
the individual will perform certain actions without seeing how they fi t into an 
overall picture. Thus, even more than with maximizing behavior, each step in 
what may appear to the observer a coherent process is relatively isolated and 
fragmented from the agent’s perspective. Thus the mnemic span is further 
narrowed and subjective time is further slowed. 
 None of the foregoing discussion of the degrees of real time makes any sense 
from the perspective that views all decision-making  as if it were the explicit 
maximization of some objective function. To the extent that we reconstruct 
decisions in terms of that framework, we implicitly adopt the Newtonian con-
ception of time. Only by paying attention to the actual content of the typical 
decision process can we determine the degree to which the activity is best 
explained in terms of real or Newtonian time. 
 Conclusion 
 The differences between a Newtonian and real-time perspective strike at the 
very heart of economic analysis. In this chapter we have developed some of 
the more general implications of real time. The fundamental indeterminacy 
of economic processes and the inseparability of time and change are foremost 
among these. In the next chapter, we shall discuss more deeply the implications 
of our view of time for uncertainty and equilibrium. The traditional approaches 
to these issues will be shown to be inadequate. In  Chapter 6 and  Chapter 7 we 
shall develop our real-time framework in the context of competitive processes 
and in some of the more important industrial organization and regulatory 
applications. Most of the remaining chapters in this book, then, can be seen 
as the development or elaboration of an alternative perspective on time. 
 Notes 
 1  One might view the formulation of a particular means-ends framework as the out-
come of a maximization procedure on a higher level. This, however, merely pushes 
the question back one step. At some point the framework is formulated in a nonde-
terministic, entrepreneurial manner. 
 
 5  Uncertainty in equilibrium 
 The existence of a problem of knowledge depends on the future being different 
from the past, while the possibility of the solution of the problem depends on 
the future being like the past. 
 Frank H. Knight ( 1921 , p. 313) 
 In this chapter we develop the implications of real time for the important 
ideas of uncertainty and equilibrium. As we have already seen, the “genuine 
uncertainty” of real time is of a more basic and thoroughgoing nature than 
that usually treated in neoclassical models. The most important features of 
genuine uncertainty are the inherent unlistability of all possible outcomes 
resulting from a course of action, and the complete endogeneity of the 
uncertainty. The fi rst feature, discussed in the last chapter, is the basis of 
novelty or true surprise. This is in sharp contrast to the mere arrangement (or 
weighting) of known possibilities characteristic of neoclassical uncertainty. 
The second feature, analyzed in the current chapter, is the origin of an 
ongoing market process that itself  produces changes to which the system 
must adapt. The state of complete adaptation or equilibrium, by contrast, is 
preeminently a Newtonian concept. The absence of  any tendency to change is 
incompatible with real time. Yet, as we shall see, some idea of equilibrium is 
important. Indeed, it would be diffi cult to imagine a viable economics without 
one. Thus, reconciliation between real time and equilibrium is necessary. A 
suitably reformulated equilibrium construct can be consistent with our real-
time framework, and can also be the analytical source of the uncertainty 
and endogenous changes that pervade market processes. Real time, genuine 
uncertainty, and equilibrium all have important functions to perform in the 
analysis of an economic system. The detailed elaboration of this point is the 
task that we have set ourselves. 
 This chapter is divided into four sections. In the fi rst, we examine both the 
endogeneity of uncertainty in real time and its incompatibility with stand-
ard notions of equilibrium. In the second section we analyze the anticipation 
of future events from the perspective of their typical and unique features. It 
will be shown that neoclassical economics deals with the typical and totally 
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neglects the unique. The third section is a detailed examination of the equilib-
rium construct. The idea of exact equilibrium will be shown to be inadequate 
for understanding economic processes in real time. In its place, we advo-
cate the idea of “pattern coordination.” Finally, we explore the interrelation 
between equilibrium and optimality. Static suboptimality is there revealed to 
be an unhelpful concept. A useful welfare economics can only be based on a 
fully dynamic and nondeterministic perspective. 
 Genuine uncertainty 
 One of the most important features of genuine uncertainty is its endogenous 
and, consequently, ineradicable nature. In principle, activities directed toward 
anticipating the future or overcoming uncertainty in a world of real time cannot 
be completely successful. The famous Keynesian beauty contest (Keynes,  1964 , 
p. 156) is an excellent illustration of this point. (We also make use of it in our 
discussion of the business cycle.) Since Keynes’ illustration lacks an overall 
stable pattern of outcomes, the actual result is entirely time-dependent and, in 
this sense, completely unique. We use the term “genuine uncertainty” to refer 
not only to this aspect of prediction but, more generally, to the recognition 
that all attempts to characterize the future involve both unique and recurrent 
(“typical”) features. Keynes’ illustration emphasizes that aspect of genuine 
uncertainty that differentiates it from Newtonian or neoclassical uncertainty. 
This is the pure (Bergsonian) case of complete time dependency. 
 A hundred photographs are reproduced in a newspaper. Each contestant 
must choose the six prettiest or handsomest faces. The winner will be that con-
testant whose choices most closely approximate those of “average opinion.” 
The goal of each contestant is therefore not to choose the six most attractive 
to him or her (opinion 1 ), or even to guess what average opinion believes to be 
the most attractive (opinion 2 ). Rather, the object must be to guess what aver-
age opinion believes that average opinion will choose (opinion 3 ). Thus, the 
goal is to guess opinion 3 , which is, in turn, opinion 4 . As we shall see, there is 
in principle no limit to the height of the levels of guessing and counterguess-
ing. There is no  logically suffi cient reason to stop at any given point; all such 
stopping is, to a large extent, arbitrary or derived from a convention. We have 
more to say on this last point in  Chapter 10 . 
 The two features of Keynes’ example that we shall explore in detail are its 
endogeneity and its inconsistency with static equilibrium. 
 Endogeneity 
 Suppose there is an agency that collects and disseminates the guesses before 
they are actually entered in the contest (see the similar technique in Frydman, 
 1982 ). Now people know for sure what the average guesses of opinion 3 are at 
 t 1 . If  every individual merely duplicates this opinion 4 , then no one will win. 
The prize will be so diluted (let us assume) that it is not enough to offset 
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the opportunity costs of engaging in the contest. Therefore, in an effort to 
improve his chances, each individual will revise his guesses. Consider that the 
individual could act in one of two ways: (1) he could choose those pictures 
the agency reveals as the average choice and receive a negligible payoff, or 
(2) he could deviate from those in the hope that others will do the same and 
he will approximate the new average choices. In the knowledge that at least 
some, if  not all, will act in accordance with (2), all will, in fact, do so. Now, 
of course, the point is to outguess or outpredict the crowd on the nature of 
these revisions. Therefore, there is still uncertainty, despite the existence of the 
information-disseminating agency. Further information has not eliminated 
(or even, in this example, reduced) uncertainty but has merely transformed it 
to a higher level of counterguessing. 1 If  the game is played round after round, 
people’s opinions will continually change and there will be no natural end to 
the process. 
 There are two factors in Keynes’ example responsible for its endogeneity. 
First, because we are dealing with a contest, it is obviously important to each 
contestant that he predict better than all the others. Thus, he has an incentive 
to gather such information as will give him an advantage or prevent others 
from gaining one. Second, because the individual is making predictions of 
predictions rather than of tastes, resource availability, and so forth, the rele-
vant information will be what others are predicting. Therefore, knowledge 
gained over time by market participants will necessarily affect the objects of 
each agent’s prediction. These considerations enable us to conclude that the 
very activity designed to cope with uncertainty (i.e., the acquisition of know-
ledge) is responsible for its continued existence. As soon as one level of uncer-
tainty is eliminated, another level is necessarily created to replace it. 
 At any  point in time, the uncertainty of this example can be seen in purely 
Newtonian terms. Every individual might be viewed as having a probabil-
ity distribution over the possible guesses of average opinion. If  we were to 
stop here, this would be no different than the uncertainty about tomorrow’s 
weather or the outcome of some conventional game of chance. On the other 
hand, the important aspects of the example are only evident in the passage 
of time. From that perspective it becomes clear that we do not have the inter-
action of stable elements (like the isolated points of Newtonian time). The 
interaction itself  ceaselessly changes those elements. As knowledge is allowed 
to increase, uncertainty is not eliminated but transformed. 
 Inconsistency with equilibrium 
 Purely time-dependent uncertainty is completely inconsistent with static 
equilibrium. In our example of this uncertainty there is no confi guration of 
the “data” that is without a tendency to change. As long as time is allowed to 
pass, knowledge will grow and there will be endogenously produced change. 2 
Accordingly, it is not possible for the system to settle down to an equilibrium, 
whether of the exact or stochastic variety. Individuals always have a private 
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incentive to overcome remaining uncertainty. As we have seen, however, the 
collective result of the actions undertaken on the basis of this incentive is to 
transform, rather than eliminate, uncertainty. 
 In a recent article Roman Frydman ( 1982 ) applies Keynes’ beauty contest 
to a model that examines the possibility of convergence to rational expecta-
tions equilibrium. Not surprisingly, Frydman fi nds that under no plausible 
set of assumptions can we characterize a learning process that leads to an 
equilibrium. Such a process would have to involve forming expectations about 
the expectations of others (O’Driscoll,  1979 , p. 162; see Rizzo,  1979 , p. 11). 
Frydman’s point, like ours, is that there is a form of uncertainty that can-
not be eradicated by further knowledge. This is the time-dependent aspect of 
genuine uncertainty. 
 The critical contrast is therefore not, as some have suggested, between 
measurable and unmeasurable uncertainty (Knight,  1971 ), or even between 
subjective and objective interpretations of probability (Savage,  1972 ). It is 
instead between purely time-dependent and Newtonian forms of uncertainty. 
The former, as we have seen, is endogenously created and thus inconsistent 
with equilibrium, while the latter is essentially static and thus consistent with 
stochastic models of equilibrium. Neoclassical tools for handling uncertainty 
have been developed in the context of these models and consequently are 
adapted solely to the Newtonian perspective. To the extent that economists 
wish to construct models embodying time-dependent uncertainty, it is clear 
that new analytical tools will have to be developed. 3 
 An important implication of time-dependent uncertainty is that exchanges 
will not take place at equilibrium prices. If  the economic system endogenously 
produces disruptive forces, then we can no longer abstract from the problems 
of false trading. Instead of focusing our attention on the confi guration of 
equilibrium exchanges or even the process of adjustment toward an equilib-
rium, the emphasis will shift to the pattern of disequilibrium exchanges. The 
“Austrian” business cycle theory is an example of systematic disequilibrium 
trading that results in a particular pattern of discoordinative behavior. This 
shall be examined in our chapter on money. Other attempts to study “disequi-
librium patterns” have been reviewed by E. R. Weintraub ( 1979 , pp. 141–54). 
The importance of these models lies in making the informational needs of 
agents quite specifi c. Since these needs cannot be fully satisfi ed by false prices, 
our attention is naturally shifted to the institutional framework and its role in 
promoting (or inhibiting) the coordination of plans. Nonprice conveyance of 
information is a necessary foundation for the process of monetary exchanges 
through time. We shall have more to say on this matter in the chapters on 
competition and money. 
 Genuine uncertainty: typicality and uniqueness 
 The purely time-dependent form of uncertainty discussed in the previous 
section must be an incomplete characterization of the way in which individuals 
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anticipate the future. If  the future were completely unpredictable in all respects, 
then planning and acting would be impossible. While complete stability and 
predictability are incompatible with time, their total absence is incompatible 
with action (Shackle,  1969 , pp. 3–7). A stable framework within which it is 
possible to project consequences is a logical prerequisite for purposefulness. 
The solution to this paradox of uncertainty lies in the recognition of typical 
and unique aspects of future events. Genuine uncertainty is characterized 
by both relatively time-independent and time-dependent features in the fl ow 
of events. The crucial diffi culty with neoclassical economics is its exclusive 
preoccupation with the former. 
 Typifi cation 
 Typifi cation is the activity that enables us to grapple with an unknown future. 
It is the process of “extracting what stability and regularity there is in the fl ow 
of reality” (Bergson,  1946 , p. 111). Stable features are called types (Schutz and 
Luckmann,  1973 , pp. 229–41). The stability of types is not to be identifi ed 
solely with those aspects of events that actually  have been repeated in case after 
case. Rather, stability refers to those aspects that are repeatable, in the sense 
that they are not affected by the mere passage of time. Consider, for example, 
the prediction that there will be a police patrol tonight. This amounts to a 
pattern or type prediction because we are quite able to conceive of a patrol 
as persisting in some unchanged overall pattern through time. The precise 
route they will take, what they will fi nd, how they will react to a bank robbery, 
and so on constitute the (relatively) unique or time-dependent features of an 
event. Even these can be further broken down into their typical and unique 
aspects. The exact form that any prediction takes is thus obviously dependent 
on the practical interests and conceptual framework of the predictor. 
 Typical aspects of events can be anticipated in one of two ways: either with 
certainty, or probabilistically. From the certainty perspective, the predictor 
simply asserts that there will be a police patrol. In the probabilistic perspec-
tive, on the other hand, the predictor associates with a whole set of mutu-
ally exclusive typical events a series of weights. Thus, the probability of a 
police patrol may be 0.4, that of a gang brawl 0.2 and that of a delivery of 
illegal narcotics 0.4. The typicality of the future events is no different in the 
second than in the fi rst case; what is different is the way in which they are 
anticipated. Probabilistic anticipation is the “loose,” as contrasted to rigid, 
determinism discussed in  Chapter 2 . Nevertheless, even loose determinism is 
fundamentally static in at least two respects. First, there is a stationarity of 
the alternative events through time. This, after all, is the meaning of typical-
ity. Open-endedness in the characterization of the alternatives is not possible. 
Second, techniques such as modifi cation of probabilities based on Bayes’ 
Theorem permit only deterministic changes. Given the occurrence of a cer-
tain subsequent typical event, there is only one way the probability weights 
can be altered. 
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 The extraction of types or patterns is made possible by factors that affect 
both the state of the environment and individual interaction. In the fi rst cat-
egory, the possibility of typifi cation rests on the stability of physical laws, that 
is, on the relative determinism of the world on the macro-(Newtonian) level. 
On this, of course, we can add nothing to the existing scientifi c literature. In 
the second category, there are the mutually reinforcing and stabilizing effects 
of rules of thumb and certain kinds of creative activity. Rules of thumb are 
adopted by agents when the computational demands of maximization are 
excessive (Hey,  1981 , pp. 252–3), or when the recognition of time-dependent 
uncertainty makes the informational demands of maximization impossible 
(Loasby,  1976 , p. 217). In the latter situation the probability distributions 
required by agents for maximization of expected utility are seen as incomplete 
descriptions of the relevant uncertainty. In either event, when agents follow 
rules of thumb their behavior is more predictable. Under a wide variety of 
situations the same rule will be applied. 
 Furthermore, creative entrepreneurship, spurred on by profi t opportunities, 
strives to make coordination of plans possible. By shouldering uncertainty 
(Knight,  1971 ), or by attempting to foresee the future more accurately, entre-
preneurs reduce the effective amount of uncertainty facing others (Kirzner, 
 1982 ). This does not mean that entrepreneurial activity does not create some 
uncertainty of its own. It simply means that, relative to a world of no entre-
preneurship, the changes that exogenously impinge on a system are less dis-
ruptive. Because of entrepreneurship there is more stability and regularity in 
the fl ow of events. 
 Uniqueness 
 The unique features of events are the nonrepeatable aspects or, in other words, 
the specifi c time-dependent variants of a stable pattern. Nonrepeatability 
emerges from an event’s temporal “place value” (Schutz and Luckmann, 
 1973 , p. 240), that is, from its order in the fl ow of events. From the experience 
of any given event we derive certain interpretatively relevant conceptual 
structures that modify any subsequent experience (Schutz and Luckmann, 
 1973 , p. 240). Thus, any attempt to anticipate the unique aspects of an event 
changes their place value at least because the anticipation itself  must now 
affect the eventual experience. This is endogeneity of genuine uncertainty 
about which we have been talking. Consideration of a future event’s unique 
features also emphasizes the basic open-endedness of anticipation in real 
time. We anticipate events as to their typical features but we cannot fi ll in the 
“details” beforehand. 
 In contrast, neoclassical economics evades the distinction between unique-
ness and typicality. Those aspects of events are confl ated when each possible 
situation or outcome is “condensed” into a single scalar quantity. From this 
perspective we delude ourselves into thinking that we have fully characterized 
the event and thus eliminated the open-endedness of the future. In reality, we 
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have only characterized a single typical feature of the event in question and 
ignored everything else. 
 Since events can never be predicted precisely but only predicted as to types, 
there are three important circumstances under which the individual’s inter-
pretative-predictive scheme can change. First, when the typical event is antici-
pated with certainty, it still may not occur: a police patrol need not materialize. 
If  it does not, the individual will obviously revise his view of what is stable in 
the environment. This is similar to what is generally meant by the refutation 
of a theory: when a predicted typical event does not occur, the theory under-
goes change. Second, when typical events are anticipated probabilistically 
any outcome may induce revisions in the agent’s framework. This depends 
on whether the actual outcome causes the agent to believe that the underlying 
probability distribution is different than he had originally thought. 
 Finally, even when the typical event does occur, or when the occurrence 
of a given typical event out of a set of possibilities does not itself  cause the 
perceived underlying probability distribution to change, the agent may be led 
to revise his scheme. The unique aspects of events (or, more exactly, what 
appeared unique relative to the initial framework) provide further “data 
points” for its improvement. 4 Since types are, by defi nition, the relatively sta-
ble elements in the fl ow of time, they will change only slowly. In other words, 
the interpretative framework and the types derived from it will change so 
gradually as to maintain their stability  relative to the changes in the unique 
elements. Ultimately, however, a new framework necessarily arises out of the 
old. The bifurcation of our anticipatory vision into unique as well as typ-
ical features means that even correct prediction carries with it an endogen-
ous source of eventual change. This source is the inevitable fi lling in of the 
“details” as events actually occur. As long as there are open-ended anticipa-
tions there will always, in the course of time, be at least gradual change in the 
frameworks from which they are derived. 
 Equilibrium 
 In the last two sections we discussed the implications of real time for the 
characterization of uncertainty. We saw that, in a world of time and genuine 
uncertainty, there is ceaseless endogenous change. In this and subsequent 
sections we shall direct our attention to the seemingly contradictory idea of 
equilibrium. Equilibrium has traditionally been centered on the absence of 
endogenous change. It has been conceived as the state of affairs produced after 
all endogenous forces have fully worked themselves out. From this perspective, 
time and equilibrium are surely incompatible (Shackle,  1972 , pp. 253–4). It 
would be a mistake, however, to insist that equilibrium entails the absence of 
any and all tendencies to change. The uncertainty framework developed in 
this book can be incorporated into an equilibrium construct in such a way as 
to allow for unpredictable change. As we shall see, an appropriately revised 
idea of equilibrium need not be inconsistent with real time. 
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 Equilibrium as exact coordination 
 Austrians generally follow Hayek ( 1937a ) in thinking of equilibrium in 
terms of the compatibility of individual plans. Thus, if  A intends to buy  x 
units of a good at $ y per unit, then B (or some group of B’s) must intend 
to sell  x at $ y . This is a situation of  ex ante coordination. If  equilibrium is 
to prevail, however, the intentions of the various parties must be based on 
the same set of expectations regarding the external data. A may plan to buy 
umbrellas tomorrow on the expectation that it will rain, while B may plan to 
sell umbrellas on the expectation that it will not. Under these circumstances, 
the plans of the relevant parties cannot in principle be carried out. There is 
no single state of the world in which both A and B will actually implement 
their plans. Accordingly, the state of  ex ante coordination is not enough for 
equilibrium; there must also be no  logical impossibility standing in the way of 
the actual consummation of intentions. 
 Hayekian equilibrium can be partial or general, and can prevail over the 
various “runs” of Marshallian time. The degree to which equilibrium requires 
the homogeneity of expectations can be seen by contrasting the long run with 
Hicksian temporary equilibrium. In the former, all individuals must base 
their plans on the same expectations over the indefi nite future. Thus, there 
must be complete expectational homogeneity. In temporary equilibrium, on 
the other hand, plans to buy and sell may be based on confl icting expectations 
with respect to the farther future. In fact, the existence of purely speculative 
markets  requires the divergence of expectations (Lachmann,  1978 , p. 5). Bulls 
plan to buy on the expectation that the price will rise, and bears plan to sell 
on the expectation that it will fall. 
 Nevertheless, the attainment of  temporary coordination requires that 
the intentions of  buyers and sellers be based on the same expectations  with 
respect to the trading day . Suppose individuals make their plans at the begin-
ning of  the day and implement them by the end of  the day. The ability of 
all parties to carry out their plans requires that, for example, expectations 
with respect to the time of  sale be homogeneous. Expectational heterogen-
eity with respect to the more distant future will not frustrate this tempor-
ary coordination. Hayekian equilibrium therefore must entail homogeneous 
expectations with respect to the time period within which equilibrium pre-
vails. Outside of  that period, however, expectations can, and sometimes 
must, be divergent. 
 The homogeneity of expectations does not imply that they will turn out 
to be correct. Coordinative equilibrium is fundamentally a subjectivist con-
struct and does not require consistency with the objective external data. If  the 
expectations on which both parties base their intentions prove to be incorrect, 
then we say that the data have changed. Indeed “change” in a subjectivist 
framework can only be defi ned relative to the state of expectations (Hayek, 
 1973a , p. 40). Equilibrium is thus perfectly consistent with error. Error, once 
discovered, will however cause the equilibrium position to change. 
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 The consistency of Hayekian equilibrium with error provides the founda-
tion for a wider appreciation of its subjectivist character. The importance of 
expectations means that equilibrium cannot be defi ned without reference to 
the interpretative-predictive schemes held by individuals. When these change 
so does the equilibrium. Furthermore, the objective possibilities, stressed by 
neoclassical economics as a codeterminant of equilibrium, are often not a 
binding constraint. In a world of divided knowledge, there is no single object-
ive state of technique that governs the entire system. What the  individual has 
learned is the constraint, and not all individuals will have learned the same 
things. Far from being an objective “pull” on the system, equilibrium makes 
sense only in the context of the presumed knowledge and expectations of eco-
nomic agents. Equilibrium need not be a holdover from objectivist Ricardian 
economics. Instead, it can be seen as a particular relationship among myriad 
individual minds. 
 Inadequacy of exact coordination 
 Hayek’s avowed intention in developing his concept of equilibrium as the 
consistency of individual plans was to marry time and equilibrium (Hayek, 
 1937a , p. 37). Since plans are forward-looking, he reasoned that plan 
coordination must entail time. Unfortunately, he did not fully understand 
the distinction between the Newtonian and real-time constructs. Hayekian 
equilibrium incorporated only Newtonian time. Nevertheless, Hayek and 
the other Austrians did realize that equilibrium is not a directly operational 
construct and that the real world was never in equilibrium. They saw, however, 
at least two empirical uses for the concept of exact equilibrium. One was that 
it constitutes a research agenda; that is, it points to those factors worthy of 
further consideration. The other was a more sweeping claim: by reference 
to the construct, it was believed that we could predict the direction of real-
world changes. In the following subsections we shall analyze these two views. 
Our examination of the purported uses of exact equilibrium will reveal its 
ultimate inadequacy. 
 Research agenda Mises developed what he called an  argumentum a contra-
rio ( 1966 , p. 250). According to this, the equilibrium construct can be used 
as a foil against which to compare actual market situations. Thus, if  condi-
tions a, b and c together imply a certain equilibrium, then the absence of 
that equilibrium would imply that at least one of these conditions does not 
hold. Economic analysis then focuses on the forces responsible for this situ-
ation. Consequently, from Mises’ perspective, the exact equilibrium construct 
merely provides us with a clue as to why certain results do not obtain. Hence, 
it is capable of only negative prediction of states of affairs. It does not elu-
cidate the actual processes by which those states may be achieved. It points 
us in the direction of those countervailing forces that are responsible for the 
actual outcome being different from the equilibrium outcome. Thus, exact 
equilibrium elucidates not the actual processes themselves but only the reason 
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they do not produce a certain result. Hence it is fundamentally capable of 
only negative prediction. 
 Mises, however, claimed too much. This method does not permit us to offer 
a logically suffi cient explanation for the “failure” of actual processes. For 
this to be the case, the conditions of equilibrium would have to be necessary 
conditions, whereas, in fact, they are merely suffi cient conditions (Hausman, 
 1981 , p. 152). The absence of suffi cient conditions does not imply the absence 
of the result predicted by the equilibrium construct (e.g., Pareto optimality). 
Only the absence of all possible sets of suffi cient conditions (the conjunc-
tion of which is a necessary condition) would imply this. Therefore, the foil 
method provides only part of the total explanation for the observed phenom-
ena. Such partial explanations are also consistent with outcomes other than 
those observed, because sometimes the other suffi cient conditions will be pre-
sent and sometimes they will be absent. Hence an element of  indeterminism is 
introduced into the explanatory process. 
 Direction of change In contrast to Mises, Hayek argued that equilibrium 
could be useful in making positive predictions. Indeed he contended that 
“the statement of  the conditions under which individual plans will be com-
patible is … implicitly a statement of  what  will happen if  they are not com-
patible” (Hayek,  1941 , p. 23; emphasis added). If  all other prices are at their 
equilibrium levels and the price of  apples is too high, relative to the price 
of  oranges, to equate supply and demand, then the equilibrium construct 
tells us that the price of  apples will fall. Hayek immediately recognized that, 
when there are many deviations from equilibrium, the “correct” change will 
depend on what is assumed to happen in the other markets ( 1941 , p. 23, n. 
1). In general, this will make predicting the direction of  change an extremely 
complex matter. 
 The prediction of the direction of real-world changes is actually a form of 
pattern prediction. We are saying that a result of the type predicted by the 
construct will happen. If, as in our previous example, the price of apples were 
too high, a predicted fall is compatible with a whole host of actual changes. 
The only thing that unifi es these changes is that they are all consistent with 
the type “fall-in-price.” Therefore, for all practical or applied purposes we 
have departed from the exact conception of equilibrium. Equilibrium is now 
a direction rather than a point. This departure, however, has proceeded purely 
informally and is akin to merely “accidental” observational error. 
 As we have seen, both the research agenda and direction-of-change inter-
pretations of the exact equilibrium construct take account of its imperfect 
applicability. But is this enough? Should we maintain an essentially timeless 
equilibrium and view indeterminism as merely a feature of the model’s appli-
cation? Or must we incorporate the indeterminism arising from real time and 
genuine uncertainty into the construct itself ? If  we are interested in using the 
idea of equilibrium to model or elucidate processes in real time, then consign-
ing indeterminism merely to the realm of application is not suffi cient. It is 
impermissible to model such a process as culminating in an exact equilibrium 
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for two related reasons. First, recall the Popper-Schick proofs of the impossi-
bility of agents predicting their own behavior ( Chapter 2 ). If  agents are uncer-
tain about what they will do in the future, then they will never make plans that 
are exactly coordinated with those of others. Commitments will then be of a 
general variety rather than pinpointed to the precise future behavior of others 
(even assuming that the latter could be predicted). 
 Second, Oskar Morgenstern demonstrated that the assumption of per-
fect foresight, a defi ning characteristic of exact equilibrium, is inconsistent 
with any equilibrating  process . He showed that, when one individual’s plan is 
dependent on that of another, perfect foresight will produce “an endless chain 
of reciprocally conjectural reactions and counter-reactions” (Morgenstern, 
 1935 , p. 174). This was illustrated in the famous Holmes-Moriarty story that 
is worth quoting in full:
 Sherlock Holmes, pursued by his opponent, Moriarty, leaves London for 
Dover. The train stops at a station on the way, and he alights there rather 
than travelling on to Dover. He has seen Moriarty at the railway station, 
recognizes that he is very clever and expects that Moriarty will take a 
faster special train in order to catch him in Dover. Holmes’ anticipation 
turns out to be correct. But what if  Moriarty had been still more clever, 
had estimated Holmes’ mental abilities and had foreseen his actions 
accordingly? Then, obviously, he would have travelled to the intermedi-
ate station. Holmes, again, would have had to calculate that and he him-
self  would have decided to go on to Dover. Whereupon, Moriarty would 
again have “reacted” differently. Because of so much thinking they might 
not have been able to act at all or the intellectually weaker of the two 
would have surrendered in the Victoria Station, since the whole fl ight 
would have become unnecessary. 
 (Morgenstern,  1935 , pp. 173–4) 
 The equilibrium in this illustration would be a stable set of plans that might 
result in Holmes escaping or in his being captured. That aspect of the solution 
is unimportant (to us); what is important would be the absence of any tendency 
for the plans of the individuals to change. In equilibrium their plans would be 
coordinated in the sense that each is optimal given what the other individual 
is in fact planning. The moral of the Holmes-Moriarty story, however, is that 
perfect knowledge of each other’s plans makes attaining such an equilibrium 
impossible. Neither individual will be satisfi ed with any tentatively adopted 
plan and so coordination cannot be achieved. 5 Despite allegedly perfect 
foresight – or, rather, precisely because of it – the genuine uncertainty of the 
Keynesian beauty contest has reasserted itself. 
 Therefore, imperfect foresight is a necessary, although not suffi cient, condi-
tion for a process to result in an equilibrium. This equilibrium cannot, how-
ever, be a position of exact coordination. A process in which there must be 
errors cannot, except by chance, culminate in an errorless equilibrium. Hence, 
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if  we are to retain the notion of equilibrium, we must incorporate the reality 
of error into the construct itself. 
 Pattern coordination 
 The inadequacy of exact Hayekian equilibrium for the analysis of processes 
in real time means that we are faced with two alternatives: either (1) revise 
the equilibrium construct so as to incorporate time and uncertainty, or (2) 
abandon equilibrium altogether. Since Austrians have never believed that the 
state of plan coordination is a direct description of the real world, the issue 
is not one of “realism”; instead, it is the usefulness of the idea as a tool of 
analysis. 
 In the broadest sense, equilibrium is inextricably linked to the causal mode 
of reasoning. An equilibrium is merely a state of affairs in which the exogen-
ous disturbing forces or changes have completely worked themselves out 
(Machlup,  1958 , p. 48). As a pure construct, it is thus a mental laboratory in 
which various causes can be isolated from one another and their effects fully 
traced. Therefore, we believe that  some concept of equilibrium is an indis-
pensable ingredient in all economic explanations. 
 The only feasible alternative is to revise our notion of equilibrium by tak-
ing account of time and uncertainty. This process has been started in the work 
of those neoclassical economists who utilize the idea of a stochastic equilib-
rium. We propose, however, a different construct: pattern coordination. This 
makes use of both the original Hayekian “compatibility of plans” and the 
distinction between typical and unique aspects of future events. The plans of 
individuals are in a pattern equilibrium if  they are coordinated with respect to 
their typical features, even if  their unique aspects fail to mesh. 
 Consider, as an illustration, Professors A and B, who teach in the same 
department and who plan to discuss their forthcoming jointly authored book. 
Their plans are coordinated with respect to the typical features of their activ-
ities if, for example, each expects the other to be in his offi ce on the day he 
actually plans to be there. Since neither has decided his position on the book’s 
central concern beforehand, the contents of their discussions can be seen as 
the unique feature. What they will say depends on the “insights” that will arise 
only in the course of conversation. These insights are surely time-dependent. 
The plans of A and B are coordinated, therefore, in the sense that each will 
come into the offi ce on the proper day and at the proper time, but they are not 
coordinated in the sense that each has planned what to say to the other. There 
is an open-endedness to their plans that allows for spontaneity or novelty. 
This is a pattern coordination. 
 There is also a looser form of pattern coordination, which we can call “sto-
chastic pattern coordination.” In this case, the typical features of activities 
are probabilistically coordinated. Thus, in the above illustration, both A and 
B may “envisage” a probability distribution over the days of the week of the 
other coming into the offi ce. They each decide when to come based on this 
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probability distribution. Sometimes the typical aspect of their activities will 
mesh in the exact sense and sometimes they will not. Overall, however, each 
individual is doing the best he can under the circumstances and so an equi-
librium has been attained. The exact contents of the discussions, when they 
do occur, remain time-dependent. Therefore, this aspect of each individual’s 
plans is not subject to stochastic characterization and must be truly open-
ended. 
 In a manner characteristic of Newtonian time constructs, the conception 
of exact equilibrium confl ates plans with activities. The looser idea, which we 
have called pattern coordination, involves the coordination of plans but not 
of actual activities. Plans made in a world of real time, as we have seen, must 
be open-ended. They embody the typical features of prospective actions and 
events, while the details are “fi lled in” as actions and events come to pass. 
Thus, coordination can exist with respect to plans or the typical features of 
planned activities, but not with respect to the actual activities themselves. 
The latter are a complex of typical and unique features and are not stable in 
real time. 
 A broadened or wider view of causality underlies the use of pattern coord-
ination as a tool of process analysis. In the exact conception of equilibrium, 
tracing out the full effects of a change means showing how that change brings 
about a precise result. In the pattern view, on the other hand, we show the 
“full” effects of a disturbance when we follow it out to a certain class of 
results. In this sense, the causal analysis is less “full” or complete than in the 
exact case. This very incompleteness, however, constitutes a major advantage 
of pattern coordination. Real time and genuine uncertainty are not, by con-
struction, eliminated from the analysis. 
 Equilibrium, in our new, less rigid sense, does not entail the complete 
absence of  all tendencies to change. As we have seen, some features are 
stable while others continue to vary. The relatively stable types or patterns 
are, in the short run, affected only by exogenous shocks to the system. In 
other words, something more than the mere passage of  time is needed to 
induce pattern reorganization. The unique aspects of  events, however, are 
time-dependent and hence change from within the system. These kinds of 
changes are what constitute the  endogenous market process. 6 In that process 
market participants acquire non-theoretical “knowledge of  the particular 
circumstances of  time and place” (Hayek,  1945 , p. 521) as the future comes 
into existence. Although such knowledge cannot be anticipated in either an 
exact or a probabilistic sense, the essence of  entrepreneurship is to attempt to 
“see” these developments in advance. Because this aspect of  the future is, by 
defi nition, time-dependent, no logically suffi cient basis can be given for any 
particular prediction. Therefore, the entrepreneurial predictions will appear 
to be creative or intuitive rather than strict implications of  a model. The goal 
of  the economist, therefore, must be to render entrepreneurial prediction 
and its derivative behavior “intelligible.” As we have seen in  Chapter 2 , this 
means that the conceptual scheme attributed to the relevant mind construct 
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must show how the predicted behavior is more likely given the scheme than 
otherwise. 
 The analysis of an individual dealing with unique features of future events 
must involve a nondistributional measure of uncertainty. We cannot distrib-
ute unity over a fi xed set of possibilities and expect to capture the essential 
indeterminism or open-endedness of the future. Shackle ( 1969 , pp. 67–85, 
117–69) has developed a framework (“potential surprise”) designed to cope 
with this aspect of expectation. We shall not here try to restate his position 
or the criticisms that have been offered (Shackle,  1969 , pp. 86–108, 170–9). 
It is suffi cient, however, to note that neither subjectivists nor anyone else has 
fully developed a formalism to deal with this problem. This is one of the most 
critical tasks that remain to be completed in order fully to implement a sub-
jectivist research program. 
 There are, to be sure, certain similarities between our concept of pattern 
coordination and neoclassical stochastic equilibrium. Nevertheless, there is 
a fundamental distinction. The crux lies in the recognition of uniqueness. 
In a stochastic pattern equilibrium the typical features are probabilistically 
coordinated as in the conventional stochastic equilibrium. However, the neo-
classical analysis ignores time dependency. In so doing, it reduces all ideas of 
uncertainty and inexact equilibrium to pure Newtonian constructs. 
 The usefulness of a nondeterministic conception of equilibrium lies in our 
ability to use it to model adjustments in a manner that does not foreordain 
their outcomes. As we shall see in the next chapter, the competitive process is 
a  discovery procedure and thus, in principle, its results cannot be predicted. On 
the other hand, it is important to be able to say something about the major 
features of market processes. The idea of pattern coordination allows us to 
have it both ways: we can discuss adjustments in general (pattern) terms while 
recognizing the essential creativeness of market activities. 
 Equilibrium and optimality 
 Knowledge requirement for equilibrium 
 Unlike the general competitive equilibrium of Arrow and Debreu, a Hayekian 
equilibrium, in either its exact or its pattern form, is not necessarily Pareto-
optimal. Participants in any given exchange are not assumed to possess all of 
the knowledge in the system or, especially, the knowledge of the observer. The 
knowledge requirement for plan coordination is simply that expectations be 
correct in the sense that nothing agents are “bound” to learn in the execution 
of their plans will falsify those expectations (Hayek,  1937a , p. 55). In effect, 
this means that equilibrium requires the absence of the type of endogenous 
learning that would upset initial (exact or pattern) plans. There ought to 
be nothing in the original confi guration of data that will bring about their 
undoing. What individuals are bound to learn in any given situation depends, 
of course, on what the model-builder puts into his construction. This, in turn, 
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depends on the empirical appropriateness of his assumptions about learning. 
Presumably, if  an individual plans to erect a skyscraper he will inevitably learn 
whether the ground underneath will support such a heavy structure. Moreover, 
we may require him to learn what other individuals will reveal or do in the 
course of executing his plans. Market activity, for example, may cause the 
price of certain types of labor and materials to rise before the skyscraper is 
completed. This could result in the project being left unfi nished. Only if  such 
information is correctly anticipated at the beginning of the period can there 
be plan coordination. 
 Irrelevance of suboptimality in static equilibrium models 
 A number of neoclassical economists have recognized that meaningful 
welfare economics cannot be based on Pareto optimality as the standard of 
evaluation. Suboptimality relative to knowledge possessed by an omniscient 
observer is completely irrelevant. In the absence of a feasible alternative 
institution that could remedy the problem, we have merely demonstrated that 
the world is imperfect (Demsetz,  1969 ). This, of course, will always be the case. 
Suboptimality relative to information possessed by some “isolated” individual 
in the system is also irrelevant in the absence of a tendency to dissemination. 
Dissemination may be impossible owing to the costs of acquiring information. 
If  it is argued that optimality-producing information can,  in some way , be 
provided to the system, there is an obvious puzzle. It is inexplicable, in a static 
context, that such information has not  already been provided or is not already 
being provided at the optimal rate. Static models effectively abolish time and 
succession. All that eventually “will” happen happens now. Therefore, what 
started out as a suboptimal state of affairs is now revealed to have been 
an optimum all along. Standard equilibria are optimal with respect to the 
knowledge that the relevant agents do have. In other words, people make the 
best use of what they know (the “effi cient markets” hypothesis). But this is 
trivial from a normative perspective: optimality here means nothing more 
or less than equilibrium. Pursuit of this line of reasoning would lead to the 
crude Panglossian tautology that has plagued the work of some economists 
(e.g., Stigler,  1982 ). 
 Only something exogenous to the model can account for the system’s sub-
optimality. This is equivalent to saying that static maximizing models can-
not explain (rationalize) suboptimality; they can merely postulate it. Either 
an equilibrium is suboptimal in an irrelevant and unexplained sense, or it 
is optimal in an explained but trivial sense. Static welfare economics thus 
self-destructs. As long as there are logically suffi cient reasons for a given 
imperfect state of  knowledge, we obviously cannot say that there could be 
less ignorance. The preexisting conditions (e.g., costs and benefi ts of  search) 
rigorously imply that state of  knowledge. Consequently, we must loosen the 
link between causes and results in order to say that things  could be better or 
that more knowledge  could prevail. As we have seen, a conceptual framework 
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that takes time seriously will introduce such indeterminism in the structure 
of  models. 
 Thus, from the dynamic perspective developed in this book, there can be 
some role for welfare economics. Since knowledge would then be changing, 
we obviously could not evaluate a system by the effi ciency of its allocations 
relative to some fi xed body of knowledge. Instead, the only possible standard 
would be the degree to which various processes and systems generate know-
ledge or make discoveries. The competitive market, viewed as an engine of 
discovery, is the topic of the next chapter. In that chapter, we deal with welfare 
analysis in a dynamic theory. 
 Notes 
 1  This is not to deny that the uncertainty could be overcome for an individual if  the 
agency were to reveal the guesses only to that individual. If  no one else knew this, 
then there would be no incentive for anyone except the lucky person to change his 
guesses. This, however, would mean that we were back in a Newtonian world. 
 2  For the purposes of the model, time will stop if  the agency calls an end to its activ-
ities and people are required to make their fi nal guesses. 
 3  G. L. S. Shackle has made an important start in this direction. See especially Shackle 
( 1969 ). 
 4  Although the framework may have predicted “well” in the past, it could have done 
better. In addition, circumstances may have changed and so the framework must 
also change in order to do equally well in the future. 
 5  Another example of the phenomenon was provided by G. B. Richardson ( 1960 ). 
Assume, initially, that in one industry there is an “initially” expected rate of return 
higher than the normal rate. Assume further that all market participants have per-
fect foresight of this and that all the other conventional assumptions of the com-
petitive model have been satisfi ed. If  each potential entrant must take into account 
the behavior of others because they can produce competitive supply, there will be 
either an indefi nite expansion of output or no expansion at all. If  everyone foresees 
a supernormal return, then an indefi nitely large number of fi rms will enter at the 
same time and the actual rate of return will be indefi nitely lower than the “initially” 
expected return. But if  people are very clever they will foresee this and not enter. If, 
however, no one enters, then the rate will again fail to be bid down to the equilib-
rium level. In neither case, then, is the assumption of perfect foresight compatible 
with a tendency toward equilibrium. This is not a mere cobweb-like situation but 
rather a problem of logical circularity. Each potential entrant must make his deci-
sions on the basis of what others decide. Perfect knowledge of what they intend 
to do, however, paralyzes the ability of each to make any decisions at all. Also cf. 
Frydman  et al . ( 1982 ). 
 6  There is an “exogenous market process” only in the sense of a market reaction to 
exogenous shocks. Although the process may be initiated by something outside the 
system, the adjustment process itself  is endogenous. 
 
 SECTION II:   APPLICATIONS 
 6  Competition and discovery 
 The theory of perfect competition is unscientifi c because, by assuming a 
world of perfect knowledge in which fi rms cannot interact to change their 
economic environments, such a theory imposes pompous preconditions on 
our subject matter: competitors are so constrained in the behavior in which 
they can engage … we are precluded from understanding economic reality or 
developing a testable theory. 
 Burton H. Klein ( 1977 , p. 71) 
 Introduction 
 A parable on competition 
 Consider a sports game for which spectators and participants agree that the 
rules are fair. The judges of individual sports events profess, however, to know 
beforehand what the outcome of individual contests should be. Failure of the 
sports events to produce the predicted outcome results in condemnation of 
them by these judges. Judicial nullifi cation sometimes involves substituting the 
preferred or predicted winner for the actual winner of the contest. Sometimes, 
however, the judges require that the sports event be replayed over and over again, 
until the “correct” outcome is produced. Plays are called back, races rerun and 
contests repeated, not because of untoward conduct or fouls committed by 
participants, but solely because the “wrong” outcome results. If, contrary to 
judicial expectations, a particular participant or team persists in winning, that 
person or team is handicapped or perhaps even forbidden from playing in the 
future. The judges assert that they are enforcing rules, but the evidence that rules 
have been broken is inferred from the fact that other than the predicted winner 
came out fi rst in the game. Some creative judges produce theories about what 
unfair activity  must be going on to produce the unwanted results. However, 
these theories generally involve hypothetical actions not observed by anyone. 
Observable behavior that is blamed for bad outcomes cannot be distinguished 
by participants or spectators from approved behavior. 
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 Clearly, no such sports contest exists. The enforcement of such rules would 
make a mockery of playing the game or running the race. Almost everyone 
recognizes that the winner of a sports event cannot be defi ned apart from who 
fi nishes fi rst or scores the most points. “Winning” means nothing but playing 
fairly and coming in fi rst. “Playing fairly” is defi ned before the fact in terms of 
observable behavior during the contest, and not, of course, in terms of after-
the-fact outcomes. Teams or individuals scoring highly are not penalized for 
doing so, and certainly are not implicated in cheating merely because they fre-
quently win by large margins. There is no sports foul of “excess points.” 
 Indeed, sports contests are played precisely because we cannot and do not 
know before the event who is the better player or team. Prior expectations of 
winners and losers are frequently falsifi ed. To know the outcome with cer-
tainty would be to render the playing of the game unintelligible. To rig the 
results after the fact would be to perpetrate an injustice on players and specta-
tors alike. 
 We claim that this procedure, which would be rejected out of hand for 
sports competition – or any other kind of competitive “race” in life, including 
that for most scientifi c analysis – is precisely that adopted by the vast major-
ity of economists in thinking about competition. What would be an obvious 
paradox is suppressed by redefi ning “competition” to mean nearly the oppos-
ite of the behavior and phenomena it obstensibly denotes. 
 In this chapter, we argue that economic competition has more in common 
with other competitive activities in life than it has with economists’ standard 
conceptualization of economic competition. Competition is most fruitfully 
viewed as a process rather than a state of affairs. Viewing competition in static 
terms causes numerous analytical problems, some of which we highlight in 
this chapter. Among other things, static competition theory ignores the fact 
that only if  there is a rivalrous, competitive process will the desirable norma-
tive properties of competition tend to be produced. For instance, statutory 
monopolies are objectionable not only because they produce a  given product 
at higher prices, but also because they fail to produce the range and quality of 
products preferred by consumers. 
 More generally, we argue that the theory of perfect competition denies the 
very reality it purports to study, is a poor predictive theory and is untenable 
in normative analysis. As well as offering a critique of current approaches, 
we present our own approach. We try to be concrete and offer examples, for 
we believe that only by offering numerous examples can we suggest just how 
unsatisfactory the dominant theory of competition is. Moreover, in many 
cases we view these problems as exemplary of the future research agenda of a 
process theory of competition. 
 Perfect competition 
 It is well known that in economic theory “competition” means the opposite 
of its meaning either in ordinary language or in commonsense economic 
Competition and discovery 137
discussions of competition. This ironic use of “competition” is seen as a virtue 
rather than a vice. Theorists argue that perfect competition teaches us about 
important relationships among economic variables in competitive equilibrium 
and about certain normative properties of equilibrium. Before examining these 
professed benefi ts, we shall look at what is lost by using the theory. 
 Perfect competition is a theory of states, not of processes; it tells us nothing 
about the adjustment from one competitive equilibrium state to another. In 
fact, if  we consider what we know from general economic theory, we must be 
pessimistic about the system’s ability to move from one hypothetical equilib-
rium state to another. Equilibrium positions are not path independent. False 
trading, for example, produces wealth effects, which in turn generate a new 
implied equilibrium, different from the original one. 
 Not only does theory tell us nothing about adjustment processes, but, when 
taken seriously, it implies that there ought to be no process of adjustment at 
all (see  Chapter 3 above, pp. 54–5). Once a new equilibrium is known, agents 
move to it immediately. 
 Competition in fact is a continuous process and not a set of conditions. 
As Hayek ( 1948a , p. 94) observed of competition, its “essential character-
istics are assumed away by the assumptions underlying static analysis.” The 
received theory of competition is comparative static, focusing on beginning 
and end points. Economic agents are interested in neither the beginning nor 
end points, but in coping with never-ending adjustments. The theory of per-
fect competition analyzes the state of affairs or equilibrium conditions that 
would exist if  all competitive activity ceased.  It is not an approximation but the 
negation of that activity . 
 All theories abstract from part of reality. Theorists must determine in each 
case the appropriate degree of abstraction. What is essential and permanent 
to the phenomena ought to be part of the analysis. It would, for example, be a 
pretty poor economic theory that abstracted from scarcity. All genuinely eco-
nomic, as opposed to purely computational, problems arise, however, because 
of the passage of time and concomitant changes in knowledge and the data. 
Economics must analyze the process of adaption to change as surely as it ana-
lyzes scarcity. Under some conditions, this adaptive process is competitive. 
We need, therefore, a theory of the competitive process. Neoclassical econom-
ics contains no such theory. 
 The orthodox theory of competition postulates a situation in which a large 
number of buyers and sellers of a homogeneous good transact in an envir-
onment of free entry, parametric pricing and perfect knowledge. We have 
already added our own criticisms of perfect knowledge to those of numer-
ous other authors. Here we would emphasize that the problem of incomplete 
knowledge and the necessity of adaptation exist only to the extent that the 
data change unexpectedly. “Economic problems arise always and only in con-
sequence of change. So long as things continue as before, or at least as they 
were expected to, there arise no new problems requiring a decision, no need 
to form a new plan” (Hayek,  1945 , p. 523). 
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 The existence of scarcity necessitates agents making a set of choices – a 
plan. In a static world of scarcity, however, each individual would need to 
form only one plan per lifetime. Plan revision occurs not because goods are 
scarce but because of changes in the environment, or in the individual agent 
himself. 1 If  the static model were a close approximation of reality, we would 
have exhausted our subject long ago. There is just so much that can be said 
about the Pure Logic of Choice in an unchanging world. Yet in the theory of 
competition, which ought to be preeminently a theory of change, the static 
model of pure competition reigns supreme. 
 For example, contrast a process view of product heterogeneity to the ortho-
dox one. Neoclassical economic theory treats product differentiation as an 
equilibrium phenomenon, the outgrowth of consistent plans between con-
sumers and producers. Yet product differentiation may also be the outcome 
of a process in which entrepreneurs try to mesh their plans with those of con-
sumers. Because of changing conditions (including but not limited to changes 
in consumer tastes), producers are not sure what buyers want. By a process of 
trial and error, producers change nonprice variables in an attempt to discover 
how best to serve consumer wants. This producer-generated trial and error 
process is likely also to generate consumer experimentation with heteroge-
neous offerings. The observable result, which is not part of anyone’s explicit 
intention, is “product differentiation.” The attempt to discover by trial and 
error the actual set of consumer tastes is bound to produce greater diversity in 
product offerings. Uncertainty and a high degree of competition, not market 
power and imperfect competition, produce this result. Heterogeneous expec-
tations and tastes characterize the process. 
 The treatment of product heterogeneity is an instance of a more general 
issue. Concepts and problems whose existence derives from change and the 
passage of time are often analyzed in static terms. The positive analysis is 
defi cient, and will almost inevitably mislead the analyst in policy application. 
We say more about this issue in what follows. 
 The discovery of opportunities 
 Equilibrium 
 In our analysis of competition, plan coordination is the norm. As we have seen, 
the plan coordination concept was the outcome of Hayek’s early attempt to 
reformulate equilibrium analysis for a multi-person economy in time. The Pure 
Logic of Choice is abstract and deductive. The degree to which an economy 
actually tends toward complete plan coordination (“equilibrium”) determines 
the applicability of equilibrium models to real-world economies. For Hayek 
( 1937a , pp. 43–4), the analysis of equilibrating tendencies constituted the 
“empirical element” in economics. 
 The focus on forces tending to equilibrium explains the concern with 
entrepreneurship in modern Austrian work, since the entrepreneur is the 
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active coordinating agent in market economies. Prices are signals or indica-
tors, but not unfailing guides to economizers. Institutions provide a back-
ground for decision-making, and these set practical limits to the divergence 
of  expectations. Nonetheless, it is entrepreneurs who are alert to oppor-
tunities, and, indeed, whose creativity is the very source of  many of  these 
opportunities. 2 In static equilibrium, there can be no profi t opportunities. 
But only by acting on their hunches and forecasts, so as to grasp prof-
its, could entrepreneurs bring about a situation in which equilibrium is 
approached. 
 Hayek originally defi ned as an equilibrium a situation in which there is 
both  ex ante plan consistency, and no information disruptive of plans that 
agents are bound to learn in the course of executing their plans. Exogenous 
disturbances might occur before these plans are executed, and upset the equi-
librium. As long as agents did not themselves bring about these disturbances 
by the very execution of their plans, their plans were coordinated and con-
sistent. Endogenous market forces would then tend to bring the system to the 
original equilibrium position. 
 In his work on entrepreneurship, Kirzner ( 1973 ) has consistently adhered 
to Hayek’s early view. Yet by focusing on entrepreneurship, we can under-
stand better the reasons that surely entered into Hayek’s revised approach to 
competition, coordination and equilibrium. The fundamental problem is that 
the “tendency to equilibrium” view does not take time seriously. The latter is, 
of course, as serious an internal criticism as one could levy against a subject-
ivist analysis. 
 Process 
 Competition is a dynamic process, a process in time. Since, as we have seen, 
knowledge must change with the passage of time, individual agents will alter 
their plans as time passes. This changing of plans disrupts the plans of other 
agents. Conventional learning models are, however, “clockwork” models, whose 
most signifi cant characteristics have been succinctly described by Littlechild:
 The agents are equipped with forecasting functions and decision func-
tions to enable them to cope with uncertainty. Indeed, the agents  are 
these functions. But though their specifi c forecasts and decisions may 
change over time in response to change in economic conditions,  the func-
tions themselves remain the same . The agents never learn to predict any 
better as a result of  their experience. Nothing will ever occur for which 
they are not prepared, nor can they even initiate anything which is not 
preordained. They are clockwork Bayesians, wound up with prior dis-
tributions and sent on their way, to attain eventually, if  circumstances 
permit, that everlasting peace in which they never need to move their 
posteriors. 
 (Littlechild,  1977 , pp. 7–8) 
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 The theory problem is modeling competition as a continual process. One could 
formally model the economy as a clockwork mechanism, and then hypothesize 
a never-ending stream of exogenous shocks wrought by entrepreneurs outside 
the system. In such a model, the passage of time would not be accompanied 
by learning. To prevent the system from “winding down,” one would need to 
bring in the entrepreneur as a  deus ex machina . Schumpeter chose this latter 
course in his  Theory of Economic Development ( 1934 ). The circular fl ow is 
then the natural state of the economy, into which it settles unless disturbed by 
disruptive entrepreneurs. The Schumpeterian gambit maintains the Newtonian 
conception of time and places the entrepreneur outside the system. Yet surely 
neither entrepreneurship nor learning ought to be completely exogenous 
(i.e., unexplained) in a process analysis, even if  one accepts that there are 
exogenous components to both. 
 In “Competition as a Discovery Procedure,” Hayek ( 1978 ) explicitly inte-
grated true learning (i.e., changes in the learning functions themselves) into a 
process theory. He brought the entrepreneur in from the shadows and made 
him part of the economic system. In so doing, Hayek offered a genuinely 
novel view of the function of competitive institutions. He treated a competi-
tive market as a spontaneously evolved set of institutions and customs facili-
tating information acquisition. To simplify only slightly, nearly everything 
assumed to be data in orthodox constructions is the object of a trial and error 
process in Hayek’s approach. As Hayek put it, 
 Competition is valuable  only because, and so far as, its results are unpre-
dictable and on the whole different from those which anyone has, or could 
have, deliberately arrived at. Further, … the generally benefi cial effects 
of competition must include disappointing or defeating some particular 
expectations or intentions. 
 (Hayek,  1978 , p. 180) 
 Hayek’s view embodies endogenous learning and entrepreneurship. Moreover, 
it captures that essential element of competition that is absent from alternative 
economic conceptualizations: the element of surprise or the unexpected. It 
thereby meets the criterion suggested in our sports contest example; at least 
some of the time, the outcome of a competitive struggle must be other than 
what we expect. 
 Knowledge and competition 
 There are fi ve general characteristics of knowledge with which a Hayekian 
view of competition is concerned. Knowledge is (1) private, (2) empirical, (3) 
often tacit, (4) not all gained through price signals and (5) often the source 
of surprise. Each of these characteristics is important, and together they 
distinguish a process from a static conception of competition. 
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 Private knowledge 
 A large and signifi cant part of advanced economic theory explicitly or 
implicitly rejects the privacy of knowledge. The strong version of the “effi cient 
markets” hypothesis explicitly denies that  any knowledge remains private, 
and not just part of the data of the system. With relatively few exceptions, 3 
rational expectations theorists fashion models as though information available 
to anyone is available to all. While it certainly would be an exaggeration to 
suggest that privacy of knowledge is generally accepted, there is nonetheless 
some recognition of this issue in other areas of theory. 
 In the literature on localized information, 4 some knowledge is private and 
not datum. Privacy models can be used to analyze numerous issues, including 
the ability of individuals to exploit the knowledge on the market. We consider 
this literature to be salutary, and we have no disagreement with it as far as it 
goes. Our problem with the direction it has taken comes out in the following 
discussion of the other characteristics of knowledge. 
 Empirical knowledge 
 The knowledge sought by economic agents is empirical in the following sense. 
They are primarily seeking “knowledge of the particular circumstances of 
time and place” (Hayek,  1945 , p. 52). When acquired, this knowledge does 
not consist of abstract scientifi c propositions, which form the basis of 
logical deductions to certain conclusions. Empirical knowledge consists of 
information of temporary and fl eeting signifi cance, which may be factual 
(i.e., profi table) only so long as others do not also know it. Almost any profi t 
opportunity fi ts this characterization. 
 The value of incomplete information partly depends on the processor of 
the information. Each actor must exercise judgment about information and 
its place in his overall plan. What an agent ought to do cannot be determined 
by an outside observer possessed of different information, judgments, tastes 
and plans. There is, consequently, no uniquely rational or “correct” course 
of action, as may be the case when dealing with a scientifi c-deductive prob-
lem. This latter point requires emphasis, given economists’ inclination to pro-
nounce on “the rational” course of action in numerous situations. 
 In a situation of  given means and  given ends, there may be only one course 
of action that will maximize the relevant objective function. This would be 
true by virtue of our construction of the problem. We may choose to label 
this course of action “rational.” We can deduce  the “rational” or “correct” 
action only because we have converted an empirical or trial and error learning 
problem into a logical or deductive problem. This conversion is acceptable if  
and only if  all required information is available simultaneously to the deci-
sion-maker. Only in this case could one logically deduce an optimal course of 
action. It is misleading to conceive of decision-making, which involves trial 
and error discovery of incomplete information, as though it were a scientifi c 
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problem, about which agents “theorized.” Hayek stated the point clearly and 
concisely:
 Implication is a logical relationship  which can be meaningfully  asserted 
only of propositions simultaneously present to one and the same mind … 
Only to a mind to which all these facts were simultaneously known would 
the answer necessarily follow from the facts given to it. The practical 
problem, however, arises precisely because the facts are never given to a 
single mind, and because, in consequence, it is necessary that in the solu-
tion of the problem knowledge should be used that is dispersed among 
many people. 
 (Hayek,  1945 , p. 530; emphasis added) 
 Tacit knowledge 
 The nondeductive or nonscientifi c quality of much economic knowledge is 
obviously related to its privateness. Both are also related to the tacit quality 
of much economically important knowledge. In all areas of human endeavor, 
individuals employ knowledge that either they are not aware they possess 
or they cannot characterize precisely enough to communicate to others. In 
philosopher Gilbert Ryle’s terminology, they “know how” to do something 
but do not “know that” so and so is true of what they do (Ryle,  1949 ). 
 Scientifi c progress occurs as the stock of interpersonal and communicable 
knowledge increases. In this regard, however, scientifi c knowledge and pro-
gress are poor models of economic knowledge and progress (Sowell,  1980 , 
pp. 8–11). Thus, tacit knowledge may take the form of a skill or may be 
embodied in a custom or unarticulated rule of behavior. Cycling and swim-
ming are two examples. Relatively few accomplished at either activity under-
stand the principles involved, or are even adept at teaching others how to ride 
or swim. Cyclists and swimmers know how but not that. They may very well 
be fi t subjects for imitation. Apprenticeship, not a reference work or univer-
sity short course, is the learning model. Michael Polanyi illustrated the theor-
etical point with reference to swimming:
 The decisive factor by which the swimmer keeps himself  afl oat is the man-
ner by which he regulates his respiration; he keeps his buoyancy at an 
increased level by refraining from emptying his lungs when breathing out 
and by infl ating them more than usual when breathing in; yet this is not 
generally known to swimmers. 
 (Polanyi,  1962 , p. 49) 
 Two important implications follow from the above considerations. First, 
discovering tacit knowledge involves time-consuming processes that may 
never be successful. Other market participants may not be able to discover the 
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source or reasons for an entrepreneur’s success. His profi ts may accordingly 
persist for a substantial length of time. Second, some of what individuals 
do and why they do it cannot be successfully communicated or explained to 
third parties. Third-party observers ought not to expect agents to be able to 
rationalize their conduct. We develop some of the further implications of this 
for public policy on competition and monopoly. 
 Since much information is tacit and cannot be communicated,  even in equi-
librium , not everyone will know everything. Economic systems do not move 
toward a situation in which information is fully disseminated, at least not 
explicitly. Some knowledge will remain private. 
 Nonprice signals 
 When it comes to the role of prices in allocating resources, Hayek’s message 
seems to have been learned almost too well. The proposition that “the price 
system [is] a mechanism for communicating information” (Hayek,  1945 , p. 526) 
plays an especially important role in the localized information literature. 
But the context in which Hayek presented the idea has been forgotten. The 
proposition has been transformed into the entirely different one that “nothing 
but” price signals communicate information on markets. Its corollary is that, 
unless price signals accurately refl ect equilibrium scarcity values, we cannot 
or ought not rely on them. 
 A world in which prices were always at their general equilibrium level 
would be a world in which prices were not needed. To understand this point, 
consider the function of  the Walrasian auctioneer. He centralizes infor-
mation and ensures that individuals do not act on disequilibrium data. 
Equilibrium prices are generated via the  tatonnement process. No real time 
passes and no false trading occurs. Though nominally in time, the Walrasian 
world is really static. The most interesting feature, however, is the central-
ization of  information. Formal economic theory provides no argument for 
decentralization. Based on general equilibrium theory, perfect competition 
theory is more applicable to centralized than to decentralized economies. 
Static models of  centralized information render real competition superfl u-
ous and literally wasteful. In this world, we can forget prices and just have 
the central processor of  information issue production orders instead. The 
prices of  general equilibrium theory do not provide information of  the type 
we have been discussing. These prices are simply statements of  equilibrium 
rates of  trade-off. 
 What of the idea that prices guide behavior? First, prices are useful guides 
or signals because, and insofar as, they reveal discrepancies, previous malad-
justments and errors. It surely misses the point to ask if  they are now “cor-
rect.” Prices reveal what people want relatively more urgently now, and in the 
future, not what they would want in a hypothetical and unattainable equi-
librium. No known system accomplishes the latter, and it is pointless if  not 
misleading to make this a normative reference point. 
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 Second, prices and markets function as part of a social system, not in isola-
tion. A social system generates many kinds of signals and rules besides prices. 
Unless all these other guides are superfl uous, it is erroneous to suggest that 
prices alone are suffi cient guides. A theory of passive response to prices and 
only to prices is not a theory of human action, but a physics of automatons. 
 Nonprice constraints are as much part of a decentralized economy as are 
the prices they help to generate. These constraints are reference frameworks 
and orientation points, in terms of which actors form expectations. Prices are 
formed on markets composed of contracts, rules and customs, which are part 
of the constraints and basis for observed behavior. 5 
 The tendency in the industrial organization and applied price theory litera-
ture is to view nonprice constraints as either extraneous or suspicious intru-
sions on “competition.” We are arguing to the contrary, namely that these 
constraints are often necessary accompaniments to markets. For example, 
it is strictly impossible to imagine a “price system” devoid of contracts and 
property rights. Yet much of the focus of the applied literature involves cast-
ing suspicion on all nonprice constraints on behavior (e.g., resale price main-
tenance). There is a presumption against them, and agents must justify their 
existence. We think this attitude follows from the presumption that prices 
“ought to” allocate resources, because they do so in perfectly competitive 
models. Not prices but people allocate resources, and fl esh and blood human 
actors depend on all these nonprice variables in their decision-making. 
 Third, to varying degrees agents are endowed with entrepreneurial abil-
ity. Entrepreneurs do not merely respond to, but also create, change. They 
 outguess market prices when these prices do not seem consistent (Rothbard, 
 1970 , II, pp. 464–9). Whether we call this entrepreneurship a capacity to fi nd 
out “particular circumstances” (Hayek,  1945 , p. 52) or “alertness” (Kirzner, 
 1973 , pp. 65–9), it is a  sine qua non of  a market economy. Yet this “driv-
ing force” of market economies is absent from models of perfect competi-
tion. Schumpeterians and Austrians have tried to fi ll this gap with theories of 
entrepreneurship. 
 Surprise 
 Competitive market processes must produce results surprising (at least in 
part) to market participants  and observers. Any interactive social process 
in real time produces unintended and hence unforeseen results. This will be 
true if  for no other reason than the confl icting goals of diverse members of 
society. Whenever there is goal confl ict, there must be a social mechanism to 
reconcile these confl icts. The mechanism may involve peaceful or nonpeaceful 
reconciliation. It may entail either private or collective action. If  private, it 
may involve market or nonmarket approaches. Regardless of the mechanism, 
some agents must experience disappointment and revise their plans. This 
plan revision must involve their making choices other than the ones they had 
originally wanted to make. 
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 The outcomes of social processes are unintended for three interrelated rea-
sons. First, there is the need to reconcile confl icting plans. Second, there are 
always unintended by-products to individual actions in a society. Acting indi-
viduals inevitably produce results that were, in Adam Smith’s phraseology, 
“no part of their intention.” This realization is surely the basis for  any social 
theory and is, in any case, the core principle of modern economics (O’Driscoll, 
 1977 ). Any economically interesting analysis of attempts to engineer  ex ante 
economic and social outcomes necessarily involves specifying unintended 
consequences of human action. For instance, the results of imposing below-
market rental prices on housing units is an example of the principle involved. 
The intended outcome (plentiful and cheap housing) is the  given for the prob-
lem; the  analysis entails deducing the unintended outcome (expensive and 
depleted housing stock). What is true of economic theory is likewise true of 
sound sociological and political analysis. Each discipline studies the unin-
tended consequences of human action. 6 
 Third, actions are not merely “additive.” As the number of buyers and sell-
ers of a good increases, this may result in not merely more production and 
trade, but also a more highly developed market for the good. For instance, if  
an increasing number of traders seek liquidity and try to economize on hold-
ing inventories of real goods, they may succeed not only in achieving their 
goals but in facilitating the emergence of a medium of exchange (Menger, 
 1892 ). As Marx emphasized, quantitative changes evolve into qualitative 
differences. 
 The unintended consequences of human action must often be as surpris-
ing to the theorists as they are to market participants. Similarity of problems 
renders pattern prediction feasible (as in the rent control case). Yet the seem-
ing precision of such predictions masks basic theoretical ambiguity. Myriad 
outcomes are possible. Will the controls be enforced or not enforced? Evaded 
(how?) or not evaded? Will the government eventually subsidize enough con-
struction to meet the excess demand (Sweden) or not (the USA and UK)? 
The attempt to predict precisely the unintended by-products of human action 
would involve,  inter alia , a predictive theory of human institutions. Nothing 
short of discovering the “laws of history” would make this endeavor possible. 
Past efforts in this area have been conspicuous failures. Our only prediction of 
the future is that this record will continue unchanged. 
 The fi nal element of surprise concerns expectations formation. We have 
more to say on “objectivist” theories, such as rational expectations, in the 
chapter on money ( Chapter 9 ). Here we simply observe that a subjectivist 
approach emphasizes the diversity of expectations. This diversity is a func-
tion both of the diversity of human beings and of the effects of change and 
the passage of time. Pre-reconciliation of plans and forecasting of the future 
would necessitate each individual’s predicting the mental states and choices 
of large numbers of unknown people, whose decisions affect his environment 
and his choices. Theories that entail or assume this ability violate the basic 
requirements of a subjectivist and methodologically individualistic analysis. 
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They fail to take differences among individuals seriously. The theories pro-
ceed “as if” there were only one decision-maker. These theories produce unin-
telligible results when applied to decentralized economies. Yet, to reiterate, 
the modern theory of competition assumes centralized information (in the 
auctioneer), and (usually) uniformity of expectations. It would thus be only 
a slight exaggeration to say that neoclassical economics has produced an ele-
gant static theory of centralized resource allocation, but no theory of compe-
tition in a decentralized economy. 
 Process theories and normative economics 
 A theory of competition as a process will necessarily be at odds with static 
theories of competition. These latter equate competition with the attainment 
of certain conditions, the existence of certain market structures, and the 
presence of stereotypical behavior (e.g., price-taking) by transactors. If  
markets fail to replicate these conditions or to produce certain results (e.g., 
 P =  MC ), then this is taken as imperfection of competition. This conception 
underlies the proclivity, illustrated in our parable, to condemn actual market 
outcomes. 
 If  competition serves a social purpose, it must produce something that we 
could not have in its absence. To the degree that competition does what we 
could have done equally cheaply in its absence, it is wasteful. Competition in 
fact leads to the discovery of opportunities that would otherwise go unnoticed. 
It thus generates a spontaneous discovery process, the exact course of which 
is unpredictable. This process includes,  inter alia , both the discovery of hith-
erto unsatisfi ed wants and the products to satisfy those wants, and the inven-
tion of lower-cost methods of satisfying preferences. It also encompasses the 
creation of new economic forms, customs and structures. 
 None of this suggests, of course, that competition does not also fulfi ll its 
traditional functions of creating incentives to keep one’s prices and costs in 
line with other producers. Even in this case, however, the discovery process 
plays a crucial role. Costs are not a well-defi ned given; they change as pro-
ductive techniques vary. Even in highly competitive industries that best fi t the 
model of pure competition, such as agriculture, different production tech-
niques exist literally side by side. The differences are sometimes dramatic, as 
in tending of vineyards and production of wine. They exist also, however, in 
activities as prosaic as the growing of feed corn. If  we move to industries of 
heterogeneous goods, then the relevant price is no longer a given, and ascer-
taining its profi t-maximizing level is part of the competitive discovery pro-
cess. It is not, then, what competition does to fulfi ll our expectations that 
recommends it: it is what competition does that we would not have expected 
it to do that recommends it. 
 Normative analysis of competition must differ in process and static theories 
of competition. In its positive analysis, process theory analyzes the competi-
tive discovery procedure inherent in the coordination of plans. Accordingly, 
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process economists focus on the capacity of social systems to discover and 
innovate. Contrast the emphasis on change and discovery with the approach 
of standard welfare economics. Choices are pre-reconciled under known 
conditions, which generate predictable outcomes. As Kaldor ( 1934 , p. 147) 
pointed out, “the formation of prices must  precede the process of exchange 
and not be the result of it.” In effect, the outcomes of trade must be known 
by agents before the trades are consummated. Further, the analyst-observer 
knows the outcome in the guise of well-known equalities at the margin. 
 Emphasis on the unintended consequences of human actions leads to 
another decisive difference between process and neoclassical normative 
analyses. Standard optimality criteria are foreign to a process approach. 
Optimality criteria are static rather than dynamic, and judge performance 
or outcomes rather than processes or operation. They presume that social 
processes ought to produce outcomes that can be specifi ed in advance. This 
argument is taken up in more detail in the next chapter. Here we will just 
observe that there is no straightforward way of applying standard optimality 
concepts to institutions or processes. To know whether an institution or pro-
cess is optimal, we would need to know the very information whose discovery 
is the object of that process or the operation of that institution. Once again, if  
we could independently ascertain the information, the institution or process 
in question would be superfl uous. 
 Even casual inspection of the literature reveals a systematic confl ation 
between general equilibrium theory and classical arguments in favor of free 
competition or  laissez-faire . Consider the following argument of Kornai:
 The modern equilibrium theory is nothing else than a mathematically 
exact formulation of Smith’s “invisible hand” which harmonizes the 
interest of egoistic individuals in an optimal manner. At the time of 
Smith … this description of the functioning of a capitalist economy was 
not unrealistic (though not exact either). More than a hundred years were 
required for Smith’s intuition to be expressed in a faultlessly exact form; 
by the time it was achieved, it became utterly anachronistic. 
 (Kornai,  1971 , p. 349) 
 Or compare Hahn:
 When the claim is made – and the claim is as old as Adam Smith – that 
a myriad of self-seeking agents left to themselves will lead to a coherent 
and effi cient disposition of economic resources, Arrow and Debreu show 
what the world would have to look like if  the claim is to be true. In doing 
this they provide the most potent avenue of falsifi cation of the claims. 
 (Hahn,  1973 , p. 324) 7 
 In fact, Smith’s defense of competition involves a theory of unplanned 
or spontaneous order. This tradition, in which Smith forms a middle link 
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between the scholastics and natural law theorists on the one hand and modern 
theorists like Mises and Hayek on the other, is an alternative to modern general 
equilibrium theory and not an early or crude anticipation of it. A theory of 
evolved orders is not a theory of optimality or effi ciency, precisely because it 
is a process and not an end-state theory. Social effi ciency or global optimality 
concepts must be foreign to process theories.  Individuals economize and, in 
this sense, attempt to allocate their own resources effi ciently. There is no social 
choice process, however, in which society chooses so as to maximize “social 
utility.” Outside of a static context and absent the stringent assumptions of 
general competitive theory, it cannot be demonstrated that the pursuit of 
individual optimality results in a well-defi ned social optimum ( unless all that 
is meant by the latter is the process of individual optimization). As a corollary, 
however, one cannot apply static welfare criteria to demonstrate that there is 
suboptimality. 
 It is simply anachronistic to attribute modern welfare concepts to eight-
eenth- or even to most nineteenth-century writers. No such concepts existed 
then. Many modern interpreters apparently believe that Smith  et al. “must” 
have been groping toward modern welfare analysis, but lacked the necessary 
training in calculus to articulate their views. Nonetheless, careful reading of 
 The Wealth of Nations provides little support for the thesis that Smith was a 
crude neoclassical welfare theorist. 
 First, Smith wrote of advancing (not maximizing) the material well-being 
(not utility) of the common man (not society as a whole). He thus frequently 
advocated uncompensated property rights transfers, as when he recommended 
removing monopolistic trading privileges for the benefi t of consumers and to 
the detriment of the monopolists. 
 Second, Smith relied heavily (though not exclusively) on arguments in terms 
of rights and liberty. For example, he argued that
 [t]he property which every man has is his own labor, as it is the original 
foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable. 
The patrimony of a poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of his 
hand; and to hinder him from employing this strength and dexterity in 
what manner he thinks proper without injury to his neighbour, is a plain 
violation of this most sacred property. It is a manifest encroachment 
upon the fi rst liberty both of the workman, and those who might be dis-
posed to employ him. 
 (Smith,  1937 , pp. 121–2) 
 Smith’s argument is typical of the classical arguments for free and competitive 
markets. Competition would permit individuals to achieve those goals most 
important to them. For Smith, this would lead to the maximal attainable 
gain for most,  given side constraints of which individual liberty was the most 
important. He did not suggest that the result of this would conform to any 
particular, preconceived outcome of nonindividualist welfare criteria. 
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 Arguments in terms of liberty formed important parts of the classical lib-
eral case for competition. Liberty was valued both in its own right and for 
instrumental reasons. Paralleling the common law, liberal political economy 
justifi ed outcomes, at least in part, because they resulted from a system of 
voluntary trade and political freedom. 8 The  modus vivendi of  a process of 
free exchange and production created a presumption in its favor. Only if  this 
process were operative would we know what individuals valued most. In other 
words, the classical liberal argument for free exchange and competition – an 
argument inextricably intertwined with the classical political-economic case 
for competition – is a process argument. It is also a fundamentally different 
argument than modern ones in terms of optimality criteria and social utility 
maximization. 
 Our major point is not doctrine-historical but substantive. Any dynamic 
analysis of competition must have criteria alternative to those of static welfare 
theory. It would be strictly inconsistent to fall back on static welfare theory 
in assessing markets. Whatever can be claimed on their behalf  must depend 
on the alternative criteria. Elements of a normative analysis are presented in 
the next section. 
 Dynamic equilibrium 
 Theorists have traditionally utilized exact or deterministic equilibrium concepts. 
Indeterminism and unpredictability show up in fi tting or applying the concept 
and analysis to concrete problems. By emphasizing the unpredictability and 
indeterminateness of social process, we are not raising a new problem so 
much as proposing a new solution. As Coddington ( 1975 , p. 156) has said, 
“When it comes to being put to some use, the static method abandons its 
own formalization anyway. The choice then becomes less dramatic: between 
abandoning formalization openly or abandoning it in a surreptitious way.” 
We have argued above that our alternative approach would permit theorists to 
incorporate time and change in a meaningful way in models. 
 The passage of time makes it inevitable that some expectations will not be 
met, some plans not fulfi lled. Some disappointment of expectations and a 
degree of frustration in implementing plans are inevitable in any social sys-
tem. No set of policies or institutions can insulate us from the effects of time’s 
passing. The relevant question is how different institutions and policies affect 
individuals’ adaptations to unexpected outcomes. 
 Once we abandon the static framework, our theoretical and policy focus 
changes. For instance, owners of existing entitlements always prefer policies 
that insulate them as far as possible from the undesirable effects of a changing 
environment. These preferences may sometimes by justifi ed by a static analysis 
(e.g., by a favorable “equity-effi ciency” trade-off). These claims automatically 
carry diminished weight in a nonstatic framework. Policies protecting exist-
ing entitlements inhibit adaptation of agents to past and future changes. To 
the extent that this happens, the probability that a market participant chosen 
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at random will be able to fulfi ll his plans diminishes. Even those protected 
owners of current entitlements will fi nd adaptation in the future more, not 
less, diffi cult because of their seeking current protection. Thus, “sick” indus-
tries become sicker not better as they are protected more thoroughly. 9 
 As we saw in the previous chapter, exact coordination of individuals’ activ-
ities is not only practically impossible but also conceptually self-contradic-
tory. Acting takes place in real time, and, as time passes, agents learn and 
alter their behavior. Complete coordination of activities thus cannot be a 
state toward which social systems are moving. It is possible, however, to pos-
tulate a tendency toward  pattern coordination (a true dynamic equilibrium). 
This depends,  inter alia , on the degree to which typical features persist with 
the passage of time. If, on the contrary, there were  no typical features, then we 
could not speak of a tendency to equilibrium in any sense of the term. 
 Pattern coordination consists of coordination among the typical but not 
the unique aspects of individual behavior. In this context, two variants of a 
normative criterion suggest themselves. The fi rst variant ranks different pat-
tern equilibria, while the second deals with properties of the transition pro-
cess from one equilibrium to another. 
 With respect to the fi rst case, it is important to realize that any given instance 
of concrete behavior can be described in myriad ways. Many patterns of typ-
ical features can in principle be identifi ed in a set of actions. The same vector 
of actions can thus comprise numerous pattern equilibria. Some are, how-
ever, “better” from agents’ perspectives than others. To refer to the illustration 
of the previous chapter, Professor B may identify several patterns of his co-
author’s (Professor A’s) behavior. The realization that A comes into the offi ce 
on Mondays and Wednesdays may be a more useful insight than the fact that 
he carries his briefcase whenever he comes into the offi ce. Some pattern equi-
libria enable agents to coordinate their activities more effectively than others. 
To repeat, no form of pattern coordination will permit exact coordination of 
activities because there will always be unique features of events and actions. 
Our criterion of evaluation must, therefore, relate to the degree of coordin-
ation consistent with the  endogenous change within the system and thus with 
the existence of real time. 
 With respect to the second case, the criterion is essentially the same. Suppose 
that the system is exogenously shocked, so that the typical features of agents’ 
behavior change. In the movement from one pattern equilibrium to another, 
some attempts at coordination will be frustrated. The actions of A may be 
predicated on the no-longer-typical features of B’s behavior (and vice versa). 
Nonetheless, we can still assess the performance of an economic system on 
the basis of its adjustment to change. Here the criterion is the relative amount 
of coordination consistent with the system’s  exogenous change. 
 More concretely, we can attempt to base our judgments of various policies 
on the likelihood that a given change will result in a randomly chosen indi-
vidual’s fulfi lling his plans (Hayek,  1978 , pp. 183–4). This criterion has two 
interrelated features. First, some social systems or policies adapt to changes 
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with greater or lesser plan frustration. Second, other systems completely or 
partially block adaptation to change, thus also resulting in plan frustration. 
 We illustrate our point by referring again to the example of rent control. 
First, we argue for plan coordination as the preferable equilibrium concept. 
Second, we explain why a market-process approach requires adopting the 
concept of pattern rather than that of exact coordination. 
 The economically crucial effect of setting rents below market levels is surely 
 not that they create a market excess demand for housing. The crucial and 
more general effect of these controls involves their effect on plan coordin-
ation and market signaling of relative scarcity values. If  a public housing 
authority were created to supply the requisite housing units, then any excess 
demand would be temporary. Yet frustration and discoordination of plans 
would persist. We will show this fi rst by considering the standard case of no 
public housing, and then by considering the case in which excess demand is 
supplied governmentally. 
 After effective controls are imposed, housing services will be  temporarily in 
excess demand. Lessors and lessees cannot make their plans mesh. Over time, 
however, the housing stock will deteriorate until housing services supplied 
satisfy observed demand at the controlled rental prices. Even with market 
excess demand eliminated, plans continue to be frustrated, however, for rent-
ers cannot bid higher prices for the higher-quality units that they prefer. 10 
 Now we consider the case in which a public housing authority supplies 
the unsatisfi ed demand at controlled prices. Market excess demand is elimi-
nated in the long run, and plans are apparently fulfi lled. In reality, however, 
plan frustration (but not market excess demand) appears in other sectors 
and under other guises. Taxpayers must shoulder part of the housing cost of 
entitlement-holding tenants. Net taxpayers (i.e., those paying more in taxes 
than the value of subsidized housing received) must now curtail their planned 
consumption of other goods. Moreover, satisfaction of renters’ preferences 
will be more apparent than real. Renters will be satisfi ed with their existing 
housing stock only because they are unable to implement other plans, such 
as moving to more desirable areas. Entrepreneurs wishing to respond to price 
signals in nonhousing markets (e.g., in manufacturing) and workers wishing 
to take advantage of higher wages will be frustrated in their attempts to move 
to more desirable cities or regions by the infl exibility of the housing market. 
Eventually, these planned moves will be canceled and the best will be made 
of the current location. There is frustration and lack of coordination, but the 
market excess demand is eliminated. The state housing authority will perceive 
that it has “solved” the problem. Instead, it has  added to the discoordination 
of plans. This can be seen by considering why a region would be attractive to 
fi rms and workers. 
 Consumers’ preferences would be better satisfi ed by immigration of fi rms 
and individuals into the hypothetically more desirable region. Without this 
immigration, wants that could be satisfi ed will go unfulfi lled. Plans cannot be 
executed. The mechanism that would normally facilitate adaptations – rising 
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rental prices in growing regions – is rendered inoperative by the controls. 
There is probably no government with suffi cient command over resources to 
supply excess housing demand of a  mobile population (the source of infl ex-
ibility in the housing stock alluded to above). Even if  public housing author-
ities were able to draw on the necessary funds, no effective system of signaling 
and incentives exists to inform managers of the relative importance of differ-
ent housing demands. The very reason for the housing authority, the rent con-
trols, has eliminated market-generated signals (i.e., fl exible price changes). 11 
 Thus far we have been arguing the case for adopting plan coordination 
as the equilibrium concept. We now will explain the reasons for adopting a 
process approach and pattern coordination concept. The rent control case is 
vastly more complex than even we have made it thus far. Textbook analysis 
is misleading in a number of respects. For example, the New York City hous-
ing market has not yet fully adapted to a system of rent controls fi rst put in 
place during World War II. This situation certainly does not stem from the 
housing stock’s failure to deteriorate suffi ciently! Rather, controls generate a 
process of response, where each stage generates changes in the environment 
that cause further responses. In turn, market participants’ responses produce 
further political responses. Public choice theorists would (correctly) assure us 
that the political changes are endogenous to the system. This endogeneity can 
be best captured in a model of rent control incorporating a dynamic concep-
tion of time. 
 Each control breeds evasions of the control. Each evasion produces further 
changes in the market environment and additional adaptations. In the polit-
ical arena, those evasions produce demands for new controls, some of which 
are supplied. There is literally no end to this process so long as there are cal-
culating entrepreneurs, economic and political, who can profi t from existing 
opportunities. There simply is no static equilibrium to which anything will 
settle down. The rent control case is a prime example of how a process may 
never cease or stabilize. If  we were to predict the future course of events in the 
New York City housing market, we could predict only possible patterns. The 
only sure prediction is that the details will be upset endogenously. 
 For any applied problem, theorists can and do cut off  the analysis at a 
point at which they have reduced the unexplained phenomena to second-order 
effects. It is misleading, however, to suggest that they have identifi ed an equi-
librium, in the sense of a complete state of rest. They have just delimited an 
analytically convenient place to end one chapter of a story. What is a second-
order effect often becomes a fi rst-order problem subsequently. For instance, 
no analysis of the economics of converting rental units to cooperative apart-
ments (a legal form that is economically similar to condominium ownership) 
would be complete if  it did not relate the process to the longstanding system 
of rent controls in New York City. Yet such conversions belonged to the cat-
egory of second-order effects until comparatively recently. 
 Our process view is fully consonant with cutting off  analysis in accord with 
the problem at hand (writing “chapters” of analysis).  By not employing an 
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exact or deterministic equilibrium concept, however, we enhance the chance that 
related and dependent events will be seen as such, rather than as the product of 
unrelated exogenous shocks (such as the case of cooperative apartment con-
version and rent controls). This is one major advantage, as we see it, of aban-
doning the search for determinateness at the conceptual rather than at the 
application stage. 
 We agree that a  fruitful equilibrium concept is necessary for developing a 
systematic analysis. As we saw in the last chapter, equilibrium analysis is a 
type of causal reasoning. Causal reasoning about process in time differs from 
static analysis, however, and the equilibrium concept must change accord-
ingly. Maximal possible plan coordination is the most straightforward adap-
tation of the plan coordination concept to dynamic problems. Like any other 
normative economic criterion, this one leaves some issues unresolved. For 
instance, one could increase the likelihood that some plans would be fulfi lled 
by decreasing the likelihood that others will be fulfi lled. Likewise, one would 
presumably wish to minimize the chance that some plans, such as those of a 
would-be murderer, would be implemented. This is to recognize that the basic 
questions of right and wrong, of the justice of entitlements, and of the role 
of the private and governmental sectors must be resolved  before economic 
reasoning can be used in policy analysis. If  this fact is made more obvious by 
adopting the criterion of maximal plan coordination, so much the better. 
 Our claim here is that a well thought out economic analysis can contribute 
to public policy discussions. As in the rent control example, economic ana-
lysis may serve largely to clarify fact patterns for policy-makers. Indeed, the 
rent control case is a paradigmatic example of Arrow’s observation ( 1968 , 
p. 376) that 
 the notion that through the workings of an entire system effects may be 
very different from, and even opposed to, intentions is surely the most 
important intellectual contribution that economic thought has made to 
the general understanding of social processes. 
 More than any other modern school, Austrian subjectivists have consistently 
applied this insight to social processes. One’s attention is drawn to the 
unintended effects of human actions by systematically analyzing these as 
part of a process in time. Economic models in which agents foresee all events 
(even in a probabilistic sense) render unintelligible any concept of unintended 
consequences of human action. Insofar as models postulate perfect foresight, 
they obscure “the most important” contribution of the economic way of 
thinking. 
 We have argued that neoclassical economic theory misconceives the prob-
lems when it abstracts from the passage of real time, a tendency that has been 
particularly harmful in the theory of competition. In the next section, we 
develop our point further. We focus on the technique of assuming that agents 
engage in continuous utility maximization. We suggest that they cannot do 
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this in a world of uncertainty and changing knowledge. Not only is the requis-
ite knowledge for continuous utility maximization absent, but the techniques 
and institutions people actually use to cope with uncertainty are seriously 
misunderstood if  continuous utility maximization is assumed. We argue that 
agents follow rules and use institutions as a substitute for continuously choos-
ing at the margin. These rules and institutions are not themselves entirely the 
product of rational choice. We then briefl y relate our argument to some recent 
work on the theory of the fi rm. 
 Rules versus continuous utility maximization 
 Neoclassical attempts to explain rules in the widest sense, including customs, 
law and other institutionally embodied complexes of rules, are marred by 
consistent misdiagnosis. A single error characterizes much recent work on 
such varied topics as the theory of the fi rm, the effi ciency of legal rules and 
rules versus authority in monetary policy. In no other area does a subjectivist 
process approach yield such different conclusions from orthodox models and 
shed so much light on an important topic. 
 Any model that explains social rules solely in terms of maximizing behav-
ior fundamentally misconstrues the phenomena. Men follow a rule when they 
respond in the same way to perceptions of a recurrent pattern. They thereby 
exhibit regularity of behavior in typical situations. Rule-following behavior 
is the product, however, not of knowledge or omniscience but of ignorance. 
This is certainly true for the large class of social rules, examined here, which 
are the product of a process of evolution rather than maximization. 
 Superfi cially, it might appear that continuous utility maximization would 
also result in a pattern of decisions similar to rule-following behavior. 
Nevertheless, the opposite is the case. What makes an event “typical” is that it 
shares certain abstract properties with other events of this type. Nonetheless, 
events of a type or class differ in details, often signifi cantly. If, in fact, indi-
viduals were to know enough to discriminate among events of a class, then 
they would not follow rules or adopt consistent decision patterns in dealing 
with these events. Rule-following agents decide on the basis of the abstract 
properties of members of a class. When an agent knows enough about the 
details or particulars of a case, and of the differential effects of alternative 
decisions, then he decides not according to rules but on a “case-by-case” basis 
(or on “the merits of the case”). Case-by-case decisions involve treating simi-
lar cases differently, while rule-guided decisions involve treating similar cases 
identically. 
 The rule of law is perhaps the best illustration of our point. Stated simply, 
the rule requires judicial decision-makers to treat cases of the same class the 
same way (Leoni,  1961 , pp. 59–76). In adhering to a concept of the rule of 
law, judges are under no illusion that cases are all the same in every detail. 
Nor would most legal commentators deny that, in some sense, there may be 
a net social gain from occasionally relaxing a rule. The practical problem is 
that, while we know that there are probably cases in which (for instance) it 
Competition and discovery 155
would be better not to punish the guilty, we can never know concretely which 
cases conform to this hypothetical situation. What jurists and legal commen-
tators have discovered is that in the preponderance of cases justice is served by 
consistent application of relevant rules. And similarly for rules generally. 
 Rules evolve and are adopted because they work, whether these be rules of 
justice or of procedure within a fi rm. In the case of evolved rules of conduct 
or behavior, people obeying the rule often do not know why they work. In 
many cases, they may not even be aware that they are following a rule. Rule-
following behavior precedes knowledge of this behavior. Understanding this 
behavior and being able to articulate or rationalize the rule is an even later 
development. 
 To be able to articulate why rules work presupposes more knowledge about 
the processes governed by rules than rule followers often can or do have. 
Justice is much more diffi cult to articulate than it is to practice. Were individ-
uals to know enough to rationalize a rule, they would generally know enough 
to abandon it. If, for example, we had a scientifi c explanation (theory) of what 
a successful monetary rule accomplishes, we could in principle dispense with 
the rule. Indeed, monetarists emphasize this point in defending their money-
stock rule. It is  ignorance of  the lag structure that necessitates adoption of a 
monetary rule. 
 The aforementioned character of rules derives from their being evolved. 
Without doing violence to the phenomena, we cannot conceive of evolved 
rules and institutions as the product of a maximization process. We reject 
maximization models here for two interrelated reasons. First, agents arrive 
at patterns of action through a trial and error process. Successful procedures 
are adopted and unsuccessful ones are rejected. More precisely, those agents 
who do not adopt successful rules cannot adapt to the relevant environment. 
In a market situation, this would mean losses and eventual forced withdrawal 
from the unsuccessful activity. Individuals stumble upon rules unconsciously, 
and, to repeat, are often unaware that they have done so. Not only do rules 
involve tacit knowledge, but their adoption is also often tacit. Maximization 
models cannot incorporate this insight. Hayek stated the issue concisely:
 Man acted before he thought and did not understand before he acted. 
What we call understanding is in the last resort simply his capacity to 
respond to his environment with a pattern of actions that help him to 
persist. Such is the modicum of truth in behaviorism and pragmatism, 
doctrines which, however, have so crudely oversimplifi ed the deter-
mining relationships as to become more obstacles than helps to their 
appreciation. 
 (Hayek,  1973 , p. 18) 12 
 Our second reason for rejecting maximizing models as explanations of 
evolved rules relates to the optimality of  these rules. The outcomes of 
evolutionary processes will not generally be optimal in any nontrivial 
sense of  the term. There is no “rule set” from which we draw. Evolved 
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rules are not the product of  choices over known alternative rules. Rule-
governed behavior is the unintended outcome of  trial and error procedures. 
As in biological evolution, starting along one evolutionary path closes off  
options. In a trial and error procedure, knowledge of  alternatives is often 
gained only as they are tried. The “choosing” of  a rule is consequently 
done without knowledge of  alternative rules. Indeed, adopting one rule 
diminishes the likelihood that the adopter will learn about the alternatives. 
To adopt a rule is to regularize behavior, and to abandon further trial 
and error activities along certain lines. “Workable,” not “optimal,” is the 
appropriate modifi er for evolved rules. 13 
 If  our analysis is correct, then the question of the “effi ciency” of eco-
nomic, political and legal rules must be reconsidered. 14 Such rules represent 
the framework within which rational or maximizing behavior takes place. The 
adoption of such frameworks is itself  not always the product of a maximiz-
ing procedure. It is, then, not so much an error as a misnomer to talk of 
the “effi ciency” of political, legal and market rules and of rule-based insti-
tutions. Given these rules, we may analyze the effi ciency of choices. But the 
rules themselves are adopted, at least in part, by an  a-rational process. To sup-
pose that, for instance, the legal framework is the product of rational choice 
only pushes back the question of the framework within which  that choice was 
made. One would eventually be led into an infi nite regress, a problem avoided 
by adopting an evolutionary approach to rules and institutions. 
 “Economic imperialism” is widely interpreted as the application of continu-
ous utility maximization models to all human problems. If  carried through, 
this approach will yield not knowledge but the pretence of knowledge. By 
claiming more for the theory of maximizing behavior than it can deliver, econ-
omists will only put their theory into disrepute in those situations for which 
it is well suited. In pointing this out, we are only suggesting that economists 
take their own protestations seriously. Economics analyzes marginal adjust-
ments. We surely can explain the effects of changes in constraints on institu-
tions at the margin; this, however, is not suffi cient to generate a complete 
social theory of institutions. Likewise, we may feel confi dent of the effects 
of economic factors on voting; this does not, however, imply that economics 
yields a deterministic theory of voting. 
 The theory of the fi rm 
 In this chapter, we have outlined a subjectivist theory of competition. We 
highlighted a few topics on which subjectivism casts new light. We also 
attempted to indicate how concretely a subjectivist analysis might differ from 
standard formulations. At this point, we would like to focus on a subject 
of signifi cant interest to economists in recent years: the theory of the fi rm. 
Surprisingly, there is no subjectivist or Austrian theory of the fi rm. This is 
true even though the subjectivist approach is particularly appropriate for 
analyzing fi rms as evolved social institutions. The absence of a subjectivist 
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theory of the fi rm is even more remarkable, since Coase’s ( 1937 ) article has a 
subjectivist fl avor. 
 The theory of the fi rm encompasses the question of both why fi rms exist 
and how they behave given that they exist. With respect to the fi rst question, 
the situation as fi rst described by Coase ( 1937 ) still represents the classic state-
ment of the problem:
 An economist thinks of the economic system as being coordinated by the 
price mechanism and society becomes not an organization but an organ-
ism. The economic system “works itself.” This does not mean that there is 
no planning by individuals. These exercise foresight and choose between 
alternatives. This is necessarily so if  there is to be order in the system. But 
this theory assumes that the direction of resources is dependent directly 
on the price mechanism. Indeed, it is often considered to be an objection 
to economic planning that it merely tries to do what is already done by 
the price mechanism. 
 (Coase,  1937 , p. 387) 
 The  existence of  fi rms represents a paradox for formal economic theory 
because it represents “nonprice planning.” This paradox derives from the 
exclusive reliance of the theory on prices to allocate resources, a reliance 
we criticized above. In Coase’s analysis, individuals compare the costs of 
using the price system to the costs of nonprice planning. Firms represent 
nonprice market institutions within which decisions are made and resources 
allocated. On the market, there is an “optimum” amount of this nonprice 
planning (Coase,  1937 , p. 389 n.). The limit to vertical integration is set by 
the calculational chaos that may infect nonprice planning. If, for instance, the 
market for an input were to disappear entirely through vertical integration, 
then all fi rms using the input would be caught in an economic calculation 
problem. There would be no market to yield transfer prices within the fi rm. 
The fi rms could no longer calculate profi ts and losses in this line of activity 
(Rothbard,  1970 , II, pp. 554–60). 
 We have long found Coase’s approach to the existence of fi rms congenial. 
It incorporates the essential conclusion of the economic calculation debate. 
That is, calculation of profi ts and losses is impossible without competitive 
markets for inputs. Gains from hierarchical organizations can be captured 
only so long as they do not completely eliminate factor markets. Coase’s 
approach is an excellent static conceptualization of the problem. 15 
 The Coasean solution does not, however, address the question of fi rm 
behavior in response to change. Neoclassical production deals with this issue 
but does so in “Newtonian time.” Subjectivists cannot be comfortable with 
the theory, but they have not offered a substitute approach. We believe, how-
ever, that Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter ( 1982 ) have given us the elem-
ents of a dynamic theory of the fi rm. In effect, they apply a Hayekian theory 
of rules and evolved market institutions to fi rm behavior. Their explicit debt 
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is to Schumpeter, but to exactly those parts of the Schumpeterian system that 
have most in common with the work of Menger and Hayek. 
 Nelson and Winter view fi rms as generated by an evolutionary process. 
Existing fi rms can be best explained by reference to prior adaptations of the 
environment. This adaptation is revealed as rule-following behavior, or “rou-
tines” in their terminology. Routines characterizing fi rm behavior correspond 
to genes in biology. A fi rm’s routine largely but not completely determines its 
behavior, as well as its ability to cope with environmental change. Thus, fi rms 
adapt to the environment in different ways. The way in which they adapt may 
determine their survival characteristics for future environmental changes. If  a 
fi rm’s routine is inappropriate to a changing environment, and the fi rm does 
not hit on a new routine quickly enough, it will be “selected out,” i.e., may 
suffer losses and disappear. 16 
 We read Nelson and Winter as avoiding the pitfall of taking the evolution-
ary analogy too literally. Entrepreneurs can consciously alter their fi rm’s rou-
tine, as can human and some nonhuman species. There is also a Lamarckian 
element in their story; acquired characteristics are inheritable. 
 An important advantage of  Nelson and Winter’s approach is the ease with 
which the entrepreneur is integrated into the analysis. Indeed, the entrepre-
neur is absolutely indispensable to their story. He is a force for change but 
is not the product of   ad hoc theorizing. He disturbs fi rms’ routines by chan-
ging the environment. In turn, conscious entrepreneurial adaptation to a 
changing environment is sometimes the only way a fi rm, locked into a now-
inappropriate routine, may survive. Entrepreneurial innovation may result 
eventually in a new routine, an adaptation to the new environment. Nelson 
and Winter focus their analysis on innovation, invention and the upsetting 
of  fi rm routines. 
 Clearly, much more work needs to be done on a subjectivist or Austrian 
theory of fi rm behavior. Any theory along these lines must take seriously the 
Menger-Hayek distinction between designed and undesigned social institu-
tions. Certainly, fi rm owners attempt to maximize their profi ts through the 
vehicle of their fi rms. The pattern of fi rm survival and the character of surviv-
ing fi rms is not simply the result, however, of conscious planning and rational 
profi t-maximization. The industrial landscape refl ects both the results of con-
scious planning and the unintended consequences of entrepreneurial inter-
action in the marketplace. (Firms do not, for instance, normally plan their 
own demise.) We fi nd an evolutionary approach like Nelson and Winter’s to 
be attractive because it allows for both planning and profi t-maximization, 
and unplanned consequences. Entrepreneurs can, to some extent, infl uence 
their environment and affect the fortunes of their fi rms. But fi rms are ultim-
ately either “selected” or not. Evolutionary forces in the environment refl ect 
the unplanned consequences of others’ actions (both purchasers of a fi rm’s 
products and competitive fi rms). 
 Though consciously an essay in Schumpeterian economics, Nelson and 
Winter’s work may have the unintended consequences of providing a building 
Competition and discovery 159
block for a subjectivist theory of the fi rm. In any case, their work exempli-
fi es the sharp contrast between neoclassical theory and one incorporating the 
effects of the passage of time. Their contribution is a fi rst step toward an 
alternative theory of the fi rm. More generally, it offers an approach to mod-
eling institutional change. 
 Appendix: stochastic equilibrium 
 In modeling learning, change, error and expectations, theorists increasingly 
employ the concept of a stochastic equilibrium. In such models, there is an 
underlying stochastic process generating the data. Expectations of rational 
agents will tend to the mathematically expected value. “Learning” involves 
updating of priors until the subjective probability distribution conforms to 
this objective probability distribution. Apparent forecast error is optimal. 
Since information is costly to acquire, it does not pay agents to acquire more 
information about the underlying stochastic process. There is variance in the 
outcomes, but experienced errors in forecasts will not lead agents to revise 
their optimal forecasts or to alter their behavior. 
 Some of our misgivings with this approach were stated above in reference 
to Hahn’s “learning functions.” In the dynamic or pattern equilibrium that 
we have articulated, there is genuine learning. The competitive market pro-
cess is a never-ending learning process. In an explicitly evolutionary theory 
this learning is captured in the process of adaptation and innovation. There 
is no learning in a stationary stochastic equilibrium (Hahn,  1973 , pp. 18–20; 
Littlechild,  1977 , pp. 6–8). 
 Similarly, “imperfections” in the market process do not necessarily arise 
from participants’ choosing an “optimal level” of error. The errors on which 
we are focusing  arise from the very attempt to arrive at individual adjustment to 
the environment . They are unintended and unplanned consequences of individ-
uals’ actions and interactions. These market errors or imperfections may take 
the form of “too much” product heterogeneity, as fi rms try to discover and 
satisfy consumer tastes. The errors may also show up as poorly invested capital 
( Chapter 8 and  Chapter 9 ). In our theory, agents will be dissatisfi ed with out-
comes, will revise expectations and will alter their behavior in the face of error. 
Error is part of the very market process itself, part of the stimulus to further 
adjustments. In general equilibrium models, none of this should occur, since 
all observed error is “optimal.” At the descriptive level, we think our frame-
work provides a better understanding of a wide range of phenomena, from 
the behavior of fi rms on competitive markets to agents’ desperate attempts to 
cope with “ragged (uneven) infl ation.” At the normative level, our approach 
and that of neoclassical economics frequently generates diametrically opposed 
policy prescriptions. We examine some of these in the next chapter. 
 As noted above, neoclassical models to which we are referring postulate 
an underlying objective stochastic process. This assumption is very helpful if  
one is studying Brownian motion, the decay of radioactive particles, and, to a 
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lesser extent, the weather. Social science surely must also take account of how 
physical processes affect human decisions. But there is no given, underlying 
process to which individuals must conform. In an open system, the process 
itself  is largely the product of individuals’ tastes, aspirations and expectations. 
They help make this “objective” process whatever it is. It is not something 
entirely apart from human beings, but is partly of their creation. In forming 
expectations, they are not guessing about the collision of heavenly bodies. 
They are forming expectations about other individuals forming expectations 
about them, and so forth, as in the classic Keynesian beauty contest example. 
Every shift in their expectations changes others’ expectations, thereby chan-
ging the data. There may be no unique, objective value to which expectations 
“ought to” conform. Sometimes there may be such an “objective” value, as 
in the cycle of weather and crop failures; other times there may not be, as in 
certain aspects of infl ationary expectations. 
 As in a number of  other areas, we are not claiming that there are no 
applications of  stochastic equilibrium in economics. Our objection is to the 
implied assumption that it is the one, uniquely correct way of  understanding 
informational issues, even if  the approach does violence to the phenomena 
itself. For instance, in their effort to explain learning, neoclassical economists 
are one step short of  “proving” that there is no error in the world. Before 
falling with them into this abyss, we may want to step back and consider 
alternatives. 
 Notes 
 1  “ Man wants liberty to become the man he wants to become . He does so precisely 
because he does not know what man he will want to become in time. Let us remove 
once and for all the instrumental defense of liberty, the only one that can possibly 
be derived directly from orthodox economic analysis. Man does not want liberty in 
order to maximize his utility, or that of the society of which he is a part.  He wants 
liberty to become the man he wants to become ” (Buchanan,  1979 , p. 112). 
 2  Kirzner ( 1973 ,  1979a ) emphasizes entrepreneurial discovery of existing opportun-
ities. Shackle ( 1979 ) emphasizes entrepreneurial creativity; entrepreneurial actions 
themselves make the profi t opportunities. 
 3  Lucas ( 1975 ) is one conspicuous exception. 
 4  Hurwicz ( 1973 ) provides a useful bibliography up to the early 1970s. Recent work 
includes Grossman ( 1976 ,  1977 ) and Grossman and Stiglitz ( 1976 ), which also con-
tain partial bibliographies. See also O’Driscoll ( 1981 ). 
 5  The importance of contractual and nonprice constraints in competitive markets 
arose in  Chicago Board of Trade v. United States , 246 U.S. 231 (1918). Apparently 
the court did not understand that price restraints could, at least in principle, foster 
competition. We would have to examine this case more carefully to make a defi ni-
tive judgment. But it does seem to represent an example of our point here. See the 
interesting discussion in Bork ( 1978 , pp. 41–7). 
 6  Menger ( 1963 , p. 146) perceived the basic question of all social sciences as, “how 
can it be that the institutions which serve the common welfare and are extremely 
signifi cant for its development can come into being without a common will directed 
towards establishing them?” Marx’s conception of social science was, of course, 
similar to Menger’s. 
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 7  We submit that Hahn is logically in error in this argument. Arrow and Debreu 
have given us  suffi cient conditions for the attainment of competitive equilibrium. 
Hahn’s argument would be strictly correct only if  the Arrow-Debreu conditions 
were  necessary (see the discussion in  Chapter 5 ). 
 8  See Epstein ( 1982 , p. 55) on the common law system’s concern with private prop-
erty, individual liberty and corrective justice: “The initial ethical premise of 
the system is that possession is the root of  title, or that taking possession of  an 
unowned thing is prima facie evidence of  individual ownership, as lawyers say, in 
a fee. The rule is stated as a presumption that can be rebutted only by a person 
whose earlier possession gives rise to a higher title.” Justice depends, then, on the 
process producing ownership, and not on presumed benefi ts of  the pattern of 
ownership of  property. 
 9  Two examples come to mind. Milk price supports (and agricultural price supports 
generally) have not solved or alleviated farm problems, but have perpetuated and 
even exacerbated them. Current problems of US steel producers have a history 
going back to nineteenth-century protective tariffs. Each round of protection cre-
ates more dependency on existing and future protection. 
 10  Here and in what follows, one could recast our analysis in terms of “notional” 
excess demands. We have no desire to quibble over words. Our substantive point 
would remain:  even when there is no effective excess demand, plans may  be frus-
trated . This point is recognized in macroeconomics; see Clower ( 1965 ). 
 11  A more complete property rights analysis could demonstrate that managers of  the 
housing authority would not be as likely to respond to market signals as would 
entrepreneurs who could appropriate the profi ts of  correct decisions. Our case is 
not entirely hypothetical. We understand that the extensive and longstanding sys-
tem of rent controls has inhibited regional growth and mobility in Great Britain. 
 12  Friedman has argued that “natural selection” explanations and continuous utility 
maximization explanations are complements rather than substitutes. Thus, suc-
cessful fi rms are selected by the market. But as theorists we can suppose that it is 
“as if” fi rms are conscious profi t-maximizers (Friedman,  1953 ). Langlois effect-
ively refutes Friedman’s position. He argues that it is dubious methodologically, 
and, building on Sidney Winter’s work, points out that profi t-maximizers who 
are best adapted to an equilibrium state may be selected out during the equili-
bration process. Survivors might then not be true “optimizers” (Langlois,  1982a , 
pp. 19–22). 
 13  Our anthropomorphic language presents a barrier in discussing evolutionary proc-
esses. In speaking of “adopting” a rule, we do not wish to imply conscious choice 
by the adopter; quite the contrary. 
 14  Such a reconsideration was started in a special volume of the  Journal of Legal 
Studies , to which both of us contributed (March 1980). 
 15  None of what we have said here is intended as an implicit criticism of Alchian and 
Demsetz’s theory of the fi rm ( 1972 ), which we view as dealing with one aspect of 
the fi rm. This aspect is not of particular concern to us here. 
 16  A distinction between the maximizing and evolutionary approaches can be illus-
trated in this case. If  there is a “correct” adaptation to the new environment, 
rationality and profi t-maximization are invoked to ensure that the fi rm will sur-
vive. The evolutionary approach supposes no such thing. For instance, a fi rm may 
not survive environmental change even were it true that an infi nitely long search 
would ensure its survival and even prosperity. The evolutionary approach thus 
implicitly incorporates the passage of real time, which in this case incorporates 
cash and other relevant constraints. Trial and error discovery takes time, and fi rms 
may run out of resources before they discover a profi table response to change. 
Optimization models do not incorporate real time. Thus constraints such as liquid-
ity constraints, which operate in real time, are ignored. See  note 12 (above). 
 
 7  The political economy of competition 
and monopoly 
 The “order” of the market emerges  only from the  process of  voluntary exchange 
among participating individuals. The “order” is, itself, defi ned as the outcome 
of the  process that generates it. The “it,” the allocation-distribution result, 
does not, and cannot, exist independently of the trading process. Absent this 
process, there is and can be no “order.” 
 James M. Buchanan ( 1982b , p. 5) 
 Competition: static and dynamic 
 In the previous chapter, we analyzed the sources and effects of unexpected 
change on behavior. Regardless of recent attention paid to particular issues 
or problems of dynamic competition (e.g., advertising), economic theorists 
still employ static analysis of competition and monopoly. Our critique is 
directed less to the fruitful positive analysis of competition and monopoly 
developed in recent years, and more toward conventional normative analysis. 
We fi nd congenial much of the recent positive analysis of regulation, antitrust 
and competitive practices. This work includes,  inter alia , the “Chicago School 
of Antitrust” (Posner,  1979 ), the UCLA-Chicago tradition in industrial 
organization, and the “New Institutionalism.” Indeed, some of our own work 
belongs in these areas. 
 Even in this recent work, however, the normative analysis is less appealing 
than the positive economics. Normative analysis remains essentially static, 
even when the positive analysis is dynamic. Normative implications are drawn 
on the presupposition that the market process quickly achieves a preexisting 
or predetermined equilibrium position (Reder,  1982 , pp. 11–13). There is a 
postulated ontological order, dictated by tastes, opportunities, etc., toward 
which markets converge rapidly. In the epigraph for this chapter, Professor 
Buchanan criticized this presupposition. The view criticized there embodies 
the fallacy of conceptual realism: the belief  that mental constructs and purely 
hypothetical states have an existence in reality. 
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 There are generally many possible orders or equilibria, depending on 
the operative institutional processes. Different processes and institutional 
arrangements are not merely better or worse mechanisms for arriving at the 
 same given end points. Rather, different institutions and attendant processes 
generate different orders. No one of these needs to be the “correct,” “true,” or 
“optimal” order or outcome. There is no institutional or process-independent 
order, such as is suggested by relating equilibrium positions to tastes, endow-
ments and transformation possibilities (i.e., “data”). That is, there is no order 
defi ned apart from the process generating it. 
 There are, however, systematic relationships between outcomes and proc-
esses producing them (Sowell,  1980 , pp. 98–100 and  passim ). “Systematic” 
does not mean deterministic. Particular features or aspects of social outcomes 
may be attainable by a number of processes. Policies infl uencing one outcome 
or feature will not, however, leave other things constant. Nor do they leave the 
process itself  unaffected. 
 Systematic criticism of outcomes logically involves criticism of the pro-
cess producing those outcomes. Similarly, approval of a process producing an 
order entails approval of the resultant order. For instance, one cannot con-
sistently approve of markets as allocational mechanisms, while objecting to 
distributional results. In objecting to market outcomes, one is in reality object-
ing to market processes. In upholding a different allocational-distributional 
outcome, one is implicitly upholding a different social process. Conversely, 
sanctioning a social process or mechanism, like the market, logically entails 
approval of the outcomes (Rawls,  1963 , p. 102). “Social choice” involves sim-
ultaneous choice of means and affi rmation of ends or outcomes. 
 Uncertainty and markets 
 We have argued that economic problems arise only in consequence of 
unexpected change, i.e., change relative to expectations. In characterizing 
a disturbance as “unexpected,” we focus precisely on those events for 
which no probability distribution can be meaningfully postulated. Richard 
Langlois has recently clarifi ed the issue in question by distinguishing 
between structural and parametric knowledge. In neoclassical economics, 
“uncertainty” refers to situations in which agents know the structure of  the 
problem but are unsure of  the exact value of  one or more parameters. As 
Arrow phrased it, 
 Uncertainty means that we do not have a complete description of the 
world which we fully believe to be true. Instead, we consider the world 
to be in one or another of a range of states. Each state of the world is a 
description which is complete for all relevant purposes. Our uncertainty 
consists in not knowing which state is the true one. 
 (Arrow,  1974 , p. 33–4) 
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 As Langlois has observed:
 The agent is implicitly presumed to have an exhaustive list of possible 
actions and states of the world and, equally importantly, a mean/ends 
framework relating the actions and states of the world to his utility. We 
might say that the agent has certain knowledge of the structure of the 
problem he faces or, to put it another way, that he has perfect  structural 
knowledge. Imperfections in that agent’s knowledge extend only to spe-
cifi c parameters of the problem … He may have imperfect  parametric 
knowledge, but never imperfect structural knowledge; he may acquire 
parametric information, but never structural information. 
 (Langlois,  1984 , p. 29) 
 In our terminology, the agent may know typical features but simply be 
unable to list all possible unique features (see Loasby,  1976 , p. 9). He faces an 
open-ended problem for one of two reasons. First, he may have no relevant 
experience on the basis of which he could calculate probabilities of outcomes. 
This situation is characteristic of unique features. Second, the possibilities 
and their likelihood are not independent of his actions and those of other 
agents. We have previously emphasized the fact that economic “data” are not 
objective, in the sense of being independent of human volition and action. 
Unless one believes in the strictest form of philosophical determinism, this 
ensures a realm of true uncertainty in human affairs. The imperfection in 
knowledge is structural and not merely parametric. 
 As argued in the last chapter, behavioral regularity results not from con-
tinuous utility maximization but from rule-following. Rule-following behav-
ior refl ects, in turn, a high degree of genuine uncertainty, not certainty. 
Continuous utility maximization under uncertainty would produce unpre-
dictable results. These results are contrary to conventional wisdom, but this 
wisdom is not the product of systematic analysis. In a recent article, Ronald 
Heiner ( 1983 ) subjected the conventional wisdom to systematic analysis and 
sided with the position being articulated here. He observed that
 [i]n the special case of no uncertainty, the behavior of perfectly informed, 
fully optimizing agents responding with complete fl exibility to every per-
turbation in their environment would not produce easily recognizable 
patterns, but rather would be extremely diffi cult to predict. Thus, it is in 
the limits to maximizing behavior that we will fi nd the origin of predict-
able behavior. 
 (Heiner,  1983 , p. 561) 
 Decision-makers face the greatest risk of loss (and gain) when forced to adopt 
new behavioral rules. The adoption of new rules is a discrete, time-consuming 
learning process, which not all agents complete successfully. We offer the 
following example to illustrate our point. Good economic theory predicted 
the general (typical) effects of deregulating airfare:  ceteris paribus, real airline 
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tariffs would fall; better resource allocation would result. Careful analysis 
would also have predicted an industry shake-out. Cartel prices produce excess 
capacity. With deregulation, excess capacity would predictably be employed 
providing services that cover incremental but not full costs. In the long run, 
excess capacity would be removed. Real airfare would rise again, though to 
a level below the old regulated price. In simple diagrammatic terms  P c was 
the cartel price,  P m the market or competitive price, and  P e the temporarily 
depressed price refl ecting excess capacity (see  Figure III.2 ). 
 Airlines have had great diffi culty in coping with the transition from a regu-
lated to a competitive environment, in part because most of it took place dur-
ing one of the most severe of postwar recessions. It is also true however that, 
to all intents and purposes, airlines had always been regulated. Behavioral 
rules were geared to survival in a regulated cartel environment. Being the 
fi rst transportation industry to be deregulated, the airlines had nothing to 
imitate. The actual experience under deregulation proved surprising to many 
observers, supporters and opponents of deregulation alike. Among other 
things, opponents feared the demise of services to small communities. This 
fear was effectively translated into protection for such services. Deregulation 
proponents argued that any loss of services would be a price worth paying 
for improved resource allocation. Few questioned, however, that small com-
munity services would not be viable. There was little experience with the eco-
nomics of such service in a deregulated environment. 1 Critics and supporters 
of deregulation alike were proved wrong, as small operators picked up and 
sometimes expanded small community services heretofore provided by major 
carriers. “Commuter” lines are the fastest growing segment of the industry. 
 At the onset of deregulation, it was generally believed that carriers could 
maximize profi ts by fl ying wide-bodied aircraft with high-density seating on 
well-traveled routes (such as New York–Los Angeles). Based on accumulated 
knowledge and experience in the industry, there was every reason to expect this 
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to be a successful strategy. Yet, the very carriers adopting this strategy (e.g., 
United Airlines) fared relatively poorly. On the other hand, Piedmont, a regional 
carrier, is among the most profi table airlines. Its strategy consists of connecting 
medium-sized cities on routes of 300–600 miles, utilizing smaller jet aircraft. 2 
 Airline deregulation illustrates an important implication of the evolution-
ary theory of the fi rm. Environmental change renders much accumulated 
knowledge obsolete. Airlines are now engaged in a trial and error process of 
discovering and adapting to a new environment. For instance, United Airlines, 
which had abandoned short “feeder-routes” in favor of longer “high-density” 
routes, is now reversing its strategy. And it is imitating low-cost interlopers 
with its cut-rate “Friendship Express” service. 3 
 The modern evolutionary theory of the fi rm must, however, be distin-
guished from nineteenth-century views of evolution. These emphasized grad-
ualism of evolutionary change, summarized in Marshall’s dictum (borrowed 
from Darwin):  natura non facit saltum. For gradual changes, much of our 
analysis might seem inapplicable or exaggerated. Modern biology now recog-
nizes, however, that evolutionary change is often sudden if  not catastrophic. 
Biologists, who borrowed the concept of evolution from eighteenth-century 
political economy, have now progressed beyond their social science brethren. 
 Consider the neoclassical production function. In a world of real time, con-
ventional characterizations of the production function are misleading: “The 
production possibility set is a description of the state of the fi rm’s knowledge 
about the possibilities of transforming commodities” (Arrow and Hahn, 
 1971 , p. 53). This is an inadequate representation of what fi rms know at any 
given moment. As time passes, technology changes. Firms acquire informa-
tion about “segments” of various different production functions. They thus 
know more than could be provided by learning about any one opportunity 
set. Yet they know less than is suggested by static analysis. They experience 
only limited ranges of any particular production function, never the complete 
production set (Nelson and Winter,  1982 , pp. 59–65). 
 We illustrate the practical import of this by considering the effects of a 
disturbance or innovation. Firms will not move costlessly and immediately to 
the profi t-maximizing point on the relevant production function. In the ensu-
ing selection process, some fi rms will be eliminated. Some of the losers may 
be fi rms that, if  they had survived, would have been low-cost producers (ibid., 
pp. 128–9). If  all such change were anticipated, it would be pointless and 
misleading to talk about “disturbances,” much less to analyze the adjustment 
process. Firms would anticipate and already would have adapted optimally 
to the change. Indeed, neoclassical economic theory has diffi culty explaining 
why fi rms (i.e., asset-owning organizations), as opposed to lines of commerce, 
would ever disappear. In anticipating environmental change, fi rms would 
shed unprofi table lines of commerce and enter new ones. Personal comput-
ers would be the product of fi rms formerly engaged in making quill pens. 
In this world swift application of Occam’s Razor would eliminate evolution-
ary analysis in favor of the hypothesis of continuous utility maximization. 
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Neoclassical theorists are perhaps inclined to reject evolutionary theorizing 
precisely because it appears superfl uous. And it is superfl uous in a world of 
zero information costs. If  one does not assume zero information costs, how-
ever, then the conclusions of the evolutionary approach cannot be ignored. 
 Long-run assumptions suffuse standard analyses. Even when economists 
ostensibly employ short-run analysis, they implicitly assume away informa-
tional problems. Transactors are viewed as adapting perfectly and costlessly 
to postulated disturbances. Standard analytical tools and procedures impose 
these assumptions on problems. Indeed, our critique is directed less at what 
is stated formally and openly in textbook and applied analysis, and more at 
what is implicit and hidden. 
 We offer a vivid illustration of a piece of positive analysis that surrepti-
tiously employs a long-run equilibrium assumption to deal with a short-run 
adjustment problem. In that analysis, Professor Stigler “tested” the propos-
ition that fi rms generally produce under conditions of constant cost (Stigler, 
 1966 , pp. 141–4). He did this by investigating fi rms’ responses to changing 
demand conditions (see  Figure III.3 ). Confronted by falling demand for their 
products, fi rms with constant costs over a wide range ( MC A ) would respond 
by shutting down. Firms with rising costs over a wide range ( MC B ) would cut 
back output but continue operating. Stigler found that output restrictions by 
existing fi rms dominated plant closings. He accordingly concluded that  MC B 
better approximates industrial cost conditions than  MC A . 
 What Stigler actually did was conduct a multiple test of (1) cost condi-
tions, (2) price-taking behavior and (3) equilibrium conditions. He implicitly 
assumed that competitive fi rms facing constant long-run costs would also face 
constant short-run costs, as well as be price-takers outside of long-run equi-
librium. Arrow ( 1959 ) has demonstrated the implausibility of the second and 
third conditions. Without bringing in most of the considerations already dis-
cussed, we could adduce an explanation more plausible than Stigler’s. Let us 
fi rst stipulate that in fact cutbacks predominate over shutdowns. We assume, 
however, that,  à la Arrow, fi rms confront downward-sloping demand curves in 
 Figure III.3  Firm behavior 
P
P i  
P  2
O Q
m c b m c a
168 The economics of time and ignorance
the short run. We can then explain the empirical results, even in situations in 
which marginal costs were constant across all runs. Our hypothesis is accord-
ingly more robust than Stigler’s, since it applies to situations of both constant 
and increasing costs. Further, we can illuminate why even competitive fi rms 
might keep prices constant in the face of falling demand (a phenomenon not 
without examples). This latter would occur, for instance, in the case of linear 
demand curves and constant costs, if  demand changed equiproportionately 
at every price. 
 Perfect-adaptation models are implausible, yet economists adhere to them. 
Often, they do so because the alternative appears to be theoretical nihilism. 
Since nihilism is not the alternative, it is time to reexamine an essentially 
untenable position. 
 Optimal policy 
 Standard welfare economics deduces a set of conditions that must be satisfi ed in 
order for there to be optimal resource allocation (Baumol,  1965 , pp. 356ff.). Stated 
most generally, these conditions demand equality at the margin of social benefi ts 
and costs. This approach is applied to such issues as externalities, monopolies 
and tariffs. Under idealized conditions, markets yield an optimal allocation of 
resources. If the unfettered operation of markets produces a divergence between 
social benefi ts and costs, be it in the form of externality, monopolistic output 
restriction, or whatever, this is attributed to “market failure.” 
 The theory of economic policy prescribes three main approaches to deal-
ing with market failure: taxation, regulation and antitrust. There is usually a 
choice between two of these general approaches. For instance, antitrust policy 
is largely inapplicable to externality problems. Similarly, though a few obser-
vers have proposed using tax policy to infl uence monopolists, policy-mak-
ers generally weigh choices between regulation and antitrust for monopoly 
problems. 
 For most major questions, there is a large literature on choice of policy 
instruments. There is also typically a substantial literature on various meth-
ods of implementing a particular policy, e.g., taxation. Within and among 
alternatives, the criteria applied to policy choices are those of general equilib-
rium welfare theory. Policy judgments are typically made on the basis of pre-
sumed differences in informational requirements and transactions costs. This 
literature frequently begs important questions and exaggerates the differences 
among the three policy approaches. We argue our position by reference to two 
concrete examples: control of pollution, and control of monopoly. 
 Pollution 
 Ronald Coase ( 1960 ) challenged the Pigovian policy of using taxes and 
subsidies to control pollution, arguing that taxation of externalities would 
not generally result in optimal resource allocation. He criticized reasoning 
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that presumes producers of externalities cause costly interactions and ought 
automatically to be taxed. “Victims” of pollution may in practice be least-cost 
avoiders of harm. In setting a tax at an apparently optimal level, authorities 
may thus effect an uneconomic use of resources. Coase focused here on the 
information requirements for implementing optimal policy. He suggested 
that preferred solutions generally arise when parties negotiate among 
themselves to rearrange property titles. If  high transaction costs preclude 
negotiations, Coase suggested carefully drafted liability rules as a solution. 
These rules ought to take account of comparative costs of avoiding harm, as 
well as presumptions regarding the identities of the highest-valued users of 
resources. Coase further argued that cases of apparent market failure were 
often the effects of statutory exemptions from standard liability rules. His 
article spawned the modern property rights approach to externalities and to 
legal questions generally. 
 Proponents of the Pigovian tradition were slow in responding effectively 
to the Coasean challenge. Baumol’s ( 1972 ) reply was, however, an articulate 
case for the classic taxation alternative. It is, moreover, explicit about infor-
mational assumptions that are usually implicit, thereby revealing problems 
inherent in all theories of optimal taxation. The following quotation suc-
cinctly states the case:
 Despite the validity in principle of the tax-subsidy approach of the 
Pigovian tradition, in practice it suffers from serious diffi culties. For we 
do not know how to estimate the magnitude of the social costs, the data 
needed to implement the Pigovian tax-subsidy proposals. For example, a 
very substantial proportion of the cost of the pollution is psychic; and 
even if  we knew how to evaluate the psychic cost of some one individ-
ual we seem to have little hope of dealing with effects so widely diffused 
through the population. 
 This would not be very serious if  one could hope to learn by experience. One 
might try any plausible set of taxes and subsidies and then attempt, by a set 
of trial and error steps, to approach the desired magnitude. Unfortunately, 
convergence toward the desired solution by an iterative procedure of this 
sort requires some sort of measure of the improvement (if  any) that has been 
achieved at each step so that the next trial step can be adjusted accordingly. 
But we do not know the optimal combination of outputs, so we simply have 
no way of judging whether a given change in the trial tax values will then have 
moved matters in the right direction. 
 These diffi culties are compounded by another characteristic of external-
ities which has already been mentioned – the likelihood that in the presence of 
externalities there will be a multiplicity of local maxima. Consequently, even 
if  an iterative process were possible, it might only drive us toward a local max-
imum, and may thus fail to take advantage of the really signifi cant opportun-
ities to improve economic welfare (Baumol,  1972 , p. 316). 
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 Theories of optimal taxation ignore the fact that information necessary 
for their implementation will always be missing. Cost is subjective, and 
 forward-looking. As such, cost is not a directly observable magnitude. There 
is, further, no calculational mechanism with which to measure gains and losses 
from alternative levels of taxation. Finally, to extend Baumol’s argument, the 
data of the problem are not constant. This alone negates any iterative solu-
tion. During a time-consuming iterative process, data change. An iterative 
taxation system has neither a calculational mechanism, nor the entrepreneur-
ship driving market behavior. 
 Baumol adduced an argument almost isomorphic to the more general 
argument against nonprice resource allocation. Mises and Hayek fi rst stated 
this more general argument as a critique of “socialist,” i.e., nonprice, resource 
allocation. Absent a system of markets, especially factor markets, transactors 
are unable systematically to calculate benefi ts and costs of various actions or 
production plans. The initial socialist response or “solution” was to set price 
and marginal cost equal. But this response is an evasion of, not a solution 
to, the informational and calculational dilemma posed by Mises and Hayek. 
How could a central planner ascertain the subjective cost or marginal value 
of an action to millions of citizens? It is true, of course, that if  marginal cost 
and consumer preferences are institutionally independent, and if  information 
about these is costlessly available, then marginal cost pricing is equivalent 
to the competitive “solution.” The Mises-Hayek critique questioned these 
assumptions, not the conclusion of the valid but unsound socialist argument. 
In fact, it was the Austrians, particularly Wieser, who had long before demon-
strated the logical validity of that argument. 
 The next socialist solution was to suggest an iterative process for allocat-
ing resources. Arbitrary prices would be set and then adjusted in response 
to observed excess demands. Hayek replied that, without real markets for 
factors, profi ts and losses would be impossible to calculate. In a socialist 
economy, there would be no factor owners to weigh (internalize) the risks 
and rewards of alternative production plans. The absence of private prop-
erty rights in capital (if  not in other factors) is the essential characteristic of 
socialism. Accordingly, there would be no competitive bidding process pro-
ducing offers to internalize. Further, without title to residual claims, socialist 
managers of resources would lack incentives to act entrepreneurially in dis-
covering opportunities. 
 The force of these arguments is measurably increased when one recalls that 
Mises and Hayek always presumed that signifi cant changes in data typify all 
economies. Though they had by then abandoned the goal of abolishing mar-
kets, the advocates of socialism ignored the informational issues and assumed 
static conditions in their response. Somehow, however, texts repeat the myth 
that Mises and Hayek were “answered” (see Reder,  1982 , p. 4). 
 In the Mises-Hayek analysis, socialism is intervention carried out system-
atically in all markets. It substitutes nonprice and nonmarket allocation for 
pricing and market institutions. Particularistic intervention at the micro level 
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is socialism writ small. To paraphrase Robertson, market interventions gen-
erate islands of calculational chaos in a sea of markets. It is a misnomer to 
speak of “calculating” the benefi ts and costs of intervention, when the evi-
dent effect of such intervention is interference with the market’s calculational 
procedures. Consider the use of taxes to infl uence output levels (as opposed 
simply to raising revenue). Taxes are often viewed as substitutes for interven-
tion by regulation or other means; yet the two alternatives are more similar 
than not. 
 If  a tax rate is to be optimal, policy-makers must know the optimal level of 
the taxed activity (e.g., discharging effl uents into a river). If  that were known, 
however, a regulatory system prescribing this level of activity would seem 
neither inferior nor more costly than the tax alternative. The  informational 
requirements of taxation and regulatory approaches are formally identical, 
a point made evident in the Baumol quotation above. And the informational 
requirements for optimal regulation are simply those for optimal nonprice 
resource allocation. There can be no theory of optimal regulatory (taxing) 
behavior until there is a theory of nonprice resource allocation that actually 
addresses the original Mises-Hayek argument. 
 Taxation of an activity is often proffered as a “market” approach, which 
substitutes for a regulatory or interventionist approach. Economists mislead 
themselves and their readers, however, by speaking of “tax prices.” The only 
shared features that taxes have with prices is their dimensionality. Taxes do 
not result from a market process, nor do they refl ect allocational decisions 
of resource owners. Taxes affect prices but are not themselves market prices 
measuring an economic trade-off  at the margin. In other words, taxation is a 
method of intervening, not an alternative to intervention or nonmarket allo-
cation. Absence of markets and improperly specifi ed property rights do gen-
erate economic problems. The very absence of relevant markets, however, 
implies the absence of any ability to acquire the very information needed to 
correct the problem. If  markets are not providing signals to transactors on all 
costs of an action, policy-makers will also lack this information. Moreover, 
even were they to possess the required information, political decision-makers 
face different incentives than do entrepreneurs. 
 Let us hasten to point out what we are  not saying. By itself, the foregoing 
is neither an argument for unfettered markets, nor a criticism of  any kind of 
intervention. (Indeed, the foregoing is strictly positive analysis.) We would, 
however, criticize any argument that a cost-benefi t calculus can be applied 
to such intervention. We ourselves are sympathetic, for instance, to judi-
cial rectifi cation of  tortious acts performed by polluters. But our support 
of  judicial remedy rests on a belief  in principles of  corrective justice. We 
would not pretend that social utility is being maximized by the use of  com-
mon law remedies. We would be quite pleased, however, if  the victim were 
made whole. Pursuit of  the latter strikes us as a worthy enough goal even 
if  it falls short of  an artifi cial welfare ideal that is, in any case, unattainable 
in principle. 
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 Antitrust 
 For a variety of perceived economic problems, antitrust policy represents an 
alternative to a classic regulatory solution. For instance, as deregulation of 
the transportation sector has occurred, Congress has removed the antitrust 
immunity of fi rms engaged in surface and air transportation. The discipline 
exerted by the antitrust statutes has been substituted for that of the regulatory 
process. Many economists would favor this procedure generally, because, 
within a framework of rules, it seems to leave outcomes to market processes. 
While many individual antitrust policies, such as on resale price maintenance 
and prohibitions on vertical mergers, have been criticized, there is substantial 
agreement among economists on the need for a policy on horizontal mergers 
and collusion. 
 This support for antitrust cuts across the political spectrum, although pro-
ponents of market solutions must be ambivalent toward the use of antitrust 
laws. Antitrust may be a preferred substitute for activist regulation, but it 
is still an intervention. Antitrust policy diminishes or eliminates the market 
value of asset titles, and circumscribes private property rights. The tension 
between support of a market-oriented policy and advocacy of antitrust is 
heightened by the realization that antitrust law has little basis at common 
law. 4 It is not the development of reorganized legal principles, like the law of 
torts and contract, so much as an application of administrative law. Epstein 
( 1982 ) has recently argued that antitrust policy is broadly inconsistent with 
common law doctrine and principles of corrective justice. 
 Our concern in this section, however, is with the economics of public pol-
icy toward monopoly. We associate any problems with standard economic 
analysis rather than with defects in legal reasoning or the political process, 
though the latter two factors are also undoubtedly sources of diffi culties. We 
focus on informational issues suppressed or ignored in standard formulations, 
issues that infi nitely complicate the process of utilizing economic analysis in 
antitrust policy. We suggest that the informational requirements for antitrust 
policy are closer to those for a regulatory approach than is generally recog-
nized. These requirements are qualitatively the same as for other forms of 
nonmarket resource allocation. 
 Competitive values or allocations do not exist “out there,” independently 
ascertainable apart from actual market results. Competitive prices and cost can 
be consistently defi ned only as the outcomes of competitive processes. There 
are not competitive results unless there is competition. As Buchanan reminds 
us, the “order” produced by competition “is, itself, defi ned as the outcome of 
the process that generates it … The allocational-distributional result does not, 
and cannot, exist independently of the trading process.” Without competi-
tion, there is no reference point to which comparisons with real-world results 
can be made. In absence of competitive markets, economic theory cannot 
tell us what is optimal. Still less can theory yield detailed predictions of what 
fi rms would have done under competitive conditions. Antitrust economics 
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assumes, however, that policy-makers can do just this – or, at least, it assumes 
that they can move us in the correct direction. Yet even the latter is doubtful. 
 There are a few abstract distinctions that can be posited about the out-
comes of monopolistic as compared with competitive markets.  Ceteris pari-
bus , monopolists produce less at a higher price. This is true, however, virtually 
by defi nition. In a static framework, the theory is pellucidly clear and deter-
ministic. Problems arise, however, when it is applied to actual market arrange-
ments. We refer to the familiar diagram representing monopolistic equilibrium 
( Figure III.4 ). 
 As is illustrated in the fi gure, a monopolist is treated as knowing or being 
capable of discovering competitive equilibrium. The monopolist chooses, 
however, to maximize profi ts by producing at  Q m instead of  Q c . He faces the 
same production possibilities, demand, etc., as would exist in a competitive 
environment. Regulation or antitrust can move the market from ( P m ,  Q m ) to 
( P c ,  Q c ). If, however, we relax the assumptions of standard theory, these pol-
icy conclusions appear much less certain. Indeed, outside of long-run equilib-
rium, it is not clear that we can distinguish conceptually between the behavior 
of competitors and monopolists. 
 As Arrow ( 1959 ) fi rst made clear, the characteristics associated with perfect 
competition would only eventuate in long-run static equilibrium. In “Toward 
a Theory of Price Adjustment,” Arrow ( 1959 , p. 42) presented “the theor-
etical analysis of the decisions as to price.” We do not normally associate 
pricing decisions with competitors, because neoclassical theory treats prices 
parametrically in competitive models. As Arrow (p. 46) noted, however, in dis-
equilibrium there is no reason to believe that Jevons’ Law of One Price would 










174 The economics of time and ignorance
apply. He associated disequilibrium with an imbalance between supply and 
demand. If, for instance, demand exceeds supply at a disequilibrium price, 
then, so long as production is time-consuming, entrepreneurs will discover 
that they can raise their prices without losing all their customers to competi-
tors. In other words, each entrepreneur will realize that he is in the position 
of a profi t-maximizing monopolist. By a trial and error process, the entrepre-
neur seeks out the price-quantity combination that maximizes the profi t of 
his competitive fi rm. In this disequilibrium process, competitive fi rms con-
front downward-sloping demand curves. 
 Arrow chose to model a dynamic process using a static model: that for a 
neoclassical monopolist. We rejected this ploy because it captures one fea-
ture of  the competitive process – the search for a profi t-maximizing price – at 
the cost of  losing sight of  all the other features characterizing competition. 
As we argued in previous chapters, the attribution of  “equilibrium” to reality 
(as opposed to a model) is an egregious example of  the fallacy of  misplaced 
concreteness. The  world is never “in equilibrium.” In  Chapter 6 we suggested 
that the appropriate response is to abandon formalism and static assump-
tions at the stage of  modeling the system (rather than in applying the model). 
Professor Arrow adopted the alternative strategy. In this instance, his more 
conventional approach does highlight one salient point. If  the conditions 
of  perfectly competitive theory are not met – and they never can be ful-
fi lled in reality – then formal economic theory cannot distinguish between 
the behavior of  a monopolist and that of  a competitor. It is not simply that 
the theories of  competition and monopoly are diffi cult to apply to the com-
plex fact-patterns of  antitrust cases: rather, the theories are analytically 
indistinguishable. 
 Arrow compressed the competitive and monopolistic cases into one by 
arguing that competitors will often confront the same pricing problem as 
monopolists. Elsewhere, O’Driscoll ( 1982 ) argued that monopolistic markets 
are more like competitive markets than is true in neoclassical models. If  all 
costs are properly measured, than a monopolist will price equal to cost at 
the margin. This is true even though he confronts a less than infi nitely elastic 
demand curve. 
 Regardless of which tack one takes (Arrow’s or O’Driscoll’s), the analysis 
undermines the sharp distinction between monopoly and competition char-
acteristic of formal neoclassical theory. This is not to suggest that the two 
market types cannot be sharply distinguished. In the next section, we present 
an alternative approach to a theory of monopoly. Neoclassical economics 
does not, however, provide this distinction. 
 Not only does antitrust policy lack the sound theoretical foundations it 
claims for itself, but, as a practical matter, the informational requirements 
needed to implement it will never be attainable. It is true, of course, that pol-
icy-makers do not look at the relationship between price and marginal cost 
in antitrust cases. Marginal cost is unobservable, a fact apparent even in non-
subjectivist formulations of cost theory. Rather, policy-makers look at other 
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characteristics that they believe distinguish competition and monopoly. Not 
surprisingly, we question this procedure. 
 Put simply, no one knows what a competitive market would look like in the 
absence of competition. This is surely the essential lesson of a process view 
of competition. The point is driven home by considering again the course of 
one episode or instance of deregulation: the airline industry. One of the most 
striking results of demonopolizing the airline industry is the  greater degree of 
product heterogeneity and the  larger dispersion of fares. Neither result would 
be predicted by neoclassical theory. Each result is fully consistent with a pro-
cess view. Indeed, the greater diversity of product offerings is a prediction of 
a process theory of competition, as we indicated in  Chapter 6 . 
 As regulations have been relaxed, airlines have increased the diversity of their 
services. Cut-rate (less than full-fare coach) service has certainly increased. 
Imitating low-cost interlopers, traditional trunk carriers have introduced “no-
frills” transportations; for instance, United Airlines has reconfi gured jets with 
lighter-weight seats so that more can be fi tted on each plane. But the range of 
services and classes has also increased, fi ne-tuning output to the diversity of 
consumer preferences. The introduction of business class is one example of 
satisfying the diversity of consumer preferences. 
 Interloper airlines are frequently responsible not only for the low-cost ser-
vice, but also for the greater diversity of offerings. This refl ects their greater 
orientation toward marketing. Newcomers know only a relatively competitive 
environment. Existing trunk carriers had adapted to a regulated environment 
with well specifi ed monopoly rights. The trunk carriers were superb at public 
relations and weak on marketing. In regulated environments, fi rms are con-
cerned overwhelmingly with explaining or justifying existing industry prac-
tices. Competitive fi rms are prone to upset shopworn practices. In the process, 
they develop other skills. 
 Airline deregulation has revealed accumulated ineffi ciencies in the regu-
lated environment. New carriers not only have lower factor costs (labor and 
capital), but also use absolutely less of almost all factors. Greater fl exibility 
in utilizing labor permits fi rms to have a smaller labor pool. For instance, 
New York Air utilizes workers interchangeably (e.g., reservation clerks and 
stewardesses). Likewise, 30 minutes used to be a quick turnaround time for 
aircraft; now, Southwest Airlines (a Texas-based carrier that was never regu-
lated) can unload and refi ll a plane in 10 minutes. 
 Consideration of the effects of airline deregulation reveals that monopo-
lized (or cartelized) markets differ from competitive ones in several, not just 
one, dimension. There are systematic differences besides pricing disparities 
between the two. Monopolists tend to produce the wrong goods from the 
perspective of consumers. There is lack of diversity and, as we suggest below, 
a tendency to lower-quality goods in monopolized markets compared with 
a competitive environment. These effects receive short shrift in neoclassical 
analysis, because of the stringent assumptions of these models. In the latter, 
the good is a given and cost conditions are data. Price is the only dimension 
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in which monopoly can differ from competition. This does not merely refl ect 
simplifying assumptions, but goes to the heart of the static conception of 
competition. Prices are statements of rates of trade-off  among commod-
ities, rather than refl ecting discrepancies among individuals’ plans and the 
existence of profi t opportunities. 5 Further, price is the only market-signaling 
mechanism. This leaves price the only control variable, and relative scarcity 
values the only endogenously produced information. Tastes, for instance, are 
and must be exogenous. 
 The multifaceted effects of monopoly were understood by classical polit-
ical economists (see Smith,  1937 , pp. 147; 575–6; 595–6). Their insights on 
nonprice effects of monopoly were lost as neoclassical economic theory was 
formalized, to survive only in what Nelson and Winter ( 1982 , p. 46) have 
described as the “appreciative” theory of competitive adaptation that we 
teach to undergraduates. This informal theory of price bears little relation to 
formal theory. 
 In a process analysis of competition, fi rms must,  inter alia , discover con-
sumer preferences. Competition provides incentives to undertake the search, 
incentives largely lacking with monopoly. 6 In presenting our own approach to 
monopoly, we clarify and sharpen this analytic point. First, however, we con-
sider the case of telecommunications policy. 
 American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) long beguiled 
observers with its apparent effi ciency, innovation and orientation to consumer 
preferences. It seemed to be a monopoly that worked. In reality, deregulation 
has revealed defi ciencies in all three respects. In analyzing AT&T, economists 
failed to adopt a systematic opportunity-cost approach. The question should 
never have been AT&T’s performance relative to the US Post Offi ce, or to 
foreign telephone services. The question is, and should have been, AT&T’s 
performance relative to that of fi rms in a deregulated environment. 
 Deregulation came fi rst to the offi ce telephone market. Western Electric 
(AT&T’s manufacturing subsidiary) rapidly lost its share of the market to 
competitors because of inferior technology. As the home equipment market 
opened up, a similar process began taking place. Indeed, a great deal of equip-
ment now sold in Bell System retail stores was not made by Western Electric. 
 AT&T’s use of capital resources is extravagant compared with its competi-
tors. For instance, MCI’s microwave towers are smaller and cost considerably 
less than AT&T’s. Recent closings of Western Electric plants apparently sig-
nal recognition of technological backwardness. Engineers and scientists may 
fi nd it diffi cult to think of AT&T as technologically behind the times. AT&T 
is well known for its basic research. Economists, however, ought not to be per-
plexed. Benefi cence in support of pure research is irrelevant: ability to bring 
technology to the bottom line is what counts. Deregulation in telecommuni-
cations is repeating a familiar pattern. Existing fi rms, heretofore possessing 
statutory monopolies, must catch up with interlopers. 
 We have argued that the effects of monopoly are more complex than a 
price-cost divergence. Some costs tend to be higher, others lower. Output 
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characteristics are not as well attuned to consumer preferences as on com-
petitive markets. We have suggested that these differences can be related sys-
tematically to the different property rights possessed by monopolists and 
competitors. In the fi nal section, we develop some of our theoretical points in 
greater depth. We also consider some policy options. 
 Property rights theory of monopoly 
 In this fi nal section, we make explicit our conceptualization of the differences 
between monopoly and competition. In so doing, we present elements of a 
theory of monopoly. There is obviously more than one way to distinguish 
among market types. In fact, O’Driscoll ( 1982 ) presents two distinct 
conceptualizations of monopoly that are consistent with an overall subjectivist 
analysis. We believe that the one approach offered here is both fruitful and 
consistent with recent developments in other areas of economics. 
 We defi ne monopoly as an enforceable property right in a product or mar-
ket share. A monopoly right can encompass a great deal of  economic activ-
ity or apply to a wide geographic area; or it can be narrow in scope and 
circumscribed geographically. When monopolists holding market shares or 
operating jointly in a territory or market cooperate, we call this situation a 
“cartel.” Cartels are shared monopolies. There is thus no separate oligopoly 
theory. 
 Monopolistic and competitive markets are characterized by different prop-
erty rights structures. Variations in rights structures generate relevant incentive 
effects. Competitive fi rms do not engage in rivalrous activities because they 
have a preference or predisposition to compete. Rather, they face constraints 
compelling rivalrous behavior merely to maintain, much less to expand, exist-
ing market shares or profi ts. This analytic approach is consistent with the 
emphasis on property rights that has evolved in other economic areas (e.g., in 
externality theory and in the analysis of exploitable resources). 
 A competitive fi rm has no  ex ante property right in a share of the market 
or a portion of market demand. Each period, it must expend resources to 
reacquire market share, sales, profi ts, etc. Other fi rms are in the same position. 
Actions leading to previous success can be imitated, reducing their expected 
payoff. This stimulates expenditure of resources to fi nd ways to do as well or 
better than before. It is this process, only sketched here, that we describe as 
“rivalry.” It occurs because of the structure of property rights. 
 Competitive fi rms have no property rights or titles to a market share, and 
certainly none to profi ts. In a market with free entry and no restriction on 
competitive practices (e.g., no advertising bans), past market shares yield no 
 ex ante guarantee of future market performance. Observed market shares 
are  ex post outcomes. Absent a secure property right, they tell us little about 
future market shares. 
 Firms owning secure property rights to market shares would be foolish to 
expend resources in the same manner as competitive fi rms. For instance, a 
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monopolist will do less of the kind of innovation stimulated by competition. 
Instead, he will devote resources to innovating in public and governmental 
relations. These expenditures help secure his property right, though produ-
cing little or nothing of value to customers. This is a kind of ineffi ciency 
that until recently has escaped the notice of conventional monopoly theory. 
It exemplifi es the kind of specifi c costs incurred by monopolists. 7 There are 
other costs incurred by competitive fi rms but not by monopolists. Many of 
these are expenditures made necessary by the actions of rivals. They are exem-
plifi ed by advertising and marketing costs that are spared a monopolist. Some 
critics of competition characterize them as waste. Other issues aside, we see 
that the alternative is not necessarily less, but different costs incurred. Costs 
incurred in the competitive process, however, produce some expected payoffs 
for consumers. 
 Let us return to airline deregulation to illustrate the latter point. Regulated 
trunk carriers invested in excess capacity under CAB regulation. Because they 
faced supra-market rates, they fl ew too many fl ights and utilized larger than 
necessary aircraft. This investment was profi t-maximizing, but wasteful from 
the perspective of consumers. Excess capacity enabled airlines to capture 
peak-load traffi c, generating monopoly returns. Aircraft were full or nearly 
so only a relatively small portion of the time. During those periods, revenues 
were far above costs. In normal times, capacity was underutilized. Losses 
incurred during normal periods were less than monopoly returns in peak 
periods. With lower competitive fares, fi rms cannot afford this procedure. In 
the new competitive environment, airlines better apportion their resources to 
average demand. Peak-load pricing substitutes for excess capacity. 
 To an outside observer, it is “obvious” that resources were being wasted 
under CAB regulation. And there was ineffi ciency from the consumer’s per-
spective, the only one that should matter in market analysis. For the monopol-
ist, however, the utilization of capital was profi table. Property rights analysis 
focuses on the source of the perverse effects of private profi t-maximization. 
These effects derive from the monopoly right itself, which insulates the produ-
cer from competitive pressures. 
 One could tell our story somewhat differently by characterizing airlines’ 
behavior as rational responses to regulatory actions. In the end, this would 
be the same story. Regulation is not adventitious, but is the mechanism by 
which a monopoly right is enforced if  not secured. Without regulation, the 
right is unenforceable and thus economically irrelevant. Property rights ana-
lysis focuses on issues like the specifi cation and enforcement of legal entitle-
ments or rights. This approach raises the question of how a right is acquired 
and enforced. Standard neoclassical analysis is weakest on this issue. Even 
property rights theorists have failed to extend their analysis systematically 
to monopoly theory. Yet the questions raised in this literature have special 
importance to the monopoly question. Especially in the transportation area, 
regulatory commissions were the relevant enforcement mechanism of mon-
opoly rights. 
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 There is good reason for subjectivists and process theorists to adopt a prop-
erty rights theory of monopoly. This can be best understood by recalling the 
introductory discussion in this chapter. We related outcomes to the processes 
generating them. Institutions play a crucial role in shaping social processes. 
Changes in fundamental institutions will generate different economic proc-
esses, and thus different outcomes. We view property rights as a fundamental 
institution, partly determining the nature of economic processes. Property 
rights analysis focuses on the structural environment of economic processes. 
Langlois has gone so far as to characterize modern process theory as the 
“New Institutional Economics,” though with an important caveat:
 The problem with the Historical School and many of the early 
Institutionalists is that they wanted an economics with institutions but 
without theory; the problem with many neoclassicists is that they want 
economic theory without institutions; what we should really want is 
both institutions and theory – not only pure economic theory informed 
by the existence of specifi c institutions, but also an economic theory  of 
institutions. 
 (Langlois,  1982a , pp. 16–17) 
 We have not attempted to articulate a theory of institutions. We have, however, 
emphasized the importance of specifying the property rights and relevant 
legal rules in any economic theory of competition and monopoly. Failure 
to do so leads to incomplete and erroneous analysis. To illustrate this latter 
point, we consider the central issue of neoclassical monopoly theory – the 
entry question. 
 Monopoly yields a net revenue, yet by assumption no entry occurs. 
Monopoly rent, and the associated “deadweight loss,” are unexploited profi t 
opportunities. These ought not to persist; their existence ought to lead to 
their own demise. 
 Neoclassical monopoly theory postulates but does not explain the exist-
ence of monopoly. It leaves the entry problem unresolved. Traditional entry 
barrier arguments have lost their appeal in the face of criticism (Demsetz, 
 1982 ). Some even believe that they are all but abandoned (Posner,  1979 ). In 
any case, like many other authors, we are unconvinced by traditional entry 
barrier models. Generally, the models suffer from one of two failings (or 
both). Either they identify a real scarcity as a “barrier” (e.g., advertising or 
capital costs), or they identify a cost already incurred by existing producers as 
barriers to new entrants (e.g., start-up costs). Information and capital costs 
refl ect real scarcities. If  potential entrants cannot afford to incur the full costs 
of competing, then this merely indicates that entry is not profi table and ought 
not occur. Start-up costs refl ect a particular kind of information cost. Among 
other things, new fi rms typically must operate at a loss, even with negative 
cash fl ow, for an initial period. This requires making an initial investment, no 
different in principle from all other capital expenditures. An initial outgoing 
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in early periods is compensated by returns in later periods. At root, treatment 
of a subset of capital or information costs as suspect or unnecessary refl ects 
a belief  that these costs are not, or ought not to be, real. We know of no way 
of conjuring away either these costs or the informational factors that they 
refl ect. In any case, positive analysis must take perceived costs as they exist. 
 For reasons not entirely clear, economists are impatient about the existence 
of profi ts but view with equanimity models postulating the persistence of 
monopoly returns. In positive and normative analysis, entrepreneurial profi ts 
are merely “short-run” phenomena; the analysis quickly moves to the long 
run. Modern theories of effi cient markets and rational expectations explicitly 
treat profi ts as random events of transient duration. Profi ts cannot exist for 
more than one period, since this would permit agents to respond and obtain, 
in effect, something for nothing – a return over cost. At the same time, neo-
classical monopoly theory postulates the existence of supra-normal returns 
period after period. (The “period” in the industrial organization literature is 
certainly a year in duration.) 
 Profi ts represent no conundrum for a process view of economics. Changing 
economic conditions are continuously generating new profi t opportunities 
(and eliminating old ones). Asymmetric information is an integral part of 
subjectivist analysis. The “man on the spot,” the specialist, has superior infor-
mation. He can exploit or profi t from this superior information. Over time, 
others will discover the information. If  he has not already fully exploited 
the profi t opportunity, it will be competed away. Adam Smith’s view of the 
link between specialized knowledge (“trade secrets”) and profi t was basically 
sound: “Secrets of this kind … can seldom be long kept; and the extraordin-
ary profi t can last very little longer than they are kept” (Smith,  1937 , p. 60). 
What must be added to Smith’s observation is the recognition that markets 
continuously present entrepreneurs with new menus of profi t opportunities, 
even though each opportunity eventually disappears. 
 In the absence of a secure property title, persistent monopoly gains ought 
to be as troublesome to neoclassical economists as they are to process theo-
rists. Not only the monopolists’ gain, but also the associated “deadweight 
loss” represent unexploited profi t opportunities (O’Driscoll,  1982 , pp. 199–
204). These potential gains are not the result of temporary disequilibrium, 
asymmetric information, or any other information problem. Monopolies are 
obvious features of the economic landscape, their gains revealed for all to 
see. They ought to represent especially ripe targets for entrepreneurial action. 
Gains from invading a monopolist’s turf are inherently less speculative than 
ordinary profi t opportunities. Profi t-maximization by monopolists almost 
invariably creates relatively secure profi t opportunities for interlopers. If, for 
instance, the monopolist price discriminates, then this very pricing policy 
guarantees arbitrage profi ts. If  the monopolist has a uniform pricing and ser-
vice policy, then there are typically high-valued customers who would prefer 
a superior service at a higher price. In the latter case, the interloper “skims the 
cream” off  the top of the business. 
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 As with nineteenth-century railroad monopolies, the two situations can 
go hand in hand. The railroads engaged in value-of-service ratemaking but 
tended to provide roughly uniform service to all shippers. With the rise of 
motorized trucking, railroads fi rst lost the high-valued customers. Trucks 
offered more fl exible service, which better met the scheduling demands of 
shippers placing a relatively high value on timely delivery. Moreover, trucking 
is inherently less prone to the kind of damaged shipment problems that result 
from coupler-slack in rail transportation. In the end, railroads were left with 
low-valued business, like hauling shipments of bulk commodities and agricul-
tural produce. Yet sunk investments and common-carrier responsibilities left 
them with overhead costs not recoverable from revenue generated by remain-
ing business. Losses on passenger service added to this problem in many cases. 
Only the recent deregulation of railroad rates has halted the 60-year decline 
of rail freight transportation. 
 Monopoly gains simply cannot persist in the face of determined profi t-
seeking entrepreneurs. If  a monopoly position is to be maintained, the mon-
opolist must possess a secure title to, or property right in, a share of the 
market. Only the state can secure such titles and grant such property rights. 
Applied economic analysis of monopoly should, accordingly, identify and 
explicate the legal or governmental source of that monopoly as its fi rst order 
of business. This position does not derive from a tautological defi nition of 
monopoly as a right or privilege granted by a governmental unit: it is, rather, 
a conclusion of economic analysis. 
 The property rights approach enunciated here is basically the view of 
monopoly at common law, as restated by Blackstone ( 1803 , p. 159) when he 
described monopoly as 
 a license or privilege allowed by the king for the sole buying and selling, 
making, working or using of any thing whatsoever; whereby the subject 
in general is restrained from that liberty of manufacturing or trading 
which he had before. 
 The common law view was absorbed into American law, being clearly stated 
in the  Charles River Bridge case. 8 The court there defi ned monopoly as “the 
withdrawal of that which is a common right from the community and vesting 
it in one or more individuals, to the exclusion of all others.” The story of how 
the common law conception of monopoly was transformed into the modern 
statutory conception is an intriguing one, which, however, goes far beyond the 
subject of this chapter (but see Bork,  1978 , pp. 15–49; and O’Driscoll,  1982 ). Our 
point here is theoretical: monopoly rents can persist only if legally protected. 
From the perspective of a property rights theory, neither antitrust nor regulation 
is an appropriate vehicle for controlling monopolies. Regulation and perhaps 
antitrust policy are sources of monopoly power. Deregulation and repeal of 
legal protections are the appropriate responses. Surface and air transportation 
are not special cases, but are paradigmatic examples of monopoly in practice. 
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 There is no question that distinctions between ordinary private property 
rights, which are necessary for decentralized economic organization, and 
monopoly rights are often fi ne ones. Patents and copyrights are tough cases. 
Traditional arguments in their favor are well known. Though we are suspi-
cious of some of these, we are by no means prepared to argue here forcefully 
and universally against either patents or copyrights. From a property rights 
perspective, however, the time is ripe for reconsidering the case for both pat-
ents and copyrights. Since Sir Arnold Plant’s critique of patents, there has 
been comparatively little attention paid by property rights theorists to the 
subject (but see Littlechild,  1979 , pp. 42–3; and Rothbard,  1970 , pp. 652–60). 
The use of video cassette recorders has raised law and economics issues in 
copyright law, which invite reconsideration of its basic premise. 
 Relative to neoclassical formulations, property rights theory is more appre-
ciative of the economic usefulness and signifi cance of contractual restric-
tions and “restraints” on market participants. The theory emphasizes that 
economic activity can occur only in an institutional and legal setting. The 
process of contracting and legally binding oneself  is a prelude to almost 
any economic relationship. A market economy is a complex web of vertical 
and horizontal restraints without which economic activity would be impos-
sible. These contractual relationships, which constrain some activities, do not 
inhibit but rather make possible competition (as a process). In almost any 
purchase of an existing business, for instance, the buyer will want some assur-
ance that the seller will not immediately reenter the market as a competitor. 
The seller is not injured by permitting such contracts, but is helped: he can 
obtain a higher price for his business. To the degree that resources are thereby 
moved to a high-valuing user, consumers are also helped. Yet, after the fact, 
the seller of the business is restricted and consumers are seemingly denied a 
potential competitor. Such contracts are taken to be restrictions on compe-
tition. Yet these and other contractual restraints generally make possible the 
formation and recombining of assets and resources that is the driving force 
behind competition and economic progress. Indeed, to the extent that individ-
uals are attracted to a market by the realization that they can easily sell their 
enterprise, these restraints foster competition. There is no trade-off  between 
values. Contractual freedom is a necessary condition to obtain the value of 
competition. 
 Where we would draw the line, and where we think it must be drawn, is 
between contractual and third-party imposed restraints. Questions of polit-
ical rights aside, third-party restraints have signifi cantly different effects than 
those agreed upon contractually by the relevant parties. Consider again the 
issue of the sale of a fi rm. The potential buyer will offer up to the present 
value of expected returns from acquiring the fi rm. The potential seller will 
weigh the value of the offer against the expected losses suffered by agreeing 
to a restriction on his future conduct. If  the current owner of the fi rm (the 
potential seller) evaluates the offer as being worth more than the present value 
of these losses, his decision refl ects a judgment about the value of his services 
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in that industry. He is worth more outside the industry than in it. His custom-
ers are not being deprived of the services of a superior competitor. At least, 
that is the best judgment of the seller himself  at the time of the deal. We can 
think of no reason why sellers’ expectations would be systematically biased 
in this regard. 
 Third-party restraints cannot be presumed to be effi cient from the perspec-
tive of any of the participants. They have not been voluntarily entered into by 
the affected parties. Assuming that anyone benefi ts, all others save the third 
party lose (in an  ex ante sense) from the restrictions imposed by third par-
ties. If  effective, third-party restrictions on entry thwart resource owners from 
competing with protected fi rms. A monopoly grant prevents effi cient com-
petitors from offering their product on an equal footing. 
 We recognize that in a limited sense there is “competition” to be the monop-
olist, or to share monopoly power in a cartel. We believe that more confusion 
is sown than knowledge acquired, however, by describing political favor-
seeking as a competitive process. There is no reason to believe that superior 
entrepreneurs in the  economic marketplace will win out in the political arena. 
There is good reason to believe the opposite, as the skills required for political 
and economic success are quite different (Hayek,  1944 , Chapter 9). Further, 
special pleaders are a biased sample of businessmen, tending to be those who 
have  failed to achieve their goals in the marketplace (Kolko,  1967 ). 
 Finally, as a factual matter, existing producers tend to be given monop-
oly rights in “grandfather” clauses. This is particularly objectionable from 
a process perspective. A major benefi t of  open markets consists of  allowing 
entrants (and existing fi rms) to innovate or to recombine factors in imagina-
tive ways. It is precisely this process that is stifl ed by monopolistic restric-
tions. Over the long run, static welfare losses pale in signifi cance compared 
with this dynamic effect. Of course, these losses are inherently not measur-
able, and will accordingly be underestimated in any kind of  particularistic 
weighing of  costs and benefi ts. We can, moreover, rely on would-be monopo-
lists to account for all possible benefi ts of  any legal restriction. Arguments 
for tariffs are a classic example of  this process. We know what the domestic 
industrialists gain. We can only imagine what we will all lose as consumers. 
Whenever public policy debates are conducted on such cost-benefi t calcula-
tions, the argument will be tilted in favor of  the proposed restriction and 
against open markets. 
 In recent years, Hayek ( 1973 , pp. 55–71) has emphasized that public pol-
icy discussions must, for this and other reasons, be conducted on grounds of 
principle and not expediency. This, of course, means that discussions must 
be based on sound theoretical arguments, economic and noneconomic. We 
believe that a property rights theory of monopoly provides the economic part 
of these arguments by focusing on the systematic effects of alternative insti-
tutional regimes. For the same reason that individuals rely on rules in situ-
ations of general ignorance – the economy of information required – public 
policy discussions ought to focus more on comparative institutional analysis. 
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Economics is simply not capable of providing the information needed to make 
case-by-case decisions, like that required in antitrust cases. 
 Regardless, then, of the soundness of our particular conceptualization 
of the monopoly question, we would argue for an institutional and prop-
erty rights analysis of competition and monopoly. This shift in focus requires 
abandoning the institutionless analysis of neoclassical theory. In the last two 
chapters, we have offered a theoretical alternative to that theory. 
 Notes 
 1  The success of Allegheny Airlines (now US Air) in contracting out its commuter 
operations to smaller carriers should, in retrospect, have been accorded more atten-
tion by analysts. Allegheny’s experience revealed the potential profi tability of com-
muter operations. See Doty ( 1977 ). 
 2  On Piedmont’s success, see Briggs ( 1981 ). 
 3  On United’s strategy, see  Business Week for April 13, 1981 (p. 49); August 17, 
1981 (pp. 27–9); and October 19, 1981 (pp. 83–4). Also see  Aviation Week & Space 
Technology , August 24, 1981 (p. 30). 
 4  See O’Driscoll ( 1982 , pp. 191–3); and more generally, the discussion in Letwin 
( 1965 ). 
 5  Once the assumption of equilibrium was dropped, Arrow ( 1959 ) had to delve into 
a series of interrelated theoretical issues. These included,  inter alia , the meaning of 
competition, expectations, pricing strategy and nonprice sources of information. 
All of these arose for “an objectively competitive market” (Arrow,  1959 , p. 46). 
None are standard issues in the theory of competition, though all are on the agenda 
of questions that we have argued should be analyzed in micro theory. All these 
become critical theoretical issues once one abandons the assumption that prices 
are parametric. As Arrow ( 1959 , p. 42) noted, “every relevant variable, except those 
classifi ed as exogenous for the whole economic system, is the result of a decision on 
the part of some one individual unit of the economy.” But as he concluded (p. 43), 
“Each individual participant in the economy is supposed to take prices as given and 
determine his choices as to purchases and sales accordingly; there is no one left over 
whose job it is to make a decision on price.” 
 6  Competition to become or to replace an existing monopolist is no substitute for 
competition in an open market. The former involves striving to appropriate rents; 
resources expended in this process are expended solely to transfer income. Resources 
devoted to the pursuit of profi ts on competitive markets are expended at least in 
part to improve consumer satisfaction. In practice, of course, existing statutory 
monopolists are almost never dislodged by interlopers. Some franchised providers 
of cable TV services may be replaced in the coming years. Even were this to occur, 
it would not address the problems arising from the monopolistic provision of these 
services. 
 7  The literature on rent-seeking has given prominence to this and other issues in mon-
opoly theory. Tullock ( 1967 ) and Posner ( 1975 ) helped initiate that literature. We 
would only suggest here that the rent-seeking literature fi ts better with a subjectivist 
analysis than with orthodox formulations. 
 8  II Peters 567. 
 
 8  A subjectivist theory of a capital-using 
economy 1 
 Beer barrels and blast furnaces, harbour installations and hotel-room furniture 
are not capital by virtue of their physical properties but by virtue of their 
economic functions. 
 Ludwig M. Lachmann ( 1956 , p. vii) 
 Introduction 
 Conceiving of competition as a discovery procedure – as a set of institutions 
that facilitate the discovery of profi t opportunities – draws our attention away 
from the comparison of alternative equilibrium states and toward the workings 
of market processes. The shift in focus from timeless equilibria to market 
processes having an explicit real-time dimension creates a special role for the 
theory of capital. Capital goods, after all, bear a certain temporal relationship 
to the consumption goods that they help to produce. Expectations (and 
changes in expectations) on the part of entrepreneurs about future supply and 
demand conditions for consumption goods have implications about current 
choices made and actions taken with respect to the corresponding capital 
goods. Equivalently, consumption activities that extend over time are refl ected 
in the constellation of capital goods that exist at a particular point in time. 
 While the capital goods themselves are the concrete objects of valuation and 
exchange, the ultimate basis for their valuation and exchange is future con-
sumption activity, which, in turn, serves as the basis for production plans. Of 
course, the continually changing demands for consumer goods imply a contin-
ual revaluation of capital goods used in their production. Further changes in 
the valuation of particular goods result from the discovery of inconsistencies 
between the production plans of different entrepreneurs. And such discov-
eries are themselves the result of the market process that guides production 
towards the ultimate satisfaction of consumer demand. These are the ideas 
that subjectivist capital theory strives to elucidate and systematize. The theory 
maintains its subjectivist quality by highlighting the plans of entrepreneurs or 
other market participants (the  subjects of  the economic activity) rather than 
the capital goods themselves (the  objects of  their actions). 
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 In alternative theories capital goods have, at best, a shadowy existence. 
General equilibrium theories of  the neoclassical variety have relevance 
only when the analysis is confi ned to the allocation of  resources at a par-
ticular point in time. 2 Attempts to extend the analysis to the problem of 
intertemporal allocation have been largely unsuccessful. Including the 
“date of  availability” as part of  the defi nition of  each particular consump-
tion good forces a time dimension into the general equilibrium model, but 
the analysis itself  remains timeless. 3 The period of  time that separates the 
application of  inputs and the emergence of  outputs is a period in which 
market conditions are not allowed to change either as a cause or as a con-
sequence of  such things as changing expectations about consumer demand 
or newly perceived plan inconsistencies. As was argued in  Chapter 4 , the 
time dimension in such models is only a facade. Capital goods that may be 
created and used up during the production process play no role whatever 
in the analysis. 
 Classical models, at least on this count, exhibit more similarities than dif-
ferences when compared with their neoclassical counterparts. Although an 
explicit period of production is built into the models patterned after classical 
theory, the collection of capital goods spanning this period is never brought 
into view. Classical models are completely specifi ed in terms of the initial 
inputs and the ultimate outputs – which, in turn, become the inputs of the 
subsequent period. The basic structure of these models requires that the list 
of inputs and the list of outputs be qualitatively identical. Corn and iron, 
for instance, are used to produce greater quantities of corn and iron. (The 
quantitative difference between inputs and outputs, the surplus, becomes the 
primary focus of classical analysis.) 
 This vision of the “production of commodities by means of commodities” 
(Sraffa,  1960 ) has served as a basis for capital theory in spite of the fact that 
the vision admits of no distinct capital goods. Capital theory of this type is 
based on the premise that the time separating the input commodities and the 
output commodities is a satisfactory surrogate for capital. Insights about the 
nature of capital goods that come into (and go out of) existence during this 
time and about the relationships between different kinds of capital goods are 
simply out of reach. 
 Unquestionably, both classical and neoclassical theories provide useful 
perspectives for some purposes. But when the concern is about the market 
processes involving various kinds of capital goods in the hands of different 
entrepreneurs, these alternative theories are not in direct competition with the 
ideas presented in this chapter. If  the objective were simply to draw attention 
to the commonality among all forms of capital, the Austrian, or subjectivist, 
view would be complementary to the alternative views. Time is the common 
denominator of capital goods – and the recognition of this fact is the com-
mon denominator of capital theories. But the exchanging of capital goods 
and the restructuring of production processes cannot be explained in terms 
of the  alikeness of  all capital. A satisfactory explanation must be in terms of 
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the  differences among capital goods – differences as perceived by the entrepre-
neurs who are engaged in these activities. 
 Entrepreneurs both infl uence and are infl uenced by the market processes 
that convert resources into consumption goods. The analysis of these proc-
esses is what constitutes capital theory in the subjectivist view. While such 
an analysis is a worthwhile objective in its own right, it also sets the stage for 
the analysis of monetary disturbances, which is the subject of the following 
chapter. 
 The development of subjectivist capital theory: an overview 
 The extent to which Austrian capital theory has had a distinct subjectivist 
fl avor has waxed and waned from its beginnings to the present day. Clearly, 
Menger’s treatment of the theory of capital in his  Principles represented 
an extension of his subjective value theory as fi rst developed to apply to 
consumption goods (Menger,  1981 , pp. 80–7). This same capital theory 
lost much of its subjectivist fl avor in the hands of B ö hm-Bawerk ( 1959 , 
vol. 2, pp. 77–118 and  passim ), whose attempt to formalize the theory and 
to express the rearrangements of capital goods quantitatively caused the 
Austrian insights to take on more of a classical (Ricardian) appearance. This 
obscured the essential subjectivist theme and needlessly exposed the ideas to 
criticism from a formalistic point of view. 4 History records the dissatisfaction 
with these developments on the part of Menger and other members of the 
Austrian school (Schumpeter,  1954 , p. 847; Kirzner,  1976 , p. 76; Streissler and 
Weber,  1973 , pp. 231f.). Mises rejected the arithmetic approach offered by 
B ö hm-Bawerk and recast the arguments in a subjectivist mold. 5 He went on 
to indicate, in very general terms, how this vision of a capital-using economy 
could serve as the basis for the analysis of monetary disturbances (Mises, 
 1953 , pp. 339–66). 
 Mises’ suggestive discussions led Hayek ( 1967a ) to elaborate on the inte-
gration of capital theory and monetary theory and to devise some analytical 
tools that were capable of tracing the course of a monetary disturbance in 
terms of its effect on the markets for various kinds of capital goods. Although 
Hayek in 1935 had an appreciation for the essential subjectivist nature of cap-
ital theory, the task he had set for himself  (in  Prices and Production ) required 
that he greatly simplify and even fi ctionalize the Austrian vision of the econ-
omy’s production process. This was his means of solving an otherwise intract-
able problem. But as a result, the theory was once again to become a target 
for the formalists. The seemingly mechanistic sequence of price changes and 
resource movements – when divorced from their subjectivist underpinnings – 
did not tell an altogether convincing story. 
 Hayek’s analytical efforts did provide a skeletal outline for subsequent ana-
lysis, which, according to his introductory remarks, were all they were intended 
to do. In a later effort,  The Pure Theory of Capital ( 1941 ), he retraced his own 
steps in order to eliminate some of the fi ctitious and mechanistic aspects of 
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the earlier outline. This book was to become the basis for a more comprehen-
sive analysis of monetary disturbances. But neither he nor any of his followers 
were able (or willing) to rework the analysis of monetary disturbances in the 
light of this long and ponderous treatment of capital theory. Modern writers 
have tended to adopt the original Hayekian outline as their point of depart-
ure. Attempts to advance the theory have taken the form of generalizing from 
the specifi c sequence of price changes and resource movements identifi ed by 
Hayek and refocusing the analysis on the expectations of entrepreneurs (see 
Hayek,  1939 ; O’Driscoll,  1979 ; Wagner,  1979 ; Lewin,  1982 ; and Garrison, 
 1984 ). These developments have had the effect of eliminating the mechanistic 
fl avor of the theory and acknowledging once again the subjectivist insights 
fi rst offered by Menger. 
 The Mengerian vision 
 To formulate a subjectivist theory of a capital-using economy, we can begin 
by considering, from a subjectivist viewpoint, what Adam Smith called “that 
early and rude state of society which precedes both the accumulation of stock 
and the appropriation of land …” (Smith,  1937 , p. 47). This, in fact, is precisely 
where Menger began with his own theory. Nature, left to its own devices, will 
yield up a certain kind and amount of consumption goods (Menger,  1981 , 
pp. 73f.). Components of this “natural yield” take on the quality of goods to 
the extent – and only to the extent – that individuals (subjectively) value them. 
Such valuing is evidenced by individual acts of exchange and consumption. 
In this setting the consumption goods are the only objects of economic 
analysis. To say that the goods were “produced” by nature is to use the word 
“produced” in a strictly non-economic sense. It was the intention of neither 
the individuals nor nature that anything at all be produced. Notions such as 
the cost of production and the period of production simply have no meaning 
in the context of these natural processes having a fortuitous yield. 
 Smith sought to link the objects of consumption to a different sort of 
object, namely labor, so as to establish that there is a regular pattern in the 
natural order of things. The alternative task that Menger and later subjectiv-
ists set for themselves was somewhat different. The extension of value theory 
beyond its application to consumption does not consist of the identifi cation 
of related  objects . It deals instead with the perceptions and actions of the 
 subjects who value the natural yield. Once individuals begin to perceive par-
ticular sequences in the course of “natural production,” value is imputed to 
the earlier stages of the natural process in accordance with the value attached 
to the corresponding consumption goods. A sapling is valued for the fruit it 
will eventually yield; fertile land is valued for the crops it will grow. This is 
Menger’s Law. 6 Given the perceptions and expectations of individual actors, 
their actions involving objects in the earlier stages of natural processes, such 
as the guarding of especially high-yield land areas, can be understood in the 
same way as their actions involving consumption goods. So long as the vision 
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is confi ned to the “early and rude state of society,” it is tempting to refer to 
the objects of such actions as “natural capital.” This concept provides a clear 
base from which to build the subjectivist theory of a capital-using economy. 
 The analysis takes on a new dimension as soon as allowance is made for the 
fact that individuals can do more than simply await nature’s yield. By inter-
vening in the natural processes, individuals can have an effect on the quan-
tity and quality of the subsequent yield. Such acts of intervention may occur 
only in the late stages of the process – the act of pruning vines – or they may 
occur at earlier stages as well – the act of preparing the soil. The fabrication 
of instruments with which to prepare the soil would be a still earlier act of 
intervention. These acts of intervention constitute “production” in the eco-
nomic sense of the word. The direct objects of these acts (pruned vines, pre-
pared soil, fabricated instruments) constitute capital goods. To understand 
the objectives of the “producers” is to understand that the earlier a producer 
intervenes, the greater are the opportunities to tailor the production process 
to suit his own purposes. This provides an intuitive basis for the notion that 
the more “roundabout processes” tend to have a greater yield in value terms. 
 Introducing the concept of capital goods in this way suggests that further 
analysis should focus on both the value of various goods in relation to the 
consumption they help to produce and the temporal relationship between the 
capital and the consumption goods. That capital has a time as well as a value 
dimension is not unique to subjectivist theory, 7 but the particular way in which 
these two dimensions are introduced and developed is. The following sections 
go on to develop the intertemporal and relative-price relationships among 
capital goods in a modern capital-using economy and to demonstrate their 
relevance to macroeconomic theorizing. The fi nal section deals with preva-
lent misconceptions of the basic notions of “roundaboutness,” the “period 
of production,” and the “original factors of production,” and with common 
criticisms of capital theories that make use of these notions. 
 The structure of production 
 When the analysis is pressed beyond the “early and rude state of society,” the 
objects at which the actions of individuals are directed and the interrelationships 
between these actions grow in complexity, but the essential features of the 
analysis remain the same. Acts of production bear a fundamental relationship 
to the prospective acts of consumption that production makes possible. The 
value of the objects of productive activity is systematically related to both 
the prospective value of the corresponding goods and the time that separates 
the act of production and the subsequent act of consumption. In the analysis 
of a capital-using economy, the idea of interventions with a natural process 
at particular points in time is replaced with the idea of stages of production 
(Hayek,  1967a , pp. 37–47). A production process is conceived as a sequence 
of stages, and the capital goods that constitute a given stage are seen as 
having both a value and a time dimension. An accounting of the pattern and 
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usage of capital goods throughout the entire economy in terms of these two 
dimensions defi nes the economy’s “structure of production.” 
 As developers of this Austrian vision have clearly recognized, there are 
two distinct but closely related ways in which to conceive of the economy’s 
structure of production (see, for example, B ö hm-Bawerk,  1959 , vol. 2, p. 314; 
Hayek,  1967a , p. 40). It can be viewed as a sequence of productive acts that 
cause working capital, or “goods in process,” to move through time from one 
stage of production to another until the fi nal stage yields consumption goods. 
Alternatively, the structure can be seen as the pattern of productive activity 
taking place at a given point in time. The two conceptions are completely con-
gruent only for the case of a perfectly synchronized economy – what Mises 
called the “imaginary state of the evenly rotating economy” (Mises,  1966 , 
pp. 244–50). Apart from its serving as a device for abstracting from change, 
however, this perfect synchronization is of little interest. The pattern of pro-
ductive activities is constantly being adjusted to changing conditions. Even 
so, there still exists a distinct relationship between the temporal and the atem-
poral perspectives. A redirecting of productive activity at a particular point 
in time implies a corresponding alteration in the pattern of activity  over time. 
The reallocation of capital goods, for instance, away from the later stages of 
production and into the earlier stages corresponds to a level of consumption 
that fi rst falls during the period in which capital goods are being reallocated 
and then rises to a new height. 
 This correspondence holds perfectly only under the strict assumption that 
consumption plans and production plans are fully coordinated with one 
another over time. But to invoke such a strict assumption would be to mask 
the market process that fosters the less-than-perfect coordination that char-
acterizes any market economy. In actuality, when market conditions change – 
that is, when there is a change in consumer demand, resource availability, or 
technology – the producer begins to react. Through the passage of time, he 
continues to react – in part to his changing perceptions of the new condi-
tions, and in part to the earlier reactions of his own and other producers. This 
real-time market process constitutes the primary subject matter of Austrian 
analysis. The goal of such analysis, Austrian or otherwise, is to determine 
whether and how the market can transform the desired pattern of consump-
tion in the future into a pattern of production in the present, 8 and to deter-
mine the extent to which coordination of the two patterns is fostered under 
different institutional arrangements and in the face of alternative government 
policies. 
 A common misunderstanding can be avoided, and the element of subjectiv-
ism can be re-emphasized, by pointing out that the notion of a “stage of pro-
duction” is itself  a subjective concept. 9 That is, it has meaning only in terms 
of the relationship (as perceived by producers) between the capital goods that 
make up a stage of production and the future consumption goods. A given 
stage does not correspond to a particular industry or even to a particular, 
objectively defi ned, collection of capital goods. A paper mill that supplies 
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paper for the production of greeting cards and also for use by a blueprinter is 
operating simultaneously in two separate stages of production. The diffi culty 
of concretizing the notion of stages of production does not render the notion 
meaningless or unhelpful: it only reminds us that there is no easy solution 
to the problem of intertemporal coordination. Conceiving of the production 
process in terms of (subjectively defi ned) stages of production does help to 
identify the specifi c nature of the coordination problem, and it points the way 
to a satisfactory solution to that problem. 
 That the problem of continually restructuring production activities so as 
to conform to changing demands is an  economic problem stems from the fact 
that the capital goods that make up the various stages are heterogeneous in 
nature and are of various degrees of specifi city. 10 If  each capital good were 
perfectly specifi c with respect to its own production process, the problem of 
structuring (there could be no  re structuring) these processes would be purely 
technological. Alternatively, if  all capital goods were homogeneous in nature, 
the problem would cease to exist. In fact, the very notion of structuring and 
restructuring would cease to have meaning. The applicability of economic 
principles depends on the fact that many capital goods can be used in many 
different ways but with varying degrees of success. Recognizing this fact 
about capital requires very little perceptiveness, but understanding its impli-
cations for the analysis of a capital-using economy is the exception rather 
than the rule. Frank Knight ( 1934 , pp. 257–86) conceived of the economy’s 
production processes as consisting of a collection of highly specifi c and com-
plementary capital goods. Don Patinkin ( 1965 , pp. 199ff.) conceived of the 
economy’s production processes as consisting of a single homogeneous good. 
Each of these conceptions was intended to simplify the theories in which they 
were employed. But neither was able to shed much light on the workings of a 
capital-using economy. To make either of these polar assumptions about the 
nature of capital (extreme specifi city or extreme homogeneity) is to assume 
away the phenomena that the Austrian analysis is intended to elucidate. 
 Capital goods are related to one another, some as substitutes, some as com-
plements. This fact would suggest that a theory of a capital-using economy 
must, at a bare minimum, allow for three distinctly different capital goods. 
(A two-good model of the capital sector could not allow for both substitut-
ability and complementarity.) To allow for both intertemporal and atemporal 
substitutability and for both intertemporal and atemporal complementarity, 
the number of different capital goods must be multiplied. And allowing for 
 various degrees of  substitutability and complementarity requires still further 
multiplication. In its richest form, the capital theory introduced by Menger 
and developed by B ö hm-Bawerk, Mises and Hayek cannot adequately be 
modeled by a three-good capital sector or even by an  x -good capital sector 
where  x is some determinate number. The Austrian theory of capital is based 
instead on the concept of a complex structure of production made up of a 
wide assortment of capital goods. The rejection of determinate models of the 
capital sector is consistent with the rejection of input-output models of the 
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economy in general. The insistence on allowing for a virtually infi nite degree 
of complexity refl ects the insights of Mises on the problem of economic cal-
culation (Mises,  1966 , pp. 200–31), and of Hayek on the use of knowledge in 
society (Hayek,  1945 ). 
 The rate of interest in a capital-using economy 
 As indicated above, the anticipated value of future consumption goods and 
the present value of capital goods are related in a systematic way. If  market 
participants were completely indifferent about time considerations – that is, 
if  they had no “time preferences” – the equilibrium value of the (present) 
inputs of each production process would completely exhaust the value of 
the (future) output. The inputs, whether land, labor, or capital, would not be 
“productive” in the classical sense, which is to say that they would produce no 
“surplus value.” 
 But market participants are not indifferent about time considerations: 
they do have time preferences. Whether it is taken as a logical imperative or a 
broad generalization, there is a systematic preference for “sooner” rather than 
“later”; the future is systematically discounted. 11 As a consequence, the sum of 
the equilibrium values of (present) inputs falls short of the anticipated value 
of (future) output by the extent of the time discount. In a classical model this 
value differential would be taken to indicate that the inputs are “product-
ive.” Austrian theorists have consistently rejected this inference. In their view 
the difference between the value of the inputs and the value of the output is 
fully attributed to the time preferences of market participants. A systematic 
discounting of the future is both necessary and suffi cient to give rise to the 
market phenomena that superfi cially may be seen as value productivity. 
 In the Austrian literature the interest rate, broadly conceived, is synonym-
ous with the rate of time discount implicit in the pattern of prices of capital 
goods and other inputs. Although the rate that prevails in the loan market 
is the most conspicuous manifestation of the rate of interest, the loan rate 
is not necessarily the most appropriate focus for analysis (Rothbard,  1970 , 
pp. 321ff.). The conventional view that the interest rate is determined by sup-
ply and demand in the loanable-funds market is based on a narrow defi nition 
of the rate of interest – one that takes the interest rate and the loan rate to be 
synonymous. While it is true that the market process will cause the loan rate 
to be adjusted to the market rate of interest, broadly conceived, the determi-
nants of the latter are not confi ned to the market for loanable funds. 
 The primary focus of the Austrian theory of capital and interest is the prices 
of individual capital goods and of other inputs. Actual prices, of course, will 
provide an imperfect refl ection of the general market rate of time discount 
owing to the absence of complete intertemporal coordination. The demand 
price for any particular capital good will be determined by its discounted mar-
ginal value in the mind of the entrepreneur who is contemplating using the 
capital good in a particular way. Its value to him is likely to be reckoned 
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largely in terms of the price he expects that entrepreneurs in the next stage 
of production will pay him for his immediate output. For example, the steel 
mill’s demand price for iron ore depends upon the expected market price for 
sheet steel. The demand price for capital goods in the next stage is deter-
mined similarly. Ultimately, the demand price of any capital good is linked to 
the expected market value of the prospective consumption good. The supply 
price is determined by the next highest, similarly determined value. 
 The forces of supply and demand as embodied in the actions of individual 
entrepreneurs result in the establishment of a market price for each capital 
good. The combined effect of the discounting in the minds of the different 
entrepreneurs in each stage of the entire sequence of stages tends to refl ect the 
general rate of time discount and the interval of time separating the particu-
lar capital good and the prospective consumption good. Thus, the idea of a 
structure of production together with the idea of competition as a discovery 
procedure combine to suggest how a capital-using market-oriented economy 
functions. 
 A macroeconomic view of this same market process reveals a new dimen-
sion to the coordination problem. The market’s ability to solve this more 
global coordination problem – conventionally conceived as the problem of 
coordinating savings decisions with investment decisions – has always been 
the central issue in macroeconomics. Identifying the Austrian contribution to 
macroeconomics follows a more general discussion of variations in the econ-
omy’s fi nal output and their relationship to the structure of production. 
 Variations in the fi nal output of the production process 
 The issue of what causes the level of output in a smoothly functioning 
economy to vary over time is fundamental to macroeconomics. In fact, 
answering this question should be considered a prerequisite to addressing 
such macro-maladies as cyclical unemployment. 12 Unfortunately, this issue 
is typically relegated to a separate discussion on the subject of economic 
growth, and even then the variations considered are restricted to alternative 
(continuous) rates of growth. Austrian economists have traditionally rejected 
this dichotomization of macroeconomics and economic growth. Final 
output will vary over time in part because the production process is being 
adjusted normally in response to changes in market conditions and in part 
because that same process is experiencing a malfunction of some kind. For 
methodological soundness it is necessary to identify the possible and relevant 
sources of variation in a coordinated economy before considering the cause(s) 
of variations associated with a market malfunction. In more general terms, 
we must know how things could ever go right before we can ask what might 
possibly go wrong. 13 
 Quite apart from the unwanted and disruptive fl uctuations in the econ-
omy’s output, a number of factors can be identifi ed that will have a predict-
able infl uence on the nature and magnitude of that output. There is a nearly 
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infi nite number of possible preference changes that will eventually be refl ected 
in the economy’s fi nal output. All but a few of such possible changes consist 
of increases or decreases in the demands for particular goods and services 
and are the proper concern of microeconomics. The remaining few possibil-
ities consist of broadly defi ned preferences that, by their very nature, have 
systematic and economy-wide consequences. These preference changes, which 
are the proper concern of macroeconomics, bear an almost one-to-one rela-
tionship to the traditional macroeconomic aggregates of employment, money 
and saving and investment. Changes in preferences directly related to the fi rst 
two aggregates, which have served as the primary focus of analysis outside 
the Austrian school, will be discussed in sequence in the present section. The 
following section will focus on the one aspect of the process that has special 
relevance both inside and outside the Austrian school. 
 The level of fi nal output may change because of a change in demand for 
leisure time or, what amounts to the same thing, a change in the supply of 
labor. If  “leisure” were included in the accounting of fi nal output, this prefer-
ence change could best be analyzed with the usual microeconomic tools. The 
effect would be seen as the “production” of a larger (smaller) quantity of leis-
ure time and a smaller (larger) quantity of other goods. But because the “pro-
duction of leisure” is autistic in nature, it is rightly excluded from the  market’s 
fi nal output. Hence, a change in the labor-leisure trade-off  is seen as giving 
rise to a change in the  level of  fi nal output. Further, an increase in the demand 
for leisure will have a systematic effect on the structure of production. Some 
production processes involve capital goods that are predominately comple-
ments to labor; others involve capital goods that are predominately substi-
tutes for labor. A decrease in the supply of labor will decrease the demand 
for complementary capital and increase the demand for capital that serves as 
a labor substitute. Corresponding changes in the quantities of the different 
kinds of capital goods supplied and demanded will be brought about. 
 Conceiving each of the various production processes as a temporal sequence 
of stages complicates the effect of a change in the labor-leisure trade-off, but 
it does not affect its essential features. Some production processes may include 
some stages in which capital and labor are complements and other stages in 
which capital and labor are substitutes. While there may be no  a priori basis 
on which to specify how the fi nal output of such production processes will be 
affected by a change in the supply of labor, there is no reason to believe that 
the market process itself  cannot adjust for the preference change. 
 The relationship between the labor-leisure trade-off  and the level of fi nal 
output has served as the focus for the writings of D. H. Robertson ( 1949 ), 
and was typical of pre-Keynesian British macroeconomics. 14 Robertson was 
concerned with the particulars of the market processes that translate changes 
in leisure preferences into changes in productive activities, and with the pos-
sibility that governmental policies, particularly banking policies, interfere in 
a systematic way with these market processes. There are many modern mani-
festations of this mode of analysis. Depicting the market process triggered 
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by a monetary expansion in terms of the interplay between the short-run 
and the long-run Phillips curve is one of the clearest examples. Monetary 
factors create a distortion in the labor - leisure trade-off  – a distortion that 
is subsequently corrected by market forces. A second example, which is not 
so self-evident, is the “rational expectations” models. Logically, these models 
need not turn on the labor-leisure trade-off, but in most instances they do. 15 
It should be recognized that much of modern macroeconomics is fundamen-
tally Robertsonian in this respect. 
 In an alternative approach, the demand for money takes the place of the 
demand for leisure. As in the labor-leisure-based models, if  real cash hold-
ings were included in the accounting of fi nal output – that is, if  money were 
treated as a consumption good – the analysis would be microeconomic in 
form. An increase in liquidity preferences would give rise to an increase in the 
real quantity of money demanded and supplied and a decrease in the quan-
tity of all other goods. (This general equilibrium proposition holds for money 
only in the case of a competitively produced commodity money. Under a fi at 
system administered by an angelic and omniscient central bank, the decrease 
in the production of non-monetary goods could be avoided.) But the unique-
ness of the character of money argues for its exclusion from the accounting of 
fi nal output. This recasts the analysis in terms of macroeconomics and raises 
the question of the relationship between changes in the demand for money 
and the  level of  fi nal output. 
 In both classical and neoclassical analysis, changes in the demand for 
money have no long-run effect on the economy’s output. But the market pro-
cess that translates such changes into nominal price changes can be a long 
and troubled process, which can itself  have a signifi cant effect on the short-
run level of output. Stating the relationship between money and output in 
these terms is a useful way of interpreting and assessing the contribution of 
John Maynard Keynes (see, for instance, Keynes,  1964 , pp. 229–36). It also 
serves to draw a parallel between this approach and the approach adopted 
by Robertson. With the focus on the demand for money, the analysis takes 
the form of identifying the market process by which the economy adjusts to a 
change in liquidity preferences and of considering the possibility that govern-
ment policies, particularly banking policies, may ameliorate or exacerbate the 
problems inherent in this adjustment process. 
 Modern macroeconomics has virtually ignored the relationship between 
changes in liquidity preferences and alterations in the multi-stage production 
process as conceived by the Austrian school. But the classic article on the 
effects of infl ation by Kessel and Alchian ( 1962 ) suggests how a change in the 
demand for (or the supply of) money can systematically alter the collection 
of capital goods that make up the structure of production. Once again, the 
analysis parallels Robertson’s analysis of the effects of changes in the demand 
for leisure. Kessel and Alchian ( 1962 , p. 534) argue, in effect, that transactions 
balances and short-lived capital goods are complements, whereas transac-
tions balances and long-lived capital goods are substitutes. Thus, a decrease 
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in the demand for real cash holdings, whether exogenous or the effect of infl a-
tionary expectations, would be accompanied by a decrease in the demand for 
short-lived capital goods and an increase in the demand for long-lived capital 
goods. The resulting relative-price changes would bring about a systematic 
restructuring of the economy’s production process. The fact that both short-
lived and long-lived capital goods are employed in varying degrees in each 
of the temporally sequenced stages of production complicates the effect of a 
change in the demand for money, but does not alter the principle that governs 
the restructuring of the production process. 
 The relationship between the demand for money and the structure of pro-
duction identifi ed by Kessel and Alchian deserves attention, even though the 
effect of the life of capital goods on the demand for transactions balances 
has not been clearly established. The existence of long-lived capital goods 
that change hands a number of times blurs the distinction on which the rela-
tionship rests. Conversely, the choice within a single fi rm between the pro-
duction and employment of one long-lived capital good and the production 
and employment of a sequence of short-lived capital goods is unrelated to 
transactions balances. It can be noted in passing, however, that to the extent 
that long-lived capital goods are associated with early stages of production 
(physical plant) and short-lived capital goods are associated with the later 
stages (working capital), many of the implications of the Kessel-Alchian ana-
lysis are consistent with those of the Austrian analysis. 
 Before turning to the sort of preference changes that serve as the focus of 
analysis for the Austrian school, two other views about the relevant source of 
variation in fi nal output can be identifi ed. These sources, it will be seen, differ 
fundamentally from the ones thus far discussed (changes in leisure prefer-
ences and changes in liquidity preferences) in that they are not directly related 
to preferences). 
 In the typical treatment of  macroeconomic phenomena, the variation 
in fi nal output is attributed to the extent to which resources, both capital 
and labor, are idle. This is the standard textbook rendition of  Keynesian 
theory. The existence of  unemployed resources on an economy-wide basis 
is simply assumed. The resulting discrepancy between actual output and 
potential output is then demonstrated graphically, algebraically and statis-
tically. While this type of  analysis has a certain internal consistency about 
it, the theory as a whole is methodologically unsound. If  the objective is to 
explain the existence of  idle resources, it is illegitimate to base the theory 
on the assumption of  their existence (Hayek,  1967a , p. 34). No theoret-
ical construct can account for its own underlying assumptions. Textbook 
Keynesianism may be able to show how variations in fi nal output are related 
to variations in resource idleness, but it cannot explain why there should be 
resource idleness in the fi rst place. 16 A methodologically sound theory of 
variation in fi nal output, subjectivist or otherwise, requires that the vari-
ations be traced to some phenomenon that does not itself  require an eco-
nomic explanation. Tracing the variations to changes in preferences or to 
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(unanticipated) policy changes meets this requirement; tracing the varia-
tions to resource idleness does not. 
 Technological change has been taken by some to be the primary source of 
the variation in fi nal output. In two different contexts, both Knut Wicksell 
( 1965 ) in Sweden and Joseph Schumpeter ( 1934 ) in Austria adopted this 
view. 17 Tracing the variation in fi nal output to changes in technology meets 
the methodological requirements, but this approach has proven to be less than 
fruitful for several reasons. 
 First, from a macroeconomic point of  view, the rate of  technological pro-
gress – conceived in terms of  blueprints for productive activity – is never 
the binding constraint. In the absence of  new savings that would enable the 
implementation of  the new technology, no variation in fi nal output would 
result. (This point is emphasized by Rothbard, vol. II,  1970 , p. 749). Second, 
it is diffi cult to conceive of  technological change that occurs truly on an econ-
omy-wide basis. By their very nature, technological changes are embodied in 
specifi c capital goods or in specifi c production processes. Accordingly, the 
analysis of  the economic consequences of  such changes is more in the pur-
view of microeconomics. Third, because of  the uniqueness of  each techno-
logical change, there will be no predictable systematic effect on the structure 
of  production. No general statements can be made about how an improve-
ment in technology affects the relationships such as between capital and 
labor, or between long-lived capital goods and short-lived capital goods, or 
between capital employed in the relatively early stages of  production and 
capital employed in the relatively late stages. Undeniably, the diverse and 
continual changes in technology have a dramatic infl uence on the particular 
kinds of  productive activities undertaken, but technological change, in part 
because of  its diversity, has proven to be an unsuitable focus for macroeco-
nomic analysis. 
 Time preferences and the structure of production 
 Macroeconomic theories that satisfy basic methodological strictures focus on 
broadly defi ned changes in preferences and on the various government policies 
that affect (positively or negatively) the ability of the market to adjust to such 
changes. These changes in preferences, which correspond to the conventionally 
identifi ed macroeconomic aggregates, are of the sort that have systematic 
and identifi able economy-wide effects. As suggested by the discussion above, 
both leisure preferences and liquidity preferences have served as keystones 
for alternative classes of macroeconomic theories. Theories that belong to 
the fi rst class begin by pointing to the direct effects of a (leisure) preference 
change on wages and the volume of employment, and then go on to identify 
possible indirect effects that are brought about by the market’s adjustment 
process; theories of the second class begin by pointing to the direct effects of 
a (liquidity) preference change on the price level and the volume of real cash 
holdings, and then go on to identify the corresponding set of indirect effects. 
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 Given the particular preference changes that serve as the respective foci of 
analysis, the two classes of theories, which tell substantially different stor-
ies, are to be seen as complementary rather than contradictory. But taken 
together, they may fail to tell the whole story. They may even fail to tell the 
part of the story most relevant to the historical interpretation of government 
policies in the past and to policy prescriptions in the future. 
 The belief  that these alternative classes of theories have indeed failed in this 
respect is what led the Austrians to consider a theory that focuses on a third 
broadly defi ned change in preferences.  Time preferences serve as the keystone 
of Austrian macroeconomic theory. The analysis begins by pointing to the 
direct effects of a change in time preferences on the volume of savings, and 
then goes on to identify the subsequent effects on the level of investment in 
the various stages of production and on the pattern of the employment of 
labor. This analysis forms the basis for a theory of monetary disturbances, 
which involves a market process that resembles the preference-induced adjust-
ment in its early stages but deviates from that adjustment process in critical 
ways during the later stages. 18 
 Anticipating the arguments in  Chapter 9 , we can note that expectations will 
have their effect on both the preference-induced and the policy-induced mar-
ket process. To the extent that individual market participants understand the 
general effects of various policies, and to the extent that they anticipate policy 
changes, the  intended effects of the policy will be thwarted. Entrepreneurs will 
attempt to base their decisions on the “real factors.” This is not to say, how-
ever, that so-called “rational expectations” will eliminate all the real effects of 
monetary policy. Supporting these claims about expectations and the effects 
of policy will be the business of the following chapter. 
 Preliminary to such issues is an accounting of how the market adjusts to a 
change in time preferences in the absence of any policy disturbances. The pre-
sent concern, then, is how the various markets  would have to work if  a change 
in time preferences on the part of consumers is to be successfully translated 
into a corresponding change in the pattern of productive activities. The issue 
of whether the markets  do in fact work in this way (or would work in this way 
in the absence of debilitating government policy) is an issue that turns on our 
understanding of entrepreneurship. The following discussion will assume that 
entrepreneurs are alive and well and that they tend to discover and act upon 
opportunities for making profi ts. In other words, for the time being we are 
abstracting from coordination problems in order to focus on these later. 
 The analysis focuses on the effects of an hypothesized fall in time prefer-
ences, that is, a shift in preferences away from current consumption and toward 
greater consumption in the future. This task is a prerequisite to the Austrian 
analysis of a monetary expansion. (Detailing the effects of a rise in time pref-
erences, which are – with some qualifi cations – symmetrical to the effects of a 
fall, would be a prerequisite to the analysis of a monetary contraction.) 
 Hypothesizing a fall in time preferences is equivalent to hypothesizing a 
decrease in the demand for consumption goods in the current period and 
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a concomitant increase in the supply of loanable funds. That the funds not 
spent on consumption goods are made available in the loan market – that is, 
that they do not simply accumulate in cash hoards – follows from the hypoth-
esis that the preference change involves time preferences only and not liquidity 
preferences or some combination of the two. Further, a fall in time prefer-
ences implies an increase in the demand for consumption goods at some time 
in the future. That is, the preference change does not imply a permanently 
lowered level of consumption and hence of production. This would be the 
case only if  the consumers had also experienced an increase in leisure prefer-
ences. With unchanged preferences for liquidity and leisure, a change in time 
preferences implies only a change in the time pattern of desired consumption 
activity in the future. A fall in time preferences means a demand for relatively 
less consumption activity in the present and near future and relatively more 
in the more distant future. 19 
 The direct effect of a fall in time preferences is a fall in the loan rate of inter-
est and an increase in the quantity of loanable funds supplied and demanded. 
This result requires only that market-clearing forces prevail in the market 
for loanable funds. More interesting is the question of the particular ways in 
which this increased quantity of loanable funds is put to use. The hypothet-
ical change in preferences implies that individuals will want to consume some 
assortment of consumption goods at some date in the future. Gaging what 
particular consumption goods to produce and when in particular to have them 
ready for consumption is the task of the entrepreneur. But then, this is always 
the task of the entrepreneur. The change in time preferences simply means 
that the entrepreneur is performing his task under the conditions of a lower 
rate of interest and a greater availability of credit. All that needs to be said 
here about the ability of entrepreneurs to adapt successfully to these changed 
credit conditions is that self-correcting forces are at work: those entrepreneurs 
who do successfully adapt will tend to make profi ts and hence will gain com-
mand over greater quantities of resources, while those who do not will tend to 
make losses and hence will lose command over resources. 20 
 In any case, the systematic effect of the change in credit conditions can 
be stated independently of the particular assortment of consumption goods 
produced. 21 The lower rate of interest provides the incentive to allocate more 
capital to the relatively early stages of production. As suggested earlier the 
greater the amount of time separating an existing capital good from the pro-
spective consumption good, the greater the difference in value arising from 
time discounting between the capital good and the prospective consumption 
good. Alternatively stated, the value of capital goods used in the early stages 
of production is more sensitive to changes in the rate of interest than is the 
value of capital goods used in the later stages. Thus, a lower rate of interest 
provides an incentive to allocate more capital to the relatively early stages of 
production – and even to create still earlier stages of production than had pre-
viously existed. This reallocation of capital is consistent with the increase in 
demand for consumption goods in the relatively distant future. The increased 
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level of savings – that is, the decreased level of consumption in the present and 
near-future periods – releases resources that would otherwise have been used 
in the later stages of the old structure of production. These are the resources 
that enable the completion of the new, more time-consuming, production 
processes. To the extent that entrepreneurs correctly perceive and act upon 
profi t opportunities, the allocation of capital among the stages of production 
in the new production process will refl ect the rate of interest associated with 
the new time preferences. 
 The pattern of prospective consumption activity and the pattern of current 
production each contain an explicit time element. And the market process 
that tailors the production pattern to the prospective consumption pattern 
itself  takes place through time. This means that expectations about the par-
ticular assortment of consumption goods demanded become concretized 
with the passage of time in the particular capital goods of the early stages, 
while the passage of time itself  begins to reveal the extent to which those ini-
tial expectations were valid. Clearer perspectives on approaching periods of 
consumption and mounting information (via the price system and otherwise) 
about resource availabilities may serve to establish the validity of the initial 
expectations or to demonstrate their falsity. In the case of the latter, new pro-
duction activities will have to be planned in the light of changed expectations 
and in the circumstances of a partially completed, but inappropriate, struc-
ture of production. 22 (An illuminating  gestalt is that of buttoning together 
two pieces of material of unknown relative lengths. With each successive but-
ton we commit more resources to the total task and at the same time gain a 
better perspective on whether or not we are correctly matching the buttons 
and the buttonholes.) 
 The obstacles that stand in the way of successful entrepreneurship are sub-
stantial and multifaceted. Entrepreneurs must foresee what particular goods 
will be in demand and when, in particular, the consumers will demand them. 
They must take into account the extent to which the various consumption 
goods are substitutes for or complements to one another. They must decide 
how best to produce these goods, what capital goods should be used, and how 
the value of these various capital goods may change because of their relation-
ships with other capital goods as substitutes or complements. They must base 
all these foresights, this accounting and these decisions on changing informa-
tion while recognizing that each new bit of information is itself  the result of 
the passage of time and the entrepreneurs’ attempts to implement their earlier 
production plans. Further, because few production processes are character-
ized by complete vertical integration, entrepreneurs must form expectations 
about the actions (and hence about the expectations) of other entrepreneurs 
who are involved in other stages of the production process. 
 The opportunities for entrepreneurial error are virtually infi nite. Yet, there 
is no reason to believe that entrepreneurs will be  systematically in error. In 
general, the market process should result in the production of consumption 
goods whose time pattern tends to correspond with the time preferences of 
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consumers. It is expected to produce consumption goods neither systematic-
ally too early nor systematically too late. There is no reason to believe that 
the market process would cause the structure of production to be adjusted in 
such a way that resources were left idle, or that it would result in the abandon-
ment of an attempted structural adjustment because of a lack of suffi cient 
resources. In other words, the market process is expected to result in neither 
general gluts nor general shortages of resources. 
 But systematic errors on the part of entrepreneurs are observed historically. 
Particular periods in the course of history appear to be marked with “clus-
ters” of entrepreneurial errors as revealed by economy-wide losses suffered 
by business fi rms. These clusters of errors – and of losses – constitute the 
downturn of the business cycle. 23 With no reason to believe that this cyclical 
pattern is inherent in the market process that tailors production activities to 
consumption activities, theorists must look outside the market itself  for an 
explanation. And the explanation of cyclical activity is to be found in the 
effects of monetary policy on the structure of production. The arguments can 
be anticipated by recognizing one similarity and one difference between the 
effects of a fall in time preferences and the effects of an expansion of credit by 
the central bank. A fall in time preferences results in a lower rate of interest, 
which initiates a restructuring of productive activities and releases enough 
resources (from the later stages of production) to complete the new structure 
of production; a policy-induced expansion of credit lowers the loan rate of 
interest, which has an initial effect similar to that of a fall in time preferences 
but which does  not release the resources required to complete the new struc-
ture of production. 
 Information about the activities of the central bank, anticipation of future 
policy changes, and an understanding on the part of entrepreneurs of the 
effects of credit expansion do, undeniably, have important effects on the way 
in which the restructuring takes place; but neither these nor any other con-
siderations can eliminate all the real effects of credit expansion. This is the 
subject matter of the following chapter. 
 Before turning to monetary theory, it may be worthwhile to address dir-
ectly several popular criticisms of Austrian capital theory and of such related 
notions as the period of production, the degree of roundaboutness and the 
original factors of production. 
 Subjectivism revisited 
 Dating from the writings of B ö hm-Bawerk, the basic concepts in Austrian 
capital theory have met with substantial criticism. An early controversy 
involving Clark and B ö hm-Bawerk was followed by an involved and protracted 
debate between Knight and Hayek. 24 Although criticism stemming from the 
Clark-Knight tradition continues today (see, for example, Rolph,  1980 ), these 
controversies have given way to challenges from other quarters. In the last 
two decades, Cambridge capital theorists, who have been largely preoccupied 
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with the phenomena of “technique reswitching and capital reversing,” have 
constructed multi-period models of capital-using production processes 
that are widely believed to have discredited the older Austrian vision. 25 The 
models of the more broadly conceived “classical revival” are believed to have 
similar implications about the theory of capital devised by B ö hm-Bawerk. 
To provide anything like a comprehensive survey of this literature would be 
both tedious and unnecessary. It will serve our purposes to point out that 
the challenging views share a single characteristic which renders all of this 
criticism inapplicable to the formulation offered in the present chapter. 
 It was emphasized above that the concept of “stages of production” and, 
by implication, the related concepts of the “period of production” and the 
“degree of roundaboutness” are subjectively defi ned. That is, they are defi ned 
in terms of the prospective consumption activity that ultimately motivates a 
given act of production. At best, the various criticisms of Austrian capital 
theory are well-taken warnings against all attempts to defi ne these concepts 
objectively. 
 The fact that the critics have seen the objectively defi ned concepts as their 
target is not entirely their own fault. B ö hm-Bawerk himself, in his eagerness 
to make use of arithmetic examples, imbued these concepts with a distinctly 
objectivist fl avor. But this aspect of B ö hm-Bawerk’s formulation has been 
the target of criticism from  within the Austrian school. Mises, for instance, 
pointed out that one “shortcoming of B ö hm-Bawerk’s reasoning was his mis-
construction of the concept of the period of production. He was not fully 
aware of the fact that the period of production is a praxeological category …” 
(Mises,  1966 , p. 488). Israel Kirzner shows that B ö hm-Bawerk virtually stood 
alone on this methodological issue (Kirzner,  1976 , p. 54). Later Austrian the-
orists who have built upon the B ö hm-Bawerkian vision have been careful to 
recast the basic concepts in a more consistently subjectivist mold. 
 In the present exposition of Austrian capital theory, certain summary-type 
statements have been deliberately avoided. “A fall in the rate of interest tends 
to increase the degree of roundaboutness.” Or “the rate of interest and the 
period of production are inversely related.” Such statements invite misin-
terpretation. They suggest that the degree of roundaboutness and the aver-
age period of production are measurable quantities – quantities that can be 
determined by, say, inspecting the blueprints that map out a given production 
process. And the statements would have to be true in this sense if  the dem-
onstration of technique reswitching is to constitute a refutation of Austrian 
capital theory. 
 Cambridge capital theorists have constructed models of an economy that 
employs one or the other of two alternative production techniques, desig-
nated as technique A and technique B. They have then demonstrated that 
successive reductions in the rate of interest can lead to the abandonment of 
technique A and the adoption of technique B followed by the abandonment 
of technique B and the re-adoption of technique A. This is the phenomenon 
of technique reswitching (Samuelson,  1966 , pp. 236–8). So long as the degree 
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of roundaboutness of the two production techniques is uniquely specifi ed by 
their respective blueprints, one of the switchings has to be contrary to the 
summary truths of Austrian capital theory. 
 The possibility of technique reswitching in this Cambridge sense was rec-
ognized by Hayek in the early 1940s (Hayek,  1941 , pp. 76–7, 140ff. and 191f.), 
but neither he nor later Austrian theorists have seen this phenomenon as a 
threat to Austrian capital theory. If  the theory is interpreted subjectively, the 
Cambridge challenge misfi res. The blueprint of a production technique does 
not, by itself, fully defi ne the economically relevant time element of the econ-
omy’s production process. If  increased savings cause entrepreneurs to commit 
additional resources to the earlier stages of production of a given production 
process, then the structure as a whole is more time-consuming. The fall in the 
rate of interest translates the now more distant time horizons of consumers 
into correspondingly more distant time horizons of producers. This result 
is quite independent of any change in the production technique employed. 
In the context of the Cambridge model, the Austrians would claim that the 
re-adoption of technique A involves more roundaboutness than its earlier 
employment. 
 The value in the summary statements quoted above lies precisely in their 
ability to summarize a complex argument. They represent a shorthand for 
expressing the general way in which the pattern of productive activity can be 
expected to change in response to a change in time preferences on the part of 
the consumer. 26 
 Finally, it can be noted that the period of production is sometimes reck-
oned in terms of the time that elapses between the application of the so-
called original factors and the emergence of the fi nal output. The “original 
factors,” a phrase that is usually interpreted to mean raw land and labor, has 
also been avoided in the present exposition. Again, the use of such termin-
ology invites misinterpretation. It suggests not only an objectivist conception 
but also an historical orientation. Any attempt to impute economic meaning 
to the period of time between the objectively defi ned original factors and the 
resulting consumption activity will be in vain. With a subjectivist interpret-
ation, factors of production have meaning only in the context of prospective 
consumption goods and the plans formulated by the entrepreneurs to prod-
uce these goods. All factors – land, labor,  and capital – that were in existence 
when the entrepreneur’s plan was fi rst formulated can rightly be thought of 
as original factors. 27 
 Modern objections to Austrian capital theory could be countered on still 
other grounds (see Yeager,  1979 ; Garrison,  1979 ). In the Cambridge formu-
lation the rate of interest is treated as an exogenous variable. The changes in 
the interest rate that supposedly induce technique reswitching are themselves 
unaccounted for. This simply makes for bad theory – theory in which changes 
in the level of savings are neither a cause nor a consequence of changes in 
the rate of interest. In the reswitching models, the only change in production 
activities allowed for is a change in the technique employed. A change in the 
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rate of interest either has no effect whatever or provokes a change in the pro-
duction technique. The relevance of such a model – even to B ö hm-Bawerk’s 
formulation of Austrian capital theory – is questionable. And the particular 
way in which the analysis is carried out raises still further questions. Despite 
claims to the contrary, the fundamental distinction between the comparison 
of alternative equilibrium states and the description of the process by which 
the economy is moved from one state to another is hopelessly blurred. This is a 
virtually inevitable consequence of the failure to specify what particular pref-
erence or policy change caused the initial change in the rate of interest. While 
these aspects of Cambridge capital theory are grounds for dissatisfaction with 
the theory itself, they have been largely overlooked in the present treatment in 
order that the thematic distinction between subjectivist and objectivist views 
of a capital-using economy could be emphasized. 
 Notes 
 1  This chapter was contributed by Roger W. Garrison, Professor Emeritus at Auburn 
University. 
 2  Walsh and Gram ( 1980 , pp. 122ff. and  passim ) take this atemporal resource alloca-
tion to be the defi ning theme of neoclassical thought. 
 3  A fuller accounting of the limits of neoclassical general equilibrium theory is 
found in Hahn ( 1980 ); see also Walsh and Gram ( 1980 , pp. 159–61). 
 4  Ludwig Lachmann ( 1973 , p. 46) identifi es formalism, defi ned as “a style of thought 
according to which abstract entities are treated as though they were real,” as the 
antithesis of subjectivism: see Lachmann ( 1969 , pp. 95–100) for a discussion of for-
malism and subjectivism in the perspective of the history of economic thought. 
 5  In his early writings Mises ( 1953 , p. 339) simply indicated that, while he was mak-
ing use of B ö hm-Bawerk’s terminology and general approach, he was not an 
adherent of B ö hm-Bawerk’s theory of interest. Mises identifi ed and elaborated 
upon his dissatisfaction with the theory some years later in  Human Action ( 1966 ). 
 6  Israel Kirzner sees this as the central idea in Menger’s  Principles. “Men value 
goods according to the value of the satisfactions that depend on possession of 
those goods. More generally, Menger’s Law – as we may call this insight – draws 
attention to man’s propensity  to attach the value of ends to the means needed for 
their achievement.” 
 7  Capital as a two-dimensional concept can be traced as far back as Turgot, but it is 
commonly associated with the writings of Jevons ( 1970 ) and Cassel ( 1903 ). 
 8  In Keynes’ vision of the economy, the question is whether and how the inves-
tors can “defeat the dark forces of time and ignorance which envelop our future” 
(Keynes,  1964 , p. 155). 
 9  This point was fully recognized by Mises but not by B ö hm-Bawerk. 
 10  “The mere information conveyed by technology would suffi ce for the performance 
of calculation only if  all means of production – both material and human – could 
be perfectly substituted for one another according to defi nite ratios, or if  they were 
absolutely specifi c” (Mises,  1966 , p. 207). 
 11  Mises ( 1966 , pp. 483–8) and Rothbard ( 1970 , pp. 323–32) make the case that (posi-
tive) time preference is a logical imperative. 
 12  Hayek ( 1967a , pp. 32ff.) clearly recognizes this question as preliminary to the 
question about the nature of industrial fl uctuations. This section can be viewed 
as an updated and elaborated version of the fi rst few sections of Hayek’s second 
chapter. 
A subjectivist theory of a capital-using economy 205
 13  This methodological stricture, which is typically observed in the breach by mod-
ern macroeconomic theorists, was fi rst introduced by Hayek in a macroeconomic 
setting. “Before we can explain why people commit mistakes, we must fi rst explain 
why they should ever be right” ( 1937a , p. 34). 
 14  Hayek ( 1967a , p. 33) cites Robertson’s  Banking Policy and the Price Level as the 
best example of reasoning based on the labor-leisure trade-off. 
 15  A recent survey article (Maddock and Carter,  1982 , p. 42) points out that “the 
example most often used in the (rational expectations) literature involves the allo-
cation of time between labor and leisure.” 
 16  In Keynes’  General Theory, resource idleness is caused by a blockage of some kind 
in the market for labor – or in the market for the capital assets to which labor is 
complementary (see Keynes,  1964 , pp. 222–44, 257–71). The attempt to pin down 
the precise nature of these blockages has separated Keynes’ interpreters into two 
camps: those who believe that Keynes was only emphasizing the possibility – long 
recognized by pre-Keynesian economists – that disequilibrium wages and prices 
can result in resource idleness (see, for instance, Knight,  1960 ), and those who 
believe that Keynes held some truly revolutionary ideas that he was not quite able 
to spell out in his book (see, for instance, Clower,  1965 ). 
 17  For Schumpeter “technological change” refers to any change not spontaneously 
initiated by consumers; see Schumpeter ( 1934 , pp. 65ff.), where several specifi c cat-
egories of such changes are itemized. 
 18  One of the most succinct comparisons of the preference-induced process and the 
corresponding policy-induced process is found in Hayek ( 1967a , pp. 49–60). 
 19  The relevance of this analysis does not depend upon the actual occurrence of the 
monolithic changes in time preferences on an economy-wide basis. It is enough 
that such changes are conceivable and that less monolithic changes do in fact 
occur. Hayek ( 1967a , p. 50) clearly recognized that he was dealing with a “strong 
case” that is “highly unlikely to occur in practice.” 
 20  This reasoning implies that current production is in fact linked to future con-
sumption plans via the interest rate and entrepreneurial activity. The exist-
ence of  any such link was denied by Keynes ( 1964 , p. 21) when he accused the 
orthodoxy of  “fallaciously supposing that there is a nexus which unites deci-
sions to abstain from present consumption with decisions to provide for future 
consumption.” 
 21  This is the systematic effect that Hayek depicted with his triangles: see Hayek 
( 1969 , pp. 49–54) and Rothbard ( 1970 , pp. 470–9). For an attempt at a compre-
hensive diagrammatical exposition of Austrian macroeconomic relationships, see 
Garrison ( 1978 ). 
 22  The idea that expectations are neither truly exogenous nor entirely endogenous is a 
recurring theme in the writing of Ludwig Lachmann. See for example Lachmann 
( 1976 , pp. 126–32). 
 23  According to Rothbard ( 1970 , p. 16), “The main problem that a theory of depres-
sion must explain is:  why is there a sudden general cluster of business errors? ” As 
critics of the rational expectations school, Maddock and Carter ( 1982 , p. 44) 
point out that this problem is being overlooked. “If  expectations are rational, then 
expectation errors should be randomly distributed over time. A straightforward 
implication of that for this model is that the level of output (or unemployment) 
is uncorrelated over time. Yet everybody knows that the GNP and the unemploy-
ment series have a high degree of serial correlation. We tend to go through a series 
of years in which unemployment is below the ‘natural rate,’ and then a series of 
years in which it is above the ‘natural rate.’ It doesn’t seem to be distributed very 
randomly. Compare the sixties and the seventies in Australia – it’s the old story of 
business cycle expansion and contraction.” 
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 24  For a critical assessment of the Clark-Knight view, see Kirzner ( 1966 , pp. 79–82). 
 25  The key article by Samuelson ( 1966 ) is reprinted in Harcourt and Laing ( 1971 ). 
This volume contains a number of other articles that deal with the Cambridge 
capital controversy. 
 26  This is the basis upon which Hayek ( 1941 , p. 70) recommended that such state-
ments be retained. 
 27  This point was fi rst made by Kirzner ( 1966 , p. 80). 
 
 9  The microanalytics of money 
 Money is not a consciously created artifact, but grows out of, refl ects, and 
in turn affects the ever-changing relationships between individuals and the 
society which they compose. 
 S. Herbert Frankel ( 1977 , p. 12) 
 Introduction 
 In this chapter, we focus on two major topics: Menger’s theory of the 
origins of money, and the Mises-Hayek theory of economic fl uctuations. 
Each exemplifi es the subjectivist approach to economic questions followed 
throughout this book. In his theory of the origins of money, Menger adopted 
a microeconomic approach to analyzing the evolution of money and monetary 
institutions. He viewed money as an example of an organic social institution, 
which, though the result of human action, was not the product of human 
design. 
 Menger applied a kind of “invisible hand” theorem to explain how a com-
mon medium of exchange emerges from individual choices. Specifi cally, trans-
actors must decide in what form to hold their wealth. Their choices involve 
commitments in the form of commodity inventories. Menger argued that 
liquidity considerations would dominate these choices. If  the process did not 
produce a unique money, it would certainly converge on a small number of 
media of exchange. 
 In their business cycle theory, Mises and Hayek also adopted microeco-
nomic reasoning to analyze a macroeconomic problem. Their theory empha-
sizes the importance of the passage of real time, and the intertemporal effects 
of agents making commitments in the form of fi xed investments. Further, 
it illustrates the practical importance of the distinction between typical and 
unique events. 
 The Mises-Hayek theory of economic fl uctuations analyzes the inter-
play between monetary disturbances, resource scarcities and entrepreneurial 
expectations. It concludes that, by changing expectations, monetary shocks 
can infl uence the course of economic expansion. The resulting expansion will 
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develop, however, in a way that is inconsistent with long-run scarcity con-
straints. The theory focuses on sectoral imbalances in economic expansion, 
imbalances producing economic fl uctuations. 
 In this chapter we focus on points of convergence and divergence between 
the earlier Austrian theories and modern formulations of the problems. We 
emphasize the common ground between them, and in some cases try to sug-
gest resolution of the differences. In doing this, we also highlight the policy 
relevance of the theories. 
 Microanalysis of money 
 The modern macroeconomic revolution is associated with Keynes’  General 
Theory . We refer here to the division of economics into two major areas or 
fi elds: micro- and macrotheory. At least until the mid-1970s, the two areas 
evolved semi-autonomously. This theoretical isolation diminished somewhat 
with the quest for the microeconomic foundations of macrotheory. 
 Subjectivists always felt uneasy about this bifurcation. In particular, Mises 
and Hayek consciously sought to integrate monetary economics and micro-
theory. They viewed the marginal revolution basically as a microeconomic 
upheaval, a triumph of micro- over macroanalysis. They saw monetary theory 
as a backwater in which macroeconomic reasoning dominated (O’Driscoll, 
 1977 , pp. 135–42). In other words, monetary theory was macroeconomic in 
its orientation before the Keynesian episode. Hayek and Mises specifi cally 
criticized the quantity-theory tradition for being mechanistic and aggregative, 
a holdover from the macroeconomic approach of classical (Ricardian) polit-
ical economy. Along with other pre-Keynesians, they recast monetary theory 
in light of modern microeconomics. Thus, Hicks’ “Suggestion for Simplifying 
the Theory of Money” ( 1935 ) met with great professional acclaim precisely 
because it encapsulated the unifying theme or goal of these contributions. 
The fruits of all these efforts were swept aside by the Keynesian tide, which 
was a macroeconomic inundation. 1 
 Hayek criticized Keynesian macroeconomics for lacking microfoundations – 
indeed, for being inconsistent with microtheory on key issues. In particular, he 
questioned the validity of analyzing the determination of aggregate demand 
and national income as distinct theoretical problems. He argued that the pro-
cess of moving toward equilibrium in individual markets is identical with 
that of achieving full employment of resources. What is called “unemploy-
ment” equilibrium is a manifestation of microeconomic discoordination. 
Macroeconomic phenomena can be analyzed properly only by microeconomic 
analysis.  There are macroeconomic effects of economic disequilibrium, but there 
is no distinct macroeconomic theory . That is, there is no consistent theory of 
macroaggregates that can be couched solely in terms of these aggregates or 
that consistently relates aggregates to each other (see Lachmann,  1973 ). 
 In terms of the literature on both microfoundations and rational expec-
tations, Hayek and Mises anticipated some modern theoretical arguments. 
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Moreover, their specifi c theories pointed in the direction toward which 
important contemporary theories are evolving. For this reason, we devote 
some time to presenting their position and relating it to modern theoretical 
developments. 
 Hayek’s monetary theory of economic fl uctuations is couched in terms of 
changing relative prices and costs. Monetary shocks produce particular types 
of discoordination in markets. The process of adjusting to these shocks pro-
duces effects on aggregative variables. It is not possible, however, to analyze 
these effects in terms of a standard macrotheory. The level of aggregation 
necessarily obscures the economic phenomena being studied. If  one were, for 
instance, to aggregate heterogeneous capital goods into “capital,” the complex 
relationships among capital goods would be lost. The concept of “aggregate 
demand” is problematical because, among other things, it obscures the poten-
tially  inverse relationship between consumption and investment. An increase 
in consumption expeditures does not simply increase aggregate demand and 
national income: it may also decrease investment. Investment alone leads to 
capital formation, which provides for a future supply of output. As a result, a 
given quantitative increase in consumption, compared with the same increase 
in investment, can have qualitatively different effects on employment and real 
income. 
 Hayek’s approach is ultimately as inconsistent with monetarist as it is with 
Keynesian macroeconomics. The precise points of contention change, but not 
the ultimate theoretical questions. Monetarists focus on the determination of 
the price level. The determination of the equilibrium price level is analyzed 
separately from that of relative prices. Monetarists thereby implicitly invoke a 
limited neutrality assumption. Unanticipated monetary shocks may cause the 
growth rate of output to deviate from its trend rate, but these shocks change 
neither relative prices nor the composition of output. Monetary shocks and 
concomitant price level effects are superimposed on a given structure of pro-
duction and set of relative prices (O’Driscoll and Shenoy,  1976 , pp. 192–3). 
In contrast, Hayek integrated the analysis of the value of money with that of 
the determination of relative prices. 
 Modern neutrality assumptions virtually rule out the possibility of relative-
price effects of monetary shocks. By integrating monetary analysis and the 
theory of prices, economists make it feasible to analyze relative-price effects 
that may exist. The former approach closes off  theoretical avenues of inquiry 
while the latter opens them up. 
 Menger’s theory of money similarly integrates micro- and monetary ana-
lysis. It analyzes the evolution of money and the effects of monetary devel-
opment on economic activity. There is no distinction in the theory between 
micro- and macroanalysis. Menger does distinguish, however, between the 
intended and unintended consequences of human actions. This distinction 
is central to his analysis of monetary evolution. In his theory of monetary 
evolution, he treated theoretical and institutional analysis as complementary 
endeavors. Indeed, his approach is a model of the theoretical-institutional 
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approach sought by the New Institutional economists (Langlois,  1982a , 
pp. 11–17). 
 Menger and Hayek each adopted a microeconomic approach to traditional 
macroeconomic questions. Each thereby evidenced his aversion to macroeco-
nomic reasoning. In what follows, we both explicate the theoretical basis of 
this attitude and develop the respective theories. We begin with Menger’s sem-
inal analysis of money and monetary institutions. 
 The origin of money 
 The central issue with which Menger dealt was the question of “how … 
certain commodities come to be exalted into general media of exchange?” 
(Jones,  1976 , p. 758). 2 In distinguishing between money and nonmoney goods, 
analysts have traditionally highlighted intrinsic physical characteristics, such 
as portability and divisibility. Money and banking textbooks still repeat 
these explanations. Menger’s contribution was to focus not on physical but 
on market characteristics of goods. In taking this path, Menger was being 
more modern than are most contemporary monetary theorists. As Robert 
Jones observed in his study, “analysis suggests that the rationale for using a 
medium of exchange in the fi rst place might be found in the differing market 
characteristics of goods and the decentralized nature of exchange” (Jones, 
 1976 , p. 775). 
 The evolution of money is a paradigm case of the development of an 
organic social institution. In his  Principles , Menger summarized the evolu-
tionary process in the following way:
 As  each economizing individual becomes increasingly more aware of his 
economic interest, he is led by this  interest, without any agreement, with-
out legislative compulsion , and  even without regard to the public interest , to 
give his commodities in exchange for other, more saleable, commodities, 
even if  he does not need them for any immediate consumption purpose. 
With economic progress, therefore, we can everywhere observe the phe-
nomenon of a certain number of goods, especially those that are most 
easily saleable at a given time and place, becoming, under the infl uence of 
 custom , acceptable to everyone in trade, and thus capable of being given 
in exchange for any other commodity. These goods were called “ Geld ” by 
our ancestors, a term derived from “ gelten ” which means to compensate 
or pay. Hence the term “ Geld ” in our language designates the means of 
payment as such. 
 (Menger,  1981 , p. 260) 
 Menger’s theory is reminiscent of Adam Smith’s invisible hand reasoning. 
He based his theory of money on his analysis of commodity-stock holdings. 
Economies progress from economic self-suffi ciency, to production on order, 
to speculative production for the market. In the course of this evolutionary 
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process, transactors increasingly hold inventories of unfi nished and fi nished 
goods. They do so in order to enhance their ability to consummate future 
trades and to further their own consumption plans. 
 In committing themselves to holding commodity stocks, traders are con-
cerned, among other things, with the marketability ( absatzfahigkeit ) or sale-
ability of the goods held in their inventories. Traders discover that some 
commodities are especially marketable and widely acceptable, while other 
commodities are less so. Menger was almost exhaustive in discussing the fac-
tors impeding and facilitating marketability (Menger,  1981 , pp. 248–53). For 
the purpose of our discussion, it is suffi cient to observe that such factors exist 
and lead to differences in the saleability of various commodities. 
 Over time, entrepreneur-traders will prefer holding their wealth in more 
marketable commodities. This preference accentuates the differences in mar-
ketability among commodities. Those commodities perceived to be more sale-
able will tend to become even more so as individuals act on their perceptions. 
In building inventories of preferred commodities, wealth-owners create a 
wider and more active market for the commodity. Subjective factors thus play 
a crucial role in this market process, far more than is captured in arguments 
focusing on physical characteristics of commodities. Because the free choices 
of traders and the sequence of events affect the ultimate outcome, it is partly 
an accident of history which goods become the most marketable. This inde-
terminism is typical of evolutionary processes. 
 If  a good is suffi ciently marketable, particular individuals (mainly profes-
sional traders) would be willing to hold inventories of it even if  they have 
no fi nal demand for it. The good becomes a store of value. If  the process 
continues, the store of value becomes a medium through which other transac-
tions are conducted. In other words, we are describing the economic rationale 
for indirect exchange. Again, however, we are analyzing the productivity of 
indirect exchange on microeconomic grounds and in terms of a general the-
ory of inventory holdings. Moreover, the focus is on subjective perceptions 
and market characteristics of goods, not on their physical attributes. 
 Menger initially developed this theory by observing that goods do not have 
a unique price, but have different buying and selling prices. Not only is there a 
bid-asked spread, but this spread varies for different commodities. This phe-
nomenon was not explicable in terms of standard demand and supply theory. 
Menger’s explanation of bid-asked spreads is essentially a transactions-cost 
explanation. The bid-asked spread helps compensate wealth-owners for the 
costs of disposing of goods, costs that vary among goods. Since money is the 
most liquid commodity, it alone has a unique price, there being no bid-asked 
spread. 
 Sir John Hicks has succinctly characterized liquidity preference as a desire 
for fl exibility: “Liquidity is not a property of a single choice; it is a matter of a 
sequence of choices, a related sequence. It is concerned with the passage from 
the known to the unknown – with the knowledge that if  we wait we can have 
more knowledge” (Hicks,  1974 , pp. 38–9; see Shackle,  1967 , p. 6). In contrast, 
212 The economics of time and ignorance
“by holding the imperfectly liquid asset the holder has narrowed the trend 
of opportunities which may be open to him … He has ‘locked himself  in’ ” 
(Hicks,  1974 , pp. 43–4). Liquidity provides economic agents with fl exibility, 
fl exibility that lowers the cost of specialized production. 
 So large are the cost savings that the development of a complex economic 
order depends crucially on monetary evolution. Without the evolution of 
a highly liquid commodity with general acceptability, economic develop-
ment would be impossible. Specialized production depends on the ability 
of transactors to calculate effi ciently, and money alone makes this calcula-
tion possible. In our schematic analysis, we linked the progress of economic 
development with that of monetary evolution. Monetary evolution must be 
far advanced before a complex market system can evolve. In other words, a 
non-monetary economy must logically be a primitive one. This implication is 
corroborated by the notable absence of highly developed market economies 
utilizing barter. 3 
 Modern monetary theory characterizes money as though it were in some 
sense invented, despite the fact that over 100 years ago Menger realized that 
“money is not the product of an agreement on the part of economizing man 
nor the product of legislative acts. No one invented it” (Menger,  1981 , p. 262). 
Of the modern literature on the evolution of money, Jones has commented 
that “although these works illuminate how money might overcome logistical 
diffi culties of reaching an effi cient allocation with decentralized exchange, 
they offer no suggestions of how a monetary pattern of trade could evolve 
without a centralized decision” (Jones,  1976 , p. 759). Jones himself  avoided 
this pitfall, but did not solve the problem of simultaneously determining the 
money good and its market value. Menger had, however, accomplished this in 
the  Principles and in “ Geld .” There, Menger noted that, since money is simply 
the most marketable good, it has always had an exchange value. As it evolves 
into the medium of exchange, demand for the good increases. This process 
increases the relative price of the commodity money over time. 
 There is, of course, no unique point at which a good becomes money, no 
logical or historical break in economic history. One day’s price builds upon 
yesterday’s. At some point, we recognize that a commodity has become money 
in the modern sense, but any arbitrariness derives from our perception, not 
from the historical events themselves. In very recent times, economic histori-
ans have tended to look to the enactment of legal tender laws as marking the 
monetization of a good. Aside from perpetuating the myth that money is the 
invention of the state, this approach overlooks the fact that governments have 
done no more than sanction the existence of what has evolved on the market. 
The approach embodies the error dubbed “constructivism” by Hayek. 
 Consider the issue of monetary reform as an application of the evolution-
ary principle being discussed. Monetary reform proposals are often long on 
lists of advantages of adopting a new standard or monetary constitution, but 
short on transitional details. Hall has stated that “[e]xperience in countless 
nations shows that the simple announcement of the defi nition of a national 
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monetary unit, without any compulsion for its use, is suffi cient to bring about 
almost unanimous use” (Hall,  1982 , p. 2). This casual empiricism is not com-
pelling. Consider the example of a government’s introducing a new monetary 
unit, the “ecru.” To be a clear test of the thesis, the ecru cannot be linked 
to another currency. If, for instance, the ecru were declared to be worth one 
British pound, then the country would be effectively going on a sterling stand-
ard rather than introducing a new standard: the ecru would simply be the 
name for a pound sterling in the hypothetical country. There are many prac-
tical legal, political and economic problems inherent in such a change; but 
these are not the problems that concern us here. 
 Introducing the pure ecru standard raises the following analytical problem, 
which is Menger’s central problem in another guise. No economic agent would 
have an incentive to accept ecrus, because no one would have any grounds for 
forming expectations about the ecru’s future expected value. By assumption, 
the ecru has never existed before. Accordingly, it has no established value. 
Even if  the government were to declare the ecru legal tender, no one would 
have a clue as to its market value: no one, for instance, would know the ecru-
price of a pair of shoes. Until that question can be resolved, ecrus will not 
circulate as a medium of exchange. 4 
 We are simply restating the fact that the marginal utility of money depends 
on its exchange value, the reverse of the ordinary relationship for goods. In 
general equilibrium analysis, the  equilibrium values of all economic variables 
are simultaneously determined. Actual market prices are not established, 
however, by everyone sitting down and jointly solving a system of equations 
that describes the economy. The mutual determination of prices is a charac-
teristic of general equilibrium, not a method of attaining that equilibrium. 
No  market mechanism exists that could provide information to transactors 
as to what prices would be if   all of  them were to accept ecrus as the means 
of payment. The assumption to the contrary is an implicit denial that we are 
analyzing a decentralized system. 
 In the nineteenth century, Hall’s “simple announcement” of a new monet-
ary unit consisted of a country’s adopting either the gold or silver standard. 
In the twentieth century, “new” monetary units have typically come about in 
one of the following two ways. First, a government may link its national cur-
rency to another major currency, such as the pound or dollar. In this case, the 
government has effectively adopted a sterling or dollar standard. Second, a 
government may institute currency reform, substituting fi ve, ten or 100 units 
of the old currency for a unit of the new currency. If  the government couples 
this conversion with newly found monetary stringency, then the action can 
have value in speeding adjustment to anti-infl ationary policies. 
 To some extent, of course, it is a purely verbal issue whether this change is 
characterized as introducing a new monetary standard. Verbal issues aside, 
however, the success of the change depends crucially on the new standard’s 
being defi ned in terms of the old standard. If  it were not, the policy action 
would be equivalent to trying to adopt the ecru standard. With respect to 
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the second type of currency reform, the cases of Germany in the 1920s and 
France in the 1950s come to mind. In each case, a new currency was defi ned 
in terms of the old. Both were successful reforms. 
 Following Menger, Hayek has suggested that money is an evolved social 
institution in the same sense that language is. The analogy in fact can help 
illuminate the issue at hand. Modern linguists do not suppose that recognized 
languages are invented. 
 To suppose that they could be invented would be to involve oneself  in 
absurdities. To convince a whole population to switch its language, one would 
have to assure each individual that everyone else would use the language 
if  he did. To introduce successfully the new language, one must thus fi nd a 
population already conversant with the language. The richer one makes the 
example, the more overwhelming the informational and organizational prob-
lems become. (What motivates anyone to play this game? In what language do 
they negotiate, the new or the old?) 
 The problems with designed linguistic innovation derive from the com-
plexity of undesigned orders. Money and monetary institutions are largely 
undesigned or evolved social institutions. Policy actions do, of course, affect 
the evolution of institutions. Policy actions cannot precisely determine the 
eventual outcome, however, as is illustrated by the failure of attempts in 
French-speaking countries to maintain the “purity” of the language, and by 
the failure of the Irish government to maintain Gaelic as a living language. 
 We are not arguing against monetary reform or against the idea of per-
mitting a new monetary standard to evolve. We are suggesting, however, that 
reform proposals ought to take account of the complexity of evolved social 
institutions, as well as the exigencies of decentralized social systems. Actual 
historical examples of monetary reform do not illustrate governmental power 
to implement change so much as they illuminate the constraints on reform-
ers. Reforms have consisted of precisely those types that we have treated as 
being feasible. Governments can no more alter the monetary system by mere 
announcement than they can change their citizens’ language by fi at. 
 Constructivist monetary reform proposals attempt to predetermine out-
comes, rather than permit these to be determined by market forces. Market-
determined outcomes refl ect all relevant factors, not just the comparatively 
small number that can be included in economic models. Constructivist reform 
proposals overlook the fact that markets embody more information than will 
ever be available to a single mind or even to a group of experts (Hayek,  1945 ). 
The proposals treat these institutions and practices as being susceptible to 
centralized planning. In reality, monetary institutions – indeed, money itself  – 
are shaped by the same kind of forces affecting ordinary business practices 
and market institutions. 
 Indeed, in monetary matters generally, economists adopt procedures and 
theorize in ways rejected in other areas. Few economists would accept the 
validity of trying to reason  a priori about the optimal qualities that should 
be possessed by a cup of coffee or a glass of wine. These are recognized to 
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be things that can be determined only by market test, and which, moreover, 
typically show great variation across brands or trademarks. Yet most monet-
ary economists believe that rational economic theory ought to be capable of 
prescribing the optimal qualities, if  not the optimum quantity, of money. In 
part, these attitudes refl ect the belief  that money is “different,” different in a 
way possessing normative signifi cance. This belief, though long incorporated 
into theoretical assumptions, is yet to be convincingly substantiated. At the 
very least, there is an heuristic value to carrying the analysis of money as an 
ordinary good, generated by market forces, as far as it can be carried. This 
would better determine the limits of policy-making than would continued 
applications of  a priori reasoning about desirable properties of money. 
 Economic theory can perhaps specify the likely limits of monetary reform 
or the range of possible institutional outcomes. The range is not, however, 
open-ended; monetary systems that are postulated to be the product of mar-
ket processes must be the probable outcome of such processes. They must also 
be consistent with incentives facing individuals in the situations postulated 
(see O’Driscoll,  1983 , p. 331). 
 Business cycles 
 Cyclical variations generate profi t opportunities, a fact that is most apparent 
in the case of unemployed resources. Unemployed resources represent a 
mismatching of inputs to outputs. As long as fi nal output is scarce, versatile 
resources ought not to be persistently unemployed. Entrepreneurs who can 
reallocate resources to superior uses will earn profi ts. There are also profi t 
opportunities in speculating against markets in cyclical expansions. For 
instance, the housing and construction boom of the 1970s should have 
provided as many potential arbitrage possibilities as any eighteenth-century 
“bubble.” 
 We are characterizing the phases of an economic cycle as periods in which 
plans are persistently discoordinated. Any attempt to analyze such move-
ments, however, presents insuperable problems for models based on general 
equilibrium theory. The logic of static general equilibrium theory cannot gen-
erate processes in which decentralized systems move away from equilibrium. It 
cannot do so even if  it postulates exogenous disturbances. Even then, general 
equilibrium theory “can do no more than demonstrate that … the economic 
system always reacts to such changes by its well-known method of adapta-
tion, i.e. by the formation of a new equilibrium” (Hayek,  1966 , pp. 42–3). 
 In essence, rational expectations theorists have renewed Hayek’s critique of 
business cycle analysis. In his own work, Lucas ( 1977 ) has explicitly referred 
to that critique. Rational expectations theorists have generally focused their 
criticism on the expectational assumptions of traditional macroeconomic 
models. In their own positive theory, they treat the business cycle as an “equi-
librium” phenomenon, utilizing static models to analyze cyclical activity. This 
is one way to resolve the theoretical dilemma in question, but one that we 
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suggest does violence to the phenomenon. In our analysis, we adopt Hayek’s 
view of the cycle as a disequilibrium phenomenon. We restate his analysis, 
however, in terms of our own formulation of process theory. In particular, we 
argue that the distinction between typical and unique aspects of phenomena 
is especially useful in analyzing economic fl uctuations. 
 Analyzing expectational equilibrium is one aspect of the more general 
problem of modeling error in economics.  Ex ante error has been all but 
eliminated from neoclassical economics. Models can accommodate  ex post 
forecast errors, so long as these do not cause agents to revise their forecast-
ing function. In other words, there is error without regret or revision. Such 
errors must be uncorrelated with information available at the time decisions 
were implemented. In models of stochastic equilibrium, agents are correct 
on average. “Error” observations result from serially uncorrelated, random 
disturbances. Business cycles, however, represent a jarring element in this  wel-
tanschauung . Maddock and Carter concisely stated the issue:
 If  expectations are rational, then expectation errors should be randomly 
distributed over time. A straightforward implication of that for this 
model is that the level of output (or unemployment) is uncorrelated over 
time. Yet everybody knows that the GNP and the unemployment series 
have a high degree of serial correlation. We tend to go through a series 
of years in which unemployment is below the “natural rate” and then a 
series of years in which it is above the “natural rate.” It doesn’t seem to be 
distributed very randomly. 
 (Maddock and Carter,  1982 , p. 44) 
 Any consistent theory of  cyclical fl uctuations must incorporate time and 
expectational error in the analysis. It must also explain the important sources 
of  expectational error. As we argued in the previous chapter, it is insuffi cient 
merely to invoke uncertainty, even radical uncertainty, to explain the cycle 
of  economic expansion and contraction. Individual fi rms are continuously 
making errors, which show up as profi ts and losses. Some entrepreneurs 
underestimate demand, resulting in an excess demand for their goods. 
Others overestimate demand, resulting in an excess supply of  their goods. 
These errors tend to be negatively correlated, not because of  the law of large 
numbers but because of  the Law of Markets. If  excess demand exists in some 
markets, there must be a corresponding excess supply somewhere else. Over 
a cycle, however, there tends to be not only serial correlation in error terms 
within given time series, but an observed correlation in errors across markets. 
In simplifi ed terms, periods of  general excess demand for commodities 
(accelerations in the infl ation rate) alternate with periods of  general excess 
supply of  commodities (disinfl ation). This is the problem of the “clustering 
of  errors” referred to in  Chapter 8 . While the stylized facts require more 
precise statement, they do point up the problem of using received theory to 
analyze the business cycle. 
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 In general equilibrium theory, markets always equilibrate because of the 
adjustment process triggered by matched purchases and sales: every sale con-
stitutes a demand for other goods. It is in this sense that theory embodies 
Say’s Law of Markets (Hayek,  1966 , p. 42n.). Money alone can break the 
mechanical linkage of matched purchases and sales, because only money 
constitutes a source of demand for real goods with no corresponding sup-
ply of real goods. In the Mengerian or Hicksian sense, a demand for money 
expresses a preference for liquidity or generalized purchasing power, with no 
implied commitment to purchase any particular commodity. Similarly, varia-
tions in individuals’ money stocks, whether caused by a demand or a supply 
shift, can cause the demand for some produced goods to increase (decrease) 
with no corresponding diminution in demand for other produced goods (see 
Hayek,  1966 , p. 45). 
 The difference between a money and a barter economy is the essential 
ingredient in any analysis of economic fl uctuations. This insight does not 
itself  constitute a cycle theory, nor does it commit one to a monetary theory 
of the cycle, except in the broadest sense of the term. Though the formula-
tion of the problem may strike one as “Keynesian,” in no sense can Keynes 
be credited with this particular insight. If  we have paraphrased anyone, it is 
Hayek. Hayek, however, was merely restating here a position well established 
in classical political economy. The existence of a variable money supply, i.e., 
one at least partially composed of fi duciary media, changes the “black let-
ter” statement of the theory of value. It can be readily established that clas-
sical economists were aware of the point. For instance, after articulating what 
would now be called a caricature of the quantity theory, including a strong 
neutrality proposition, John Stuart Mill observed that
 [t]he proposition which we have laid down, respecting the dependence 
of general prices upon the quantity of money in circulation, must be 
understood as applying only to a state of things in which money, that is 
gold or silver, is the exclusive instrument of exchange, and actually passes 
from hand to hand at every purchase, credit in any of its shapes being 
unknown. When credit comes into play as a means of purchasing, distinct 
from money in hand, we shall hereafter fi nd that the connection between 
prices and the amount of money in circulation is much less distinct and 
intimate, and that such connection as does exist no longer admits of so 
simple a mode of expression. 
 (Mill,  1973 , p. 495) 
 We have insisted on viewing formal economic theory as incorporating Say’s Law, 
thereby implicitly denying the frequently repeated distinction between Say’s 
Law and Walras’ Law. There simply is no distinction, at least not at the level 
of generality specifi ed here. Say’s Law is a statement of the interdependency 
of all markets, a statement formalized but not fundamentally changed by 
Walras. Economists relying on Say’s Law recognized that monetary factors 
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introduced complications, as is indicated by the previous quotation from 
Mill. Similarly, business cycles fascinated economists, from the South Sea 
Bubble down through the end of the nineteenth and into the early twentieth 
centuries. What was missing was a consistent monetary analysis in which 
existing insights were woven into a story that shed light on economic cycles. 
 The use of money in a decentralized economy refl ects the scarcity of infor-
mation available to transactors, a scarcity that generates pervasive uncer-
tainty. If  money had not evolved, individuals could neither cope with this 
uncertainty nor solve the allocational problem confronting them. Money 
itself, however, can produce informational problems, causing particular types 
of disequilibrium. It can do so by interfering with market forces tending to 
produce consistency of plans. Monetary shocks can, then, discoordinate plans 
and economic activity. In the next section we develop these points. 
 A subjectivist theory of economic fl uctuations 
 The existence of business cycles evidences coordination failure. The 
price system fails to accomplish the task assigned to it by static economic 
theory. In a modern economy, any serious coordination failure disrupts 
entrepreneurial planning. In analyzing economic fl uctuations, then, we focus 
on entrepreneurial expectations, particularly those embodied in decisions to 
utilize or abandon concrete capital goods. Expectations, coordination and 
capital allocation are the analytical building blocks of a subjectivist theory 
of economic fl uctuations. 
 Our analysis fi ts within the Thornton-Wicksell monetary tradition, a trad-
ition focusing on the interest rate mechanism for coordinating saving and 
investment decisions. We follow the Austrian development of that tradition, a 
variant originally enunciated by Mises and Hayek. O’Driscoll ( 1977 ) restated 
the theory; Garrison ( 1978 ) clarifi ed the static capital theory underlying it; 
and Wainhouse ( 1982 ) confronted the theory with postwar evidence. 
 In presenting our version or approach, we recognize that other schools have 
developed the Wicksellian theme differently: the Stockholm School (Lindahl, 
Ohlin, Myrdal) and the early Cambridge School (Hawtrey, Robertson, 
Keynes), presented alternative formulations of savings-investment disequilib-
rium (Leijonhufvud,  1981a ). Though the differences among these variants are 
important, where appropriate we draw on insights from the broad Thornton-
Wicksell tradition. 
 We begin with the familiar loanable funds approach to the determination 
of market interest rates ( Figure III.5 ). At an interest rate  r 0 , the plans of 
savers and investors are consistent in the aggregate. Planned saving equals 
planned investment at this rate, which is Wicksell’s “natural rate.” At an inter-
est rate below  r 0 , such as  r 1 , planned investment exceeds planned saving (by 
 I 1 –  S 1 ). Only if  the banking system creates additional liabilities in the course 
of extending credit will  r 1 persist, and will  I 1 be the actual or  ex post level of 
investment. In this case, the supply of loanable funds is increasing by more 
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than the supply of savings. The difference is made up by the creation of bank 
money or bank credit. 
 An interest rate of  r 0 represents  neutral bank policy. Bank policy is neutral 
if  it does no more than intermediate between savers and investors. If  policy is 
neutral, changes in the supply of credit are governed by changes in the supply 
of planned saving (see Leijonhufvud,  1981a , p. 153). If  policy is non-neutral, 
then some plans must be frustrated or go unfulfi lled. The form that this frus-
tration takes depends crucially upon the assumed sequence of events. In what 
follows, we specify a sequence of events. 
 Assume that the bank policy is adhered to for several periods, and does not 
merely represent a once-and-for-all shock. So long as the policy is effective, 
the market or loan rate will be less than the equilibrium rate. Each period, 
entrepreneurs plan to invest more income than recipients plan to save. As 
explained in  Chapter 8 , entrepreneurs will implement projects geared to prod-
uce greater consumption output in the more distant future, but relatively less 
in the near term. Consumers’ plans, however, entail greater consumption in 
the near term, and relatively less in the more distant future (compared with 
producers’ plans). 
 Something must adjust as the result of the implied intertemporal plan dis-
coordination. In the aggregate, income recipients will be unable to acquire 
the consumer goods that they would wish to purchase at that income level. 
Consumption plans cannot all be fulfi lled, since, by assumption, a smaller 
proportion of consumption goods is being produced at the very time that 
incomes are being bid up. The complete allocational and distributional stories 
await development of the relative-price story. What is being described here, 
however, corresponds to the concept of “forced saving” in nineteenth-century 
British monetary economics (Hayek,  1932 ; O’Driscoll,  1977 , pp. 51–6). In 
real terms, consumers are compelled to consume less than planned for each 
period. 
 Figure III.5  Determination of interest rates 
r
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 The assumed sequence of events is as follows. 
 (1)  In period 1, bank money is created in the form of business credits. 
 (2)  In period 2, entrepreneurs spend the money on factor services, bidding up 
incomes. 
 (3)  In period 3, income recipients bid up the prices of consumer goods. 
 The transmission mechanism goes from money, to incomes, to prices, and 
then to output. At this point, we have linked the Thornton-Wicksell tradition 
with that of Richard Cantillon. As Hayek ( 1967a , pp. 8–9) pointed out, it 
is a logical connection. Cantillon argued that, because the infl ation process 
is sequential, i.e., takes place in real time, there will be gainers and losers. 
Some incomes rise before others: early recipients of increased income do not 
confront higher prices. In the case that Cantillon adduced, owners of gold 
mines and those supplying them with goods clearly gained from an infl ow of 
bullion. Their incomes rose before prices increased. In the third and fourth 
rounds, incomes still rose more quickly than did prices. At some point in the 
sequence, however, we discover consumers who face higher prices but whose 
incomes have not risen proportionately. They are the losers in the infl ation 
process. So long as the infl ow of bullion continues, the distribution effects 
will be operative. These distribution effects generate,  mutatis mutandis , 
allocational effects. In Cantillon’s analysis, there is no sharp distinction 
between the allocational and distributional effects, because there is no sharp 
distinction between real and monetary shocks. 
 For Cantillon’s comparatively simple case, it was relatively easy to out-
line the sequence in some depth. The greater complexity of our case requires 
somewhat more analysis, which we develop in the following subsection. 
 Prices and production 
 A fall in interest rates, generated by monetary expansion, will not increase 
uniformly the value of all investment projects. The value of investment 
projects yielding consumption output in the more distant future rises relative 
to projects with more immediate payoffs. We call these projects and capital 
goods type 1 and type 2, respectively. Here, a “project” is defi ned as a set 
of interrelated, heterogeneous capital goods. The full impact of the fall in 
interest rates comprises (1) a discount rate effect, (2) derived-demand effects 
and (3) cost effects. 
 Ceteris paribus, the decline in interest rates will increase the value of all 
long-lived assets. This effect refl ects the negative elasticity of present value 
with respect to the interest rate. It is, however, a partial effect, as can be seen 
by considering the full effect on individual capital goods. The demand for 
type 2 capital goods is affected more immediately by the demand for cur-
rent consumption output than by current interest rates (the derived-demand 
effect). Consumption demand has declined, at least in relative terms. In other 
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words, the increased demand for type 1 capital goods is equivalent to a decline 
in demand for type 2 goods. In terms of a standard present value (PV) for-
mula for a capital good yielding services over  n periods, 
PV = + + + +





3( )1+ r ( )+ r1 ( )1+ r ( )+ r1
,
 there are derived-demand effects for different capital goods, effects that 
show up in the numerator. The interest rate disturbance causes the expected 
stream of quasi-rents (S) accruing to capital goods to change. For type 1 
goods the stream tends to rise; for type 2 goods the stream tends to fall. For 
some goods, therefore, the quasi-rent and interest rate effects reinforce each 
other; for other goods, these are offsetting effects. To calculate the full impact 
of the kind of disturbance being analyzed, we must also take account of cost 
effects. 
 The prices of complementary factors, which we designate “labor” and “raw 
materials,” will be affected in this process. Entrepreneurs undertaking type 1 
projects will be able to bid factors away from type 2 projects. Moreover, this 
occurs as the derived demand for the latter is declining. Owners of type 2 
goods are thus caught in a price-cost squeeze. Of course, none of this implies 
that already completed type 2 projects will be abandoned. So long as depre-
ciation is suffi cient to pay the increased variable costs, these projects can be 
continued. The quasi-rents accruing to these projects will, however, decline. 
More importantly, new investment funds will tend to fl ow to type 1, not type 
2, projects. 
 In any period, net investment is small relative to the value of the existing 
capital stock. Nonetheless, investment is a large component of each period’s 
GNP. Moreover, shifts in investment expenditures can have substantial impact 
on production and employment in the affected industries. We are interested 
primarily in changes in the  pattern of  investment fl ows, not in the demand for 
“capital.” 
 In analyzing the effects of changes in capital value on  users of  capital goods, 
it may be useful to assume the short-run fi xity of capital. It is misleading to 
do so, however, for  producers of  capital goods. Monetary disturbances affect 
credit markets, which in turn cause demand for new capital goods to change. 
Adjustments in the capital goods industries begin as soon as the change is 
perceived to be permanent, or at least long-lived enough to warrant a com-
mitment of resources. 
 Our analysis involves expectational assumptions at each stage, and we now 
make some of these more explicit. First, we assume that all information pos-
sessed by entrepreneurs is embodied in the  I  d  function. This includes not only 
future expected returns, but also information on current economic policy. 
Changes in entrepreneurial knowledge or beliefs show up as shifts in  I  d  . The 
investment demand function might, then, be specifi ed as follows: 
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 I sd ( ,r , )i  
 where 
 r = relevant interest rate 
 s = profi t (quasi-rent) expectations 
 i = a  portmanteau information variable. 
 We have thus packed a great deal into  i . We by no means wish to argue that 
information will remain fi xed during the cumulative process: indeed, the 
contrary is almost surely the case. Certain factors change,  mutatis mutandis , 
as the cumulative process proceeds. One could attempt to incorporate all 
these into the elasticity measure. We argue below, however, that at least one 
factor will show up as a shift effect. Moreover, as indicated above, we are 
not trying to present the analysis in terms of aggregate investment. So we 
do not pursue the analysis in each of  n periods in terms of stable aggregate 
saving and investment functions. If  the reader is more comfortable in doing 
so, he may do so to get a “fi rst approximation” of the theory. This would 
be a rough approximation at best, and one that ultimately does violence to 
the microeconomic approach being employed. We are not, strictly speaking, 
presenting an over-investment model, but one of  mal- or  misdirected investment 
(see Rothbard,  1963 , pp. 34–5). 
 Second, we assume that entrepreneurs are  ex ante profi t-maximizers, 
making use of  the best information that they have. Entrepreneurs will 
devote resources to acquiring relevant information, so long as they expect 
it to be cost-effective. To the degree that they are successful, they may mod-
ify their actions compared with what they would have done in the absence 
of  that information. This assumption does not, however, warrant any infer-
ence that monetary policy will be ineffective. In a decentralized economy, 
the kind of  information acquired by agents is not suffi cient to insulate 
them completely from the effects of  monetary shocks. We can outline the 
reasons here; we elaborate on some of  these points in dealing with rational 
expectations. 
 Agents know prices and other endogenous variables, but not the structure 
of the system. They may have acquired information in the past about demand 
and supply conditions in the neighborhood of a prior, temporary equilibrium 
point. This information is subject to obsolescence, a process speeded up by 
the kind of shocks that we are analyzing here. Agents may have theories about 
how the system works, but, as recently clarifi ed by Frydman ( 1982 ), theory 
confl ict ensures that entrepreneurial error will not be eliminated. Information 
characteristics of decentralized economies ensure that agents will disagree on 
the effects of policy and on the future course of events generally. 
 We return now to the dynamics of the expansion. Reallocation of capital 
and other factors is occurring, but in a manner inconsistent with preferences 
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and opportunities (revealed, for instance, in the planned savings ( S ) and 
investment ( I ) functions). 5 As the output of current consumption goods 
declines, investment in this sector declines. Future-period consumption is 
being provided for at an ever increasing rate. Investment is being committed 
to multi-period projects, and their future output cannot be used now to satisfy 
consumption demand. (People cannot consume half  completed steel plants 
and hydroelectric dams.) Rising incomes make the satisfaction of consump-
tion demand more urgent, but interest rate and relative-price signals continue 
to make the satisfaction of future-period consumption demand seem even 
more profi table. At some point,  ex post returns in consumer goods industries 
will begin rising. In theory, this might ameliorate or slow the process (Hayek, 
 1969 ). If  it did, however, it could do so only by leading entrepreneurs in con-
sumer goods industries (type 2 investment projects) to enter into a bidding 
war with the capital goods (type 1) industries. To the degree the former suc-
ceeded, some of the new projects would be rendered unprofi table. 
 Both practical and theoretical considerations argue against this happen-
ing, especially in earlier stages of an expansion. First, policy-makers nor-
mally view with alarm any slowdown in the recovery of business investment. 
One Keynesian legacy is to defi ne economic recovery virtually in terms of 
the profi tability of producers of capital goods (i.e., “smokestack industries”). 
Excessive attention to capital goods industries leads monetary authorities to 
respond by accelerating the rate of growth of money. Consequently, they are 
induced to step on the accelerator until signs of recovery in investment occur. 
If  the past is any guide, they will kick the accelerator again at least once in any 
recovery, in order to maintain the strength of the recovery and, thereby, the 
growth in the capital goods sectors. 
 A theoretical consideration also argues against an endogenous end to a 
malinvestment cycle. This consideration depends on the complementarity of 
capital goods. The more resources that have already been sunk in the capital-
intensive production methods, the greater will be the demand for additional 
resources that can be used to complete the projects. If  a project is nearly com-
plete, then the incremental resources needed to complete it will have a far 
greater value than would have been the case  ex ante .  In the limit , entrepre-
neurs would be willing to pay up to the discounted value of the future quasi-
rents accruing to the entire project in order to obtain a comparatively small 
additional sum needed to complete the project. 
 Indeed, it was precisely this consideration that led Hayek ( 1937b ) to one of 
his most important analytical contributions to business cycle theory. The cap-
ital complementarity effect helps explain the pro-cyclical behavior of interest 
rates,  apart from any Fisher effects . A prolonged cycle of capital investment is 
likely to increase the expected returns from additional borrowing and invest-
ment. Past investment raises the demand for current investable funds, driving 
up real market interest rates. Toward the end of a cycle, the real short-run 
interest rate, which would clear the market, will be higher – perhaps signifi -
cantly higher – than the long-run equilibrium rate. 
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 Consider the stylized analysis in  Figure III.6 . If  the savings-investment 
equilibrium had been maintained throughout at an interest rate  r 0 , then invest-
ment expenditures would have remained at the correct level “in the aggregate,” 
and would have been “effi ciently allocated.” 6 As a consequence of an expan-
sionary policy, rates are driven to  r 1 . Toward the end of the cycle, therefore, 
the investment demand schedule will have increased to  I d ′  . Presumably, price 
infl ation has accelerated by then, particularly for consumer goods. Assume 
that monetary authorities now wish to engage in a “tight” monetary policy. 
Merely to hold investment expenditures to  I d ′  , monetary policy would have 
to increase  real rates to  r 2 . This is higher than the long-run equilibrium rate. 
If  the infl ation expectation effects are operative, nominal interest rates would 
have to rise by that much more. 
 In fact, we believe that Hayek’s analysis is consistent with the basic facts 
of cycles. In the next section, we present evidence to support this contention. 
For the moment, we take it as an assumption. We suggest, further, that invest-
ment cycles typically end in a credit crunch, with a comparatively sudden 
and simultaneous fi nancial “crisis” for numerous fi rms. At  r 2 the interest rate 
is too high for long-run equilibrium. Many projects, newly undertaken, will 
have to be abandoned. Entrepreneurs simply will not be able to command the 
complementary factors to complete these projects. In particular, labor and 
raw materials will be prohibitively expensive for entrepreneurs to purchase at 
an interest rate of  r 2 . The initial round of unemployment and cyclical decline 
begins as these factors are released from type 1 projects. 
 How will the rest of the decline look? It will appear to be “Keynesian.” 
Entrepreneurs will decrease their demand for investment funds, particu-
larly for type 1 projects. The resulting unemployment will, however, even-
tually spill over to type 2 industries. Unemployment spreads because of 
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 income-constrained processes. Investment demand collapses: entrepreneurial 
expectations turn pessimistic in response to realizations of lower sales and 
profi ts. Indeed, investment demand could fall below  I . If  monetary policy 
does not respond quickly, a Wicksellian cumulative contraction may develop. 
Market interest rates are now too high; even an interest rate of  r 0 could be 
temporarily too high during such a downward-adjustment phase. 
 Notice, however, that a Hayekian analysis (or a similar story) is needed to 
rationalize a quasi-Keynesian ending. Keynesian analysis begins in the mid-
dle of a cyclical story: the marginal effi ciency of capital declines. This decline 
is either exogenous, or is predicated on a view of capital goods as all gross 
substitutes. Analysis predicated  purely on exogenous shifts in expectations is 
objectionable on a number of grounds. If  it is an accepted mode of analysis, 
then any story can be told with no  a priori grounds for distinguishing among 
them. Further, the Keynesian story depends on waves of optimism or pes-
simism striking large numbers of entrepreneurs simultaneously. This latter 
assumption appears to be the conclusion of dubious amateur psychological 
reasoning. 
 Some analysts (e.g., Leijonhufvud,  1968 ) attribute a kind of Schumpeterian 
hypothesis to Keynes. After a long period of high investment, expected returns 
decline. For the reasons indicated in the previous chapter, we are not sanguine 
about analysis of economic cycles based on technological innovations. Such 
innovations surely help explain the direction that investment takes in a cycle, 
but are dubious as an explanation of the cyclic character of investment. 
 D. H. Robertson ( 1940 ) was virtually the only one to have perceived the 
connection between Hayek’s theory of expansion and crises and Keynes’ 
theory of contraction. By the time Robertson pointed this connection out, 
however, neither party to the Keynes-Hayek controversies wanted to listen 
to Robertson’s resolution. In essence, Robertson pointed out that each had 
offered  part of  a complete Wicksellian theory: Hayek and Keynes wrote about 
different problems. In our judgment, Hayek’s theory was more complete on a 
number of grounds, especially in his far greater attention to capital and inter-
est theory. We do not wish, however, to press this doctrinal point here. 7 
 Evidence 
 As a result of the Keynesian revolution, economists basically lost interest in 
monetary analysis and monetary problems (see O’Driscoll,  1977 , pp. 35–7). 
Interest in the Quantity Theory revived fi rst, a process beginning with Milton 
Friedman’s 1956 restatement of that tradition. The Austro-Wicksellian 
tradition languished in the shadow of Keynes for another decade. The 
Austrian revival began with Hicks’ ( 1967 ) recounting of “the Hayek Story,” 
an analysis to which Hayek ( 1969 ) responded. Buchanan ( 1969 ) restated the 
Austrian-subjectivist theory of cost. With Dolan ( 1976 ), a modest amount of 
new work in that area began to appear. While Havek’s theory of economic 
fl uctuations received a great deal of attention, no one went back to check 
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the consistency of the data with the predictions of the theory. Earlier works 
on the Great Depression by Robbins ( 1934 ) and Rothbard ( 1963 ) did not 
use modern statistical and econometric techniques. In addition, Robbins had 
repudiated his earlier views; and Rothbard’s thesis won him opposition from 
monetarists as well as Keynesians. Part of Rothbard’s thesis has since been 
justifi ed by Gallaway and Vedder ( 1987 ). In a still more comprehensive study, 
Wainhouse ( 1982 ) systematically confronted Hayek’s monetary theory of the 
cycle with postwar data. 
 Wainhouse formulated six operational propositions derived from Hayek’s 
original statement of his theory ( 1967a ); these consisted of three propos-
itions about causality and three propositions about relative-price movements. 
Wainhouse applied causality tests to the fi rst three propositions. He also com-
pared actual with expected relative-price movements. He used monthly data 
from January 1959 to June 1981 (January 1959 being the fi rst month that all 
series were available as monthly data). 
 His six propositions were as follows:
 (1)  Changes in the supply of savings are independent of changes in the sup-
ply of bank credit. 
 (2)  Changes in the supply of credit lead to changes in rates of interest. 
Furthermore, changes in credit and interest rates are inversely related. 
 (3)  Changes in the rate of change of credit lead to changes in the output of 
producers’ goods. 
 (4)  The ratio of producers’ goods’ prices to consumers’ goods’ prices tends to 
rise after the initiation of a credit expansion. 
 (5)  Prices of producers’ goods closest to fi nal consumption tend to decline 
relative to the prices of producers’ goods located further away from the 
consumers’ goods in the production scheme (in the expansion phase of a 
cycle). 
 (6)  The prices of consumers’ goods rise relative to the prices of producers’ 
goods, reversing the initial shift in relative prices. 
 With respect to the fi rst three propositions, Wainhouse tested for Granger 
“causality.” He fi rst estimated state-space models for the variables, and 
then employed the equivalent Auto-Regressive Moving Average (ARMA) 
representation of each state-space form. Proposition 1 asserts the strict 
independence of changes in savings and changes in credit; this is a particularly 
strong interpretation of Hayek’s thesis. It also implies that bank policy is not 
neutral. Proposition 2 establishes that monetary policy initiates cyclical activity, 
rather than responding to real shocks. Again, a more general formulation of 
Hayek’s theory would allow real shocks to initiate the process. Proposition 3 
is an explicit statement of non-neutrality. Wainhouse found that the empirical 
evidence produces signifi cant support for the three causality propositions. 
 Wainhouse next identifi ed credit cycles corresponding to Hayekian cycles 
(though not necessarily National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 
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Reference Cycles). He examined relative-price movements after the initiation 
of each cycle, comparing them with price averages 24 months before the onset 
of the cycle. In proposition 4, Wainhouse presents Hayek’s prediction of the 
broad pattern of relative-price movements after the initiation of the cycle. 
Over two-thirds of the observations are consistent with the prediction. Most 
of the anomalous fi ndings are concentrated in one particular credit cycle. 
Again, over two-thirds of the observations confi rm the broad prediction of 
proposition 5. Proposition 6 contains one of the most controversial aspects of 
Hayek’s theory: the reversal of relative-price movements in the contraction. 
It is a precise statement of the proposition that the seeds of recessions are 
sown in the prior expansion, suggesting the inevitability of recessions after an 
expansionary period. Wainhouse found evidence in the majority of cases to 
be consistent with this sixth proposition. 
 Wainhouse’s results are robust, not varying signifi cantly with alternative 
formulations. In his study, Wainhouse utilized state-of-the-art time series ana-
lysis. Moreover, he applied Hayek’s theory to recent periods, in which the 
economy had changed fundamentally from the nineteenth-century institu-
tions that Hayek ( 1969 , p. 282) had in mind. Wainhouse’s evidence not only 
corroborates key elements of Hayek’s theory, but also suggests that further 
empirical research would be rewarded. 
 Rational expectations 
 In this section, we do not claim to present a comprehensive treatment of the 
rational expectations revolution. That revolution is in progress, currently 
doing intellectual battle with a counter-revolution. No clear resolution has 
yet emerged. Our concern here is to relate our theory to this controversy, and 
to forestall misunderstandings about what we are and are not saying. 
 The fi rst problem is to defi ne carefully what rational expectations means 
or implies. Defi nitions are often either so broad as to be almost vacuous, or 
so stringent as to seem like a virtual caricature of themselves. Consider the 
variety of formulations offered by one author, David K. H. Begg ( 1982 ), in a 
recent survey:
 (1)  The Rational Expectations Hypothesis asserts that individuals do not 
make systematic mistakes in forecasting the future (p. xi). 
 (2)  These expectations are rational in the following sense: when these expec-
tations are fed back into the model the actual evolution of the economy 
will imply that there are no systematic forecasting errors which could 
have been discovered by individuals using information available at the 
date they had to form expectations (pp. 12–13). 
 (3)  The hypothesis of Rational Expectations … is concerned with incentives 
to acquire information and exploit profi table opportunities for revising 
behavior. It admits the notion of an equilibrium set of expectations, even 
when the economy is not in a static equilibrium (p. 28). 
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 (4)  The recent work on the hypothesis of Rational Expectations has com-
manded considerable attention because it seems to rely on a good opti-
mizing principle: individuals should not make systematic mistakes in 
forecasting the future. It is not appealing to assume that individuals 
make predictable errors yet take no action to revise their rule for forming 
expectations, but  ad hoc expectations assumptions typically possess this 
property; only under Rational Expectations is the contradiction avoided 
(p. 71). 
 Begg’s fi rst defi nition sometimes appears as the contention that “rational 
forecasting requires that forecast errors be serially uncorrelated” (Poole,  1976 , 
p. 465). Each formulation has been disputed. Consider the following rebuttal 
by Milton Friedman:
 For about fi ve years, the future price of the Mexican peso was decidedly 
below the current price. And every year, while the Mexican government 
maintained the price of the peso at 8¢ a peso, the people operating in the 
futures market made an error in the same direction. Anybody who sold 
the peso short was bound to lose money. Did that mean that expectations 
were not rational? Not at all. What it meant was that every single year 
there was one chance in four that the peso was going to go down 50 per-
cent; and that meant that it was appropriate for the future price to be 12 ½ 
percent below the current price. And that continued for 4 or 5 years. 
 (Friedman,  1977 , p. 14) 
 We agree with Professor Friedman that the peso story points to the need 
for precision in defi ning rational expectations. One general implication of 
Friedman’s parable should be noted. It will not generally be possible to infer 
the rationality of expectations by observing patterns of forecast error. But, 
conversely,  data on forecasts that were correct ,  ex post ,  tell us little about the 
optimality or rationality of these forecasts . Agents may have been ignoring 
information that would have generated forecasts that, in retrospect, turned 
out to be incorrect. In Friedman’s case, speculators were “wrong for the right 
reason”: in the latter case, they may be “right for the wrong reason.” 
 Begg’s second defi nition is more precise, and, in this case, admits of a wider 
range of phenomena. Friedman’s peso example meets the criterion of this 
defi nition: the experience of the same error year after year gave transactors 
no reason to revise what were optimal forecasts. This defi nition also points to 
the importance of specifying what kind of information transactors possess. 
We come back to this point shortly. 
 The third statement purports to characterize rational expectations. It is, 
however, precisely what the rational expectations hypothesis is  not concerned 
with. Rational expectations models typically  begin with the assumptions that 
all profi t opportunities have been exploited and all necessary information has 
already been acquired. Critics (e.g., O’Driscoll,  1979 ) have long pointed to 
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this defi ciency. There is no analysis of the adjustment process in the rational 
expectations hypothesis, no theory of discovery. 
 The fourth statement is outrageous but useful for being so clear a statement 
of a view that we suspect is more often believed than articulated. The rational 
expectations hypothesis is neither the “only” alternative to  ad hoc theoriz-
ing about expectations, nor the only expectational hypothesis involving opti-
mizing behavior. While it may not be appealing to assume that individuals 
make errors that they themselves could have predicted ( ex ante error), it is 
not obviously wrong to suppose that  others could have predicted the errors of 
the fi rst group. Any act of entrepreneurship or speculation involves trying to 
outguess the market, to do better than the crowd or the median asset-holder. 
Entrepreneurs and speculators are constantly taking actions that assume that 
most people make “predictable” errors (predictable by entrepreneurs). 
 In market economies, information is localized and specialized, implying the 
existence of differential returns. Because of changing circumstances and the 
fl eeting value of information, this situation is always characteristic – indeed, 
is an essential characteristic – of markets. And decentralization of informa-
tion is certainly an essential ingredient of any subjectivist economic theory. 
Any theory that begins with the elimination of profi t and informational dif-
ferences has assumed that the market process has come to an end. 
 There is another, important information difference sloughed over in the 
rational expectations hypothesis. That hypothesis takes it as axiomatic that 
there is no difference in the information possessed by the theorist, who is an 
ideal observer, and the human agents in the model. This assumption is thor-
oughly anti-subjectivist, making it diffi cult ultimately to reconcile rational 
expectations and subjectivist theories. To reiterate, we are not interested in 
refuting rational expectations  per se . It may be that our objections are only to 
“the simplicity of the models in which rational expectations have so far been 
embedded” (Begg,  1982 , p. 255). It does appear at this juncture, however, that 
rational expectations theorists are leading the profession down a garden path. 
From what we have seen of the trail thus far, it is a route that we are unwilling 
to follow. 
 There certainly are features or implications of rational expectations with 
which we agree or are in sympathy. Rational expectations theorists have cor-
rectly focused attention of the importance of expectational assumptions in 
macroeconomic analysis and policy-making. Though the Keynesian revolu-
tion began as an attempt to incorporate expectations more fully into economic 
reasoning, it paradoxically ended by suppressing expectational issues. In the 
 General Theory , Keynes emphasized the exogenous aspects of entrepreneurial 
expectations. As a modeling technique, he assumed that they were completely 
exogenous in the short run. Short-run exogeneity became the static expecta-
tions of Keynesian macromodels, an assumption inhibiting further analysis 
(see Begg,  1982 , pp. 19–22; Leijonhufvud,  1983a , pp. 6–11). 
 Extravagant claims to revolutionary character notwithstanding, the com-
monsense core of the rational expectations hypothesis represents a return to 
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inherited wisdom. This core hypothesis has been referred to as “Lincoln’s 
Law,” as in the following passage:
 You can’t fool all of the people all of the time. Eventually the masses 
come to understand the schemes of their rulers. Then the cleverly con-
cocted plans of infl ation collapse … Infl ation is not a monetary policy 
that can be considered as an alternative to a sound-money policy. It is at 
best a temporary makeshift. The main problem of an infl ationary pol-
icy is how to stop it before the masses have seen through their rulers’ 
artifi ces. It is a display of considerable naivety to recommend openly a 
monetary system that can work only if  its essential features are ignored 
by the public. 
 (Mises,  1953 , p. 419) 
 Mises developed the thesis that infl ationary expectations emerge with a lag. 
Once expectations of infl ation become embedded in the system, however, the 
effects of infl ationary fi nance become more far-reaching and serious (Mises, 
 1953 , pp. 418–19). Wicksell articulated even more concisely this commonsense 
core of any sound expectational theory:
 Those people who prefer a continually upward moving to a stationary 
price level forcibly remind one of those who purposely keep their watches 
a little fast so as to be more certain of catching their trains. But to achieve 
their purpose they must not be conscious or remain conscious of the fact 
that their watches are fast; otherwise they become accustomed to take the 
extra few minutes into account and so, after all, in spite of their artful-
ness, arrive too late … 
 (Wicksell,  1965 , pp. 3–4) 
 Rational expectations theorists have taught us that, in game-theoretic 
terminology, agents play games with policy-makers. Agents’ strategy can 
offset the intended effects of policy actions. These will not, however, always 
be the games supposed in the rational expectations literature. Consider the 
following situation. 
 (1)  Agents are very good predictors of policy-makers’ actions. 
 (2)  One or more endogenous variables are exclusively controlled by a policy-
maker. 
 (3)  The payoff of an action to a policy-maker depends on whether his policy 
will be anticipated. 
 In this situation, Frydman  et al . ( 1982 ) have shown rigorously that policy-
makers may have no uniquely rational course of action to follow. Different 
theories suggest different optimal behavior. If  no rational course of action 
exists for the policy-maker, agents cannot then form a rational expectation. 
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This follows because a rational course of action must incorporate a theory of 
the policy-makers’ behavior, and there is a confl ict of theories. The situation 
is further complicated if, in order to forestall prediction by the public, the 
policy-maker engages in nonsystematic behavior. This dilemma, known as 
“Newcomb’s Problem,” depends on all parties attempting to behave rationally. 
In a game-theoretic setting, then, fully rational behavior may be inconsistent 
with the formation of rational expectations. 
 Frydman  et al . ( 1982 ) highlight the problem of  confl ict among theor-
ies. Rational expectations theorists assume this problem away by postulat-
ing that agents’ expectations are “essentially the same as the predictions 
of  the relevant economic theory” (Muth,  1961 , p. 316). In macroeconom-
ics, however, there is an embarassingly large number of  theories claiming 
relevance. Applications of  these theories to the same data often produce 
results that, from the perspective of  the different theories, can be taken as 
corroborating rather than being inconsistent. In this case, theorists have 
no incentive to revise their views and converge to a single “correct” the-
ory. Agents who interpret the world with these confl icting theories, or who 
purchase forecasts based on confl icting theories, may also fail to converge 
on a unique theory. In fact, Frydman ( 1982 ) investigated the possibility of 
convergence to an expectational equilibrium in some detail. His analysis led 
him to conclude that 
 the possibility of convergence to the rational expectations equilibrium 
appears to be remote in the context of models of decentralized com-
petitive markets in which agents are assumed to be making individual 
decisions on the basis of market prices and their private information 
(p. 664). 
 Economists have basic disagreements about macroeconomics, particu-
larly concerning causal relationships between monetary changes and income, 
prices and output. Expectational theories cannot ignore this disagreement or 
confl ict. As Leijonhufvud ( 1983b , p. 5) put it, “When theorists are not sure 
they understand, or cannot agree, it is doubtful that they are entitled to the 
assumption that private sector agents understand and agree.” 
 Frydman ( 1982 ) has offered a criterion for incorporating information into 
economic models that is consistent with both optimization and information 
decentralization. 8 In specifying the information available to individual actors, 
the economic modeler should include “ only information they can acquire 
according to the model in the process of making individual decisions and 
observing market outcomes.” This postulate “requires that the REH [rational 
expectations hypothesis] be  internally consistent with other informational 
assumptions of the model” (Frydman and Phelps,  1983 , p. 15). Frydman fi nds 
this criterion violated in the rational expectations models that he considers. 
This violation is theoretically equivalent to postulating that agents can per-
form actions violating the resource constraints in the model. In other words, 
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agents are acting in ways that are strictly infeasible in terms of the model’s 
other assumptions. 
 One recent development in monetary economics is both encouraging and 
consistent with the spirit of the Hayek–Frydman criterion. This is the new 
economics of monetary regimes, or what used to be called the monetary 
standard. Leijonhufvud has described a monetary regime as
 a system of expectations that governs the behavior of the public and that 
is sustained by the consistent behavior of the policy-making authorities 
… The present defi nition assumes that people understand the system-
atic components of the authorities’ behavior in a general sort of way but 
avoids a linkage so tight as to build, for example, short-run neutrality or 
policy ineffectiveness assertions into the concept itself. Nonetheless, it is 
in effect an equilibrium concept. 
 (Leijonhufvud,  1983b , p. 2) 
 This literature explicitly links institutions and expectations formation. 
Specifi cally, it postulates that the amount and quality of information possessed 
by individuals depends on the institutional environment (the “regime”) within 
which they operate. A monetary regime or institutional environment generates 
patterns or regularized features among economic variables. On the basis of 
this pattern, agents can form reasonably fi rm expectations. In the course of 
gaining experience under a given regime, individuals learn the typical features 
of the monetary environment. Different regimes produce different features or 
relationships, possibly requiring a different theory. Changes in regimes render 
obsolete knowledge about typical features. 
 Leijonhufvud examines two regimes: one embodying a “quantity prin-
ciple” (e.g., a modern fi at standard) and the other, a “convertibility principle” 
(e.g., a commodity standard). Macroeconomists frequently mismatch theory 
and regime. Further, today’s regime is not merely a hybrid, but, according to 
Leijonhufvud, is really no standard at all (Leijonhufvud,  1983b , p. 27). 
 Klein ( 1975 ) is an example of empirical work informed by analysis in terms 
of alternative regimes. Among other things, Klein found that public recog-
nition of a change in monetary regime occurs slowly and over a long period 
of time. Consequently, in a transition from a regime of stable prices to one 
of high and variable infl ation, the public may be caught unaware or else may 
anticipate a return to the old regime. During a transition phase, infl ation may 
be largely unanticipated. Once there is public recognition of the change in 
regime, however, infl ation will tend to be anticipated. If  there is a great deal 
of unpredictability in prices, however, expectations formation will be diffi cult 
and costly. Thus, a regime in which infl ation is higher on average but more 
predictable might,  ceteris paribus , be preferred to a highly unpredictable but 
lower average infl ation rate (if  such a choice is possible). 
 The monetary regime approach may also explain why, under the gold 
standard, monetary growth was frequently comparatively large over periods 
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of months and even years with no acceleration in price infl ation. What would 
be an alarming rate of monetary growth under a pure fi duciary standard is 
not worrisome under a commodity standard, so as long as people believe in 
the government’s commitment to the standard. A standard is an investment in 
creating public trust that rules and goals will be adhered to (see Klein,  1975 , 
pp. 482–3). The investment may take the tangible form of real resources held 
as reserves, or it may involve legal limits on policy-makers that can be relaxed 
only at great cost (e.g., constitutional rules). The trust cannot, however, be 
obtained costlessly. 
 These theoretical insights cannot be incorporated into models by assuming 
the availability of information to all agents at low cost and independent of 
the character of monetary institutions. The Hayekian criterion for informa-
tion, recently restated by Frydman, together with an institutional approach 
to monetary analysis, represents a promising avenue of analytical inquiry (see 
O’Driscoll,  1984a ). 
 We have focused on expectational issues because they are important for any 
theory of economic fl uctuations. The main conclusions of our theory do  not 
depend, however, on expectational errors – at least not in the conventional 
sense. Most theories of economic fl uctuations attribute deviations from trend 
rates of growth of economic variables to expectational error. If, for instance, 
there is a monetary innovation, then prices accelerate, output increases and 
unemployment declines. There are real effects only because transactors mis-
perceive purely nominal changes as real changes. Workers, for example, sup-
ply more labor as wage rates rise, in the mistaken belief  that real wage rates 
have risen. The process is reversed once expectations are revised. 
 Expectational errors may be suffi cient, but they are surely not necessary for 
the existence of fl uctuations in economic activity. Monetary shocks – changes 
in the rate of monetary growth – have real effects quite apart from those gener-
ated by expectational error. These shocks have distributional and allocational 
effects, which we have labeled “Cantillon effects.” In the model presented in 
this chapter, these consequences depend on capital-theoretic considerations 
fi rst adduced in the previous chapter (and simplifi ed greatly in our type 1 
and type 2 capital goods model). The profi tability of alternative investment 
projects is affected by monetary policy. Entrepreneurs are not making errors 
in responding to these changes, though, of course, it may take time to discover 
the new opportunities. Indeed, entrepreneurs would be committing mistakes 
if  they ignored the profi table opportunities just because they had not resulted 
from what economists choose to call “real factors.” 
 Infl ation-induced economic growth is not sustainable. Nonetheless, there 
are profi ts to be made from exploiting temporary situations. US postwar 
expansions average three to four years in length, time enough for entrepre-
neurs to reap profi ts. It is true, of course, that expansionary monetary policy 
tends to increase the profi tability of projects having  longer periods of invest-
ment. In the last chapter, we already noted that entrepreneurs in earlier stages 
of a production process can make profi ts selling to later stages, even if  the 
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latter eventually experience losses. And owners of nonspecifi c resources (e.g., 
raw materials) can still profi t from a  fully anticipated cyclical episode (i.e., 
expansionary and recessionary phases of a cycle). Such a situation might 
refl ect, however, one set of entrepreneurs benefi ting at the expense of another 
set. Can a Hayekian cycle occur if  fully anticipated by all? 
 To answer this question, we must distinguish between “micro-” and “macro-” 
prediction. Entrepreneurs may understand the macroaspects of a cycle, which 
correspond roughly to the typical features of cycles. They understand that 
investment, the profi tability of which depends on continued infl ation of the 
money stock, cannot be sustained once the infl ation ceases. Though entrepre-
neurs understand this at an abstract (or macro) level, they cannot predict the 
exact features of the next cyclical expansion and contraction. That is, they do 
not know how the unique aspects of one cyclical episode will differ from the 
last such episode or from the “average” cycle. They lack the ability to make 
micropredictions, even though they can predict the general sequence of events 
that will occur. These entrepreneurs have no reason to foreswear the tempor-
ary profi ts to be garnered in an infl ationary episode. In the end, of course, 
all profi ts are purely temporary. And each individual investment opportunity 
carries with it a risk. For one thing, other entrepreneurs may be quicker. Or 
so many may have perceived an opportunity that there is a temporary excess 
supply at some point in the future. 
 From an individual perspective, then, an entrepreneur fully informed of the 
Austrian theory of economic cycles will face essentially the same uncertain 
world he always faced. Not theoretical or abstract knowledge of economic 
relationships, but knowledge of the circumstances of time and place is the 
source of profi ts. In any case, real effects of monetary expansion will be a 
compound of the distributional impact of the expansion and errors of pre-
diction about infl ation’s impact. This case probably corresponds best to the 
real-world situation. 
 What if  entrepreneurs could predict the exact sequence of redistribution, 
relative-price changes and output responses resulting from a given monetary 
expansion? To hypothesize this case quickly gets us into the general paradoxes 
(including Morgenstern’s and Richardson’s) resulting from assuming perfect 
foresight. Nonetheless, this case presents no additional problems of logic or 
theory. Fully anticipated monetary shocks should have the same general impli-
cations as a fully anticipated change in tastes or a fully anticipated (exogen-
ous) redistribution of income. The complexity of the case derives from the 
assumption of the self-reversing character of the allocational changes. And, 
as in other instances of perfect foresight models, one cannot begin to specify 
what one entrepreneur will do without also specifying what all others will do. 
“Perfect foresight” here, as elsewhere, implies perfect prediction of the actions 
of all other relevant parties. It really is the Holmes-Moriarty example multi-
plied to an  n -player case. If  the players were not paralyzed by their dilemma, 
then they presumably would make investment commitments that have a posi-
tive present value over the cycle or relevant planning horizon. They would not 
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get caught unaware by the downturn, though they might experience account-
ing losses in some periods. 
 Let us put the case starkly, and shorn of some of the capital-theoretic issues 
emphasized heretofore. Assume that the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) decides to engage in an aggressive monetary expansion over the next 
two years. It breaks with tradition by immediately announcing its intentions 
in great detail. Included in this announcement is the statement that it is simply 
going to give all the newly created money to Roger Garrison. Over the next 
two years, the money supply will increase by 50 percent. Assume further that 
no one doubts the Fed’s intentions, etc. (The 12 district banks post a bond 
equal to the proposed increase in the money supply.) Once all adjustments are 
made, prices will have risen approximately 50 percent. 
 Will the fact that the subsequent price infl ation is fully anticipated make Mr. 
Garrison other than a rich man? Surely not. (Those who do doubt this con-
clusion should not be willing to pay a positive price to take Garrison’s place.) 
In fact, the openness of the procedure clarifi es the way in which Garrison 
benefi ts. It also clarifi es that, except for thought experiments  à la Hume or 
Friedman, the process of expanding the money supply involves redistribution 
of wealth. Though the redistribution may or may not be random and unpre-
dictable, it is redistribution nonetheless. (The non-randomness of the redistri-
bution constitutes the empirical content of our hypothesis.) 
 “Surely,” says the neoclassical economist, “the anticipation of the event 
will offset the effects.” The answer is “no,” if  we adhere consistently to the 
assumptions of economic decentralization and competition. Garrison, we 
assume, is either a canny Scotsman or closely related to one. He will not pay 
more for his purchases just because he is wealthier. Given his greater wealth, 
he may, of course, purchase higher quality products. His wealth elasticity of 
demand is not equal to one for every good. To pursue this line of reasoning 
would call into question even the long-run neutrality of money (see Mises, 
 1953 ), a point that we are not interested in pursuing here. 
 If  the rest of us could get together and, as it were, gang up on Garrison, 
we could nullify his wealth gain. That is, every potential supplier could agree 
to charge Garrison –  and only Garrison – prices that are 50 percent higher 
than before. We would however, no longer be describing a competitive envir-
onment. If  some of us were parties to such an agreement, good neoclassical 
theory would remind us that the canny Scotsmen among us would cheat on 
the agreement. Garrison would retain his wealth gain, not because printing 
pieces of paper creates wealth, but because monetary expansion can transfer 
wealth. 
 The problem of anticipating monetary shocks and their effects surely 
exacerbates the costs of infl ation (see below). Neither entrepreneurs nor the 
monetary authority can predict the microdetails of a given policy change. 
Expectational errors probably account for a signifi cant portion of the real 
effects of infl ation. At the theoretical level, however, it is important to dis-
tinguish between these real effects and those arising from the distributional 
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consequences of infl ation and defl ation of the money stock. For one thing, 
the distinction helps one avoid arid debates on whether fully anticipated mon-
etary policy matters. 
 In a sense, we are having our cake and eating it too. In emphasizing the 
importance of Cantillon effects, we can also recognize the role of the unex-
pected component of policy changes. Thus, we agree that, as an infl ation-
ary policy comes to be anticipated, its effects diminish. We do not follow the 
rational expectations theorist or even the monetarist in concluding that real 
effects of monetary expansion and contraction can be eliminated once agents 
understand the structure of the economy or the causal nexus among eco-
nomic variables. This strikes us as analogous to suggesting that the horrors of 
war would be eliminated once citizens understood the causes of war. 
 We are not, of course, suggesting that the FOMC meets every six weeks 
and decides whom to enrich the following period. To the extent that wealth 
and income redistributions accompany monetary accelerations and decelera-
tions, these effects are undoubtedly no part of the intention of the members 
of that committee. Resulting redistributions and misallocations may be offset 
by other factors or benefi ts. Nonetheless, it is important that all the signifi -
cant effects of infl ation be understood before deciding to engage in some of 
it. Further, if  we are correct, then the conventional wisdom on the “costs” of 
fi ghting infl ations is fundamentally wrong. 
 Unsustainable monetary expansions generate resource misallocation. The 
pattern of investment in such expansions is self-reversing; once the growth 
of money ceases or even decelerates, the pattern will begin to be reversed. 
The “costs” have been incurred in the expansionary phase. That misalloca-
tions occur during the expansionary phase of a business cycle is one thesis 
of rational expectations models with which we are in complete agreement. 
The recession phase constitutes the recognition of costs already incurred and 
errors already made. Ending an infl ation does not generate costs but reveals 
those already incurred. This is true unless an actual monetary  contraction is 
imposed on the previous expansion. Of course, without specifying a regime, 
it is impossible to say exactly what would constitute a contractionary policy. 
With an endogenous component of the money supply, a fall in the stock of 
money may merely refl ect the decreased demand for credit in a contractionary 
phase of the cycle. If  authorities attempt to offset any decline, they may per-
petuate what they are attempting to remedy. 
 Three basic policies have been derived from the Austrian development 
of Wicksell’s theory. Hayek ( 1967a ) argued for maintaining the amount of 
spending ( M x  V ) constant. He suggested that this would entail a rough con-
stancy in factor prices, and, in a growing economy, a falling price level of fi nal 
output. Rothbard ( 1963 ) argued for constancy in the money supply, all but 
ensuring secular defl ation. More recently, however, White ( 1984 ) has criti-
cized any infl exible monetary rule derived from  a priori theorizing. He argues 
for a system of free banking, in which the quantity of money is market-deter-
mined by the interaction of competitive suppliers (unregulated banks) and 
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demanders (the nonbank public). From our perspective, the question is not 
yet settled. We do expect the renewed interest in monetary regimes to help 
provide a resolution, if  not to offer new alternatives. 
 Conclusion 
 In this chapter we have attempted to adopt a subjectivist and microeconomic 
approach to monetary theory. We have argued that, from Carl Menger down to 
contemporary fi gures, subjectivists have adopted a distinctive perspective on 
monetary questions. The distinctiveness of this position is most striking in the 
theory of economic fl uctuations. In no other area is economics so dominated 
by macroeconomic and nonsubjectivist reasoning. This is also an easy area to 
relate to modern monetary theories and models. For instance, modern rational 
expectations models have, paradoxically, incorporated essential features of an 
Austrian-subjectivist theory of the cycle, while at the same time representing 
an extreme example of anti-subjectivist reasoning. We have suggested that 
the essential truths of modern macroeconomics can be better presented and 
defended with a consistently subjectivist monetary theory. 
 Subjectivist economics involves a consistent development of methodo-
logical individualism, and hence is systematically microeconomic in its mode 
of analysis. The further one strays from this approach, the less subjectivist is 
one’s theory. Monetary economics represents a test case. Economists have, by 
and large, accepted that there is something distinctive about the subject mat-
ter, which requires a separate theory if  not a distinct set of economic “laws.” 
Admittedly, any treatment of traditional monetary questions involves discus-
sion of aggregates. Where a subjectivist draws the line, however, is in insist-
ing that nothing other than microeconomic forces are at work. Among other 
things, this precludes analysis in terms of such hoary macroeconomic con-
cepts as “the price level of output” or “output as a whole.” Neither aggregate 
has any real existence, or has any direct impact on economic decision-making. 
As we have tried to demonstrate in the last two chapters, this conclusion does 
not merely follow from arcane methodological considerations. Traditional 
macromodels overlook important microeconomic phenomena. Nowhere 
is this more apparent than in the area of capital theory, and particularly 
where capital and monetary theories intersect. The subjectivist approach also 
involves an emphasis on real time and the indeterminacy of processes. As we 
have seen, Menger’s theory of the evolution of money embodies the insight 
that the outcome of a process is not independent of the process itself. No 
one could have predicted the development of today’s monetary institutions 
or monetary regime. In business cycle theory, Austrians have recognized that 
whatever applicability the rational expectations hypothesis has to the typical 
features of cycles, it cannot predict their unique features. Moreover, in real 
time economic fl uctuations contain many surprises; agents will accordingly 
suffer disappointments. These insights are surely consistent not only with sub-
jectivism, but also with our experience of economic cycles. 
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 Notes 
 1  We are not suggesting that Hicks ( 1935 ) represents a consistent subjectivist analysis. 
This article is, however, a pioneering effort in the microeconomic analysis of money. 
It thus belongs to a literature of which the subjectivist work of Mises, Hayek and 
others is one part. 
 2  This section draws heavily from O’Driscoll ( 1984b ). 
 3  Axel Leijonhufvud convinced us of the importance of this latter argument. 
 4  The government might try circumventing this problem by promulgating the price 
of one commodity, e.g., a representative pair of shoes. For this promulgation to be 
effective, however, transactors would have to perceive informational value in the 
decreed price. The price certainly would not have the same informational content as 
a market price, which conveys information about the exchange rate at which shoes 
are bought and sold on a regular basis. For this and other reasons, we suspect that 
this strategy would not work. We are aware that this line of reasoning calls into 
question the ability of the government to introduce a truly  fi at currency, a doubt 
also expressed by Mises ( 1953 ). 
 5  As Hayek ( 1939 ) pointed out, equality between savings and investment is an impre-
cise and ultimately unsatisfactory way of describing intertemporal equilibrium. In 
his words, the “starting point” of a Wicksellian theory should be “(a) the intentions 
of all the consumers with respect to the way in which they wish to distribute at all 
the relevant dates all their resources (not merely their ‘income’) between current 
consumption and provision for future consumption, and (b) the separate and inde-
pendent decisions of the entrepreneurs with respect to the amounts of consumers’ 
goods which they plan to provide at these various dates. Correspondence between 
these two groups of decisions would be characteristic of the kind of equilibrium 
which we now usually describe as a state where savings are equal to investment 
and with which the idea of an equilibrium rate of interest is connected.” Hayek’s 
microeconomic approach takes account of the complexities of the  multi-period case 
sloughed over in the macroeconomic formulation that  S =  I . It also makes clear that 
“the” rate of interest is a shorthand for the whole set of relative prices involved in 
the intertemporal coordination process (and certainly not merely some loan rate of 
interest). 
 6  We do not mean to imply that, but for money, the economy would be in general 
equilibrium. Following the distinction made in the previous chapter, we are distin-
guishing between an economy characterized by normal entrepreneurial error and 
one subjected to persistent monetary shocks. In the latter case, we argue that sys-
tematic errors are being made; and economic activity will be discoordinated in a 
systematic and predictable manner. 
 7  Any comparison between Hayek and Keynes depends on one’s interpretation of 
Keynes. Leijonhufvud ( 1983a ) offers an interpretation that makes Keynes seem 
more Wicksellian, and hence more attractive, than the “textbook” Keynes. 
 8  As Frydman and Phelps ( 1983 , p. 15) make clear, this criterion is the very one fi rst 
offered by Hayek ( 1937a ). 
 
 10  Some unresolved problems 
 To me it is far more pleasant to agree than to differ; but it is impossible that one 
who has any regard for truth can long avoid protesting against doctrines which 
seem to him to be erroneous. There is ever a tendency of the most hurtful kind 
to allow opinions to crystallize into creeds … A despotic calm is usually the 
triumph of error. In the republic of the sciences sedition and even anarchy are 
benefi cial in the long run to the greatest happiness of the greatest number. 
 W. Stanley Jevons ( 1970 , p. 260) 
 Scientifi c progress is a process of creative destruction. What is destroyed is 
the intellectual capital of other scientists whose resistance to accepting new 
contributions is not only understandable, but desirable; it is only by overcoming 
this resistance that the few genuine contributions can be separated from the 
more numerous invalid proposals. 
 Melvin W. Reder ( 1982 , p. 20) 
 At the beginning of this book, we suggested that what separates schools in 
science is the questions posed, not the answers given. Certainly in the history 
of economics, major innovations have occurred when theorists observing the 
same phenomena asked new questions about it. And these innovations have 
been opposed precisely because different questions were being asked. In the 
eighteenth century, students of government sought to devise policies that 
would achieve a pre-ordained social pattern and lead to an increase in national 
wealth. Adam Smith altered the nature of the inquiry by asking a different 
question. He speculated on how a nation of autonomous individuals, each 
seeking to increase his own wealth and well-being, could produce an overall 
order that was no part of anyone’s intention. The answers to this question 
spawned what we now recognize as economic science. 
 A century later, Ricardianism had transformed economics into an arid set 
of laws of distribution and production, conjoined with a dubious population 
theory. Jevons, Menger and, to a lesser extent, Walras posed a new question: 
What governs the choices of consumers? The resulting neoclassical analysis 
transformed economics into the science of choice. It also transformed eco-
nomics from a predominantly macro- into a predominantly microanalytic 
discipline. 
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 In this century, Keynes changed economics by inquiring into the determin-
ation of aggregate demand and national income. In a sense, economics had 
now come full circle back to macroanalysis and the study of distributional 
rather than allocational questions. The subsequent dilution of Keynesianism 
in the neoclassical synthesis is well known but does not change our interpret-
ation of the Keynesian message. 
 Subjectivists do not perform constrained maximization problems differ-
ently than neoclassical theorists. Nor are subjectivists privy to a special math-
ematics that yields different solutions to familiar equations. Subjectivists do, 
however, ask different questions. To relate our philosophy of science to our 
concise history of economics, subjectivists try consistently to analyze eco-
nomic phenomena within the framework fi rst sketched out by Menger in the 
last century. This involves,  inter alia , a focus on the goals and plans of indi-
viduals, not on the objects or instruments of these plans; the reconstruction 
of observed phenomena in terms of individual choices; and the analysis of 
overall outcomes as the unintended results of individual interactions. 
 We have attempted to steer a course, as it were, between Charybdis and 
Scylla. On the one hand, we have sought to avoid unnecessary controversy. 
We are certainly aware that, within the neoclassical edifi ce, many of  the indi-
vidual points that we have made in this book are recognized and incorpo-
rated in the work of  at least some major fi gures. Indeed, wherever possible 
we have cited the orthodox literature to emphasize points of  convergence 
or, alternatively, the subjectivist elements in neoclassical economics. Where 
we are critical, our purpose in citing specifi c individuals is not to foment 
controversy but to be precise in our criticism. In every instance, we have 
attempted to cite an author who is representative of  the orthodox position 
on a particular point. 
 On the other hand, we have been cognizant of the necessity of clearly 
stating the differences that do exist between subjectivists and their neoclas-
sical brethren. It should not be surprising if  there were substantial overlap 
between Austrian or subjectivist economics and neoclassical orthodoxy. The 
Austrians were one of the three founding schools of modern economics; and, 
in fact, there are more Austrian elements in neoclassical economics than are 
recognized in textbooks (including, via Lord Robbins, the very conception of 
economics as the study of the allocation of scarce means among competing 
ends). The reader may at times wonder why we have not emphasized this over-
lap more. The simple reason is that the subjectivist analysis would then have 
been obscured. Our purpose in writing this book was to restate and advance 
subjectivist economics. This goal would scarcely have been promoted by pre-
senting an exhaustive list of neoclassical propositions with which we agree. 
 There is a “sponginess” to neoclassical economics that enables it to absorb 
divergent elements around it without ever emphasizing their main points. 
These fringe ideas become footnotes to which theorists can refer as evidence 
that they have taken the ideas into account. For instance, Keynes’ liquidity 
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preference concept is incorporated in neoclassical economics as an interest-
elastic demand for money. The idea has been formally incorporated, yet 
Keynes’ main point has been lost: the  instability of  liquidity preference. Nor 
are the effects of an unstable liquidity preference on interest rates and capital 
markets adequately treated in orthodox analysis. In terms of our own ideas, 
we have chosen to compare them to the dominant themes of neoclassical eco-
nomics and not to unrepresentative footnote presentations. 
 We have also attempted to strike a balance between, on the one hand, pre-
senting theoretical and methodological abstractions and, on the other hand, 
offering examples or applications. We did not wish to overwhelm the reader 
with too much of the former, or to confuse him with too much of the lat-
ter. If, however, we were to characterize the subjectivist literature generally, 
we would have to admit that it has been relatively long on methodological 
prescriptions and short on applications. It is time to do the diffi cult work 
of applying subjectivist ideas to actual problems. We are aware that most of 
our applications involve only a sketchy analysis of a particular problem. In 
almost every case, more work needs to be done. We believe, however, that the 
time is ripe for applying subjectivist insights to current economic problems. 
Accordingly, we outline here some areas where we think the returns would be 
particularly high. 
 First, we would mention the whole area of law and economics. We do so 
not only because we have each written in this area, but because it is a fi eld 
that virtually demands the theoretical-institutional approach advocated by 
subjectivists. If  any area involves a blending of theoretical and institutional 
analysis, it is law and economics. Nowhere else is an institutionless analysis 
less fruitful and more destructive. For instance, a good bit of ink has been 
spilled on the question of the effi ciency of common law. This view, fi rst of 
all, treats an undesigned order as if  it were the creation of individuals; and, 
second, it puts the theoretical cart before the horse. What is effi cient depends 
on the institutional environment. One can inquire whether a particular insti-
tution is consistent with a whole set of institutions (as when one analyzes the 
consistency of a common law doctrine with all others). It is quite meaning-
less, however, to ask whether an entire set of institutions – like the property 
rights structure – is effi cient. This question treats as “givens” conditions that 
change  mutatis mutandis as property rights evolve (Rizzo,  1980b ; O’Driscoll, 
 1980 ). Of course, having made this point, we have only opened up a research 
program, not completed one. Needless to say, an important aspect of that 
program involves a theory of these institutions that does not treat them as the 
outcome of a collective constrained-maximization problem. The next item on 
our subjectivist research agenda is a suggestion for a start in this direction. 
 The analysis of money as an evolved social institution is a quintessential 
subjectivist topic. Viewing money as the unintended outcome of a market 
process involves thinking about money in a fundamentally different way 
(Frankel,  1977 ). Money then becomes not something that individuals can 
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shape or control, but an institution or order to which they must accommodate 
themselves. In this process of accommodation, individuals will inadvertently 
affect the monetary order. The resulting monetary “innovations” will not, 
however, be changes that individuals have deliberately adopted: rather, these 
changes will represent evolutionary adaptation. Even when dramatic choices 
are made, as when a gold standard is substituted for a fi at money system, or 
fi xed exchange rates are substituted for fl exible exchange rates, policy-makers 
have not created new monetary institutions so much as they have moved the 
country from one given environment or regime to another. Policy-makers do 
not necessarily have a great deal of explicit control over the characteristics of 
either environment. They may surely take actions that affect their environ-
ment, but this does not imply that they can control the outcome. If  we may 
suggest an analogy, we each have options with respect to which kind of cli-
mate we live in. We choose by moving from one climate to another, however, 
not by altering the climate of the area in which we presently live. The sum 
total of individual actions may affect the climatic environment, but even col-
lective action will not enable individuals to effect a desired outcome. 
 The monetary approach suggested here has policy implications, of which 
two can be mentioned. The fi rst concerns the nature of monetary rules. Every 
monetary system has or can be described by rules, including rules governing 
the growth of the supply of money. If  a monetary system is an evolved eco-
nomic order, then it is diffi cult to imagine how these rules could be externally 
imposed or chosen exogenously. The rules themselves, including the money 
growth rules, must be the product of an evolutionary process – a process of 
economic adaptation. Macroeconomic planning for a fi xed rate of growth of 
the money supply has all the allure of microeconomic planning – and all the 
pitfalls, if  recent history is any guide. 
 The second implication is more specifi c, though it is related to the fi rst 
one. If  the monetary institutions and money itself  are part of the market 
system, then it is diffi cult to imagine how the quantity of money could be 
exogenous or independent of individual choices. Empirical evidence aside, 
there are strong  a priori reasons to suspect the endogeneity of the money sup-
ply. Of course, empirically we may recognize that monetary questions have 
historically become political questions, and that political intervention leads to 
exogenous infl uences on the quantity or rate of growth of the money supply. 
This recognition puts the question of the exogeneity of the money supply in 
quite a different light, however, than that produced by, say, monetarist ana-
lysis. In the evolutionary view, money is a market institution and its supply 
is endogenously determined. There may be exogenous factors, as there are 
exogenous factors like fortuitous inventions in economic growth. An unex-
pected discovery of new sources of base money would be an example of an 
exogenous monetary change. For the supply of money to be strictly exogen-
ous, however, it must be transformed from an economic or market institution 
into one subject to rigid political control. And market forces will constantly 
be at work offsetting the effects of these controls. 
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 We think that an evolutionary approach to money has more explanatory 
power for analyzing recent fi nancial market innovations, including the multi-
plication of close money substitutes (if  not money themselves), than a posi-
tive theory of exogenous money determination. 
 Finally, we turn once again to the topic of competition. Economists ana-
lyzing competition as a process need to develop a theory of nonprice infor-
mation structures. Neoclassical formulations rely almost exclusively on prices 
to convey information. This is untenable as soon as one incorporates real 
time and expectations in the analysis. Spot-price movements no longer convey 
unambiguous signals. Even were futures markets to be “complete,” the pas-
sage of time would upset any temporary intertemporal equilibrium. Not only 
do producers require information about trade-offs, they need to know how 
other producers will react to these prices. No matter how rich the array of 
futures markets producers confront Keynes’ beauty contest problem. 
 Entrepreneurs are not, of course, paralyzed by this informational void. 
Their ability to plan in a tolerably stable environment indicates the existence 
of other, nonprice, sources of information. There must be market institutions 
and rules of thumb that “fi ll in” some of the information not provided by 
prices. This realization requires, however, that we rethink our attitude toward 
familiar institutions and practices. For some of the required information will 
be about product characteristics, production plans, and even prices charged by 
competitors. Competition may, then, depend on the existence of institutions 
and practices presently regarded as non-competitive or anti-competitive. 
 In  Chapter 5 we discussed endogenous uncertainty in the guise of Keynes’ 
beauty contest and the Holmes-Moriarty story. We saw there that, as long 
as independent decision-making remains independent, the search for more 
knowledge does not reduce uncertainty. It merely heightens the level of 
guessing and counterguessing. In this sense, then, endogenous uncertainty is 
ineradicable. On the other hand, as we have previously intimated, endogenous 
uncertainty can be reduced or eliminated if  actors (agree to) follow “arbitrary 
conventions.” Independent fi rms, for example, face endogenous uncertainty 
in the form of trying to guess the price decisions of their rivals. In “oligopol-
istic” markets, the price that any given fi rm should charge will depend, in part, 
on the prices that he expects other fi rms to charge. Their decisions will in turn 
depend on what he is expected to decide. Thus, the expected price distribu-
tions faced by fi rms are endogenous; that is, they arise from the very oper-
ation of the market process. One “arbitrary convention” or institution that 
can reduce this form of uncertainty is the exchange of reliable price informa-
tion among the rival fi rms. 
 Firms are subject to both exogenous and endogenous uncertainty. While 
exogenous risk may be transformed, by defi nition nothing can be done to 
eliminate it. Endogenous uncertainty arises from the very operation of the 
market. At least in principle, some actions can be taken to lessen this type of 
uncertainty. Consider uncertainty about what price to charge. At any given 
moment, fi rms observe a distribution of prices charged by their competitors, a 
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distribution that need by no means be normal. Firm owners are aware, more-
over, that they do not have complete information about prices. The variance 
of prices refl ects,  inter alia , temporary cost advantages, special discounting 
and product differentiation. 
 Each fi rm owner desires information that will improve his planning ability. 
This would include information about the mean and variance of the price dis-
tribution, product characteristics, amounts sold at these prices, etc. All of this 
information is either given or superfl uous in perfectly competitive models, but 
is available only at some cost in competitive markets. Though he would never 
describe it in this way, the entrepreneur is seeking information about equi-
librium conditions in his market. Though he may have quite different uses 
in mind for this information, a competitive fi rm owner requires much of the 
same information needed by a cartel. 
 By reducing price uncertainty, information-sharing arrangements may 
reduce the variance of prices. If  fi rms are risk-averse, this may also reduce 
the mean of the price distribution. This latter point is emphasized in Dewey 
( 1979 ), while Rizzo ( 1984 ) presents the more general argument. 
 None of this sanctions other aspects of collusive arrangements, especially 
not legal barriers to entry. Indeed, the existence or absence of legal blockages 
to competition would surely be crucial in ascertaining empirically whether an 
exchange of information were facilitating collusion or abetting competition. 
 We are not arguing that the exchange of price information would be gen-
erally characteristic of competitive industries, though some of it probably 
occurs in every industry (including among economists). We are suggesting, 
however, that competitive markets will generally rely on institutions and prac-
tices to generate information assumed in neoclassical analysis to be given by 
price signals alone. Sharing of price information may be one of these prac-
tices, which may also be institutionalized. A theory leaving no room for these 
nonprice sources of information is an impoverished – indeed, a biased – ana-
lysis of competition. 
 In conclusion, we have attempted in this book to offer a sample of research 
topics whose development would especially benefi t from a consistent appli-
cation of subjectivist economics. This sample is certainly not meant to be 
exhaustive, refl ecting, as it does, the constraints both of space and of the 
authors’ own interests. We will count this book a success if  readers begin add-
ing their own items to the research agenda. 
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 Mario J. Rizzo 
 Introduction 
 In the past 25 years, a large amount of new research in Austrian economics 
has developed and expanded the basic themes that are central to its unique 
identity (O’Driscoll and Rizzo,  1996 ). These highly interrelated themes are 
(1) the subjective, yet socially embedded, quality of human decision-making; 
(2) the individual’s perception of the passage of time (“real time”); (3) the 
radical uncertainty of expectations; (4) the decentralization of explicit and 
tacit knowledge in society; (5) the dynamic market processes generated by 
individual action, especially entrepreneurship; (6) the function of the price 
system in transmitting knowledge; (7) the supplementary role of cultural 
norms and other cultural products (“institutions”) in conveying knowledge; 
and (8) the spontaneous – that is, not centrally directed – evolution of social 
institutions. The specifi c ways in which these themes have recently manifested 
themselves is the subject of this article. 
 Since our task is to discuss the developments in Austrian economics pri-
marily since the last  New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics entry in 1987 we 
shall not review the work of the many “classic” Austrian authors. In add-
ition, since our concerns are the substantive developments in the fi eld, we 
omit many valuable contributions in the history of economic thought and in 
methodology. 
 Macroeconomics and monetary theory 
 There have been many advances in Austrian macroeconomics. These include 
new work on business cycle theory and on alternative monetary institutions. 
 Each of these areas can be looked at from the general perspective of treat-
ing time, money and their related institutions seriously (Horwitz,  2000 ). Time 
is the medium of all action. Decisions are taken in time to produce conse-
quences in the future. Taking time seriously means also taking the uncertainty 
that characterizes these decisions seriously. This applies to savings-investment 
choices, production plans and the time structure of capital goods. In an 
Austrian (and Keynesian) perspective the pervasive uncertainty of the future 
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makes money necessary. Thus, as time is the medium of all action, money is 
the medium of all exchange. All goods markets are accordingly affected by 
the supply and demand for money and the nature of monetary institutions. 
 The Austrian Business Cycle Theory (ABCT) received a major systemiza-
tion and refi nement in the work of Roger Garrison, culminating in his book, 
 Time and Money: The Macroeconomics of Capital Structure ( 2001 ). The pre-
vious work in the subject was scattered in many articles by Friedrich Hayek 
and in the work of Ludwig von Mises. It was also very imperfectly linked 
to the brilliant, but underrated, work by Ludwig Lachmann,  Capital and Its 
Structure ( 1956 ). Garrison corrects these defi ciencies and adds coherence to 
ABCT which had previously been unknown. In a sense, Garrison has done 
for ABCT what John Hicks and Alvin Hansen did for Keynes’ macroeconom-
ics, except that the Garrison’s work is an accurate rendition of Hayek, Mises 
and Lachmann. 
 The subtitle of Garrison’s book, “The Macroeconomics of Capital 
Structure,” expresses the important claim that Austrian macroeconomics 
cannot adequately be appreciated without understanding that “investment” 
is not a homogeneous decision. This insight is developed at length by Peter 
Lewin in  Capital in Disequilibrium: The Role of Capital in a Changing World 
( 1999 ), the most important work in Austrian capital theory in many decades 
(see also Endres and Harper,  2008 ). The ABCT focuses on the inappropri-
ateness of the capital structure (malinvestment) generated by artifi cially low 
real interest rates (that is, interest rates that are lower than the real supply of 
savings would allow). Thus, the term overinvestment is, by itself, a misleading 
characterization of the ABCT process. While excessively low interest rates do 
increase the level of investment relative to its previous position, they do so 
in a biased way – those stages of production further from consumption are 
affected to a greater extent. 
 However, as Garrison’s recent work ( 2004 ) has shown, there are even more 
widespread distortions in the production structure generated by artifi cially 
low interest rates. These include initial “overconsumption” as the result of 
reduced savings and of increased incomes on the part of factors of pro-
duction. Increased investment in close temporal proximity to the overcon-
sumption is labeled the “derived demand effect.” This is in addition to the 
“discount effect,” described above, which increases the profi tability of new 
investment distant from consumption. These two contrary effects come at the 
expense of intermediate stages of production as well as reduced maintenance 
of existing capital at all stages. They may even result from the utilization of 
unused resources during periods of less than full employment. These effects 
show that the ABCT is a type of “coordinationist macroeconomics” insofar 
as it describes the discoordination of various sectors of the economy, and is 
not simply a micro, choice-theoretic approach to macroeconomics (Wagner, 
 2005 ). 
 Accordingly, in this Austrian view recessions are characterized not simply 
by low levels of aggregate economic activity but also by the misdirection of 
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resources caused by previous boom-induced malinvestments. These system-
atic sectoral imbalances – too much investment in interest-sensitive areas of 
economic activity – must be corrected as recovery proceeds. 
 The Austrian theory, however, is not a complete theory of the business cycle. 
It accounts mainly for the process leading to and including the cycle’s upper 
turning point. It is a theory of the crisis. How long the resulting recession 
lasts is not predicted by the theory or even, strictly speaking, by the degree to 
which resources were misallocated. The length of the recession will depend, 
for example, on those factors affecting the mobility of resources. 
 None of this implies that Hayek, Garrison or Horwitz are insensitive to 
the problems that would be induced by an aggregate increase in the demand 
to hold money (a fall in income velocity), which can accompany recessions. 
This “secondary defl ation” should be avoided by a concomitant increase in 
the supply of money by the relevant monetary institutions. Horwitz ( 2000 ) is 
the fi rst to integrate Austrian macroeconomics with monetary disequilibrium 
theory to analyze defl ationary processes. Nevertheless, recessions are not pri-
marily defl ationary phenomena (or at least need not be), but occasions for 
correction of the misdirection of resources. Some Austrians, however, argue 
that increases in the demand for money have signifi cant negative consequences 
only in the presence of legal restraints on price fl exibility (Salerno,  2003 ). 
 One of the most important possible obstacles to recovery from recessions 
may be in the behavior of “big players.” These are agents whose discretionary 
behavior, insulated from the normal discipline of profi t and loss, can signifi -
cantly affect the course of economic effects (Koppl and Mramor,  2003 ; Koppl, 
 2002 ; Koppl and Yeager,  1996 ). Thus, discretionary behavior on the part of 
monetary authorities (in the United States, the Fed), fi scal policy makers 
(Congress or the executive), or even in some cases private monopolists, can 
increase uncertainty faced by most economic agents (“small players”). They 
will have to pay more attention to trying to guess the perhaps idiosyncratic 
behavior of the big players. Economic variables will become contaminated 
with big-player infl uence. It will become more diffi cult to extract knowledge 
of fundamentals from actual market prices. And thus entrepreneurs will fi nd 
it harder to determine where resources should be withdrawn and where they 
should be added in a way that is sustainable in the medium to long term. 
 An important variant of the ABCT in  Risk and Business Cycles: New and 
Old Austrian Perspectives ( 1998 ), developed by Tyler Cowen, focuses on the 
integration of business cycle theory with developments in modern fi nance. The 
main sense in which this can be called a variant of ABCT is that changes in 
the riskiness of investment decisions are linked to the “old Austrian” concern 
with the degree of futurity or roundaboutness in investments. For example, 
in Cowen’s analysis, an increase in the acceptable level of risk will encourage 
undertaking more longer-term investments (as well as, of course, investments 
of any given length with more uncertain yields). These can be both invest-
ments in durable capital goods (that is, investments with a continuous fl ow 
of payoffs over a long period of time) and investments with a long period of 
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gestation before the ultimate output is produced. Cowen associates less risky 
(“safe”) investments with consumption and shorter-term investments. 
 Cowen’s analysis is more general than the traditional ABCT because it 
allows many factors besides a fall in real interest rates to generate a lengthen-
ing of the capital structure. These include exogenous risk-preference shifts, 
increases in savings, easing fi nancial constraints, and reductions in uncer-
tainty (so as to reduce “waiting” for acceptable investment opportunities). 
Any of these changes can generate an increase in the riskiness of investment. 
None of these changes must necessarily cause a cyclical boom and bust, but 
they might do so. 
 Horwitz ( 2000 ) shows that the traditional business cycle concerns of 
Austrian macroeconomics quite naturally lead into comparative institutional 
analysis. Therefore, the obvious question is: what kind of institutional frame-
work is necessary or conducive to avoiding the distortionary effects of infl a-
tion and defl ation? Austrians have been critical of both discretionary central 
banking policies and rigid monetarist rules. Some have favored free banking 
while others have favoured a 100 percent (usually gold) reserve requirement 
and hence have opposed fractional reserve banking. 
 The free banking school, represented by Selgin and White ( 1994 ), Horwitz 
( 2000 ), Dowd ( 1996 ) and Sechrest ( 1993 ), emphasizes the importance of 
adjusting to changes in the demand to hold money (income velocity). For 
prices in particular markets to do their work appropriately in transmitting 
knowledge and allocating resources they must be free of the distortions 
induced by infl ation and monetarily induced defl ation. Free banking advo-
cates argue that bank profi t maximization, under sound institutional con-
straints, will lead banks to expand or contract deposits or currency  pari passu 
with changes in the demand for money. Banks will receive signals about the 
demand for (their) money as their reserves expand or contract. When reserves 
expand, the demand to hold is increasing, and vice versa. Profi t maximization 
leads banks to increase the supply of money when reserves expand beyond 
their desired levels. Thus, no explicit monetary policy is needed to avoid 
unwarranted expansion or contraction on the “money market,” just as on 
commodity markets no deliberate industrial policy is needed to avoid unwar-
ranted expansion or contraction of resources in different areas. 
 The advocates of 100 percent reserve money follow the work of Murray 
N. Rothbard ( 1983 ). These include Block ( 1988 ), Hoppe ( 1994 ) and Huerta 
de Soto ( 1995 ). They argue that free banking – to the extent that it is frac-
tional reserve banking – is ethically suspect. Regardless of the merits of this 
argument, our concern here is solely with economics. They further argue that 
fractional reserve banks are inherently infl ationary because any creation of 
fi duciary media beyond an increase in specie will generate a business cycle. 
(The word “infl ationary” is being used here either as a defi nition – an increase 
in money not covered by an increase in specie – or as an intellectual place-
card to suggest the generation of a cycle.) Critiques are offered in Horwitz 
( 2000 ) and in Selgin and White ( 1994 ). 
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 Entrepreneurship 
 The theory of entrepreneurship has been a subject of great importance in 
Austrian economics since the publication of Israel Kirzner’s  Competition and 
Entrepreneurship ( 1973 ). One could argue, of course, that this was implicit 
in the prior works of Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek. Nevertheless, 
there is an important difference between implicit and explicit ideas. Over a 
long period of time, Kirzner refi ned his theory of entrepreneurial discovery 
or alertness in many books. 
 Kirzner’s approach is predominantly cognitive. There are roots of this cog-
nitive approach in the early work of von Mises (Ebeling,  2007 ). However, 
quite curiously in this time of the resurgence of psychology and econom-
ics, it is a cognitive theory without explicit cognitive foundations. Kirzner is 
interested in the market implications of the fact that there is entrepreneurial 
alertness. He is not interested, beyond some very general observations, in the 
causal factors that give rise to or are conducive to alertness. 
 Alertness, or equivalently, entrepreneurial discovery, is hard to defi ne. It 
is a creative, spontaneous and to a certain extent idiosyncratic, mental act 
that goes beyond the mere apprehension of objective data. First, while it usu-
ally begins with objective data, it critically involves drawing connections with 
other data when those connections are not obvious or even the result of com-
plex computations. Second, true discoveries are not the result of deliberate 
acts of search. They cannot reliably be attained by the simple deployment of 
resources. Something more is necessary. This is not to suggest, however, that 
they must be viewed as random shocks to the economic system. They can be 
cultivated and prepared for by deliberate decisions, but they cannot be mech-
anically produced by them. We might say that while deliberate search is not 
a suffi cient condition for discovery, it is necessary. Even better, eschewing the 
excessively constraining categories of necessity and suffi ciency, we might say 
that the serendipity of discovery favors the searching mind (Holcombe,  2007 ; 
Shane,  2000 ). Finally, it is likely that many individuals can be exposed to the 
same data and yet not make the discoveries that the alert individual does. 
 In a market context, entrepreneurial cognition is the discovery of  profi t 
opportunities. In Kirzner’s perspective, this is based on noticing price incon-
sistencies, whether at a point in time or across time. Hence this is an arbitrage 
theory of  profi t. How well this conception of  entrepreneurship takes uncer-
tainty into account is a matter of  some dispute (Kirzner,  1982 ). In the theory 
advanced by Young Back Choi ( 1993 ,  1999 ), however, uncertainty is more 
explicitly considered. In this perspective, related to Schumpeter’s classic ana-
lysis ( 1934 ), entrepreneurs break through the conventional way of  looking at 
the world. These conventions were originally adopted to reduce uncertainty. 
But as time goes on the world changes and they become less and less effect-
ive. Profi t opportunities accumulate. Entrepreneurs adopt new paradigms 
that enable them to see the new profi t opportunities that conventionalists 
cannot. 
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 To the extent that entrepreneurial discovery is unconnected to any cogni-
tive or psychological basis, it functions as a  deus ex machina of  the market 
process. It drives the processes that occur in response to errors and disequi-
libria. Ultimately, it is defi ned by what it does. This approach has been criti-
cized because it presupposes empirical psychological processes that are not 
necessarily present in all circumstances (Jakee and Spong,  2003 ). Can we say 
anything systematic about the factors that, on an individual or social level, 
are conducive to discovery? If  we can, we might begin to understand more 
precisely what it is, when it is successful and when it is not. 
 In the fi rst unifi ed analysis of the factors affecting entrepreneurship, David 
Harper focuses on the presence of a sense of personal agency as the primary 
factor. “It comprises two cognitive elements – beliefs in the locus of con-
trol (or contingency expectations) and beliefs in self-effi cacy (or competence 
expectations)” (Harper,  2003 , p. 14). This means that the entrepreneurial agent 
believes that in a particular context results are contingent upon actions as 
opposed to luck or nature, and that he himself  possesses the personal capabil-
ities to effect these actions and thus to produce the overall results. Individual 
characteristics also interact with situations to make the development of a dis-
covery propensity more likely. Harper goes on to show the ways in which eco-
nomic, political and cultural institutions mediate the individual factors. 
 In most Austrian treatments entrepreneurial discovery is important because 
it drives the market process. Nevertheless, in path-breaking work Frederic 
Sautet ( 2000 ) shows that there are multiple levels of entrepreneurship. In the 
simple case, the entrepreneur is herself  alert to profi t opportunities outside of 
the fi rm. In the more complex case, the entrepreneur must face the fact that 
she often doesn’t know what her employees know. They are often closer to 
the local facts and may have a superior insight in some respects about profi t 
opportunities in the fi rm (from restructuring) as well as outside of the fi rm. 
Thus, the entrepreneur in a “complex fi rm” will seek to structure the fi rm with 
abstract or loose rules – some relating to compensation schemes – that encour-
age employees to make discoveries and communicate those appropriately. The 
fi rm itself  can be a locus of entrepreneurship. In related work, Harper ( 2008b ) 
suggests that a team of individuals, either inside or outside fi rms, might also 
constitute an entrepreneurial unit. 
 Randall Holcombe ( 2007 ) utilizes an idea of entrepreneurship beyond pure 
cognitive alertness, which includes, as well, acting upon the perception of 
novel opportunities. In this view, the entrepreneur can never be certain that 
she has correctly perceived a profi t opportunity until she acts and assesses the 
consequences. 
 Some Austrians have not followed Kirzner in their analysis of entrepre-
neurship. For example, Joseph Salerno ( 1993 ) rejects the characterization of 
alertness as the essence of entrepreneurship. He sees resource ownership as 
a necessary feature of entrepreneurial activity (Salerno,  2008 ). Along simi-
lar lines, K. Foss  et al . ( 2007 , see also P. Klein,  2008 ; K. Foss and N. Foss, 
 2007 ) have weaved together aspects of Knight’s uncertainty theory ( 1971 ) and 
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Austrian heterogeneous capital theory (Lachmann,  1956 ) to create a theory 
of entrepreneurial judgment. This theory makes entrepreneurship inseparable 
from asset ownership. The entrepreneur’s judgment is about the control of 
heterogeneous capital assets under conditions of radical uncertainty. These 
authors have applied their theory to understanding the internal operation of 
the fi rm. 
 Market processes and economic institutions 
 The entrepreneurial function is closely related to market processes and 
economic institutions. These interrelations are both complex and important. 
It will help to somewhat artifi cially separate them for our consideration. 
 A . The Austrian approach to market processes is distinctive in a number of 
respects (Wagner,  2007 ,  2010 ). It is sometimes described as a genetic-causal 
theory (Cowan and Rizzo,  1996 ). First, markets are in process and not continu-
ally in equilibrium. Thus, most Austrians do not take interpersonal equilibria 
of any kind simply as given or as consequences of an axiom of rationality. 
(An exception is Salerno ( 1994 ), who considers momentary market-clearing 
equilibrium as an implication of rationality.) Lack of alertness can be respon-
sible for economic errors and inconsistencies (or lack of interpersonal coord-
ination). The market process consists of those entrepreneurial responses to 
error. Kirzner and others take the view that market processes are generally 
coordinating: that is, that they generally correct market errors. Austrians 
accept this as an  empirical generalization . The extent to which the empirical 
generalization can be traced to an  a priori discovery tendency is a subject of 
debate. Kirzner appears to accept this view because he sees the tendency to 
discover as equivalent to, or tightly connected to, the tendency toward greater 
coordination (Kirzner,  1997 ). Rizzo, however, rejects this equivalence (Rizzo, 
 1996 ). Other authors have also expressed similar, though not identical, criti-
cisms (D. Klein and Briggeman,  2009 ; D. Klein,  1997 ). The neoclassical view 
that equilibrium is an implication of rationality should not, in this author’s 
opinion, be replaced with the view that a tendency to equilibrium is the impli-
cation of purposefulness. The former has empirical implications while the 
latter is not clearly defi ned, unless it is meant as the positive heuristic of an 
empirical research program (Rizzo,  1982 ). 
 Second, market processes are not instantaneous but take time. In the pas-
sage of time (“real time”), knowledge changes and unpredictable events occur 
(O’Driscoll and Rizzo,  1996 ). What were data at the start of a process may 
change because the process of “equilibration” occurs in real time. Real time 
cannot elapse without knowledge changing. 
 Third, market processes take place in the context of radical uncertainty. 
This is to be distinguished from risk, in which all of the possibilities are known 
with objective probabilities. However, radical uncertainty is not simply a con-
dition where the assigned probabilities are not objective, but one in which 
not all of the possibilities are known beforehand. (Still further complications 
270 Austrian economics: recent work
ensue because sometimes individuals know that they don’t know the possibil-
ities and sometimes they do not.) 
 This leads to the fourth feature of market processes: they are relatively inde-
terminate. If market processes – in the form of entrepreneurial discovery – can-
not be predicted, then the economist cannot know at the beginning where they 
will lead. In the process of adjusting to change, new “data” will be discovered 
(Rizzo,  1990 ,  2000 ). How far to take this point about the indeterminacy of 
market processes is subject to debate and may, in part, depend on defi nitional 
issues (Holcombe,  2007 ). Some have argued that Kirzner, in particular, has 
incorrectly downplayed this indeterminacy (Jakee and Spong,  2003 ). 
 This is not to rule out the use of constructs in which equilibria are reached 
as heuristic devices when appropriate (Holcombe,  2007 ). However, since they 
are simply heuristic devices they can be thrown out when circumstances do 
not warrant such “static” dynamics. 
 The fi fth, and fi nal, feature of market processes is the communication of 
decentralized or scattered knowledge. Markets enable individuals to act on 
more knowledge than they can ever hope to possess explicitly. They can do 
this through entrepreneurially produced market prices and through nonprice 
manifestations of market behavior. As Hayek showed, the man on the spot 
may be directly aware of certain economically relevant conditions. If  he acts 
by taking advantage of this knowledge in profi tably buying or selling he will 
ensure that market prices communicate what he knows (Hayek,  1948 ; Kirzner, 
 1992a ). 
 Prices are not the only communicators of knowledge in markets. Capital 
goods also embody knowledge. First, the particular use and combination 
of capital goods can, under nondistortionary conditions, convey know-
ledge about effi cient resource allocation and possible profi t opportunities 
(Lachmann,  1956 ). Second, even the physical design of capital goods can con-
vey accumulated knowledge about successful production techniques (Baetjer, 
 2000 ). 
 In general, the communication of knowledge in market settings depends not 
only on catallactic phenomena but also crucially on the appropriate “institu-
tional” context. This includes legal and cultural products (Harper,  2003 ). In 
the latter category David Harper ( 2008a ,  2010 ) has drawn attention to the role 
of numerical cognition – a product of both unique human biology and cul-
tural development – in facilitating economic calculation. The development of 
conventionalized systems of number sequences and techniques of counting 
reduces transaction costs, and helps agents to make plans, compute values, 
scarcities, notice arbitrage opportunities and ascertain the economically rele-
vant aspects of capital goods. 
 B . Entrepreneurship does not simply operate within a familiar institu-
tional structure like the market. It can also operate within structures like 
those involving social ties, philanthropy, nonprofi t organizations and so forth 
(Boettke and Coyne,  2009 ). There is also “political entrepreneurship” within a 
given constitutional or governance structure, which seeks to create coalitions 
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to effect specifi c legislation or transfers of wealth (“rent-seeking”). These 
nonmarket structures determine the precise form that entrepreneurship takes. 
The common differentiating factor that separates the entrepreneurship of the 
market process from these other forms of entrepreneurship is the absence of 
the discipline of monetary profi t and loss in the latter cases. Although money 
may change hands as a result of these forms of entrepreneurial activity, their 
outputs are not valued according to market prices. Whether effective feed-
back mechanisms exist in these contexts is an open question (Boettke and 
Coyne,  2009 ). 
 Some Austrians, however, have emphasized that nonmarket institutions 
can indeed provide feedback to entrepreneurs and can generate a social 
learning or knowledge-communication process similar to market prices and 
profi t-loss signals (Chamlee-Wright,  2008 ; Chamlee-Wright and Myers, 
 2008 ; Lewis and Chamlee-Wright,  2008 ). In particular, reputation and status 
are forms of  “social capital” that convey information. Under conditions of 
competition and effective monitoring of  standards, knowledge can be trans-
mitted far beyond networks of  individuals in direct communication with 
each other. 
 An important example of the communication of knowledge in a nonmar-
ket context can be found in the scientifi c community (McQuade and Butos, 
 2003 ). We discuss this below in the section on spontaneous orders. 
 Entrepreneurship can also shape or create institutions. Rules of behavior 
that surround and defi ne markets, constitutional systems, social and cultural 
systems arise out of the previous framework of rules, whether it was  de facto or 
 de jure . (In fact, the distinction between  de facto and  de jure may not be all that 
important for the economics of institutions, aside from the possible issue of 
transaction costs.) There is path dependency in the development of institutions 
(Boettke  et al .  2008 ). Those that develop as “indigenously introduced endogen-
ous institutions” are closely related to the informal practices and expectations 
of people, which in turn are grounded in local knowledge and values. Other 
institutions may be indigenously introduced but are exogenous in the sense 
that they are imposed by some formal authority, and do not gradually evolve 
from the informal traditions of a people. There is a risk that these institutions 
will not “stick” because of confl ict between the institution and the underlying 
norms. Externally (or foreign-) introduced exogenous institutions exhibit the 
greatest probability of not succeeding because of the greater likelihood of 
confl ict with underlying norms and expectations. Boettke  et al . ( 2008 ) refer to 
this analysis as an example of the “regression theorem” fi rst propounded by 
Ludwig von Mises ( 1953 ) in his analysis of the evolution of money. 
 Some of the evolution of framework institutions may simply be the 
undesigned outcome of individual behavior that is not necessarily entrepre-
neurial, as when people follow each other in making a path through the snow 
(Kirzner,  1992b ). In other cases, there may be alertness to possibilities of gain 
for the relevant acting parties in altering the political or social frameworks. 
Plausibly, the creation of the US Constitution was one such case. 
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 Institutions exist at many levels. Perhaps the most basic are those that 
involve informal institutions like customs, traditions, norms and religion 
(Williamson,  2000 ). These take the longest time to change. They may also 
determine the standards by which lower-level institutions and behavior within 
them are evaluated. A new political system is good or bad depending on the 
(more basic) norm structure in place. 
 Spontaneous orders 
 Our discussion of entrepreneurship and of institutions leads naturally into 
a discussion of spontaneous order, an idea very closely associated with 
Austrian economics. Unfortunately, the term “spontaneous order” is opaque. 
Somewhat more descriptive is the expression made famous by F.A. Hayek, 
“the results of human action but not of human design” (Hayek,  1967 ), and 
even more descriptive is the idea of unintended social order produced by 
individually purposeful behavior. 
 A spontaneous order is an organic or emergent form of coordination that 
manifests itself  in social institutions, some organizations and clusters of indi-
vidual plans. Orders of this kind arise without the design and maintenance 
(oversight) of a social planner. Nevertheless, spontaneous orders are gen-
erated by individual agents who do plan and carry out actions within their 
sphere of activity. Social order emerges as individuals adjust their plans to 
each other and to the environment over time. 
 Spontaneous order theories come in different varieties. Some refer to order 
produced on markets, while others concern order produced in nonmarket set-
tings. These theories can be purely positive (descriptive) or they can also be 
normative. When they are normative their normativity can be relative to the 
society as a whole or simply to particular subgroups. 
 At the most basic level, spontaneous order can refer simply to the welfare-
enhancing outcomes of competitive market processes operating within the 
“fi xed” constraints of property, contract and tort law. This is best studied 
within the context of market entrepreneurship. 
 Bruce Benson ( 1989 ), in his path-breaking study of the spontaneous evo-
lution of commercial law, shows how market interactions, based on basic 
property constraints, can give rise to commercial (contract) law without a law-
giver. The self-interested interactions of merchants lead them to develop and 
adhere to rules that increase their trade and hence overall social cooperation. 
These rules develop through a process of trial and error in which entrepre-
neurial alertness at a higher level – the level of rules of the game – doubtless 
plays an important role. Similarly, Stringham ( 2002 ,  2003 ) and Stringham 
and Boettke ( 2004 ) show that the self-interested interaction of participants in 
fi nancial markets has generated useful regulations that govern the operation 
of these markets. 
 Peter Leeson ( 2007 ,  2009 ), in a number of studies of the organization of 
eighteenth-century pirate activity, shows how an outlaw subgroup of society 
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developed maximizing (or “rational” in a limited sense) rules of governance 
without central direction. Outside of a market context, pirates converged on 
a set of rules whereby their ability to steal wealth from the rest of society was 
enhanced. This involved rules within the pirate society itself as well as rules gov-
erning its treatment of others. Within their society “democracy” was used; out-
side of it the use of brutality was constrained. This case is a good example of a 
spontaneous ordering process with “good” consequences within the subgroup 
and yet negative consequences for society as a whole. Pirates steal resources 
from the rest of society. The success of any such rogue subgroup weakens the 
possibilities of voluntary exchange and other forms of peaceful interaction. 
 Thomas McQuade and William Butos ( 2003 ; see also Butos and Koppl, 
 2003 ; Butos and McQuade,  2006 ) further develop the spontaneous order 
approach in the case of the organization of scientifi c research communities. 
Even where markets in the traditional sense may be missing, spontaneous – 
that is, noncentrally directed – ordering processes are still present. They focus 
on the evolved nonmarket mechanism of publication-citation-reputation. 
Scientifi c knowledge is viewed as a “by-product” of the intentional activities 
of scientists to publish their results, get citations and enhance their reputa-
tions. Within this process competition among scientists tends to fi lter out 
inferior ideas. The resultant product (“science”) is orderly in the sense that it 
tends to be reliable and codifi able. A set of procedures is put into place which 
acts as a fi lter to discriminate between rival claims. Furthermore, what comes 
out of the fi lter can be collected, integrated with other knowledge and trans-
ferred to other scientists. 
 These illustrations suggest the need for a more general theory of spon-
taneous order that would clarify the various conditions under which such 
ordering processes will take place. Specifi cally, it should also explore the role 
of markets and market prices, since it is clear that spontaneous order can 
develop without markets. From the welfare point of view the research dis-
cussed above leaves us with a puzzle: when do spontaneous orders produce 
an enhancement of social welfare and when a reduction in it, as in the case 
of pirate societies? 
 Law and economics 
 One of the most important areas of research in Austrian economics is the 
vibrant area of law and economics. Some of the contributions mentioned 
above in connection with spontaneous order and institutions could be 
included in this section. The fi eld’s uniquely Austrian features consist of 
attention to (1) the process of law and state intervention in markets; (2) the 
need for relatively stable law in a world of external change; (3) the infl uence 
of decentralized knowledge on the character and limits of law; and (4) the 
privatization of some of the basic functions of the state. 
 1 . The most signifi cant work on the processes generated by intervention 
since the classic analyses of Ludwig von Mises ( 1977 ), F.A. Hayek ( 1994 ) 
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and Israel Kirzner ( 1985 ) can be found in Sanford Ikeda ( 1997 ,  2003 ,  2005 ) 
and in Mario Rizzo and Glen Whitman ( 2003 ). Ikeda’s framework focuses 
on the deviation of the actual outcomes of intervention from the intended 
outcomes. This gap, based on an assumption of radical ignorance, generates 
price distortions, whether because the intervention takes the form of price 
regulations or because redistribution of wealth degrades incentives and thus 
individual responses to underlying economic data. These economic changes 
interact with largely, though not entirely, endogeneous changes in ideology to 
produce a tendency toward further policy intervention. 
 Rizzo and Whitman, on the other hand, begin from the largely philosoph-
ical and jurisprudential literature of “slippery slopes.” They construct a gen-
eral approach that emphasizes the role of changes in ideas, or more precisely, 
in the arguments that rationalize or justify legislative policies or judicial deci-
sions. The mechanism by which these arguments change is a combination of 
the largely unanticipated consequences of decisions and the higher-level the-
ories in which acceptable arguments are embedded. 
 Recently, Rizzo and Whitman ( 2009a ; see also Whitman and Rizzo,  2007 ) 
have applied their slippery slope analysis in conjunction with many of the 
assumptions and fi ndings of behavioral economics to demonstrate the expan-
sive tendencies inherent in the supposedly moderate policies of new or “liber-
tarian” paternalism. 
 The Rizzo-Whitman and Ikeda approaches seem largely compatible. Ikeda 
stresses more traditional economic processes, while Rizzo and Whitman stress 
the details of the intellectual changes that occur in the context of economic 
or other processes. In neither of these approaches is the “slippery slope” con-
sequence of policies inevitable. They each describe tendencies that could be 
counterbalanced in specifi c cases, but which often have not been. 
 2 . The classic work of Hayek ( 1960 ,  1973 ) on the rule of law simultaneously 
stresses the importance of stability in the legal framework and its adaptability 
to changing external circumstances. The solution to this paradox can be found 
in the level of abstraction of the relevant rules. For example, the abstract form 
of contract law can remain stable while the prices, conditions and content of 
exchanges vary at a point in time or over time. The consequences of abstrac-
tion in legal rules are examined in Whitman ( 2009 ). Whitman shows that an 
intermediate level of abstraction is optimal from the perspective of generating 
rules with predictable consequences. 
 From a slightly different perspective, Rizzo ( 1980a ,  1980b ,  1985 ) and Roy 
Cordato ( 2007 ) both criticize the cost-benefi t framework in many concep-
tions of negligence law because it produces legal decisions that lack predict-
ability to those for whom the particular law is relevant. Peter Lewin ( 1982 ) 
extends the critique to pollution externalities and social cost. The economic 
data upon which effi cient legal decisions are to be made are often unavail-
able, complex or transient. This is especially true in a world characterized 
by radical uncertainty. Thus the so-called economic approach to tort law is 
defective on its own terms. Lack of predictability generates costs. In terms of 
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the abstraction language of Whitman’s analysis, the problem of the effi ciency 
approach is that it enshrines a standard, rather than a set of specifi c rules, 
which is too abstract. 
 Similar criticisms of the so-called economic approach to property rights 
that derives from Ronald Coase and Harold Demsetz have been advanced by 
Walter Block. Block argues that the Coasean cost-benefi t approach effectively 
abolishes property rights ( 1977 ,  1995 ,  2000 ). This view is extended to the ana-
lysis of the recent US Supreme Court eminent domain case,  Kelo v. City of 
New London (Block,  2006 ). 
 3 . The decentralization of factual knowledge is a critically important factor 
limiting the feasibility of many forms of intervention. As in the earlier ana-
lysis of Mises ( 1977 ), the critiques discussed here begin from the announced 
goals of the interveners and do not challenge their worthiness. The approach 
is thus non-normative. It simply seeks to answer the question: can the pol-
icies achieve the goals that their advocates have set? Rizzo ( 2005 ) tackles this 
question in the case of moral paternalism: that is, the form of paternalism 
that coerces the individual in the interests of her moral betterment. Using 
the internal standards of three major ethical approaches – utilitarianism, nat-
ural law and Kantianism – Rizzo argues that the factual knowledge needed 
to determine just what the moral course of action is in concrete cases is not 
available to the paternalist. Rizzo ( 2005 ) also applies this kind of analysis to 
a form of economic paternalism based on behavioral economics. He argues 
that the factual knowledge that behavioral economics claims is relevant to the 
crafting of policies designed to improve the decisions of individuals exceeds 
what is known to the policy makers. 
 4 . Most economic analysis proceeds on the assumption that the state exer-
cises at least its minimum functions: that is, provision of protection, enforce-
ment of property rights and contracts, and the adjudication of disputes. 
Nevertheless some economists in the broad Austrian and spontaneous order 
tradition have argued that privatization of at least some of these functions is 
feasible and desirable. Bryan Caplan and Edward Stringham ( 2008 ) have com-
pared the private and public adjudication of disputes. They fi nd that private 
adjudication is more effi cient in areas of commercial disputes, and more gen-
erally in those areas where prior relationships exist among the parties. They 
also speculate on a broader use of private adjudication. In a related area of 
public choice economics, Powell and Stringham ( 2009 ) survey a surprisingly 
large extant literature on the economics of a stateless society. 
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 Twenty-fi ve years after 
 Gerald P.  O’Driscoll , Jr. 1 
 It never occurred to me after fi nishing  The Economics of Time and Ignorance 
that I would be sitting on a panel a quarter-century later discussing the 
book. Indeed, when Mario contacted me to let me know of  its reissuance 
ten years after the initial publication, it was a pleasant surprise. In preparing 
for this session, I reread Mario’s Introduction to the second edition and it 
motivated me to reconsider the infl uences on us – or at least me – in writing 
the book. 
 The infl uence of having both Israel Kirzner and Ludwig Lachmann as col-
leagues has been well-told, including in Mario’s Introduction. I want to go 
back further, to Hayek. Over the years, I have come to view Hayek’s essay 
“Price Expectations, Monetary Disturbances and Malinvestments,” to be 
of overriding importance. I refer to it as the Copenhagen Lecture because 
it evolved from a 1933 lecture in Copenhagen and because of its unwieldy 
title. So Hayek made the substance of the essay’s argument in 1933 and saw 
the essay published in German (later in French) in 1935. It did not appear in 
English until the end of the decade (Hayek  1939 ). 
 The original lecture’s delivery date coincides roughly with the publication 
of Hayek’s edited volume,  Collectivist Economic Planning. It predates the 1937 
essay, “Economics and Knowledge” ( 1937 ). He footnotes the 1933 lecture in 
that essay (at least in the version reprinted in  Individualism and Economic 
Order ). 2 Hayek’s  1937 essay is credited with the fi rst statement of the propos-
ition that equilibrium means that individuals have correct foresight and that 
equilibrium is plan coordination. But that conception is central to the argu-
ment of the Copenhagen Lecture. In the lecture, he insists on the necessity of 
making assumptions about what expectations of the future individuals pos-
sess in order to construct a concept of equilibrium in time. 
 The assumptions of this kind which are implied in the concept of equi-
librium are essentially that everybody foresees the future correctly and 
that this foresight includes not only the changes in the objective data but 
also the behavior of all other people with whom he expects to perform 
economic transactions. 
 (Hayek  1939 : 139–40) 3 
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 The Copenhagen Lecture unifi es Hayek’s work on the informational con-
tent of prices; the differentiation between individual and societal concepts of 
equilibrium; the institutional comparison of resource allocation in centrally 
planned and individually planned economies; and the problems of foresight 
and intertemporal resource allocation in the face of monetary disturbances. 
 The Copenhagen Lecture demonstrates that Hayek was simultaneously 
working out similar theoretical problems across diverse areas of economics, 
which we would today label micro, money-macro and comparative institu-
tions. While he may later have forgotten that, there is textual evidence he was 
conscious of the linkages of these problems at the time. More than anything, 
it shows the unity of his work. 4 
 I certainly did not neglect the lecture when writing my dissertation on 
Hayek, expanded and published as  Economics as a Coordination Problem 
(O’Driscoll  1977 ). I devoted considerable space to it. But I now realize that 
the problems Hayek focused on in the lecture and later in “Economics and 
Knowledge” were central to what I’ll call the NYU controversies and the lin-
gering debates over our book. 
 Hayek began the Copenhagen Lecture by observing that “The most char-
acteristic feature of the work of our generation of economists is probably 
the general endeavor to apply the methods and results of the pure theory of 
equilibrium to the elucidation of more complicated ‘dynamic’ phenomena” 
(Hayek  1939 : 135). It is instructive to note a change of mind by the mid-1930s 
on how the task should be approached. He stated that he once thought cycle 
theory should be “organically superimposed” on the static theory of equilib-
rium. Later, he came to believe that general theory should be developed so as 
to be applicable to the analysis of economic fl uctuations (Hayek  1939 : 137–
38). In other words, pure theory should be developed with time as an essential 
part and the equilibrium concept should be one of coordination across time 
periods. That was a major goal of our book. 
 For Hayek, “the main diffi culty” with received economic theory “is its com-
plete abstraction from time” (Hayek  1939 : 139). He outlines the approach he 
would take, which appears in the passage already quoted. It is not clear that 
the radical nature of his reformulation of economic theory was understood, 
however, much less accepted, even by Austrians. Hayek returned to the con-
ception of social phenomena underlying that concept in his work on political 
philosophy and law. The economics profession at large, after a detour through 
the Keynesian Revolution, had arrived at its own solution: Arrow-Debreu 
and Walrasian general equilibrium theory. But Austrian economists had not 
advanced Hayek’s program. The question is why? 
 In his Introduction to the second edition of our book, Mario Rizzo dis-
cusses in almost clinical fashion the protracted debate over the entrepreneur. 
The debate is central to the issue at hand. Hayek understood that answering the 
question of “what determines the expectations of entrepreneurs” was pivotal. 
For a long time, Kirzner maintained that all entrepreneurial action is equili-
brating. Considerations of the passage of time did not change his conclusion. 
Twenty-fi ve years after 285
As Rizzo noted: “Such a view is plausible because the adjusting changes have 
no impact on the data to which they are adjusting” (O’Driscoll and Rizzo 
 1996 : xviii). Contrast Kirzner’s position with Hayek’s opposing one. 
 Even then, and certainly in retrospect, it is amazing that Kirzner was main-
taining his view into the 1980s. In the 1937 and 1939 papers, Hayek distin-
guished between the equilibrium of an individual and the vastly more complex 
concept of an overall market or societal equilibrium (Caldwell  2004 : 206–09). 
Hayek ( 1939 : 139) saw that equilibrium (plan coordination) has meaning 
either for “an isolated person” or “a centrally directed communist system.” 
But he went on to write that “it is much less clear” when we apply the con-
cept to a competitive society. Because then we face the problem of individual 
responses to the actions of their fellow individuals that “necessarily take place 
in time, and which can be represented as timeless equilibrium relationship 
only by means of unrealistic special constructions.” 
 Mario and I began where Hayek left off. There was great resistance in 
some quarters to our reformulation of  Austrian economics. I think it is fair 
to say that  The Economics of Time and Ignorance helped break that resistance 
and, more importantly, opened possibilities for others to advance Hayek’s 
program. In our book, we advanced a concept of  real time in which surprise 
and innovation are inherent features of  markets. Surprise and innovation 
are endogenous outcomes of  actions taking place in time. The data change 
as a consequence of  entrepreneurial individuals adapting to the data and 
to the prior adaptations of  their fellow actors. We thus advanced Hayek’s 
agenda. 5 
 I suspect that Kirzner’s portrayal of the entrepreneur as an inherently 
equilibrating force was really a defense against what he saw as an attack on 
the Misesian program. Kirzner mounted the battlements to protect the  a pri-
ori core of that program. In his mind, a breach of the outer defenses threat-
ened the core. The issue was Hayek’s call in the 1937 article for economics to 
be “an empirical science,” which has been interpreted by many as an attack 
on Misesian apriorism. 
 I am aware that, if  I offer this hypothesis, I solve the mystery of Kirznerian 
intransigence but not the mystery of Misesian indifference. As Caldwell ( 2004 : 
221) explains (quoting Hayek), Mises took Hayek’s criticism of apriorism in 
his 1937 paper “more good naturedly than in most other instances.” Mises 
was a notoriously prickly individual who took offense to the point of break-
ing with both Haberler and Machlup for years. Yet on this seemingly funda-
mental issue, Mises took no offense. 
 Mises sharply distinguished between the construct or model of the evenly 
rotating economy and actual, real-world markets. “The essence of this imagin-
ary construction is the elimination of the lapse of time and the perpetual 
change in the market phenomena” (von Mises  1966 : 247). And von Mises 
( 1966 : 247) was emphatic that “there is never such a thing as an evenly rotat-
ing economic system.” Where Hayek and others saw confl ict, perhaps Mises 
saw fulfi llment of his own vision. 
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 Pete Boettke has suggested that the best way to read Hayek is as a Misesian, 
and the best way to read Mises is as a Hayekian. The episode, as described by 
Caldwell, may be an example of why Boettke’s approach may be fruitful. 
 Hayek called for moving beyond the Pure Logic of Choice to construct an 
economics in time. That surely was Mises’ goal as well, as clarifi ed in his later 
work. As far as the economics of time is concerned, Hayek and Mises were in 
agreement. Time changes everything in the analysis, and everything changes 
with the passage of time. The Austrian generation after Mises and Hayek 
were not always so clear. Lachmann is a notable exception. 
 Our book did start a renewal in Austrian economics, and advanced both 
the Hayekian and Misesian conception of subjectivist economics. The book’s 
success must be measured by whether that renewal supports a self-sustaining 
learning and growth process. Boehm ( 2012 ) offers a re-examination that is at 
once fair and also critical in parts (Boehm  2012 : 4). He credits the book with 
stimulating research in Austrian economics, but questions whether we made 
an impact on the mainstream. 
 I do not want to directly respond for our book, but address the broader 
issue of the impact of Austrian economics on the mainstream. In some ways, 
Austrian economics is part of the mainstream and in other ways it is not. In 
Congressional testimony, Henry Manne ( 2012 : 21) credited Mises and Hayek 
for their criticism of central planning and observed that “with small modifi ca-
tions” it could be applied to the modern regulatory state. He also described 
Hayek’s article on “The Use of Knowledge in Society” as “one of the most 
famous and infl uential articles in all of economic history.” I am confi dent that 
far more economists today know Hayek’s argument than realize its origin. 
 Manne also provides an account of the seminal infl uence of Public Choice 
Theory on regulation. Among other insights, Public Choice Theory pre-
dicts that regulatory agencies will be subject to capture and end up promot-
ing the interests of the regulated industry over the public interest. Manne 
( 2012 : 21) observes that this criticism of regulatory agencies and others have 
“become standard fare in political theory.” And what has the infl uence been 
on regulatory practice? Zero. 
 None of the works Manne cites either in Public Choice Theory or in 
Austrian economics employed high-brow modeling. Yet they gained accept-
ance in the profession. Despite widespread professional acceptance, however, 
ideas can have no impact on policy. I think most economists would like to 
have felt that their ideas had some practical impact. 
 Since 2007, I have written numerous articles, commentaries and papers on 
the fi nancial crisis. Most of these embodied what I will call applied analysis 
from  The Economics of Time and Ignorance . I have received recognition for 
my insights from a broad public audience and also from mainstream econo-
mists. I have also watched issues that I was the fi rst or among the fi rst to raise 
(crony capitalism in America) and at least one phrase I coined (casino bank-
ing) entered into the daily lexicon. One prefers credit, but there is satisfaction 
to helping change the terms of a debate. To paraphrase Ronald Reagan, there 
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is no amount of good you can’t accomplish if  you don’t insist on getting 
credit. I take this to be what Boehm ( 2012 : 13) meant when he raised the pos-
sibility of appealing to a wider audience. I am personally satisfi ed with the 
impact of our book after 25 years, if  only because of its impact on discussions 
of public policy issues. 
 Notes 
 1  I wish to thank David Harper for organizing the panel at the 2011 Southern 
Economic Association meetings. 
 2  It is apparent that the footnote was at least updated for the book because Hayek 
cites the English publication of the Copenhagen Lecture, which was later than the 
essay’s original publication. 
 3  At this point, Hayek inserted a footnote to “Economics and Knowledge,” describ-
ing it as a further elaboration and “partly revised” discussion of the argument of the 
Copenhagen Lecture. 
 4  The unity of Hayek’s work undermines the argument of Caldwell ( 2004 ) and others 
that Hayek’s 1937 essay ( 1937 ) represented a “transformation in Hayek’s thinking.” 
O’Driscoll ( 2004 ) deals in detail with that claim. 
 5  This telling of the story clarifi es why questions about originality are diffi cult to 
answer. The underlying idea was Hayek’s, but had not been fully absorbed in subse-
quent research. We rediscovered and advanced it. In any case, truthfulness trumps 
originality. 
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 Foundations of  The Economics of 
Time and Ignorance 
 Mario J.  Rizzo 
 M. Jourdain : What? When I say: “Nicole, bring me my slippers, and give me 
my night-cap,” is that prose? 
 Philosophy Teacher : Yes, sir. 
 M. Jourdain : Good heavens! For more than 40 years I have been speaking 
prose without knowing it. 
 Moli è re,  Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme , 1671 
 Yet the moment we have produced … theories, they create new, unintended 
and unexpected problems, autonomous problems, problems to be discovered. 
 Karl R. Popper ( 1979 : 161) 
 There are two very general ideas that underlie  The Economics of Time and 
Ignorance. The fi rst is the startled statement of M. Jourdain in Moli è re’s play, 
 The Would-Be Gentleman , when he says: “I have been speaking prose without 
knowing it.” 
 The second is actually related. This is the philosopher Karl Popper’s idea 
of “objective knowledge” or World Three. Once ideas are promulgated to the 
world, they have certain objective implications – independent of the subject-
ive intentions of those who developed the ideas in the fi rst place at a cer-
tain time in history and point in space. These implications are the results of 
human action but not of human design. 
 1.  The intellectual climate in the old days 
 Before, however, proceeding with these themes the reader needs some 
background. In the late 1970s and early 1980s Jerry O’Driscoll and I were 
working quite deeply in the Austrian tradition. We had studied Austrian 
economics at least since our college days at Fordham University in the mid-
late 1960s. We were by no means new to the fi eld. But we sensed two main and 
related problems. 
 The fi rst problem was that there were many misconceptions about the 
nature and content of Austrian economics among the many in the economics 
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profession we hoped to infl uence. Many then, as still today, did not see the 
difference between Austrian economics and libertarian political theory. Many 
thought that Austrian subjectivism meant some kind of irrefutable solip-
sism. Many thought that Austrians didn’t “believe” in data. Many thought 
Austrians acted as if  they could learn nothing from any other school of eco-
nomics. In fact, one non-Austrian NYU faculty member said that we were a 
“mystery cult.” We claimed, or so it seemed to him, that we had the  key – mys-
terious to all others – to all economic knowledge. Finally (only because I fi nd 
making this list depressing), many thought that all we could do was quote the 
classic Austrian economists – Mises, Hayek and so on. We had nothing new 
to say. 
 The second problem is that some of these things were true. Austrians were 
insular and very absorbed with their own tradition as well as highly critical of 
standard neoclassical economics, even in its Chicago variant. And yet there 
were good reasons for this. The Austrian school had been in decline. Very few 
economists really understood what it was. Its central concerns and principles 
had to be learned. Even some in Austrian circles of the 1970s were badly 
misinformed and needed to clarify for themselves and others the basic ideas. 
Most importantly, Austrians had to apply and, in many cases, contrast their 
approach to contemporary economic issues – both theoretical and policy – to 
that of other schools of economic thought. We had to show that we had a 
distinct intellectual product. 
 This is where the Moli è re-Popper principles come in. Our task seemed to 
be both to restate the fundamental ideas of Austrian economics and to do it 
in a way that opened the door to further ideas – advances in the system of 
thought. This was not and is not an easy task. Restatements tend to be back-
ward-looking and stimulation of new research is forward-looking. A book 
about how great Menger, B ö hm-Bawerk, Mises and Hayek were would not 
accomplish our goals. On the other hand, a book simply setting out a new 
agenda would not be easily understandable or appreciated if  people didn’t 
comprehend the basic principles of the research framework. 
 2.  Where we went 
 Moli è re’s character tells us to be aware of what we have been doing. Popper 
tells us to follow the objective implications of a line of thought even if  
the espousers of that line of thought did not, or do not, recognize these 
implications. 
 If  there is a single, fundamental concept in the Austrian framework it has 
to be subjectivism, followed closely by the analysis of economic processes 
in time and the inescapability of uncertainty. If  one looks at the Austrian 
contributions since the beginning, these three ideas continually appear in fun-
damental ways. It is impossible to imagine Austrian economics without them. 
It is not possible to fi nd another signifi cant approach in economics that lays 
so much importance on them. It seemed, and still seems, reasonable to begin 
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from there both in systematizing Austrian economics and in laying out an 
agenda for future work. 
 Subjectivism in real time is importantly different from the static subjectiv-
ism of preferences that is an established part of standard economics. Ludwig 
Lachmann ( 1976 ) was insistent on this. He, as is well known, endorsed the 
Hayekian view that every important advance in the history of economics 
has been the extension of the idea of subjectivism. In Lachmann’s view, this 
included extension to the subjective interpretation of “data” as well as to the 
formation and content of expectations. 
 O’Driscoll and I decided to state clearly the essential Austrian themes and 
to draw out from them implications that may have been missed or ignored 
in the years of stunted growth in the tradition. As Lachmann continually 
reminded us, Austrians were often inconsistent in their embrace of subject-
ivism and process analysis. Although all Austrians had recognized the limits 
of equilibrium analysis in the continual process of adaptation to exogenous 
shocks, many did not suffi ciently appreciate the endogenous sources of dis-
ruption, that is, the disruptions that arise from processes of adjustment them-
selves. (This is why Lachmann felt the need to talk about equilibrating forces 
and disequilibrating forces.) 
 We soon discovered that seeking to extend the Austrian analysis by elic-
iting dormant or implicit implications of accepted strains of thought was 
by no means uncontroversial. Some of the most important elder fi gures of 
Austrian economics thought the book to be dangerous or subversive. Among 
these were Israel Kirzner ( 1994 ) and Murray Rothbard ( 2011 ). An important 
exception was Lachmann ( 1994 ). 
 Kirzner reacted strongly against the view that market processes could be 
seen as disequilibrating. To this day I believe that Kirzner sought to escape 
that conclusion by a non-empirical, defi nitional argument. The  success-
ful pursuit of arbitrage-profi t opportunities closes gaps in the structure of 
prices and coordinates the plans of the relevant actors in, say, the two markets 
that exhibit price inconsistency. But  even where entrepreneurs make mistakes , 
Kirzner has argued, their intention was to make profi ts and avoid losses and 
so their actions have a “tendency” to coordinate. The fi rst point could be 
transformed into an empirical claim about the frequency of entrepreneurial 
error,  viz , most or much profi t-seeking results in coordinating effects. That 
would be acceptable as a theoretical statement or hypothesis. But the second – 
a tendency argument – which was used to undergird the fi rst point, is a retreat 
into a position with little empirical content. This non-empirical turn is sur-
prising in view of F. A. Hayek’s early recognition that once we go beyond the 
pure logic of choice we enter the world of empirical statements about know-
ledge and knowledge transmission. 
 Rothbard also had many criticisms – some of the most notable revolved 
around our using ideas derived from the philosopher Henri Bergson’s per-
spective on the reality of time as the subjective perception of its passage. 
This is what we called real time or the dynamic conception of time. Rothbard 
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thought it was merely fuzzy-headed thinking. This also is surprising in view 
of Ludwig von Mises’ mostly favorable citations to Bergson in  Human Action . 
The role that Bergson’s ideas, in the air during the early twentieth century, 
played in the development of Frank Knight’s concept of “true uncertainty” 
and Mises’ related concept of “case probability” is manifest. 
 But probably the worst “sin” we committed was to try to draw some bridges 
and connections with those Keynesians who took seriously J. M. Keynes’ 
views on subjectivism and measurability in economics. Many of these were in 
the group calling themselves Post Keynesians. They should have called them-
selves something else because they were only post in the sense of trying to 
throw off the Keynesian-neoclassical synthesis promoted by Paul Samuelson 
and others. 
 Although our attempt to start a conversation was rebuffed by Paul Davidson 
( 1989 ) (on the Post Keynesian side) and by many Austrians, the idea of a con-
versation – not a synthesis or absorption – continues to make sense. I suspect 
many Austrians feared any contamination with the interventionist policies of 
anyone who would call himself “Keynesian.” We were talking about the extent 
and limits of subjectivism and not about Keynes’ peculiar view of liberalism. 
 3.  Did we say anything original and did we produce a classic? 
 In one sense, it is diffi cult, at this stage in the development of economics, for 
anyone to say anything truly new. It is possible, of course, to say old ideas in 
the new language of mathematics and axiomatic forms. For some economists 
until an idea is stated formally, it is not a scientifi c idea. So, for example, 
Adam Smith said almost nothing until he was formalized by the Arrow-
Debreu construct. 
 Since Austrians do not accept such absurdities, the question could be posed: 
weren’t all of the ideas in  The Economics of Time and Ignorance previously 
developed elsewhere? Perhaps this is so if  one includes the philosophical lit-
erature as well as the economic.  But which Austrians were talking about them 
before we wrote? With the exception of Ludwig Lachmann, I suggest that the 
answer is none. 
 It is not arrogant to say that O’Driscoll and I jolted the Austrians and 
their students out of a slumber that prevented them from appreciating or 
even recognizing important ideas that were “out there” waiting, as it were, to 
be seized. This is history. Ask the generation of Austrians that immediately 
followed us if  we had an impact on their thinking. 
 This brings us to the comments of Tony Endres who asks: Is  The Economics 
of Time and Ignorance a classic? Is the book original? 
 It is to Professor Endres’ credit that he is using relatively precise defi nitions 
of the terms “classic” and “original.” We know what he is talking about. The 
standards he sets are very high indeed. A classic sets forth distinctive funda-
mental ideas that become embodied in a recognizable school or approach to 
economics often after some decades. We did not intend any such thing. We 
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were not trying to establish a new school; we were simply trying to push an 
“old” school in some new directions that were consistent with its basic prem-
ises. We would be shocked if  the book produced a new school – we might even 
condemn that! 
 “Originality” in Endres’ sense is also a high bar. It involves not only tem-
poral priority for an idea but its wide acceptance as intellectually valid. Here 
again we intended no such thing. The ideas were out there waiting to be elabo-
rated, integrated and shown to be in the Austrian tradition. Some were clearly 
from Austrian economics while others were from philosophers or philosoph-
ical traditions consistent with Austrian economics. Some were unappreciated 
or underappreciated. In this sense “innovative” is closer to the right character-
ization of our book as Endres seems to say. We strove to produce a transition 
in which the innovations would be absorbed. So Endres’ analysis is basically 
correct. This did not mean setting out a specifi c agenda, however. We urged 
people to add items to their own personal agendas. 
 4.  Whither the new generation? 
 Solomon Stein and Virgil Storr are concerned about a different set of issues. 
Why hasn’t  The Economics of Time and Ignorance had more effect on the 
new (“third”) generation of Austrian economists? They advance three 
hypotheses:
 1.  Younger scholars may have rejected the ideas in the book. 
 2.  The advances in the book may have been so fully absorbed as to  preclude 
the need for explicit citation. 
 3.  The new generation of Austrians has moved on to other, more applied, 
issues for which the basic concerns are different from those raised in 
the book. 
 With respect to the fi rst hypothesis, Stein and Storr say that the research 
of third generation scholars “reveals an appreciation for the consequences 
of real time and ignorance as well as an emphasis on entrepreneurship and 
institutions.” So they reject this hypothesis. 
 The second hypothesis is rejected indirectly and by an inconsistent, or sim-
ply confusing, argument. In the fi rst place, they argue that in fact the book is 
cited. But, possibly reacting to the claim that it is not cited enough if  it were 
a truly infl uential work, they argue that Austrians have no reluctance to cite 
Menger, B ö hm-Bawerk, Mises and other founders on basic points. Therefore, 
it must be the case that the book has not been  so fully absorbed as to preclude 
citation. In other words, the bar for citation among Austrians is low. They cite 
all sorts of ideas from the founders that  are fully absorbed! 
 The obvious reaction to all of this is that O’Driscoll and I are not found-
ers of Austrian economics. So the security that perhaps over-citation of the 
founders gives some writers is not gained by citing us. 
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 What are we to conclude, however, from the discussion of the fi rst two 
hypotheses? It seems that the fundamental ideas of the book have been 
absorbed but that Austrians do not cite the book quite as much as one might 
expect. We agree. 
 The third hypothesis is Stein and Storr’s favored one. The third generation 
has gone on to all manner of applied issues. With regard to these issues there 
are many more relevant methodological and theoretical matters to discuss 
than those which appeared in our book. Stein and Storr mention such things 
as the “literary analysis of a culture’s folklore and literature, ethnographic 
approaches and archival social history” and “experimental economic meth-
ods.” They also appreciate the insuffi ciency of a concept of entrepreneurship 
that is not embedded within culture. We would have said “not embedded in 
real time.” In fact, all of these methods and approaches amount to a recog-
nition that economic analysis should be undertaken within history – within 
institutions and in real time. So perhaps we have another case of people 
speaking prose without knowing it? 
 5.  Simple hypotheses are often the best 
 I would venture some simpler hypotheses about why  The Economics of 
Time and Ignorance has not been cited more. First, Jerry O’Driscoll left 
the academic world for the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas and later for 
other non-academic positions. Second, the Austrian program at NYU was 
effectively deprived of graduate students as the Department of Economics 
became increasingly more mathematical in every area. Very few students were 
(are) both suffi ciently qualifi ed mathematically and seriously interested in 
Austrian approaches to be relevant candidates for admission into the NYU 
doctoral program. Simply put, from the late 1980s on, both O’Driscoll and 
I were without students (more or less; there were some exceptions). Students 
are prime citers of their professors’ work. 
 Second, the death of Ludwig Lachmann deprived Austrian economics of 
a senior voice continually striking the notes of time and ignorance at a fairly 
high level of theory and methodological awareness. He helped make sure that 
everyone realized that they were or should be talking prose. 
 Third, Austrian economics had an embarrassment of riches. Don Lavoie, Peter 
Boettke, Larry White, Roger Garrison, Steve Horwitz, Peter Lewin, Richard 
Ebeling, David Harper – to mention only a few in no special order – all moved 
Austrian economics in a variety of productive directions, both theoretical and 
applied. Austrians were so excited by the possibilities of research in specifi c fi elds 
that they just did their work. Many pursued a form of institutional analysis. 
Institutional analysis was one of the ways, we thought and Lachmann thought, 
a radical subjectivism had to go in order to understand how people deal with the 
uncertainty of economic life. Perhaps this is all Stein and Storr are saying. 
 Fourth, of course, the physical book itself  began to fade from the scene. It 
has not been advertised in a long time. For much of the past 15 years it had 
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not been available at an inexpensive price. Nor was it available in modern 
e-book formats. (O’Driscoll and I are trying to remedy these problems.) 
 6.  Austrian economics today 
 Karen Vaughn ( 1998 ) said in her study of the Austrian tradition that today 
Austrian economics is the economics of time and ignorance. By this she meant 
not that Austrian economics follows our book chapter and verse but that the 
issues raised, the themes pursued, but above all the openness to new ideas, 
is the rule now rather than the rare exception. As Peter Boettke has often 
said, Mises was not shy about criticizing his Austrian forbears, including the 
great Eugen von B ö hm-Bawerk and so we should not fear criticizing previous 
Austrians when we think it appropriate. We accepted his advice before he 
gave it! 
 So what is Austrian economics today? In my  New Palgrave article (Rizzo 
 2009 ) on Austrian economics I made a stab at answering this question. I listed 
eight, highly interrelated themes:
 1.  the subjective, yet socially embedded, quality of human decision-
making; 
 2.  the individual’s perception of the passage of time (“real time”); 
 3.  the radical uncertainty of expectations; 
 4.  the decentralization of explicit and tacit knowledge in society; 
 5.  the dynamic market processes generated by individual action, especially 
entrepreneurship; 
 6.  the function of the price system in transmitting knowledge; 
 7.  the supplementary role of cultural norms and other cultural products 
(“institutions”) in conveying knowledge; and 
 8.  the spontaneous – that is, not centrally directed – evolution of social 
institutions. 1 
 In a session of the Colloquium on Market Institutions and Economic 
Processes at NYU a few years ago, I presented a draft of the  New Palgrave 
article. One participant objected that I did not tell the reader what Austrian 
economics  is beyond the listing of some themes. 
 A list of themes is certainly not a defi nition. But to defi ne a school of 
thought in precise terms is really inappropriate – almost a category mistake. 
A framework for scientifi c thinking must be loosely defi ned. It cannot prede-
termine what will be learned within that structure. It must give guidance but 
not rigid guidance. Its principles must be open to change but, of course, not 
all at once – and not in just any direction. Yet nothing is sacred. 2 
 Even the distinction among schools is a temporary – perhaps a disequi-
librium – phenomenon. An objection was raised during the aforementioned 
colloquium discussion that other schools of thought would subscribe to some 
or many of the themes. Yes, that was one of the messages of  The Economics 
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of Time and Ignorance . In the time that has passed since the fi rst edition of 
the book (1985) some of the overlap has widened across more “schools” while 
some distinctions among approaches have grown sharper. 
 The issues that separated Austrians from other schools of thought in previ-
ous decades cannot be the same today. Neoclassical economics has developed. 
It has attempted to capture within its ambit many of the previously uniquely 
Austrian themes. What separates approaches needs to be continually reas-
sessed. No intellectual approach is standing still. The best work in Austrian 
economics during the past 35 years or so should be a surprise to any Rip van 
Winkle who fell asleep at the beginning of the Austrian revival. 
 So a viable Austrian economics must be a fl exible structure that, in accom-
modating change, can be a vehicle for the growth of knowledge. The true 
spirit of science, as Karl Popper continually taught, is to recognize that from 
errors we make some of our most important discoveries. Obviously, it is not 
that we strive to make errors. But bold thinking will,  ex post , often reveal that 
the scientist was wrong. But we go on. This is the spirit we sought to infuse 
into the Austrian tradition. 
 Notes 
 1  Much of this institutional analysis appears in what may be called the “Austrian law 
and economics” literature. See Rizzo ( 2011 ). 
 2  This is Felix Kaufmann’s principle of “permanent control” by the scientifi c commu-
nity (Kaufmann,  1944 : 39). 
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